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Francesco Petrarca ('Petrarch') is often referred to as the 'first Renaissance man', a pioneer
of humanism and a poet whose influence was both powerful and enduring. Although the
validity of the description has been the subject of intensive debate, the importance which has
been attached to his humanistic interests and vernacular poetry continues to shape our
understanding of his thought, and has significantly affected the way in which his engagement
with moral philosophy is perceived. Comparatively little scholarly effort has been made to
analyse Petrarch's moral philosophy, but where his ethical concerns have been addressed, his
status as a humanist and poet has led to many of his Latin works being viewed as eclectic
and frequently contradictory texts. Concerned more with literary imitation than with
philosophical consistency, Petrarch is often held to have equivocated between Stoic and
Peripatetic positions recovered principally from Cicero, and a fideistic theology derived from
St. Augustine, and to have been influenced by a preoccupation with stylistic interests.
In this thesis, I offer a reinterpretation of Petrarch's moral philosophy. Although
Petrarch's influence on humanistic practice and vernacular poetry is considerable, his
reputation as a poet by no means encapsulates either his own view of himself, or the manner
in which his contemporaries perceived him. Petrarch not only saw himself as a 'moral
philosopher and poet', but also viewed the practice of eloquence as being indistinguishable
from the moral philosopher's task. This corresponds to the distribution of Petrarch's works
in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, and also to the opinions expressed by
contemporary friends and admirers.
Far from being an inconsistent moral aphorist, I show that Petrarch elaborated a
coherent system of moral philosophy and I offer a re-evaluation of Petrarch's debt to
classical, patristic and medieval thought. Looking first at the Secretum, I argue that, rather
than having been a contradictory author motivated primarily by a desire to emulate classical
works, Petrarch constructed a consistent notion of virtue based on the early writings of St.
Augustine, whose debt to classical literature he knew intimately. I then turn to examine the
application of this abstract notion of virtue to a more practical philosophy of living. In
chapters dealing with otium, solitude and friendship, Petrarch's treatment of these concepts
is shown not merely to have been informed by his assimilation of St. Augustine's theology,
2
but also to have interacted closely with key texts in the history of medieval monasticism. In a
final chapter dealing with the relationship between moral philosophy and eloquence, I
attempt to demonstrate that, far from having been an unreconstructed 'Ciceronian',
Petrarch's rhetorical theory was derived from a more medieval and Christian understanding
of the role of oratory, and I offer a new reading of his provocative attacks on the rhetorical
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I had a well-balanced rather than a keen intellect, fit for all kinds of good and
wholesome study, but especially inclined to moral philosophy and poetry. Yet
in the course of time I abandoned the latter, when I found delight in sacred
letters, in which I found the hidden sweetness I once despised; for I limit poetry
to embellishment only. I have dwelt single-mindedly on learning about
antiquity, among other things because this age has always displeased me, so
that, unless love for my dear ones pulled me the other way, I always wished to
have been born in any other age whatever, and to forget this one, seeming
always to graft myself in my mind onto other ages.
Since his works first became the subject of modern critical scholarship, Petrarch has often
been thought of as the 'first modern man', as Renan put it.2 As a pioneer of humanism, he
has been viewed as having helped to usher in a revival of classical learning, while as a poet
whose influence was both powerful and enduring he has been presented as having been
concerned with the development of the concept of the individual and with the subjective
exploration of the psyche.3 Although he openly confessed his aptitude for poetry and his
deep affection for Antiquity in the Posteritati, however, Petrarch also consciously portrayed
1 Posteritati (Sen. XVIII, 1): 'Ingenio fui equo potius quam acuto, ad omne bonum et salubre studium
apto, sed ad moralem precipue philosophiam et ad poeticam prono; quam ipse processu temporis
neglexi, sacris literis delectatus, in quibus sensi dulcedinem abditam, quam aliquando contempseram,
poeticis literis non nisi ad ornatum reservatis. Incubui unice, inter multa, ad notitiam vetustatis,
quoniam michi semper etas ista displicuit; ut, nisi me amor carorum in diversum traheret, qualibet
etate natus esse semper optaverim, et hanc oblivisci, nisus animo me aliis semper inserere.' in Prose,
ed. G. Martellotti, P. G. Ricci, E. Carrara, E. Bianchi, (Milan and Naples, 1955), 6. Translation in
Letters ofOld Age: Rerum Senilium Libri I-XVIII, trans. A. S. Bernardo, S. Levin and R. A. Bernardo,
2 vols., (Baltimore and London, 1992), 2:673-4. On the Posteritati, see, for example, E. Carrara, Studi
petrarcheschi (Turin, 1959), 273-342; E. H. Wilkins, 'On the Evolution of Petrarch's Letter to
Posterity,'' Speculum 39 (1964): 304-8.
2 E. Renan, Averroes et I'Averroi'sme, 3rd ed., (Paris, 1866), 328.
3 The most useful biographical studies of Petrarch are N. Mann, Petrarch (Oxford, 1984) and E. H.
Wilkins, Life of Petrarch (Chicago, 1961). Also invaluable are U. Bosco, Petrarca, 2nd ed. (Bari,
1961) and K. Foster, Petrarch. Poet and Humanist (Edinburgh, 1984).
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himself as having had a facility for moral philosophy, and it is striking that historical
emphasis on his 'modernity' has significantly affected the manner in which his engagement
with ethical questions has been perceived.
Building on the fascination for poetic immortality which had been fostered by earlier
works such as Muratori's Osservazioni (1711), De Sade's Memoires pour la vie de Frangois
Petrarque (1764-7) and Baldelli's Del Petrarca e delle sue opere (1797), the nineteenth
century ushered in a dramatic flurry of scholarly interest in Petrarch. Although accompanied
by a burgeoning concern for philological precision, this increased attention was driven more
by contemporary aesthetic preoccupations than by more objective academic curiosity. As
Joseph Fucilla has observed, it was the impulse of Romanticism - which placed such 'stress
on biographical criticism and on imagination, feeling and sensibility as prime poetic
perquisites' - that conspired to 'bring Petrarch into new focus.' These underlying
sensibilities motivated the production of critical editions that were to be of lasting
importance - such as the versions of the Canzoniere by Marsand (1819-20) and Carducci
(1876; 18992), the Africa by Pingaud (1872) and Corradini (1874), the Familiares by
Fracassetti (1859-63), and the minor Latin poems by Rossetti (1829-34)5 - but their
influence conspired to generate a Romantic image of Petrarch as a poet with whom
Alessandro Manzoni and Giacomo Leopardi could readily identify themselves and freely
imitate.6 Demonstrating little concern for the development of a structured moral philosophy,
Petrarch was presented as a pioneer of humanism preoccupied with the exploration of his
own, often confused emotions and the elaboration of a powerful individualism in delicate
verse. For Ugo Foscolo, for example, Petrarch's outlook was entirely poetic. In his Saggi sul
Petrarca (1820-23), Foscolo saw Petrarch as having drawn on the heritage of the classical
past in his verse to explore an irreconcilable tension between nature and fortuna, between the
contrasting demands of his warring passions, and between his love of Laura and his love of
virtue.7 Similarly, for Francesco De Sanctis, writing later in the nineteenth century, Petrarch
4
J. G. Fucilla, 'The Present Status of Petrarchan Studies,' in A. Scaglione, ed., Francis Petrarch, Six
Centuries Later. A Symposium (Chapel Hill and Chicago, 1975), 25-55, here 29.
5 For an excellent treatment of the production of critical editions of Petrarch's vernacular and Latin
works, see C. Naselli, II Petrarca nell'Ottocento, (Naples, 1923), 37-98.
6 The bibliography on the debt owed by Manzoni and Leopardi to Petrarch is enormous, but for an
introduction, see Naselli, II Petrarca nell' Ottocento, 407-66; Fucilla, 'The Present Status of
Petrarchan Studies,' 29-30. On Leopardi in particular, see, for example, E. Bonora, 'Leopardi e
Petrarca', in Leopardi e la letteratura italiana dal Duecento al Seicento (Florence, 1978), 91-150 ; E.
Pasquini, 'Leopardi e i poeti antichi italiana,' in Leopardi e I'Ottocento, (Florence, 1970), 507-40; L.
Trenti, 'Riflessioni leopardiane su Petrarca' in S. Gentili and L. Trenti, eds., II Petrarchismo nel
Settecento e nell'Ottocento (Rome, 2006), 137-68.
7 The most invaluable study of Foscolo remains D. Bianchi, 'Studi del Foscolo sul Petrarca,' in Studi
sul Foscolo, a cura dell'Universita di Pavia nelprimo centenario della morte delpoeta (Turin, 1927),
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was both a literary figure who should be regarded as the founder of Italian humanism, and a
poet concerned more with imagination and the art of representation than with the analysis of
things and concepts.8 In his Saggio critico sul Petrarca (1869), De Sanctis explained that
Petrarch, valuing emotions, sensibilities, literary study and the ideal of classical beauty
highly, employed his intellect not as a systematic analytical tool, but as an auxiliary to his
other faculties.9 By the same token, influential studies of the humanists' relationship with
Antiquity - such as those by Voigt (1859) and Korting (1878, 1884) - brought Petrarch's
classical learning into sharper focus, but nevertheless added credence to his having been
occupied more with classical imitation and self-exploration than with serious questions of
moral philosophy.10
Despite the waning of the Romantic sentiments which had dominated much
nineteenth-century scholarship, the legacy of ottocento thought proved enduring and during
the early twentieth century Petrarch continued to be portrayed as a poet who was dedicated
to self-analysis and literary imitation, but immune to the concerted study of moral
philosophy. Although the details of his struggles with gloria, fama and amor were brought
into increasingly sharp focus, Petrarch remained the poet of dissidio. Those who enriched the
study of his humanism no less than any others were prone to see in his passion for Antiquity
the essence of his un-philosophical modernity. In the second edition of his Petrarque et
I'Humanisme (1907), Pierre de Nolhac staunchly defended Petrarch's claim to have been the
'first modern man' by contending that '[p]eu importe que les idees en lui ne soient pas
originales, puisque ses aspirations le sont a un degre si rare; c'est un poete, non un
philosophe, que va aider sur le monde et l'agir a se transformer.'11 From the beginning of his
literary life, the beauty of the classics enchanted him and carried him on his voyage of poetic
imagination, drawing him away from the disciplines which were the foundation of so much
contemporary intellectual endeavour - jurisprudence, theology and scholastic philosophy.12
Writing nineteen years later and with a broader historical focus in mind, Edward Tatham
451-524. For a useful discussion of Foscolo's scholarship and poetry, see also Naselli, II Petrarca
ne11'Ottocento, 189-99, 389-406.
8 F. De Sanctis, Storia della letteratura italiana, ed. N. Gallo, introd. G. Ficara, (Turin, 1996), 245-6;
Naselli, II Petrarca nell'Ottocento, 230.
9 For De Sanctis' understanding of Petrarch, see, for example, F. Calitti, '«I1 giornale dell'amore»: De
Santis legge Petrarca,' in Gentili and Trenti, eds., II Petrarchismo nel Settecento e nell'Ottocento,
215-36; V. Titone, 'II Petrarca e la critica del De Sanctis,' Critica vecchia e nuova (Florence, 1932),
1:1-84; C. Trabalza, 'Burckhardt e De Sanctis nella critica petrarchesca,' Dipanature critiche
(Bologna, 1920), 7-38.
10 G. Korting, Petrarca's Leben and Werke (Leipzig, 1878); idem, Geschichte der Litterature Italiens
im Zeitalter der Renaissance (Leipzig, 1884); G. Voigt, Die Wiederbelebung des classischen
Altertums, oder das erste Jahrhundert des Humanismus, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1859).
" P. de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'Humanisme, 2nd ed., 2 vols, (Paris, 1907), 1:2.
12 ibid.
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similarly saw Petrarch's modernity as lying in the sense of individualism and subjectivism
which arose out of his humanism. For Tatham - drawing on Korting's earlier work -
Petrarch's humanism was an end in itself and, as such, the essence of his philosophical
disinterest:
[T]he movement which he led has been justly called 'Humanism', because it
started form a sense of the dignity and independence of man..., and because it
recognised classical literature as a stage on which man had been able to play his
part in complete moral freedom. ... He strove to make antiquity, not the mere
handmaid of knowledge, but its inspiration, as theology had been for
scholasticism. Thus Humanism became to him almost a religious enthusiasm
rather than a new code of precepts.13
Other biographers occupied more with the reconstruction of Petrarch's inner self than with
the details of his humanism gently concurred with the divergence which ottocento scholars
had detected between the persona of the poet and the practices of the philosopher. Writing in
1909, Maud Jerrold detected in his poetry a distinctly modern 'sense of freedom and
emancipation' and a peculiar consciousness of his individuality, but was unable to find traces
of either consistency or profundity in his thought.14 For Jerrold, Petrarch was first and
foremost a poet, and she consequently found it 'remarkable' that his philosophy should ever
have attracted attention:
A veritable poet-painter, we are conscious sometimes of his idolatry of words:
it is only given to the greatest minds perfectly to unite form and thought, and,
when the latter is the weaker power of the two, the former will sometimes
evaporate into sentimentality.15
In his biographical study (1930) - perhaps the most thorough of the first half of the twentieth
century - Luigi Tonelli similarly followed Foscolo and earlier scholars in contending that
Petrarch's outlook remained that of a poet. Although Petrarch had been studied with care and
attention in the early part of the century, Tonelli approvingly noted that he attached
importance not to systematic thought, but to fragmentary tendencies, appropriate to poets
and artists.16
From roughly the 1940s onwards, Petrarch's position as the founding father of
humanism began to be questioned more intensively and he has gradually come to be viewed
13 E. H. R. Tatham, Francesco Petrarca: The First Modern Man of Letters, 2 vols., (London, 1926),
2:27.
14 M. F. Jerrold, Francesco Petrarca: Poet and Humanist (London and New York, 1909), 324-5.
15 ibid., 327.
16 L. Tonelli, Petrarca (Milan, 1930), 347: 'Anche come pensatore, il Petrarca e stato studiato con
cura e attenzione: specie in questi ultimi tempi, che, con maggiore giustizia e piu squisita storicita, si
da importanza, nel disegnare l'evoluzione del pensiero umano, alle stesse concezioni non sistematiche
e alle semplici, frammentarie tendenze, proprie dei poeti ed artisti.'
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as a participant in, rather than the instigator of a broad and complex cultural change. Instead
of having been the figurehead of a new movement, as it were, Petrarch has increasingly been
seen as having built on the heritage of such figures as Albertino Mussato and Lovato dei
Lovati.17 This re-evaluation of his position in relation to other early humanists has been
accompanied by a steady evolution in perceptions of his own humanism. Especially in recent
years, his humanistic practices and his relationship with Antiquity have been subjected to
closer scrutiny. Although Petrarch devoted much energy to the study and imitation of
classical texts, he also drew much inspiration from Christian writers, and evidence has been
adduced which suggests that his reading of Cicero, Seneca and Virgil - for example - was
significantly influenced by his appreciation of St. Augustine's own relationship with the
classics.18
As a consequence of attempts to uncover his sometimes complex reading practices
and the interaction of classical and Christian influences has led to Petrarch's thought being
studied more seriously. In an unfortunately brief paper published in 1947, for example,
Dayton Phillips observed that it was 'high time ... for a detailed reconsideration of what
Petrarch has said about his moral concerns' and the sentiment chimed with the tone of much
scholarship since the mid-twentieth century.19 Petrarch's reputation as the 'first modern
man', however, continues to exercise a certain influence and the fact that his influence on
European culture relies on the reception of his vernacular verse and his humanism has tended
to colour interest in his engagement with ethical questions. Although it has not been treated
with the same disregard as in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his moral
philosophy has been - and continues to be - regarded comparatively lightly, with texts such
as the De vita solitaria and the De otio religoso largely evading scholarly attention. Those
studies which have addressed the subject have been inclined to view Petrarch as having
consciously equivocated between frequently conflicting positions in moral philosophy as a
17 See, for example, R. Weiss, The Dawn of Humanism in Italy (London, 1947), 3ff; and more
recently, R. G. Witt, In the Footsteps of the Ancients. The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni
(Leiden, 2003).
18 Prominent studies include C. Calcaterra, Nella selva del Petrarca (Bologna, 1942); P. Courcelle,
Les Confessions de Saint Augustin dans la tradition litteraire (Paris, 1963), esp. 329-50; P. P. Gerosa,
Umanesimo cristiano del Petrarca. Influenza agostiniana attinenze medievali (Turin, 1966); K.
Heitmann, 'L'insegnamento agostiniano nel Secretum del Petrarca,' Studi petrarcheschi 7 (1961):
187-93; C. E. Quillen, 'Plundering the Egyptians: Petrarch and Augustine's De doctrina Christiana,'
in E. D. English, ed., Reading and Wisdom. The De doctrina Christiana of Augustine in the Middle
Ages (Notre Dame, 1995), 153-72; idem, Rereading the Renaissance: Petrarch, Augustine and the
Language ofHumanism (Ann Arbor, 1998).
19 D. Phillips, 'Petrarch's Ethical Principles,' Italica 24/3 (Sept. 1947): 219-32, here 219; see also G.
Gentile, 'Gli inizi deH'Umanesimo e Francesco Petrarca,' in E. Garin, ed., Storia dei generi letterari:
La filosofia, 2 vols., (Milan, 1947), 1:146-96; G. Toffanin, 'La filosofia del Petrarca,' Grande
antologia filosofica 6 (1964): 492-525.
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result of a 'modernity' bound up either his humanistic preoccupations or his literary
persona.20 Indeed, while there has been some disagreement as to its exact identity, the notion
of conflict has been the defining theme of evaluations of Petrarch's moral thought published
since the 1940s.
Writing from a biographical perspective, Umberto Bosco - for example - has seen
Petrarch as having been caught in a conflict between the desire for the eternal and the painful
consciousness of the temporal.21 Aware always of the fleeting nature of all things, Bosco has
contended that from his earliest years, Petrarch's preoccupation with this tension informed
both his understanding of the pursuit of salvation, and his exploration of his unrequited love
for Laura. Never seeking a full resolution, the conflict in Petrarch's thought became almost
an end in itself, an end which consisted in a continuous, wilful ambivalence and
inconstancy.22 The notion that Petrarch may have sought to construct a fully systematic
moral philosophy which transcended this conflict is absent from Bosco's reading of his life
and works.
Bosco's understanding of the conflict in his thought is framed around the contention
that Petrarch's constant revision of his works revealed him to have been a man 'senza
storia\ a figure whose intellectual development is all but impossible to reconstruct.23 Many
scholars have, however, dissented from this view and have instead described the tension in
Petrarch's thought in terms of shifting allegiances to often conflicting philosophical schools.
While he is perceived as having been deeply interested in questions of moral philosophy, he
is seen never to have attempted to reconcile the different points of view which he embraced
at various points in his life. Attention in this regard has tended to concentrate on the
Secretum, which has been viewed both as the key to Petrarch's moral thought, and as the
encapsulation of a deep philosophical inconsistency bound up with his reading practices.
Carlo Calcaterra, for example, has attempted to suggest that the work is a patchwork of
different sentiments which reflect a transition from a youthful fascination for classical
literature to a later Christian morality occasioned by a period of religious crisis.24 Believing
the transition to have occurred in the reverse order, Hans Baron - along with Francisco Rico
20 Aldo Scaglione has neatly summarised this point: '...the human condition that is... discovered by
Petrarch's unending, unrelenting, merciless search is "modern" because it embodies the principle of
dialectics, or to put it with Freud, the principle that the psyche ignores the rule of non-contradiction.
The human condition is inherently ambiguous, ambivalent, wavering, dramatic, conflicting, and
conflict must not only be comprehended but accepted.' A. Scaglione, 'Petrarca 1974: A Sketch for a







24 C. Calcatetta, 'La concezione storica del Petrarca,' Annali della Cattedra Petrarchesca 9 (1939-40):
1-26; idem, Nella selva del Petrarca (Bologna, 1942), 1-18; 418ff.
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- saw Petrarch as torn between an attachment to a broadly Augustinian moral theology and a
Stoicism recovered primarily from the works of Cicero and Seneca.25 Relying heavily on the
imputation of conceptual adherence from quotation or citation, the perceived tension
between a fideistic Augustinianism and a Stoicism founded on reason was similarly detected
by Klaus Heitmann and appeared prominently in William Bouwsma's evaluation of Petrarch
in his study of the 'two faces' of Renaissance humanism.26
In tune with postmodern approaches to language as an end in itself, other scholars
have acknowledged the presence of philosophical inconsistencies, but have chosen to present
them as the outcome of a 'poetic' or 'rhetorical' approach to the practice of moral
philosophy. Suggesting that Petrarch's understanding of ancient philosophy in particular
'was more characteristically that of a poet than a historian', Charles Trinkaus has argued that
it was 'through the medium of his poetic understanding ... that he was incited to conceive
and fulfil the roles of both rhetorician and moral philosopher.'27 For Trinkaus, Petrarch
'thought philosophically as a poet': rather than seeking to construct a philosophical system
founded on objective truth, he instead embraced a 'new mode of philosophical
consciousness' which was founded on subjective experience.28 Although wary of the ease
with which they could be described or explained in such a way, Trinkaus tentatively
indicates that the 'manifold contradictions' in Petrarch's thought - centring on broadly the
same tension between classical philosophy and Christian theology detected by Baron, Rico
and Heitmann - could be viewed as a product of the pioneering subjectivism which arose out
of his ability to think 'philosophically as a poet'. In his study of eloquence and wisdom in
Renaissance humanism, Jerrold Seigel expressed a similar viewpoint, although with specific
reference to rhetoric.29 For Seigel, Petrarch had a profound respect for the 'ideal of wisdom',
but 'sometimes described true philosophy in such a way that cast doubt on its inferiority to
25
H. Baron, Petrarch's Secretum: Its Making and Its Meaning (Princeton, 1985); idem, From
Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni. Studies in Humanistic and Political Literature (Chicago and London,
1968); idem, 'Petrarch's Secretum: Was It Revised - and Why? The Draft of 1342-43 and the Later
Changes,' Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et Renaissance 25 (1963):489-530, reprinted in a revised form
in Baron, From Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni, 51-101.; F. Rico, Vida u obra de Petrarca, vol. I,
Lectura del "Secretum" (Padua, 1974).
26 W. J. Bouwsma, 'The Two Faces of Renaissance Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in
Renaissance Thought,' in H. A. Oberman and T. A. Brady Jnr., Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of
the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations. Dedicated to Paul Oskar
Kristeller on the Occasion of his 70'h Birthday, (Leiden, 1975), 3-61; K. Heitmann, Fortuna und
Virtus: Eine Studie zu Petrarcas Lebensweisheit (Cologne and Graz, 1957).
27 C. Trinkaus, The Poet as Philosopher. Petrarch and the Formation of Renaissance Consciousness
(New Haven and London, 1979), 2.
28 ibid., 2-3.
29 J. E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism. The Union of Eloquence and
Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla (Princeton, 1968).
13
wisdom.'30 In Seigel's analysis, Petrarch 'showed himself to be a true Ciceronian orator' and
drew on different schools of philosophy as his immediate needs demanded without seeking
to propound a completely consistent body of moral thought.31 On occasions, Petrarch is
presented as having embraced a Stoic understanding of virtue, yet - because of the perceived
rigor of Stoicism - often turned to Peripatetic ethics, which 'shared a common moral and
intellectual perspective.'32
Although Petrarch's attitude towards philosophy has been treated more seriously
since the mid-twentieth century, it is nevertheless somewhat unfortunate that his moral
thought continues to be regarded as lacking in consistency, and characterised as unsystematic
or aphoristic. While the Romanticism which informed much nineteenth-century scholarship
has been shed, the importance attached to Petrarch's humanistic interests and literary
preoccupations as a result of his perceived 'modernity' seems to sustain an unwillingness to
consider the possibility that he was both willing and able to construct a consistent and
coherent moral philosophy. Few studies have attempted to consider Petrarch's works
collectively as a deliberate attempt to contribute seriously to moral philosophy - and several
texts remain woefully understudied - but even those which have adopted a broader scope
have tended to presuppose a predisposition to foster and exploit inconsistencies. This has
perhaps been fostered further by philological attempts to detect overlapping compositional
layers in certain texts and by the intellectual environment from within which some studies
have been written. Particularly when considering the relationship between eloquence and
philosophy in Petrarch's thought, for example, some scholars appear to have been influenced
by contemporary philosophical notions of language as an end in itself to a degree which
colours their interpretation of the texts.
Despite equivocating over the tension between worldly desires and the possibility of
salvation in the Canzoniere, and undergoing a continual process of intellectual development,
it seems unnecessary to assume - as many have done - that Petrarch either saw moral
questions as undeserving of systematic consideration, or prioritised literary considerations
over philosophical consistency. His frequent quotations from and allusions to apparently
contradictory schools of philosophy, together with his pervasive interest in literary imitation,
initially appear to offer some grounds for granting credence to the imputation of
inconsistency, but at a methodological level, it does not seem unreasonable to treat such
evidence with a degree of caution. As Martin McLaughlin and Thomas Greene have






practice of emulation was constructed around his independence of mind.33 Similarly, alluring
though citations may appear, it is little appreciated that quotation need not imply a deeper
conceptual adherence, and the possibility that gnomic references might mask an underlying
consistency has been significantly underexplored. Moreover, despite the greater attention
that has been given to Petrarch's relationship with St. Augustine in particular, it seems that
further consideration deserves to be given to Christian theology's capacity to have served
both as a lens through which to read classical thought, and as a loom on which to weave a
coherent moral philosophy using ancient threads.
While both must be treated with some degree of caution, Petrarch's own evaluation
of his work and the opinion of his readers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries seem to
give grounds not only to consider the possibility of coherence in his writings on moral
philosophy, but also to temper the suggestion that his classical and poetic interests inclined
him towards inconsistency. In the Posteritati, Petrarch saw moral philosophy and poetry as
being of at least equal status. Indeed, the two are implicitly linked, and poetry - which he
abandoned for the study of sacred literature in his later years - is described as having been
nothing more than 'embellishment', while the pursuit of Antiquity is presented as having
been a pleasurable release from the torments of his own age rather than as a substitute for
philosophical enquiry. Providing little evidence for a sense of divergence between the two,
he appears to have regarded himself as much as a moral philosopher as a poet and clearly
sought to be remembered as such.
Petrarch's wish did not go unheeded. Although most - such as the doctor Giovanni
Dondi dall'Orologio34 and the copyist Giovanni Malpaghini da Ravenna35 - restricted
themselves to comparing him favourably with eminent figures of Antiquity or claiming a
prominent position for him in literary history, many contemporaries who wrote in
commemoration expressed the view that he deserved to be remembered both for his literary
achievements and for his contributions to moral philosophy. In some ways mediated by an
appreciation of Petrarch's own character, eulogists saw no tension between poetry or
33 T. M. Greene, The Light in Troy. Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry (New Haven and
London, 1982), 81-146; M. L. McLaughlin, Literary Imitation in the Italian Renaissance. The Theory
and Practice ofLiterary Imitation From Dante to Bembo (Oxford, 1995), 22-49.
34 The text of Giovanni Dondi dall'Orologio's letter to Giovanni dall'Aquila is in A. Zardo, II
Petrarca e i Carraresi (Milan, 1887), 282-5. For a brief discussion of the work, see C. Biancha,
'Nascita del mito dell'umanista nei compiani in morte del Petrarca,' in II Petrarca Latino e le origini
dell'umanesimo, Quaderni petrarcheschi 9-10 (1992-3): 293-313, here 298-300; B. G. Kohl,
'Mourners of Petrarch,' in Scaglione, ed., Francis Petrarch, Six Centuries Later, 340-52, here 341-2.
35 For Giovanni Malpaghini da Ravenna's Conquestus de morte Petrarce, see R. Sabbadini, Giovanni
da Ravenna, insigne figura d'umanista (Como, 1924), 248-9. See Biancha, 'Nascita del mito
dell'umanista nei compiani in morte del Petrarca,' 300-1; Kohl, 'Mourners of Petrarch,' 343-4.
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humanism and philosophy, and even saw his classically-inspired eloquence as having
accompanied coherent moral thought.
On 24th July 1374, six days after his death, a collection of eminent personages and
admirers - including Francesco il Vecchio da Carrara - attended Petrarch's funeral in Padua,
and were addressed by his friend, the Augustinian canon Bonaventura Badoer.36 The theme
of Badoer's oration was taken from psalm 38 ('cor meum conturbatum est in me'), and - as
was appropriate - was devoted largely to lamenting Petrarch's passing and recalling his
laudable characteristics.37 A devout and pious man given to frequent prayer, Petrarch was,
Badoer proclaimed, at once the most excellent poet and the most devoted son of Christ,
deserving comparison with such holy figures as St. Paul and David. A theologian, historian,
orator and poet equally, the white-haired Petrarch had drawn on both wisdom and eloquence
to show men how to live with fortune both fair and foul in the De remediis utriusque fortune,
a work which Badoer singled out for particular mention.38 Later in the year, the poet Franco
Sacchetti composed a commemorative verse which similarly mentioned Petrarch's moral
rectitude alongside his erudition and antiquarianism, but which also tellingly contrasted his
heavenly repose with the hellish fate of the contemptible philosophers Epicurus and
Averroes.39
Yet more telling is Coluccio Salutati's letter to Roberto Guidi, Count of Battifolle,
written on 16th August 1374.40 Despite not having met Petrarch, Salutati knew his works well
and was fulsome in his praise. In his literary studies, Petrarch 'flashed out so wonderfully'
that he seemed 'easily to surpass any of the ancients you could oppose to him.'41 His
eloquence, Salutati believed, was unsurpassed. Rather than having been pursued for its own
sake, however, this eloquence was employed for a very specific purpose. Just as He had
given his creation reason to command his desires, so God had given man eloquence 'so that
36 On Petrarch's friendship with Bonaventura Badoer and his brother Bonsembiante, see, for example,
U. Mariani, II Petrarca e gli Agostiniani, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, (Rome, 1956), 79-85. For an
account of Petrarch's funeral, see Jerrold, Francesco Petrarca, 242-3.
37 For the text of Bonaventura's oration, see A. Solerti, Le vite di Dante, Petrarca e Boccaccio scritte
fine at secolo decimosesto (Milan, 1904), 273-4. For a discussion of the text, see Biancha, 'Nascita del
mito dell'umanista nei compianti in morte del Petrarca,' 293-7; Kohl, 'Mourners of Petrarch,' 342-3.
38
Solerti, Le vite, 273: 'Caput eius et capilli candidi tamquam lana alba et tamquam nix; oculi eius
velut flamma ignis et vox illius tamquam vox aquarum multarum sicut ex habundantia sapientiae et
eloquentiae suae, et de ore eius gladius ex utraque parte acutus, quo scilicet docuit in adversis non
deficere nec in prosperis defigere mentem, ut expresse prescripsit in libro quem fecit de remediis
utriusque fortunae.'
39 F. Sacchetti, II libro delle rime, ed. A. Chiari (Bari, 1936), 179-83.
40
English translation in D. Thompson and A. F. Nagel, eds. and trans., The Three Crowns of
Florence. Humanist Assessments of Dante, Petrarca and Boccaccio (New York, 1972), 3-13. For a
discussion of this letter, see, for example, Kohl, 'Mourners of Petrarch,' 347-9; A. von Martin,
Coluccio Salutati und das humanistische Lebensideal (Leipzig, 1916), 17-21.
41
Thompson and Nagel, The Three Crowns ofFlorence, 5.
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if his neighbour's reason has been put to sleep by corrupt behaviour or by the gross body's
burden, he will have the means to rouse him with the fires of mutual affection.'42 For
Salutati, it was in this marriage of eloquence and moral purpose that Petrarch's achievement
lay:
In the liberal arts, you can see from his writings how fit his nature was. But
good God, how he excelled in philosophy! The divine gift is known to be the
governess of all virtues and (to borrow a word of Cicero's) the expeller of vices
and the mistress of all arts and sciences. I do not mean that philosophy which
the modern sophists wonder at in the schools with vain, windy boastings and
impudent garrulity; but rather that which refines spirits, builds virtue, washes
away the filth of vice and throws light on the truth of all things without
quibbling disputations. Let them rejoice in that former philosophy, those who
take delight in devising 'indissoluble' arguments blown together with great toil,
those who are moved by the glory of scholastic training. We revere the newer
philosophy and embrace it with all our mind's strength. Consider in the light of
this philosophy the poems, letters and books which that man of divine genius
published while alive, and you will see how proficient he was in it. As for that
priestess of all sciences - philosophy's philosophy, so to speak - which probes
the secrets of divinity, although it seems to exceed the limits of knowledge I
would be hard put to express with what an able mind he drank of it, with what a
clear intellect he absorbed it - as can be inferred from a consideration of his
works.43
Although Petrarch was not a philosopher in the mould of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example,
Salutati believed that he nevertheless actively pursued divine truth for the sake of inculcating
virtue and exterminating vice in his readers. Rather than being set in contrast to his
philosophy, or regarded as an inferior assemblage of thought, Salutati clearly contended that
Petrarch's poetry should be read through the lens of this commitment to the elaboration and
communication of a clear moral philosophy.
Outside of Italy, Petrarch's reputation in the decades immediately following his
death shows if anything a stronger bias towards moral philosophy. Far from having being
seen as nurturing a disinterest in ethical questions or indulging in aphoristic inconsistency,
Petrarch's works appear to have been perceived as positive contributions to moral
philosophy which merited respect and admiration. At the very end of the fourteenth century,
the Frenchman Pierre Flamenc referred to Petrarch as a 'holy man of God', while also noting
his renown as a laureate.44 For Jean de Montreuil, writing in around 1407, he was a 'most
devout catholic and very famous moral philosopher'.45 The same opinion was shared by




ibid., 5-6, quoting Cicero, Tusc., V, ii, 5.
44
Quoted in N. Mann, 'Petrarch and Humanism The Paradox of Posterity' in A. S. Bernardo, ed.,
Francesco Petrarca, Citizen of the World. Proceedings of the World Petrarch Congress, Washington
D.C., April 6-13 1974 (Padua and Albany, 1980), 287-99, here 290.
45 ibid.
17
unusual, 'the mass of evidence points in the direction of the ascetic and medieval moralist
rather than of the humanist scholar.'46 In England, John Lydgate similarly stressed the
importance of Petrarch's moral treatises in the Fall of Princes, written for the Duke of
Gloucester in the early 1430s.47
With only rare exceptions, Petrarch's reception in Northern Europe in the period
1374-C.1470 is, of course, primarily a result of the circulation of his works in an intellectual
world whose lingua franca was Latin and the important role played by religious
communities in the early copying of his writings.48 Chaucer aside, Petrarch's Italian verses
appear to have been unknown until the very end of the fifteenth century. Of the known
manuscripts, the most popular were, in descending order, the De remediis utriusque fortune,
the Historia Griseldis - which was often read as a 'moralizing and allegorical story on the
Christian soul' in this period49 - , the Psalmi penitentiales, De vita solitaria, Secretum and
the Bucolicum carmen.50 While this necessarily colours the evidence, however, the
dissemination of texts need not detract from the fact that readers of his Latin works viewed
him not as an eclectic humanist, but as a serious and even venerable moral philosopher. Such
an opinion sits uneasily with the imputation of wilful inconsistency in a poet of dissidio.
The following thesis attempts to demonstrate that, far from having been a
contradictory thinker who engaged selectively and unsystematically with ethical questions,
Petrarch deserves to be considered as a consistent and coherent moral philosopher who
engaged constructively with the question of virtue in dialogue with a multiplicity of
classical, patristic and medieval texts. In an attempt to redress the omissions of previous
studies, attention will focus primarily on Petrarch's Latin works, especially treatises such as
the Secretum, De otio religioso and De vita solitaria. Although it too shall play an important
role, the Canzoniere shall not be accorded priority and shall be viewed as an adjunct to
Petrarch's other works, rather than as a lens through which to read his moral philosophy. The
analysis will be based on a close reading of the original texts, but the methods employed
shall also involve the application of philological and palaeographical techniques, and a
detailed consideration of Petrarchan historiography. The thesis is divided into five sections.
46 ibid. On Petrarch's reception in the Low Countries, see also J. Ijsewijn, 'The Coming of Humanism
to the Low Countries,' in H. A. Oberman and T. A. Brady, eds., Itinerarium Italicum. The Profile fo
the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations. Dedicated to Paul Oskar
Kristeller on the occasion of his 70'h birthday (Leiden, 1972), 193-204, esp. 203-9; M. Dykmans, 'Les
premiers rapports de Petrarque avec les Pays-Bas,' Bulletin de I'lnstitut Historique Beige de Rome 20
(1939): 51-122.
47
Mann, 'Petrarch and Humanism', 292.
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In the first chapter, Petrarch's understanding of the idea of virtue is examined and
attention is focussed on the Secretum. A crucial text for an analysis of Petrarch's moral
thought, the Secretum has been central to the argument that he experienced an intellectual
'crisis' at some point in the 1340s and has been of key importance to the implication of
philosophical inconsistency. This chapter concentrates on two episodes in the first book in
which elements of Stoic ethics are supposed to have been introduced into an otherwise
'Augustinian' treatment of worldly desires. Examining points of comparison with passages
in the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia and Invective contra medicum, the degree to
which Petrarch drew on patterns of thought recovered primarily from Cicero and Seneca is
questioned and distinctions between forms of 'Augustinianism' known to him are brought
into closer focus. Particular attention is given to Petrarch's knowledge of St. Augustine's De
vera religione and Soliloquies, and to his appreciation of the saint's use of classical thought
in relation to ideas of voluntas and ratio. Petrarch's understanding of prayer and grace is
considered in a final section, and parallels often drawn with the theology of Martin Luther
are brought under scrutiny.
The second chapter turns from the abstract notion of virtue to the ideal of the
virtuous life and examines the concept of otium. Distinguishing between different forms of
the word and the meanings attached to the term in the classical, patristic and medieval
traditions, this chapter concentrates on the identity of otium in the De otio religoso, a text
which has been examined primarily for the insight it provides into Petrarch's understanding
of the relationship between monastic and secular modes of living. The manner in which
Petrarch envisaged otium as a response to despair and worldly desire is examined in detail,
and the heritage of the concept is considered in comparison to texts he is known to have
possessed. On this basis, the meaning of otium as a term used to describe a life of virtue is
finally related to the moral programme which the Secretum was intended to inculcate.
The third chapter continues the investigation into the identity of the virtuous life and
looks at solitudo, which Petrarch frequently used as an analogue - and even a synonym - of
otium. Looking at the De vita solitaria, the Canzoniere, and numerous letters in Latin verse
and prose, this chapter begins with an evaluation of the suggestion that Petrarch modelled his
concept of solitudo after Stoic and Epicurean ideas derived from authors such as Cicero,
Virgil, Horace and Seneca. Having surveyed the literary motifs shared with the classical
tradition, the analysis then moves to consider the manner in which Petrarch saw solitudo as a
'solitudo animf, and as a freedom from 'res aliena'. Examining the interplay of classical
imagery and elements of Augustinian theology, the chapter concludes by looking at the key
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role played by the countryside in Petrarch's treatment of solitudo, and by drawing
comparisons with otium.
In the fourth chapter, the idea of friendship is considered. In contrast to his many
friendships, Petrarch's understanding of the concept of amicitia has been studied only very
little, but is nevertheless an integral part of the manner in which he conceived of the virtuous
life. Where it has been studied, Petrarch's amicitia is seen as having been constructed in
direct imitation of Cicero and - to a lesser extent - Seneca. Using evidence drawn from the
Familiares, the Seniles, the De remediis utriusque fortune and the De vita solitaria, this
chapter subjects this claim to detailed analysis, and the role played by alternative sources of
inspiration, such as St. Augustine's De vera religione, is considered. Especially in relation to
a crucial passage in the De remediis utriusque fortune, Petrarch's use of Cicero's writings is
questioned and the interplay of classical, patristic and medieval influences is examined in
relation to the connection between amiticia, amor and virtus.
Having reconstructed Petrarch's conception both of virtue and the virtuous life, the
fifth chapter returns to the relationship between eloquence and moral philosophy in his
thought. As has already been observed, this is at the heart of historical constructions of
Petrarch's approach to moral philosophy and the determining role commonly attributed to
his understanding of eloquence underpins claims of inconsistency in philosophical matters.
Having evaluated the methodological foundations of some of the most important studies of
the topic, this chapter reconstructs the development of Petrarch's thought on the relationship
between eloquence and moral philosophy, running from the ninth book of the Africa and the
Coronation Oration to the De remediis utriusque fortune. Particular attention is given to the
De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia and the Invective contra medicum, and the suggestion
that Petrarch attempted to erect poetry as a source of theological or philosophical truth is
analysed closely. In a comparative section, Petrarch's conception of eloquence and moral
philosophy is then examined in relation to classical treatises such as Cicero's De oratore and
Quintilian's Institutio oratoria, to late Antique texts such as Boethius' De consolatio
philosophiae, to medieval works such as William of Conches' commentaries, and - crucially
- to St. Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. Finally, eloquence is placed in the broader
scheme of Petrarch's moral thought, and his conception of poetry and rhetoric located within
the context of the philosophy studied in previous chapters.
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The Idea of Virtue: Stoicism and
'Augustinianism' in the Secretum
1. Happiness, virtue, vice and accidia
In the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, Petrarch described how four Venetian friends
were 'amazed and silently angered' by his disdain for their Aristotelianism.' Attempting to
redress this perceived slight, these friends would often instigate a discussion of Aristotle's
philosophy as a means of providing themselves with the opportunity to consign Petrarch 'to
the ranks of the ignorant'.2 Defending himself, Petrarch pointed out that not merely was it
not blasphemous to question Aristotle's views, but it was in fact sacrilegious to adhere to
many of the philosopher's opinions.3 Aristotle, he believed, had 'wandered from the path'
not only in unimportant matters, but also in those major respects which touched on man's
salvation.4 Although Aristotle had written on the question of happiness in the Ethics, he was
'so completely ignorant of true happiness that any devout old woman, or any faithful
fisherman, shepherd or peasant, is happier, if not more subtle, in recognising it.'5 It was not
that Petrarch lacked respect for Aristotle, but rather that he believed Aristotle's conception of
Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at conferences in Edinburgh (7th July 2006), St.
Andrews (13th November 2006) and San Antonio (10lh March 2007), as well as at the Denys Hay
Seminar, University of Edinburgh (17th October 2006).
1
De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia IV, 48: 'Stupere illi, et taciti subirasci...'; text and English
translation in Invectives, ed. and trans. D. Marsh, (Cambridge MA and London, 2003), 264.
2 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia IV, 47: 'Sic incautus usus, plurimum insidiis circumventus,
ignorantium gregibus ignorans misceor'; Marsh, 264.
3
Although Petrarch included the Ethics in his list of his favourite books and his copy of the text is still
extant (Paris BN lat. 6458), it is unclear how fully Petrarch knew Aristotle. B. Ullman, Studies in the
Italian Renaissance, Edizioni di Storia e Letterature, (Rome, 1955), 117-137. On disagreement over
Petrarch's knowledge of Aristotle, see, for example, P. de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'Humanisme, 2 vols.,
2nd ed., (Paris, 1907), 2:147-52; C. Trinkaus, The Poet as Philosopher: Petrarch and the Formation of
the Renaissance Consciousness (New Haven and London, 1979), 15-21.
4 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia IV, 49: 'credo hercle, nec dubito, ilium non in rebus tantum
parvis, quarum parvus et minime periculosus est error, sed in maximis et spectantibus ad salutis
summam aberrasse tota, ut aiunt, via.'; Marsh, 264. c.f. Ps. 119:50-1.
sDe sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 49: 'audebo dicere ... veram ilium felicitatem sic penitus
ignorasse, ut in eius cognitione, non dico subtilior, sed felicior fuerit vel quelibet anus pia, vel piscator
pastorue fidelis, vel agricola.'; Marsh, 264-5.
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happiness to have been built on unsure foundations.6 Citing St. Augustine's De Trinitate, he
contended that without an understanding of immortality or faith, it was impossible to
comprehend the vera felicitas and, by implication, also impossible to derive a true system of
moral philosophy.7 Not having recognised this, Aristotle and other philosophers 'rejoiced
over nothing, like people happy in their dreams' and were oblivious to the fact that, in
confining themselves to the mortal, 'they were miserable'.8 Only the 'thunderclap of
imminent death would wake them to their misery'.
This passage reveals the central importance offelicitas in shaping Petrarch's interest
in moral philosophy. Never doubting the coherence or rigor of Aristotle's argument in the
Ethics, Petrarch's objection that it was founded on an inadequate definition of happiness
indicates that he too saw felicitas as being the primary motivation for moral enquiry. For
Petrarch, as for St. Augustine, felicitas could only be had in the eternal life to come, while
the attempt to find happiness in mortal existence alone could lead to nothing but sorrow.
The opposition of mortality and immortality in relation to felicitas had deep
implications for Petrarch's understanding of the dynamic between happiness and virtue and
these are described in the first book of the Africa. At the beginning of the epic, the sleeping
Scipio Africanus is visited by his dead father, Publius Cornelius, in a dream. In the exchange
which follows, Publius attempts both to console Scipio's grief and to inspire him in life. As
in Petrarch's discussion with the deceased Laura in the Triumphus mortis,9 Publius shows
Scipio the bliss he currently enjoyed and eathly and heavenly existence are powerfully
contrasted. To earthly existence come
Grief and groaning and a mind uncertain of the future
And fear of death and the thousand most wretched cares
Of our world, among which we spend in shadows
The best times of our life and our finest years
[But] in this place [i.e. Heaven] is undefiled day, which eternal light
makes fair,
Which neither consuming grief nor sorrowful murmurs disturb,
[And] which never burns with hate...10
6 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 50; Marsh, 266.
7 ibid.; c.f. Augustine, De Trinitate, 13.8.11.
8
De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 51: 'Fingebant sibi ille et reliqui quod optabant, et quod
naturaliter optant omnes, cuiusque optare potest nemo, felicitatem dico, quam verbis ornatam,
absentem velut amicam canentes, non videbant, gaudebantque de nichilo, prorsus quasi somnio beati,
vere autem miseri vicineque mortis tonitru ad miseriam excitandi, apertisque oculis conspecturi
quenam esset ilia felicitas, de qua somniando tractaverant.'; Marsh, 266.
9
Triumphus mortis, II, 37-39; text in Rime, Trionfi e Poesi Latine, ed. F. Neri, G. Martellotti, E.
Bianchi and N. Sapegno, La Letteratura Italiana, Storia e Testi 6, (Milan & Naples, 1951), 481-562,
here 525.
10
Africa, I, 214-221: 'Namque hactenus ire
Et dolor et gemitus et mens incerta futuri
Atque metus mortis mundique miserrima nostri
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As in the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, Petrarch indicates that true happiness can be
found only after death. Since the corporeal world is continually in flux, any attempt to find
felicitas while on earth could lead only to grief."
The realisation that happiness could only be found in heaven, however, presents the
hero of the Africa with a problem. Introduced to his dead uncle, Gnaeus Cornelius, Scipio
asks why, 'if life endures beyond the grave' and no felicitas can be enjoyed during a mortal
existence, it is necessary for him to linger on earth.12 Gnaeus Cornelius explains that even
though on earth one may not know the vera felicitas, mortal life is a trial which must be
endured.13 If Scipio wishes to attain immortal happiness, he must merit this reward. 'A life
adorned with virtue', in which the breast is filled with piety, is 'assuredly the way to
Heaven'.'4
As the discussion proceeds, it becomes apparent that, just as felicitas is defined in
relation to the opposition of the mortal and the immortal, so virtus may be understood in
terms of the opposition of the body and the soul. Developing his earlier point, Gnaeus
Cornelius explains that a man who aspires to the vera felicitas must serve the soul while in
this flesh.15 Being of heavenly origin and desirous of happiness after death, the soul must not
be allowed to become forgetful of its 'proper seat' through contact with the body.
In other works, the relationship between body and soul, between mortal and
immortal is manifested more clearly in the opposition of virtus and voluptas. Virtue, the
preserve of the soul, is juxtaposed with the pleasures of the flesh, and Petrarch frequently
used allegory to explain this pairing. Drawing on a long tradition of interpretation, he viewed
Milia curarum, rapide quibus optima vite
Tempora et in tenebris meliores ducimus annos:
Illic pura dies, quam lux eterna serenat,
Quam nec luctus edax nec tristia murmura turbant,
Non odia incendunt...'
Text in Africa, ed. N. Festa, Edizione nazionale delle opere di Francesco Petrarca, (Florence, 1926)
11 This underpins Petrarch's critique of Epicureanism. See, for example, Fam. II, 3, 4.
12
Africa, I, 460-464: ' "Die," ait is: "si vita manet post busta, quod almus
Testatur genitor, sique hec est vera perennis,
Nostra autem morti similis, quid demoror ultra
In terris? quin hue potius, quacumque licebit,




Africa, I, 483-489: 'Pietas sit pectoris hospes
Sancta tui morumque comes, que debita virtus
Magna patri, patrie maior, sed maxima summo
Ac perfecta Deo; quibus exornata profecto
Vita via in celum est, que vos hue tramite recto
Tunc revehat cum summa dies exemerit istud




the Aeneid, for example, as an epic allegory of the tension between virtus and voluptas. As
Craig Kallendorf has explained, Petrarch saw Troy as an emblem of 'the debased life that
Aeneas must leave behind so that "armed with virtue" ... he sets out towards Italy through
the uncertainties and instabilities of life.'16 Writing to Dionigi da Borgo San Sepulcro in
January 1333, Petrarch expressed this as advice. Although no true happiness could be had in
this life, it was nevertheless possible to approach the vera felicitas by steering clear of bodily
pleasures. Forsaking riches, the applause of the vulgar mob, power and pleasure for virtue, a
man may shed his miseries and merit his reception into eternal bliss after death.17
Despite his advice to Dionigi da Borgo San Sepulcro, however, the opposition of
virtue and voluptas was the cause of great difficulty for Petrarch and served as the subject for
his most searching moral analysis. The Secretum - or, more properly, the De secreto
conflictu curarum mearum - constitutes an attempt to engage with the psychological tension
between worldly desire and a longing for the vera felicitas which can be enjoyed only after
death. Although some debate has surrounded the autobiographical accuracy and intended
audience of the text,18 the Secretum takes as its starting point at least a representation of
Petrarch's moral dilemma and offers an exploration of the means by which voluptas might
be spurned and virtus embraced.
The Secretum begins with 'Franciscus' worrying anxiously about death and
consumed by misery.19 Miraculously, Lady Truth appears and tells him that he is suffering
from an improper affection for the pleasures of the world.20 Urging him to look for true
happiness in the eternal, she invites 'Augustinus' to guide him away from the temporal and
16 C. Kallendorf, In Praise ofAeneas: Virgil and Epideitic Rhetoric in the Early Italian Renaissance
(Hanover and London, 1989), 28-9. See also E. Miiller-Boachat, 'Allegorese und Allegorie: Zu
Petrarcas Vergildeutung (Seniles IV.5),' in F. Schalk, ed., Petrarca 1304-1374: Beitrage zu Werk und
Wirkung (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), 198-208, here 205-6. Sen. IV, 5; Invective contra medicum, IV,
175.
17 Fam. IV, 2, 6.
18 H. Baron, Petrarch's Secretum: Its Making and Its Meaning (Princeton, 1985), 185-96, 208-14; V.
Kahn, 'The Figure of the Reader in Petrarch's Secretum,' PMLA 100/2 (March 1985): 154-66; E.
Loos, 'Die Hauptsiinde der acedia in Dantes Commedia und Petrarcas Secretum,' in F. Schalk, ed.,
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shake him free of his improper desires. In the three days which follow, Augustinus dissects
Franciscus' affection for worldly delights and uncovers the nature of his unhappiness. He
tells Franciscus that he is guilty - to one degree or another - of the seven deadly sins, but
succumbed most frequently to the attractions of love and glory.21 Being rooted in the mortal,
these attractions bring Franciscus nothing but sorrow and he is content to admit that it is the
'want, grief, ignominy, illness, death and all such ills' of human life which causes him such
anxiety.22
During second day's discussion, however, Augustinus devotes particular attention to
that 'deadly plague of the soul which the moderns call accidia, the ancients egritudo.'23 It is
a malady - best translated as 'spiritual sloth', 'melancholy' or even 'despair' - from which
Franciscus has suffered for a considerable time and, unlike his other sins, it is capable of
paralysing him for days on end. It causes all things to seem hard, sorrowful and horrendous,
and it opens the way to desperation and destruction.24 Explaining further, Franciscus reveals
that his grief comes not from any single blow of Fortune, but a concurrence of
mishaps. It springs from the cumulative discouragement which the
consideration of the miseries of the human condition, the memory of past
hardships, and the fear of the future jointly produce.25
In addition to his persistent indulgence of other sins, especially the desire for love and glory,
Franciscus is weighed down by his accidia, through which all things are made displeasing;
he is tied to the fickleness of others, and oppressed by the frailty of his body.26
As Siegfried Wenzel has shown, Franciscus' accidia, which is both the analogue and
culmination of his other sins, has a certain affinity with the Ciceronian and Senecan affect of
aegritudo, but is nevertheless 'firmly based on the vice as it was defined and taught by
scholastic theologians.'27 Bound up with the opposition of virtus and voluptas, and of
felicitas and fortuna, it generated what St. Thomas Aquinas described as a 'tristitia de
spirituali bono'2'' and what Hugh of St. Victor understood as an 'ex confusione mentis nata
tristia, sive taedium et amaritudo animi immoderata, qua iucunditas spiritualis
21
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extinguitur.'29 The accidia from which Franciscus suffered, as David of Augsburg put it,
'inclines to despair, diffidence and suspicions, and sometimes drives its victim to suicide
when he is oppressed by unreasonable grief.'30 At the same time, it 'is a very subjective
lament at lack of means, lack of full personal independence,'31 although, like love and the
desire for glory, it too is associated with the immoderate love of the mortal world and stands
at the core of the problem of how virtus is to be embraced andfelicitas merited.
2. A Question of Attribution: Petrarch, Augustine and the Classics
The Secretum was intended to address the misery from which Franciscus suffered.32 Taking
as its starting point the fact that he was made unhappy by the instability and uncertainty of
the world, and further consumed with spiritual sloth and melancholy, it set out to provide a
blueprint for the moral behaviour which was necessary for him to embrace virtue and merit
the vera felicitas. In the proem, Lady Truth returns to the two poles of Petrarch's moral
topography and tells Franciscus that he must turn his gaze from the mortal to the eternal.33
Although this is a perfectly succinct summary of the change which it was necessary for
Franciscus to make, however, it is a far from complete prognosis. As Lady Truth turns to
Augustinus for assistance, it is evident from Franciscus' apparent lack of understanding that
a fuller analysis of his moral condition is necessary.34 If he is to turn from the mortal to the
eternal as Lady Truth had suggested, the underlying reason for Franciscus' attachment to
voluptas must be uncovered before Augustinus can offer a detailed explanation of the means
by which virtue might be apprehended.
Despite its importance to an understanding of Petrarch's conception of virtue, the
Secretum is nevertheless a highly problematic text and has frequently been viewed as a
confused work composed during a period of profound personal intellectual change. This
confusion has been interpreted in a variety of ways and is frequently related to the question
of dating, but in each case, Petrarch is presented as having failed to offer a fully coherent
solution to Franciscus' misery because of his changing attitudes towards contrasting
philosophical traditions. For Carlo Calcaterra, for example, the Secretum was the product of
a period of religious 'crisis' between 1342 and 1343 in which the classical and humanistic
29
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enthusiasms of his youth were replaced with more overtly Christian concerns.35 The
'confusion' of the Secretum is, however, most commonly described in terms of an use of
incompatible elements of Stoic philosophy and Augustinian theology. Although the issue of
chronology is not considered closely, the idea of a 'crisis' - in which Petrarch moved from
Christian to classical sources of inspiration - is emphasised in the work of Klaus Heitmann,
Charles Trinkaus and William Bouwsma, and apparently 'stoical" moments are contrasted
vividly with 'Augustinian' passages which emphasise 'medieval' conceptions of sin and the
importance of faith and grace.36
The contention that the Secretum is a work which suffers from the eclectic use of
discordant traditions has been given particular credence by the efforts made by Francisco
Rico and Flans Baron to reconsider the date of its composition.37 Although their approaches
differ in a number of respects, particularly with regard to the identification of textual
parallels and autobiographical details, Rico and Baron both recognised the limitations
imposed by the absence of earlier manuscript drafts and endeavoured to uncover
compositional layers of the dialogue by identifying variations of style and argumentation.
Particularly sensitive to supposed contradictions between Petrarch's use of specific sources,
they saw the ambient tone of the text as reflective of an early enthusiasm for St. Augustine's
De vera religione, and identified two clearly-defined passages in the first book as being
reflective of uniquely 'Stoic' views.38 Using the Familiares and the Canzoniere as a point of
comparison, it was suggested that these two passages were inserted into the original 1347
draft under the influence of Cicero's letters and treatises in around 1353, by which time the
De vera religione was held to have lost its appeal.39 In contrast to a broadly 'Augustinian'
view of the attainment of virtue - involving a meditatio mortis - Baron and Rico believed
35 C. Calcatetta, 'La concezione storica del Petrarca,' Annali della Cattedra Petrarchesca 9 (1939-40):
1-26; idem, Nella selva del Petrarca (Bologna, 1942), 1-18; 418ff; see also Baron, From Petrarch to
Leonardo Bruni, 25, 41; A. S. Bernardo, Petrarch, Laura and the Triumphs (Albany, 1974), 6-8; U.
Bosco, 'Gli studi di Carlo Calcaterra sul Petrarca,' Studi petrarcheschi 5 (1952): 5-13, esp. 10-11.
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that these passages presented Franciscus' 'conflict of cares' as a 'perturbation of mind'
which could be overcome through the development of a 'correct will' and the application of
reason in the pursuit of self-knowledge.40
The revised dating proposed by Rico and Baron has not met with universal approval
and many reviewers expressed concern about the validity of assigning the text to a later
period on the basis of parallels drawn with works which are themselves difficult - if not
impossible - to date.41 Viewing the chronology of Petrarch's intellectual development rather
differently, Enrico Fenzi, Bortolo Martinelli and Giovanni Ponte offered a staunch defence
of the dating of the Secretum to 1342-3 and rejected a number of the biographical claims
intrinsic to Baron and Rico's case.42 Despite disagreement over the dating of the text,
however, the underlying methodology of both those who advocate the 1347-53 dating and
the 1342-3 dating remains identical.43 Critics and supporters of Baron and Rico alike appear
not to dispute that the text displays some evidence of 'Stoical' and 'Augustinian' moments in
tension, and the problem of identifying the date of Petrarch's transition from one mode of
thought to another partly fuels the continuing debate over its composition.
Even accounting for disagreements over dating, it must be granted that there is much
to support the contention that Petrarch did not manage to settle on a single resolution to the
tension between voluptas and virtus, and was induced into equivocation by apparent
contradictions between divergent intellectual traditions. His first eclogue, written between
1346 and 1348, suggests an uncertainty over whether to admire classical poetry -
represented by Homer and Virgil - or the Davidic psalms more.44 In the explanatory letter
which he later sent to his brother Gherardo, Petrarch argued that this was primarily a stylistic
40 See Baron's helpful summary of this position; Baron, Petrarch's Secretum, 45-6.
41 On Rico, Vida u obra, see reviews by F. Bruni, Medioevo romanzo 3 (1976): 144-52; G. Martellotti,
Annali delta Sculoa Normale di Pisa, Classe di lettere e filosofia, 3rd ser. 6/4 (1976): 1394-1401; D.
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442-5; A. D. Scaglione, Romance Philology 30 (1977-8): 1 16-9; K. Foster, Modern Language Review
73 (1978): 442-4. On Baron, Petrarch's Secretum, see reviews by F. E. Cranz, Renaissance Quarterly
39/4 (Winter 1986): 731-2; U. Dotti, Giornale storico della letteratura italiana 164 (1987): 120-5; G.
Holmes, English Historical Review 103 (1988): 480-1; N. Mann, Modern Language Review 83
(1988):751 -2; B. Martinelli, Speculum 62/3 (July 1987): 644-8; M. Palumbo, Medioevo romanzo 11
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consideration, but this may also have had an influence on the texts to which Petrarch turned
for conceptual inspiration in letters to his friends.45 Although he was initially drawn to the
moral theology of St. Augustine, Petrarch's enthusiasm for the De vera religione appears to
have waned by the time he wrote the first book of the Familiares. More and more, he found
himself turning to classical texts: approving quotations from Cicero's Tusculan Disputations,
the Definibus and the De natura deorum appear with mounting frequency in his letters. This
apparent transition can accord with either dating of the Secretum. For Baron and Rico, the
high-watermark of Petrarch's enthusiasm for the De vera religione was reached in 1347 and,
following Giuseppe Billanovich's dating of the first book of the Familiares, the renewed
influence of classical thought began to be felt by the early 1350s.46 The De vera religione,
however, had been known to Petrarch since about 1335, and Bortolo Martinelli has
suggested that at least the letters to Tomasso da Messina should be dated to 1339-41,
allowing for a subsequent period of uncertainty and ambivalence 47
Despite this conscious turning towards classical exemplars, however, Petrarch
remained doubtful about its implications. It is plain in the Secretum that he was grappling
with a perceived tension between the pursuit of literary fame, which he saw as being
compatible with his affection for the pagan classics, and his spiritual health. Similarly, in
attempting to explain the allegorical meaning of Eel. 1, Petrarch's defensive tone and
strategy are themselves underwritten by an acceptance that questions might be raised about
the moral value of both reading and imitating classical texts. In the opening lines of the
letter, he acknowledges that Gherardo might feel that the poetry which looks to Homer and
Virgil for inspiration is opposed to theology and the health of the soul, and despite justifying
their compatibility, there is a sense in which he too shares the same concern.48
Yet if Petrarch was experiencing something of a 'crisis' while he was composing the
Secretum, it is perhaps too easy not only to overstate any apparent contradictions between his
sources of inspiration, but also to ignore his capacity to have produced a logically coherent
text while drawing on a variety of different sources. If he was indeed tormented by tensions
between his admiration for Cicero - for example - and the moral theology of St. Augustine,
it is unnecessary to assume that this emerged out of an antagonism between two monolithic
bodies of thought.49 Although Petrarch did recognise the Stoics - known to him primarily
45 Fam. X, 4, 28-32.
46 Baron, Petrarch's Secretum, 5-6, 218-23; Rico, Vida u obra, 51-6, 532-5; Rico, 'Petrarca y el De
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through Cicero and Seneca - and St. Augustine as authors of distinct philosophical systems,
it is important to bear in mind that he had a subtle understanding of their relationship and
was aware of the possibility of reconciling these two apparently divergent strands of thought
within a discourse of faith and reason proposed by St. Augustine himself.
Although in later life St. Augustine advocated a fideistic theology which stressed the
importance of grace, he had earlier been preoccupied with the problem of synthesising his
burgeoning Christian beliefs with his admiration for classical philosophy, particularly the
'Academic' Stoicism of Cicero's Hortensius.50 In a series of works composed during the last
two decades of the fourth century - the Soliloquies, the De immortalitate animae, the De
vera religione and the De libero arbitrio - he used the problem of temptation as an
opportunity to 'transpose much inherited Stoicism into a form of [Christian] Platonism,' as
John Rist has put it.51 Espousing views in these works which he later came to revoke or
qualify, Augustine attempted to adapt Cicero's understanding of voluntas such that it became
a form of orientation, and strove to reinvent his sceptical understanding of sapientia in such
a way that it would admit the possibility of attaining to an absolute truth through the
application of reason in the context of faith.
During the fourteenth century, it is possible to identify 'a revival of Augustine which
may well lay claim to the much abused designation Renaissance.'52 Under the influence of
figures such as Thomas Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini, St. Augustine's works received
increasing attention as sources for the relationship between faith and reason, and as
precedents for the use of classical quotations in theological discussion.53 Petrarch himself
was acquainted with a number of prominent Augustinian canons and had direct contact with
the 'Augustinian Renaissance'.54 In addition to commending the work warmly, he provided
an introduction to the Milleloquium Divi Augustini, which was compiled by Bishop
50
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Bartolomeo of Urbino and which contained over 15,000 references to Augustine's works
arranged under more than a thousand headings.55 Of more telling importance, however, is the
fact that Petrarch was familiar with Augustine's efforts to integrate Stoicism into the
framework of Christian Neoplatonism. As well as having read the Confessions and observed
the important role played by Cicero's Hortensius in the saint's path to conversion,56 he was
well acquainted with at least two of Augustine's most important works of synthesis from the
late fourth century. His knowledge of the De vera religione has already been mentioned, but
he was also sufficiently impressed by the Soliloquies to include it alongside the Confessions
and the De civitate Dei on his list of his favourite books, which Berthold Ullman has dated to
1333-1343,57 and to quote from it directly on a number of occasions between the 1330s and
late 1350s.58
Having read these texts before he began the Secretum, Petrarch also acknowledged
them as an intellectual bridge between the Stoicism he knew from the works of Cicero and
Seneca, and Christian moral theology. In a letter written to Giacomo Colonna on 21st
December 1336, Petrarch rebutted the insinuation that he had read Augustine only with a
'certain simulated goodwill' and remained wedded to the work of classical philosophers.59 In
mounting his defence, Petrarch pointed out that Cicero's Hortensius had helped Augustine to
turn towards the one truth.60 As a consequence, Petrarch went on to ask Giacomo how it was
possible to see either Plato or Cicero as obstructions to the one truth when they each pointed
the way towards it.61 Writing over thirty years later, Petrarch left no doubt that he was a
Christian above all else, and read the works of Cicero - for example - as a moral source only
insofar as they could be viewed as compatible with his faith. Using Augustine as his
authority once again, Petrarch claimed that had they lived only a little later, both Cicero and
Plato would certainly have been Christians.62
Despite the interpretations which have followed from attempts to identify
compositional layers in the text, therefore, there are grounds to treat the suggestion that the
Secretum made eclectic use of divergent traditions with some caution, and to regard the two
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there being a breach between Petrarch's use of classical and patristic texts, his familiarity
with the Soliloquies and the De vera religione would have permitted a much more flexible
and dynamic approach. Viewed not as representative of a monolithic body of theology in
tension with ancient thought, but as a bridge between Stoic philosophy and classical
literature on the one hand, and Christian Neoplatonism on the other hand, the Soliloquies and
the De vera religione offered Petrarch the opportunity to marry a rationalistic search for truth
with faith and grace while allowing him a relatively free literary rein. Recognising that St.
Augustine had been an avid reader of Cicero, and approving of the Christian moral theology
which developed out of that reading, Petrarch had a precedent for the selective use of
classical texts in the Secretum. Quotation did not necessarily mean philosophical affinity any
more than imitation meant reproduction.63 Had Petrarch had the Soliloquies and the De vera
religione in mind while composing the Secretum, it would have been perfectly legitimate for
him to have mined Cicero's dialogues and Seneca's letters - for example - for gnomic
quotations and ancillary support while remaining true to St. Augustine's moral theology.64
3. Understanding Franciscus' 'illness': voluntas, cognition and the meditatio
mortis
The first of Rico and Baron's 'stoical' passages occurs at the beginning of the first book of
the Secretum. As we have already seen, in attempting to guide Franciscus away from his
misery and towards virtue, Augustinus' first task was to uncover the underlying
psychological reason for his slothful attachment to the temporal. Having been introduced by
Lady Truth, Augustinus begins somewhat obliquely by asking Franciscus whether he has
forgotten the fact of his own mortality, for, he explains,
nothing may be found more efficacious for spurning the allurements of this life
and for composing the mind among the innumerable tempests of the world than
a recollection of one's misery and a constant contemplation of death.65
Although Franciscus claims never to forget his mortality, Augustinus doubts his sincerity
and suspects that he is one of the many who persist in deceiving themselves and insist on
ignoring the perils to which they are exposed. The role of the will is central to the
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development of this line of argument. Using the analogy of sickness and health, Augustinus
shows that if a person recognises his unhappiness, he would naturally wish to rid himself of
that misery. As a result of this desire, he would earnestly strive to shed his unhappiness and,
as a consequence of this effort, would inevitably have his wish satisfied.66 Although
Franciscus agrees that a man who had recognised his unhappiness would want to be happy,
he objects that many people are nevertheless unhappy against their will. Augustinus corrects
him and states that since only virtue can make a man happy, it follows that only vice can
make a man unhappy.67 As Franciscus allows himself to be persuaded, the conversation turns
once again to the meditatio mortis™
In his study of the Secretum, Baron followed Rico in suggesting that the manner in
which Petrarch handled the 'desire to be happy' was reflective of an absorption of the Stoic
doctrine of the will.69 As Bouwsma, Trinkaus and Foster have argued, in stating that no man
can be unhappy against his will, Augustinus appears to present Franciscus' attachment to the
world as a 'perturbation of the mind', evoking the Stoicism which Petrarch would have
encountered through Cicero and Seneca.70 As such, the treatment of voluntas does not appear
to fit comfortably with the surrounding instances of the Christian and 'medieval' meditatio
mortis theme, and could best be explained as a later insertion into the text.
This interpretation is certainly not unconvincing. Petrarch was well acquainted with
several sources which describe the Stoic doctrine of the will and which would have been
attractive texts for emulation. In the Tusculan Disputations and the De finibus, for example,
Cicero outlined the Stoic view that happiness could only come from virtue71 and affirmed
that virtue could only be attained by consenting to the good and by withholding consent from
the bad.72 In his letters, Seneca frequently wrote that it was incorrect to believe that corporeal
pleasures were good and similarly incorrect to believe that physical suffering was bad.73 A
correctly ordered soul declined to consent to these errant beliefs and instead consented to
temperance in the face of pleasure, or fortitude in the face of pain.74
From Petrarch's perspective, Cicero illustrates this point particularly well in his
critique of Torquatus' Epicurean belief that pain and pleasure corresponded to happiness and
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misery in the De finibus. Here, Cicero considers Epicurus' statement that, were he being
burnt to death, he would exclaim 'How delightful this is!' In denying the existence of his
physical suffering, Epicurus is presented as having believed that he would overcome the
possibility of unhappiness.75 Cicero, however, contends that in refusing to recognise the
existence of the flames, Epicurus would not have avoided misery at all. The distress of being
burnt, he explained, does not lie in the pain of the fire itself, but in the willingness to
withhold consent from the urge to give in to the effects of the flames, and the refusal to turn
to courage.76 Here, it is the will which determines whether a man submits himself to the
effects of certain stimuli or allows himself to assume the mantle of the good.
Having encountered these views, it would not have been implausible for Petrarch to
have inserted them into a later draft of the Secretum. Had Petrarch indeed drawn inspiration
from Stoic thought, we should read the opening pages of the dialogue as an explanation of
Franciscus' need to develop a 'correct will'. Since he submits himself willingly to earthly
experiences - and, as Seneca explained, thereby willingly made himself susceptible to the
whim of fortune77 - he must, if he desires happiness, decline to consent to the effects of an
unstable world and will only the good. Read in this way, the passage would seem to outline a
reasonable remedy for Franciscus' condition, but would stand in contrast to the meditatio
mortis theme. Although Cicero, quoting Plato, declared that the life of the philosopher is a
preparation for death,78 the emphasis on the corruptibility of the body integral to Petrarch's
treatment of the meditatio mortis is entirely absent.79
Although a 'stoical' reading of this passage is not unreasonable, however, it is not a
completely satisfying interpretation. As well as relying on a poor view of Petrarch's
compositional skills, such a reading seems to fit uneasily with a close examination of
Augustinus' actual words. Discussing Franciscus' appreciation of his misery, he asks
whether anyone 'has so lost track of sense that, having been gripped by a deadly illness, he
would not ardently desire health.'80 Franciscus agrees that no-one who was really sick would
not desire health, and this prompts Augustinus to ask a further question. 'Do you think,' he
presses, 'that there is anyone so lazy and remiss of spirit that he would not strive with all his
75
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zeal after that which he desired with all his mind?'81 Franciscus agrees that there is no-one so
indolent. Augustinus then leads him to a crucial conclusion:
Just as someone who comes to recognise that he is miserable from deep and
intense meditation desires not to be miserable, and as someone who has begun
to hope for this strives for it, so he who has striven for this is also able to
achieve it. For it is clear that the third of these can only be impeded by a defect
in the second, just as the second can be impeded only by a defect in the first; so
it is correct that the root of human well-being is in the first.82
Whereas Baron, Rico and others have interpreted this as a statement of the importance of the
'desire not to be miserable', Augustinus clearly indicates that Franciscus' error is not one of
will, but of cognition. Since he does not recognise his illness, he cannot desire to be well or
strive for health and hence cannot rid himself of his sickness. A few paragraphs later,
Augustinus revisits the same point and asks Franciscus whether he recalls 'that a perfect
understanding of our own miseries produces a perfect longing to rise from them.'83
Explaining further, he states that Franciscus never really wanted to be happy because his
mind remained unmoved.84 This stands in stark contrast to the form of Academic Stoicism
propounded by Cicero and Seneca. Omitting to propose any necessary connection between
cognition and will, Cicero and Seneca leave open the possibility that a person could
recognise the cause of his misery and yet decline to consent to the virtue which he knew
would lead to happiness.
If it is unlikely for this passage to have been the outcome of an absorption of Stoic
ethics, other texts present themselves as plausible sources. The first pages of the Secretum
seem to have many parallels with the opening of Boethius' Consolatio Philosophiae and
Augustine's Soliloquies, and - in addition to their apparently autobiographical nature - these
texts appear to recall the appearance of Lady Truth, the nature of Franciscus' illness and
Augustinus' diagnosis of his error in Petrarch's dialogue. In the Soliloquies, the character
Augustinus has been thinking about the nature of the good in solitude for some time when
the mysterious figure of Ratio appears to him.85 Under questioning, Augustinus admits that
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he is disturbed by 'the fear of loss of those I love, the fear of suffering and the fear of
death.'86 Using a form of dialogue quite different from that employed by Cicero, but similar
to that in the Secretum, Ratio points out that Augustinus' sadness is the result of his being
unduly attached to the world,87 and proceeds to guide his soul toward God through cognitive
change. In the Consolatio Philosophiae, which may have been partly modelled on the
Soliloquies,88 Boethius' character is again sitting alone meditating in a glade when Lady
Philosophy appears and attempts to dispel his misery.89 As in the Soliloquies, Boethius'
'vision is clouded by mortal shadows, he is held fast by earthly longings, and he is tossed by
passion.'90 Lady Philosophy consoles him and endeavours to free him from the assaults of
fortune.
It is, however, Augustine's early works - the Soliloquies and the De vera religione -
which, as conscious adaptations of Stoic thought, recommend themselves most strongly as
potential sources for Petrarch's argument in the first pages of the Secretum.91 From his
reading of the De vera religione, Petrarch was well acquainted with Augustine's approbation
of the Stoic view that happiness could only come from virtue92 and with his affirmation that
virtue and vice were the result of will.93 In contrast to the Stoics, however, St. Augustine
viewed voluntas not as a variety of consent, but as a form of orientation that was rooted in
cognition. Virtue was, indeed, a matter of voluntas, but only in that virtue was the outcome
of an orientation of the self towards God. By the same token, sin was the outcome of an
orientation towards the world.94
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In the De vera religione, St. Augustine explained that a man could turn his
orientation towards God by coming to understand the truth about God and the soul.95 From
Scripture, he argued, it is evident that God provided the human soul with the capacity to
redeem itself and to merit a blessed life after death.96 Although a full comprehension of this
truth would lead a man to love God and the good, his understanding could be impeded by a
reliance on the senses.97 In the Soliloquies, this question was examined from the perspective
of a philosophical enquiry into the nature of Veritas and reveals a critical reliance on the
distinction between the mortal and the eternal.98
Having explained that he would like to know about God and the good, Augustinus is
told that since he is seeking the truth, he must first understand what the word 'truth' itself
connotes if he is ever to desire it.99 In this, Ratio distinguishes between 'truth' and 'true'.
The nature of a corporeal object can be described as 'true' in that one can speak of a 'true'
tree.100 This quality of being true is, however, bound up with existence and terminates with
death. Yet in order to speak of 'truth' as something which exists in itself, it must exist
distinct from the existence of corporeal things. As Ratio explains, 'truth' persists after the
death of a true corporeality in the same way that chastity exists after a chaste person dies.101
Consequently,
Truth is therefore not in mortal things. Truth does, however, exist and is
somewhere. There are, therefore, immortal things. Nothing however is true in
which there is no truth. It follows that only immortal things are true.102
The argument is somewhat abstract, but the syllogism is relatively simple. The truth which
Augustinus is searching for is absolute and eternal. Nothing of this absolute truth could be
found in mortal things whose existence is fleeting. Since anything that is not the truth is
false, all mortal things are falsehoods. The implication is clear. If a man wished to change his
orientation by coming to know the truth about God and the soul, he must first come to realise
that the truth he seeks cannot be found in the mortal. Any mortal pleasure must be avoided in
the pursuit of Veritas. He must recognise that anything that will die is the antithesis of
95
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everything he seeks. The allurements of the physical world perceptible to the body must
therefore be spurned as the first step in the pursuit of truth.103 Truth, as Ratio goes on to
explain, can be found only within the immortal soul itself.
Had Petrarch drawn inspiration from the De vera religione and the Soliloquies, a
quite different interpretation of our passage emerges. Where Franciscus' condition is viewed
as a crisis of orientation, Augustinus' contention that no-one is unhappy against his will
serves to highlight the fact that Franciscus does not recognise his 'illness'. If, as he claimed
after the initial statement of the meditatio mortis, Franciscus really did meditate on death, he
would know that true happiness could only be found in the eternal and would as a
consequence aspire to virtue and desire the verafelicitas. Augustinus' connection of will and
happiness illustrates that Franciscus cannot fully understand the implications of human
mortality. This digression, stimulated by Franciscus' self-deception, is a necessary
development of the initial statement of the meditatio mortis and logically leads on to a more
detailed explanation of the same theme. In the same way as in the De vera religione the
desire for happiness is bound up with a recognition of the fallacy of looking to the mortal
world. A reading of this passage which views Petrarch's apparent classicising tendencies as
part of a strategy derived from St. Augustine's early works, therefore, not only generates a
coherent view of Petrarch's opening treatment of virtue and happiness, but also gives weight
to the reference to 'recognition' that is ignored in a 'stoical' reading.
4. Parallels: the world, the truth and voluntas in the
De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia and the Invective contra medicum
Although it is possible to read Rico and Baron's first 'stoical' passage as a treatment of the
role of cognition in moral reorientation in imitation of the early works of St. Augustine, one
of Petrarch's most frequently quoted texts has been used to suggest it was the will, and not
the mind which was of primary significance. In the fourth book of the De sui ipsius et
multorum ignorantia, Petrarch attempted to rebut the Aristotelian claims of his Venetian
friends by using Aristotle's own philosophy. Petrarch begins by affirming that Aristotle
failed to achieve his own objective. 'I have often complained to myself and with others,' he
wrote,
that what is announced by the philosopher in the first book of the Ethics is not
fulfilled, that is to say that we study this branch of philosophy not so that we
may know, but so that we may become good.104
103 ibid., I, xiv, 24.
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Petrarch does not deny that Aristotle defines the good admirably, but he points out that the
knowledge that the philosopher imparts does not 'urge the mind towards love of virtue and
hatred of vice.'105 It is, after all, one thing to know and another one to love or to will,106 'but
it is preferable [satius] to will the good than to know the truth.'107
This passage can be examined from a variety of different perspectives and there will
be cause to return to its implications in a later chapter, but for scholars such as Trinkaus and
Seigel, Petrarch appears to criticise Aristotle's approach to moral philosophy because it lacks
the stirring exhortations and grand style that would otherwise inspire the reader to love and
will the good.108 Seeing rhetoric as intimately related to the will, Trinkaus reads the assertion
'Satius est autem bonum velle quam verum nosse' as an affirmation of the primacy of
voluntas in determining virtue.109
Although the passage may seem to imply that Aristotle's failure is rhetorical,
Petrarch's objection is actually related to the ends for which knowledge is sought. If
knowledge of the good is sought for its own sake, Petrarch suggests, its value is limited. It is
only where this knowledge is sought for the sake of loving the good that it becomes
worthwhile. 'What is the use,' he asks, 'of knowing what virtue is, if that knowledge does
not make us love it?110 Aristotle's error lay in pursuing knowledge without understanding its
proper end, not merely in explaining the nature of the good inadequately.
The importance of distinguishing between knowledge for its own sake and
knowledge for the sake of loving the good is explained in greater detail in the following
paragraphs. 'Those who spend their time,' Petrarch writes a little later,
in knowing virtue rather than attaining it err greatly, and [those who spend their
time] in learning about rather than in loving God err most of all. For while it is
104 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 107: 'Et sepe mecum et quandoque cum aliis questus
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possible for no-one to know God entirely in this life, it is possible to love Him
piously and ardently...111
While this appears to reprise Academic Scepticism, it is in fact a statement of God's
unfathomable nature familiar to St. Augustine's moral theology.112 Petrarch's intention is not
to limit the value of knowledge, but rather to criticise the man who sought knowledge of God
and virtue out of intellectual pride. Man is, after all, capable of knowing something about
virtue and something about God. What matters is the end for which it is sought. It is
impossible, Petrarch argues, to love the unknown, but it is enough
to know God and virtue no more than is granted, so that we may know Him to
be the most radiant, most judicious, most kind and inexhaustible fount of all
good, by whom and through whom and in whom we are as good as we are, and
know also that virtue is the best thing after God.113
Once a man knows this, then he shall love God, and love virtue for God's sake with his
whole heart and being.114
As a result, Petrarch's assertion that 'it is preferable (satius) to will the good than to
know the truth' appears to be misleading. It is not that Petrarch advocated prioritising
voluntas over knowledge in the pursuit of virtue, but rather that the distinction between the
two serves to highlight the importance of the proper end of knowledge. Where knowledge is
sought for its own sake it will bring him neither virtue nor happiness. Where knowledge is
sought for the sake of loving what is known, a man will come to love God and virtue fully.
Knowledge, in other words, precedes voluntas.
This connection between knowledge and voluntas is repeated and expanded in the
fourth book of the Invective contra medicum, which was compiled out of a series of earlier
letters in 1355.115 Here, Petrarch not only equates understanding with orientation, but also
develops his discussion of knowledge to explain the opposition between the mortal and the
eternal in a manner which provides a further parallel to the argument in the first pages of the
Secretum.
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In rebutting papal physician's accusations, Petrarch explained that 'within the soul is
that which makes one happy and miserable.' The man who would be happy, he continued,
should divest his soul of worldliness before turning it towards itself and God."6 Referring
directly to the De vera religione, Petrarch pointed out that
Plato's observation, which Augustine cited and praised, is widely recognised as
true. To cite his very words, 'We seek the truth not with the body's eyes, but
with a pure mind. When the soul clings to the truth, it becomes blessed and
perfect; and nothing hinders our perception of the truth more than a life devoted
to sensual desires.'"7
The turning of the soul towards itself and God is connected with the search for the truth
which resides within. The perception of the truth, however, is inhibited by a reliance on the
bodily senses which apprehend only the mortal.
Together, these passages from the Invective contra medicum and the De sui ipsius et
multorum ignorantia seem to reinforce the view that Petrarch - consciously evoking the
work of the young St. Augustine - perceived a direct connection between knowledge and
voluntas, and recognised that the apprehension of truth was impeded by the bodily senses. In
the context of the Secretum, this adds weight to the suggestion that Augustinus identifies
Franciscus' 'illness' as a problem of orientation stemming from a cognitive failure which is
itself caused by the effects of his dependence on the mortal world.
5. Becoming virtuous: the meditatio mortis, self-knowledge and the role of
reason.
Insofar as Petrarch's conception of virtue is concerned, an early-Augustinian reading of
Baron and Rico's first 'Stoic' passage serves to illustrate that the first step on Franciscus'
path was a full recognition of the corruptibility of the corporeal. Once he had apprehended
that mortal things were antithetical to his comprehension of the good, it remained for him to
turn to the eternal, as Lady Truth had suggested in the proem."8 The question of how
Franciscus could turn towards the heavenly is the issue which the second of Baron and
Rico's 'Stoic' passages concerns.
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Immediately following a paragraph restating the meditatio mortis, this passage
begins with a thinly-veiled attack on dialecticians. As in the fourth book of the De sui ipsius
et multorum ignorantia,u9 Petrarch has Augustinus attack those who define human nature 'in
all the schools' but who fail to live in accordance with the nature they claim to understand.120
'You will not find any shepherd,' he says, 'who is so untutored that he does not know that a
man is an animal, indeed, the first of all animals, or, again, anyone who denies that man is an
animal both rational and mortal.'121 Although this point is well known, there are few people
who take it to heart. If they did, they would know and live according to their own nature, and
so become virtuous. 'If you see a man,' he says,
whose reason is so strong that he organises his life as he follows it, that he
subordinates his desire to himself alone, that he reins in the impulses of his
mind with its bridle, and that he understands both that he is only distinguished
from the savagery of brute animals through it and also that unless he lives by
reason, he does not deserve the name of man; who beyond this is so conscious
of his own mortality that he has it before his eyes each day, governs himself
through it, and, contemptuous of these mortal things, aspires to that life where,
made much greater by reason, he ceases to be mortal - this person, you may
say, possesses true and useful knowledge about the definition of man.122
This passage is critical for an understanding of the mechanism by which a man who had
spurned the temporal could embrace virtue fully. It is, however, lacking both in rigour and
detail.
For Rico and Baron, this passage is best understood as another 'Stoic' interlude.
Pointing to the emphasis on the meditatio mortis theme in the surrounding paragraphs, Baron
suggests that the attack on dialecticians and the 'glorification of reason' comes at 'quite an
unlikely spot'.123 The dialogue makes perfect sense, in Baron's view, when the passage is
removed and he therefore contends that the 'glorification' of man's rational nature was
introduced into an earlier draft of the Secretion,124 Baron's point is broadly reflective of
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general historical opinion. For Bouwsma, the 'sovereignty of reason' suggested by this
passage is a manifestation of the Stoics' attribution of a 'divine spark, identified with reason'
to mankind.125 In Foster's study, it is the role played by this 'divine spark' in combating the
desires that 'the wise man cannot help feeling' that reflects the influence of Stoicism.126 In
the same vein, Trinkaus has argued that the emphasis on truth to a rational nature as the key
to a self-directed existence can be seen as a revival of the 'ideal of Cicero and Seneca'.127
This interpretation is certainly not unjust. In the De officiis alone Petrarch would
have encountered the view that reason differentiates mankind from animals. Unlike a beast,
which is moved by the senses alone, a man
because he is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends the chain of
consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands the relation of cause
to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, and connects and associates
the present and the future - easily surveys the course of his whole life and
makes the necessary preparations for its conduct.128
Reason allows man to apprehend his soul's place within the concatenation of nature and to
judge what is proper in life.129 For Cicero, as well as for Seneca, right reason allows man to
comprehend virtue.130
Reason, moreover, underpinned Cicero's recommendation of self-knowledge as the
key to the transcendence of mortality. In the rebuttal of Torquatus' Epicurean claims, the
Delphic injunction to know oneself is identified with the application of reason to human
existence.131 The man who is 'occupied day and night' in this enterprise will eventually
recognise that his soul is 'not limited to this short span of life' and will not merely cease to
worry about death, but will also effectively transcend his mortality.132
The role played by reason in Stoic moral philosophy has a parallel in Petrarch's
treatment of reason in the Secretum. When the exact wording of the passage is examined
more closely, however, there are some significant problems with a purely 'Stoic'
interpretation. Throughout the passage, Petrarch emphasises that man is not only rational, but
also mortal, and sketches the relationship between these two components. Although the
wording is awkward, Petrarch argues that while it is reason which distinguishes man from
the 'savagery of brute animals', the shift in the direction of argument before adeo suggests
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that it is the contemplation of mortality - and not reason - which allows self-governance and
permits him to temper himself.133 This impression is swiftly confirmed in the text.
Immediately following 'per [mortalitatem] se ipsum temperef, Petrarch deploys the phrase
'et hec peritura despiciens ad illam vitarn suspiret, ubi, ratione superauctus, desinet esse
mortalis.' Despite the cumbersome construction, this suggests that the contemplation of
mortality is prior to the desire to live according to reason.134
It is difficult to find any Stoic precedent for such a line of argument. Nowhere in the
works of Cicero and Seneca may we find any similar treatment of mortality. Although it was
a matter of concern for both, they consistently strove to devalue death and never advocated
the continued contemplation of mortality which Augustinus recommends in the Secretum. If
anything, Cicero and Seneca presented reason as being prior to the banishment of fears of
death and often advised friends to cease worrying about their demise. In the Tusculan
Disputations, Cicero improvised on a Stoic theme in suggesting that, since the soul is
immortal, death should be met with equanimity.135 Developing this further, he contended that
rational contemplation could lead a man to feel a 'union with the divine mind' and cease to
think himself 'limited to this short span of life'.136
It is perhaps a little too easy to overstress the significance of this problem,
particularly given the awkwardness of Petrarch's phraseology, but it is important to point out
that, despite its appeal, the identification of this passage as having been drawn from Stoic
sources is open to question. As with the first allegedly 'Stoic' passage, however, an
alternative heuristic device may be derived from the De vera religione and the Soliloquies.
In the De vera religione, St. Augustine borrowed from Stoic texts in affirming that
reason was the faculty which distinguished man from the animals.137 Granted to humankind
by God, reason allowed man to apprehend the light of truth shining from within his soul, and
is hence closely connected with self-knowledge. In the Soliloquies, Ratio explains that God,
like the soul, can be understood through the exercise of reason.138 Although God illuminates
himself, reason allows man to 'see' Him139 and the self to be reoriented accordingly.140
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In keeping with his understanding of the nature of truth, however, St. Augustine
argued that reason could be inhibited by corporeal desires. Having established that truth is
immortal in the De immortalitate animae, Ratio demonstrates that the soul contains 'truth'
within itself as a form of reason.141 The soul, however, does not possess reason except as a
natural 'memory' which can be recalled or forgotten.142 The soul can remember truth by
turning towards reason, but may jeopardise or even lose its awareness of the truth in
succumbing to corporeal phenomena or in fostering worldly sentiments.143
If his soul is to recover the 'memory' of truth within itself, therefore, it was
necessary for a person to forsake mortal things and to embrace reason instead. Elsewhere in
his works, Augustine expressed this as a need to seek the sapientia accessible to the intellect
rather than the scientia accessible through the senses.144 As he explained in the Soliloquies,
however, a person could only use reason to see the light of God within himself once he had
understood the nature of truth and desired it earnestly. As we have already seen, this was
contingent on his first having apprehended that truth could be found not in the mortal, but
only in the eternal. If reason is to operate uninhibited, therefore, a meditation on mortality
and truth is first necessary to quell voluptas and to produce a mind unmoved by corporeal
desires. In direct contrast to the Stoics, it was not reason which stilled the heart's desires, but
the contemplation of mortality. Indeed, at the beginning of the third book of the Secretum,
Augustinus uses Terence's words to suggest that reason could not be used to control
Franciscus' irrational desire for love and glory.145 Only once desire had been excised through
a meditation on death could reason act to uncover the inner truth of the soul, and thus bind
the desires of the body. In the second book of the dialogue, Petrarch used Virgil in the
manner of Fulgentius to illustrate St. Augustine's contention that once the meditatio mortis
has excised voluptas the mind may keep desire at bay thenceforth.146
Insofar as Petrarch recognised that man is a rational animal, St. Augustine's early
works would have been an equally valid point of references as Seneca or Cicero. In that they
presented the consciousness of mortality as working hand-in-hand with the exercise of
reason, however, the De vera religione and the Soliloquies are much more likely sources of
inspiration for the second 'Stoic' passage identified by Rico and Baron. It cannot, of course,
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be said that Petrarch conveyed any of the subtleties of Augustine's early treatment of reason,
but he may still be seen to have participated in the spirit of its heritage and the second 'Stoic'
passage may be interpreted as conveying adequately the general implications of the
epistemological arguments of the Soliloquies and the De vera religione. Like St. Augustine,
Petrarch's discussion of the means by which a man may become virtuous begins with a
recognition of corporeal mortality. Keeping the fact of his death before him at all times, a
man may not only 'govern himself and become 'contemptuous of mortal things', but will
also aspire to 'that life where, made much greater by reason, he ceases to be mortal.' Freed
of the burden of voluptas, reason allows a man to merit salvation for his soul, that part of
himself which will not be subject to death or decay.
6. Breaking the 'adamantine chains', the reception of grace and the function of
prayer
It would not be inaccurate to say that the 'philosophical' arguments of the first book of the
Secretum concentrate on the examination of the self. In the second and third books,
Franciscus' all-too-human failings and accidia are considered more closely, and the
theological issues of grace and prayer are frequently raised. For Trinkaus, the relationship
between rational self-examination and grace was reflective of what he terms 'the tradition of
the double consciousness'. In The Poet as Philosopher, Trinkaus argues that
'[f]or Petrarch, the transformation of the self had to come from divine mercy,
by grace alone, but first there had to be a mind that knew its errors and the self-
deceptions of its affective attachments to alluring but destructive ways of
existence. Insight concerning the self was not enough ... but insight concerning
the self was a needed preliminary to the possibility of grace.147
As Franciscus' will was 'both insufficient and divided', he could never completely heal his
soul even with the most intense meditation: only grace, Trinkaus suggests, could save him.148
Drawing a parallel with the later works of St. Augustine, Trinkaus emphasises that 'Petrarch
shared the view that man's salvation came by grace alone'.149 In this respect, Petrarch is held
to have foreshadowed certain elements of Reformation theology: pointing to Petrarch's
treatment of despair in the De otio religioso, addressed to the Carthusian monastery at
Montrieux, Trinkaus asks 'was it not also within the fold of the Augustinian Hermits that
Brother Martin Luther first experienced his sense of despair and divine hatred that led him to
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his subjective theology of sola fideV150 On the basis of what is perceived to be a common
belief in justification by grace alone, Trinkaus concludes that Petrarch's religious proximity
to Luther was 'amazing'.151
Trinkaus' argument is in some ways attractive. The image of man as continually
tortured by the ambivalence of his will, and dependent always on the grace of God for
release, corresponds well to the idea of Petrarch as a poet who indulged the conflict of his
own unresolved cares. It is, however, difficult to sustain Trinkaus' suggestion that Petrarch
advocated salvation by grace alone in anticipation of Luther's reforming theology. The
teleological approach explicit in this comparison is itself open to question, but in the present
context, it is of greater concern that Trinkaus' interpretation of Petrarch's theology of grace
rests on the assumption not merely that Franciscus had an irreconcilably divided will, but
also that there was a fissure between Ciceronian reason and a monolithic 'Augustinianism' in
the Secretum.
In that it is an examination of his moral condition, the Secretum is predicated on
Franciscus' inability to raise himself from his misery. This is not, however, to say that
Franciscus is by his very nature unable to transform himself. In the final moments of the
dialogue, Franciscus thanks Augustinus for his guidance and resolves to keep the importance
of the meditatio mortis in mind.152 Suddenly wavering, however, he then says that he is
unable to restrain his desires.153 'We're returning to our old debate,' Augustinus replies, 'you
say that your will is impotent. But let it be so, since it can't be otherwise, and I pray God that
He will accompany you and allow you to reach safety, wherever you wander.'154 In this last
exchange, Franciscus experiences a crisis of confidence in the strength of his will. Far from
acceding that this is indicative of a permanent failure, however, Augustinus' response returns
attention to the very beginning of the dialogue and reminds Franciscus that the solution to his
dilemma lies first with a meditation on death. God willing, Franciscus will indeed redeem
himself.
Augustinus' appeal to God to allow Franciscus to redeem himself in this passage is
important in that it seems to hint at the operation of the meditatio mortis and reason in the
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context of grace. Further light is shone on the relationship between Augustinus' moral
programme and God's benevolence in the second book, shortly before Franciscus' accidia is
discussed. At the beginning of the second day, Augustinus reminds Franciscus that his pride
and arrogance have prevented him from knowing his own nature and virtue.155 Yet, even if
Franciscus' strengths were as great as he believed, Augustinus cautions, this should be cause
for humility rather than pride, considering that he acquired it not by his own merits, but by
the grace of God.156 This is not to say that Franciscus could not have these strengths as an
autonomous individual capable of redeeming himself, but rather that such abilities as he has
exist only within the context of grace. So, as Augustinus explains a little later, if a man is
chaste, his chastity comes from God even though he might have struggled to overcome his
urges.157 Indeed, it is in overcoming his desires that a man both receives and evidences God's
grace. The individual's endeavour works in co-operation with the undeserved grace of God,
as Franciscus himself seems to indicate.158 At the beginning of the third day's discussion, the
need for active participation in the work of grace is highlighted explicitly. Reviewing the
'adamantine chains' which bind Franciscus and prevent him from reflecting on his own
mortality, Augustinus says that just as the blood of a goat is necessary to shatter adamant, so
the blood of Christ has been provided to soften the hardened cares with which he is
tormented.159 Although Christ's blood can penetrate even the hardest heart, however, assent
is needed for it to operate. Since Franciscus has not been healed by the blood of Christ,
Augustinus can only presume that he has not assented to its effects.160 As 'assent' is
identifiable with orientation, and orientation with cognition, it is possible to see that in order
for grace to operate, Franciscus must co-operate with its action through a continuous
meditation on death and the rational pursuit of self-knowledge.
Rather than there being an implicit tension between Ciceronian reason and an
'Augustinian' theology of grace as Trinkaus has argued, the co-operation of grace and
endeavour which Petrarch describes corresponds to the interplay between faith and
understanding in St. Augustine's early works. Although in his later writings St. Augustine
downplayed the role of human effort and placed greater emphasis on grace as the
precondition of salvation, his earlier works demonstrate a more flexible approach which
reflect his youthful attempts to reconcile classical philosophy and Christian theology. In the
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De vera religione, Augustine stressed that although mankind had fallen by its his own
volition, by God's grace it could return to God.161 By using the reason with which God had
endowed him, a man could turn himself away from the temporal and towards the truth.162 His
capacity to do so was predicated on God's divine mercy and would, by extension, also merit
the reception of grace.163
The role of prayer in the Secretum further demonstrates the compatibility of faith
and individual endeavour, and Petrarch's debt to St. Augustine's early works. There are, of
course, numerous instances of prayers being offered in the course of the dialogue, but a
particularly revealing explanation of the importance of prayer itself occurs on the third day.
While Franciscus is calling to mind the mortality of his body and trying to quash his desires,
Augustinus advises him also to 'weary the ears of the Ethereal King with devout prayer.'
Indeed
no day, no night should pass without tears and solemn appeals, if - having
taken pity - the Omnipotent One is to put an end to such troubles. You must
take care to do these things; and if you observe them carefully, divine help will
come and, as I hope, the invincible Saviour will with his right hand give
164
succour.
Although, as with the direct references to grace, this could be read as a statement of the
limitations of Franciscus' abilities, it may more meaningfully be seen as an extension of
Petrarch's debt to St. Augustine's early interpretation of the interplay of faith and
understanding. The Soliloquies itself begins with a heartfelt prayer in which Augustinus begs
to be received as he rushes towards God.165 In the same manner as Franciscus in the
Secretum, Augustinus asks for strength.166 In this respect, Augustinus' prayer in the
Soliloquies appears almost as a private recapitulation of what is already known and a
revision of what is sought. This, indeed, is precisely how St. Augustine defined prayer in the
De magistro. 'In prayer,' he wrote, 'we cannot hold that God needs to be taught or reminded,
so that when we use words we do so to remind ourselves or to admonish and teach others.'167
As such, the act of prayer to God has the effect of consolidating the devotee's commitment
to that which is sought. Understandably, St. Augustine associated prayer with the rational
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part of human nature. Again in the De magistro, he writes that 'God is to be sought and
prayed to in the secret place of the rational soul, which is called the "inner man".'168
Despite Trinkaus' willingness to distinguish between Ciceronian reason and a
monolithic 'Augustinian' theology, therefore, Petrarch's understanding of prayer and grace
can be seen as a coherent part of a moral philosophy developed under the influence of St.
Augustine's early works. Rather than being an indication of the limitations of his ability
autonomously to spurn vice and embrace virtue, the fact that Franciscus prays for God's help
reflects the co-operative relationship between grace and rational self-transformation in the
Secreturn.
168
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2
All in the Mind: Otium in the
De otio religoso
1. Living virtuously: Salutati's De seculo et religione and Petrarch's De otio
religioso
Italian humanists of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries claimed moral philosophy as
the fifth of the studia humanitatis and, as Charles Trinkaus observed in 1964, much
scholarship has been devoted to uncovering the various attempts to define concepts such as
'happiness', 'wisdom' and 'virtue'.1 In propounding a notion of virtue derived from the
moral theology of St. Augustine, but which reached out gnomically to the Latin classics,
Petrarch participated actively in the humanist appropriation of moral philosophy in the
Secretum, albeit in a distinctively Christian fashion. Yet the first humanists were not merely
interested in the abstract: they were as deeply concerned with the identity of the virtuous life
as they were with the nature of virtue itself. This question of how to conceive of the life of
virtue was in many ways inherited from 'traditional medieval problems of ecclesiastical
morality' and, overlapping with concepts of civic engagement, affected by aspects of
mendicant thought.2 It was, however, also influenced by the language and preoccupations
which shaped classical treatment of terms such as otium and solitudo. Navigating the
treacherous waters which both connected and divided texts from the classical, patristic and
medieval traditions, figures including Coluccio Salutati, Lorenzo Valla and Ambrogio
Traversari were interested in determining whether it was better to pursue a vita activa - an
active civic life - or to pursue a vita contemplativa - a life of meditative withdrawal in which
'special sanctity [was] granted ... to members of religious orders.'3
Coluccio Salutati's De seculo et religione, written in about 1381, ranks among the
most important humanist treatises on the relationship between the secular and religious
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lives.4 Although he later altered his position - most notably in a letter to Pellegrino
Zambeccari written on 23rd May 13985 - Salutati's tract is a defence of the religious life
which built on an assertion of the primacy of the will. Despite his role as Chancellor of the
Florentine Republic, he distinguished sharply between the sinfulness of a life devoted to
temporal pursuits and the virtue of a life given over to God. The distinction unmistakably
evokes the spirit of St. Augustine's works, and it is perhaps not surprising that Salutati relied
heavily on the De civitate Dei.6 As Trinkaus and Ronald Witt have pointed out, however, the
distinction between the two modes of living is infused and, indeed, shaped by a notion of
primitivism which is derived from, amongst others, Juvenal's Satires, Virgil's Eclogues and
Boethius' Consolatio Philosophiae.7 In passages coursing with fervour, Salutati merges this
with currents of traditional monastic thought and even aspects of mendicant theology.8 He
urges men to
take away greed, depose riches, renounce the world, lead your life according to
the precepts [of Scripture], attempt to fulfil the counsels, subdue your will to
the divine will ... begin to love God, hate the world, love poverty, hate riches.9
The monastic way is the true way, and Salutati speaks admiringly of those who willingly
submit themselves to harsh and difficult lives of religious discipline.
Salutati's De seculo et religione has frequently been compared to Petrarch's De otio
religioso and the latter is usually read as having contrasted life in the world with the
monastic life in a similar manner.10 Although Rodney Lokaj, for example, has viewed it as a
more critical text," most scholars have seen the De otio relgioso as a celebration of the life
of religious contemplation and as a humanistic appropriation of medieval monastic thought.
For Paul Oskar Kristeller, 'Petrarch transformed the monastic ideal of solitude into a secular
and literary ideal.'12 The same view has been shared by Charles Trinkaus, who has argued
that Petrarch's treatise presents 'the monastic life not so much as separated from the life of
4
Salutati, De seculo et religione, ed. B. L. Ullman (Florence, 1957); for a discussion of the treatise,
see, for example, R. G. Witt, Hercules at the Crossroads. The Life, Works, and Thought of Coluccio
Salutati (Durham N.C., 1983), 195-208 .
5 Text in B. G. Kohl and R. Witt, eds., The Earthly Republic: The Italian Humanists on Government
and Society (Philadelphia, 1978), 93-114. See Witt, Hercules at the Crossroads, 351 -3.
6
Trinkaus, 'Humanist Treatises,' 23; R. Bonnell, 'An Early Humanistic View of the Active and
Contemplative Life,' Italica 43 (Sept. 1966): 225-39.
7
Trinkaus, 'Humanist Treatises,' 21-2.
8
Baron, 'Franciscan Poverty', 16-7.
9
Quoted in Trinkaus, 'Humanist Treatises,' 24; for text, see Salutati, De seculo et religione, ed.
Ullman, 81-2.
10 De otio religioso, ed. G. Rotondi, Studi e Testi 195, (Vatican City, 1958); hereafter this edition will
be referred to as 'Rotondi'.
" R. J. Lokaj, 'Petrarch vs. Gherardo: a case of sibling rivalry inside and outside the cloister,'
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001).
12 P. O. Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), 14.
52
the worldly but as the safer and more fully religious way. He apparently felt no friction
between his own way and that of the monks.'13 Other scholars, however, have seen
Petrarch's idealisation of monastic life as the counterpart of a more critical estimation of his
own, secular life. Seidlmeyer, for example, has perceived a tension between Petrarch's own
otium and that which he observed at Montrieux.14 Similarly, Giles Constable has suggested
that the text cannot be understood except as the product of 'traditions going back many
centuries in monastic history' and as an idealisation of cloistered leisure.'5
That Petrarch began to write the De otio religioso after a short visit to the Carthusian
monastery at Montrieux in January or early February 1347 seems to recommend the view
that the text was conceived as a meditation on the religious life in the general manner of
Salutati's De seculo et religione}b Returning to his 'own solitude', Petrarch wrote that he
came to reflect on the 'blessed sweetness' he had observed and, thanking his hosts, thought
further on the religious leisure he had witnessed.17 The urge to compare his life with that of
his brother always having been strong, Gherardo's circumstances at the monastery at
Montrieux may indeed have provoked reflection on the relative merits of monastic and
secular living, especially as Petrarch continued to be tormented by uncertainties over his
literary endeavours and by his unrequited love for Laura while he was composing the text.18
While Salutati's De seculo et religione is a comparative work which recommends
the monastic life as the sole solution to the problematic nature of the human condition,
however, Petrarch's De otio religioso consciously uses the life of the religious merely as the
framework for his discussion of otium. As Ronald Witt has observed, 'the De otio religioso
is more properly a praise of the kind of withdrawal connected with the monastic life.'19 The
treatise takes otium - and not monasticism per se - as its subject, and the text, while called
forth by Petrarch's visit to Montrieux, considers a concept which inhabited an intellectual
13
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space he shared with the monastic community, and which implicitly bridged the gap which
otherwise divided the religious and the secular.
Although Petrarch's view of the status of the religious is indeed important, it is not
unjust to observe that very little attention has been given to the identity of otiwn itself in the
De otio religioso. While it is prudent to pay close attention to the circumstances in which the
tract was composed, and it is necessary to acknowledge that it contains much comment on
the nature of monasticism, it is nevertheless striking that - with the exception of Brian
Vickers' survey articles on the history of the concept from Antiquity to Renaissance20 -
scholars have been loath to give due attention to the fact that the De otio religioso was
written primarily as a reflection on otium.
The reason for this omission is obscure, but it is not implausible to speculate that it
may derive from a willingness to read Petrarch's work both through the lens of his original
visit to Montrieux and in the context of later humanist debates about the status of the
religious. Occasioned by contact with monastic life, and a point of reference for successive
generations concerned with a tension between the secular and the religious, the text's
persective on monasticism has come to occlude its central engagement with otium.
2. Types of otium
Otium - or 'leisure' - is a concept which is not restricted to the De otio religioso and,
indeed, recurs in many of Petrarch's works from the period between the early 1340s and the
late 1360s. In each text, it appears as an integral part in the life of the man who would be
virtuous.
In the first book of the Rerum memorandarum libri, written between early 1342 and
September 1343, Petrarch distinguished between two types of otiumf While the one was
nothing more than idleness, hateful to all men and unworthy of commemoration, the other
was 'not so much a hatred of the town as consisting in a love of literature and virtue.'22
Revisiting the same distinction some years later in the De remediis utriusque fortune,
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21 Rerum memorandarum libri, ed. G. Billanovich, Edizione nazionale delle opera di Francesco
Petrarca, (Florence, 1945), I, 1-10; Wilkins, The Making of the "Canzoniere", 347-60; Wilkins, Life
ofPetrarch, 38-943-4.
22
Rerum mem. I, 1,2: 'Ceterum cum solitarii otii duo sint genera, illud sompno et inertie amicum
quod quidam lucifuge sectantur, qui villis suis utuntur pro sepulcris et in illis se se infodiunt viventes,
"nulla re alia quam otii" cognomine gloriosi, non literato tantum sed viro etiam obscenum, atque
indignum commemoratione pretereo; alteram illud attingam non tarn urbis odio quam literarum et
virtutis amore constitutum, unde animo vel studiorum cupido vel ad ea nitenti de quibus proxime
dicturus sum gratissima proveniunt alimenta...'
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Petrarch described that otium which was enjoyed for its own sake as 'inert, languid,
accustomed to embrace rest, than which nothing is more foul, nothing more like the grave.'
The otium which was used properly, however, was 'active, labouring even at rest, and busy
around honest affairs, than which nothing is sweeter.'23 In the face of Gaudium's persistent
objections, Ratio inveighs against inactive otium as prefiguring death, and as the gateway to
the vices.24 Otium should not, Ratio claims, be a matter of sleeping idly at a country farm,
like the infamous Servilius Vatia, but of constant toil, working always towards the virtue
which is the source of joy and quietness.25
Petrarch's description of the concept both in the Rerum memorandarum libri and the
De remediis utriusque fortune places otium firmly between virtue and vice, and while the use
of leisure for productive toil leads to true peace, the enjoyment of idleness brings only
depravation and sorrow. In the Secretum, this distinction between the otium otiosum and the
otium negotiosum is related specifically to Augustinus' attempt to overcome Franciscus'
accidia and his susceptibility to the wiles of fortuna. Otium, properly employed, becomes a
response to an inappropriate attachment to temporal things and a remedy for spiritual
negligence.
Towards the end of the second book Franciscus complains about the grime and
confusion of city life. Fie would, he claims, far rather live in the countryside.26 Augustinus
rebukes him for the stupidity of his wish. Conflating the quiet of the countryside with the
genuine peace he sought, Augustinus suggests that he is shying away from the contradictions
which raged in his soul. 'If the internal tumult of your mind were stilled,' Augustinus tells
Franciscus, 'the crashing din around you would still assail your senses, but, believe me, it
would not move your mind.'27 Indeed, Augustinus goes on to argue that flight from the city
and removal to some more secluded rural setting could render him just as distant from the
23
De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 21:
'GAUDIUM: Otio fruor iucundissimo.
Ratio: "Utor" die: nulla hie re fruendum sed utendum multis habet doctrina salubrior.
GAUDIUM: Delectabile otium est michi.
Ratio: Refert multum hoc ipsum otium quale sit: duas nempe species otii diffiniunt, operosi alteram
atque ipsa in requie laborantis ac circa honesta studia solliciti, quo nil est dulcius, alteram inertis et
languidi et solam requiem complexi, quo nil fedius, nil similius est sepulchro. De primo igitur sepe
magna quedam opera, et mundo utilia et suis autoribus gloriosa, proveniunt, de secundo autem nichil
unquam nisi inglorius torpor ac marcidus. Primum illud rite philosophantibus, hoc secundum pigris et
ventri somnoque deditis peropportunum, ubi nullo interpellate edant licenter ac dormiant.'
J4 ibid.25 ibid, referring to Seneca, Ep. Iv, on which see Vickers, 'Leisure and idleness', 116, n.l 16; c.f. De
vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii; Prose, 324 where Petrarch misrepresents Seneca's meaning. For
further discussion of the treatment of this letter in the De vita solitaria, see the following chapter.
26
Secretum, II; Prose, 120.
27
Secretum, II: 'Quod si unquam intestinus tumultus tue mentis conquiesceret, fragor iste
circumtonans, michi crede, sensus quidem pulsaret, sed animum non moveret.'; Prose, 120.
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attainment of happiness. Since he had not cut out the worldliness which renders him
susceptible to the city's assaults upon his senses, the mere memory of the objects of his
desires would, in seclusion, continue to make him miserable.28 Explaining further,
Augustinus tells Franciscus that
for the man who carries his illness around with him, a change of place increases
his burden, and does not add to his health at all. It may be said to you without
impropriety that to a certain young man who was complaining that travel had
not brought him any benefit, Socrates replied 'You were travelling with
yourself.' It is first necessary for your mind to be prepared by driving out that
longstanding burden of cares; only then may you flee. For it has been
discovered, not only for the body, but also for the mind, that a cure is inefficient
unless the patient is well disposed towards it. Otherwise, you may reach the
furthermost reach of the Indies, and yet ever admit that Horace was right when
he said 'those who hurry across the sea change only the sky, but not their
mind.'29
True otium, Petrarch indicates, is not dependent on surroundings, but on labouring towards
personal spiritual health.
Examining Franciscus' avaritia elsewhere, Augustinus instigates a comparison
between the otium otiosum and the otium negotiosum by contrasting the solace which
Franciscus had enjoyed in the past with his present condition. Deliberately stressing the
sense of contentment and peace, Augustinus asks him if he remembered lying down on 'the
grassy couch of the meadows', drinking in 'the murmur of the writhing waters' as he looked
down on the valley that was open before him.30 At that time - probably before he first saw
Faura - Franciscus had no regard for wealth or the trappings of the world, and yet 'in his
mind was as wealthy as a king, and returning at night to his home, would load his table with
unbought dainties.'31 Although he was otiosus et solitarius, Augustinus evokes Cicero's
praise of Scipio Africanus in De ojficiis in pointing out that, unburdened by worldly desires,
28
Secretum, III; Prose, 164.
29 Secretion, III: 'Quia malum suum circumferenti locorum mutatio laborem cumulat, non tribuit
sanitatem. Potest ergo tibi non improprie dici, quod adolescenti cuidam, qui peregrinationem nil sibi
profuisse querebatur, respondit Socrates: "Tecum enim" inquit "peregrinabaris". Tibi quidem in
primis sequestranda vetus hec curarum sarcina et preparandus est animus; turn denique fugiendum.
Hoc enim non in corporibus modo sed in animis quoque compertum est; quod nisi in patiente
disposito virtus est agentis inefficax. Alioquin ad extremos Indorum fines penetrate quidem poteris,
semper Flaccum vera locutum fateberis, ubi ait: "celum non animum mutant, qui trans mare
currunt.'"; Prose, 164-6, quoting Horace, Ep., I, 11, 27.
30 Secretum, II: 'Meministi quanta cum voluptate reposto quondam rure vagabaris, et nunc herbosis
pratorum thoris accubans murmur aque luctantis hauriebas, nunc apertis collibus residens subiectam
planitiem libero metiebaris intuitu; nunc in aprice vallis umbraculo dulci sopore correptus optato
silentio fruebaris...' Prose, 86.
31
Secretum, II: 'regum equabat opes animo, seraque revertens
nocte domum, dapibus mensas onerabat inemptis'
Prose, 86. quoting Virgil, Georgics, IV, 130-1.
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Franciscus was neither idle nor alone.32 Always Franciscus was thinking on some high
matter and always he had the Muses for company: he longed for nothing else and was
certainly contented.33
This otium negotiosum is in stark contrast with that leisure which Franciscus currently
pursued. Horrified to be accused of ambition a little later in the text, Franciscus attempts to
counter Augustinus' charge by relating his abandonment of the city for the countryside. 'So
it has profited me nothing,' he exclaims indignantly,
to have fled the city whenever possible, to have despised the mob and public
affairs, to have sought out the refuge of the woods and the silent countryside,
and to have expressed my hatred for puffed-up honours, now that I am accused
of ambition!34
Augustinus, however, is swift to correct his interlocutor's claim. The otium, solitude and
incuriositas ... rerum humanarum which Franciscus professes to practice are not an
emanation of his virtue, but a product of his desire for glory.35 Insofar as he claims to be at
leisure and spurn temporal things, he is merely expressing the persistence of his own
inquietude and worldly longings for the sake of literary fame. Franciscus' otium is an otium
otiosum, an idleness which manifests both the cause of his misery and the spiritual sloth
which prevents him overcoming his sorrow.
The idea of an otium negotiosum as a productive leisure which stands opposed both
to idle inaction and, more importantly, to the accidia which accompanies worldliness is
repeated in the Invective contra medicum?6 Shaped by his need to rebut the claims of the
anonymous physician, Petrarch's treatment of otium in the Invective is influenced by a
somewhat different rhetorical strategy. Rather than contrasting two different types of otium -
as in the Secretion - Petrarch juxtaposes his leisure (an otium negotiosum) with the lifestyle
recommended by the papal physician. Turning the doctor's Aristotelianism back on him,
Petrarch's objective is not to demonstrate that otium relies on rustic seclusion, but rather to
32
Secretum, II; Prose, 86. Cicero, De officiis, III, i, 4. c.f. also Cicero, Pro Plancio, 66.
33 In Ovid, Tristia, I, I, 39ff, otium (sc. otiosum) is described as the necessary precondition for the
writing of poetry. Although in the Canzoniere, Petrarch appears to approve this view (q.v. Canz■ 114,
11.5-6), in this passage of the Secretum, he seems to invert this view. The reference to the Muses
indicates that it is the absence of desire intrinsic to the virtuous otium negotiosum which is the
predicate of poetic composition.
34
Secretum, II: 'Nichil ergo michi profuit urbes fugisse, dum licuit, populosque et actus pubblicos
despexisse, silvarum recessus et silentia rura secutum odium ventosis honoribus indixisse: adhuc
ambitionis insimulor!' Prose, 94.
35
Secretum, II; Prose, 96.
36 On the Invective contra medicum, see U. Bosco, 'Particolari petrarcheschi. I. Precisazioni sulle
Invective contra medicum,'' Studi petrarcheschi 1, (1948): 97-110; Wilkins, Life of Petrarch, 123-4;
U. Dotti, Vita di Petrarca, (Rome, 1987), 252-7. Text in Invectives, ed. Marsh, 2-179.
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show that otium, properly conceived, is opposed to the vices so clearly evident in the city,
and is, in fact, a precondition of salvation.
At the outset of his argument, therefore, Petrarch openly accepted the philosopher's
belief that man is by nature a political animal.37 This, however, was not incompatible with
solitary leisure: solitude, properly employed, need not harm the polity.38 His solitude, he
pointed out, had never had as its object the avoidance of humanity per se, but merely the
avoidance of the vices of men.39
To illustrate his point, Petrarch offered a satirical treatment of the 'goods' of city life.40
In the city, one can find 'a brothel, a bath-house, a market, honey-wine, pastry, relish, and
similar things.'41 While some men may revel in these 'goods', however, Petrarch argued that
the solitary man finds his happiness only increased by their absence.42 Although rustic
seclusion does indeed lack the pleasures of the vulgar crowds, Petrarch contended that it has
its own delights which are of great use in the pursuit of salvation - quies, libertas, and
otium.43 St. Jerome is used as an example of a solitary man whose felicitas (not to mention
his use to humanity) was augmented by his isolation from such things and his
recommendation of 'Holy rusticity' is praised accordingly.44 Expanding on this point a few
paragraphs later, he wrote that
it is commonly agreed that there is nothing better for the soul than, with all of
life's obstacles and shackles having been cast off, for it to be turned free and
unfettered to God and to itself: to be sure, while we are on earth, that can
happen nowhere better than in solitude.45
37 Inv. contra med. IV, 169: 'Sed sit nature obsequendum, sitque homo naturaliter animal politicum....'
Marsh, 142; referring to Aristotle, Politics, 1253al-3.
38 Inv. contra med. IV, 169; Marsh, 142. The same view that in solitude a man can still benefit society
is repeated at IV, 172; Marsh, 146.
39 Inv. contra med. IV, 169; Marsh, 142.
40 This is a parody of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 7, 1097a- 1, 8, 1099b.
41 Inv. contra med., IV, 171: '...concedam, ne de hoc ipso noviter litigandum sit, esse preter virtutem
bona, quibus urbes abundare non negem, in quibus fornicem, balnea, macellum, mulsum, adipem,
pulmentum, et que sunt similia numeratis.'; Marsh, 144. This description echoes Petrarch's scathing
description of worldly existence in a letter to Lombardo della Seta; Sen. XI, 10.
42
Inv. contra med., IV, 171; Marsh, 144.
43 Inv. contra med., IV, 173; Marsh, 146.
44
Inv. contra med., IV, 172: 'Sancta rusticitas sibi soli prodest: studiosa autem solitudo prodesse
posse quamplurimus non negatur. Et ipse Ieronimus, qui hoc dixit, quantum solitudine delectatus et
quantum ibi mundo utilis fuerit, sciunt omnes.' Marsh, 146.
45 Inv. contra med., IV, 175: 'Constat autem nunquam melius esse anime quam dum, amotis obstaculis
viteque compedibus, in Deum atque in se ipsam libera tandem et expedita convertitur. Enimvero id,
dum sumus in terris, nusquam melius quam in solitudine fieri posse...' Marsh, 148. In the following
sentences, Petrarch quotes St. Augustine's rendition of Plato, Phaedo, 80D-81E and it is worth noting
that St. Augustine's continuation of the point in the De vera religione may have served as the direct
model for the early part of this paragraph. See Augustine, De vera religione, iii, 3.
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Consequently, while not everyone could emulate Jerome perfectly, Petrarch confesses that he
would rather be saved alone than perish with the many.46 Just as 'solitude' is defined in
relation to the casting off of 'life's obstacles and shackles' rather than to physical isolation,
otium is once again identified with the negation of worldly desires and the liberty of loving
God.
In these four texts, the otium negotiosum is a form of 'active' leisure. In stark
contrast to the otium otiosum, it is a leisure from worldly desires and, as Brian Vickers has
observed, is consequently placed firmly between virtus and fortuna. The opposite of
sinfulness and vice, it is a continual striving after the good and leads to a genuine peace,
untroubled by temporal distractions. As such, it is also conceived in opposition to accidia, or
spiritual sloth, and is presented as a remedy both to the idle sorrow to which Gaudium is
prey in the De remediis utriusque fortune and to the paralysing melancholy from which
Franciscus suffers in the Secretum.
This understanding of otium consciously engages with classical, patristic and
monastic traditions, and Petrarch seems wilfully to have woven their different aspects
together. Initially, Petrarch's otium seems to resonate particularly strongly with classical
concepts of leisure. His distinction between the otium otiosum and the otium negotiosum, for
example, appears to evoke Ennius,47 while his belief in the Invective contra medicum that the
productive use of leisure could have the corollary effect of aiding humanity more generally
recalls the sentiments of both Cicero and Seneca.48 Ovidian motifs, especially in relation to
the association between otium and composition, are also in evidence in the Secretum.49 By
the same token, Petrarch toys with the familiar classical association of urban living with
vice. Although he stops short of the underlying moral connotations, Petrarch emulates
Sallust,50 Livy51 and Seneca52 in associating the city with moral turpitude, and implicitly
accepting that - while it may not actually 'transmit' vice - it could manifest the sinfulness of
those who seek its pleasures so ardently.53
This classical influence, however, is intertwined with strong patristic and monastic
themes, aided in no small part by the absorption of the earlier tradition into the later.
46 Inv. contra med., IV, 175; Marsh, 146.
47
Ennius, Iphigenia, recorded in Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, XIX, x, 12; q.v. Vickers, 'Leisure and
idleness,' 6.
48
Seneca, De otio, IV, 1-2; Cicero, De officiis, III, i, 1-3.
49
Ovid, Tristia, I, I, 39ff, see n.33, above.
50 Sallust, Bellum Catilinae, XI, 5.
51
Livy, Ab urbe condita, XXIII, xviii, 10-13.
52
Seneca, Ep. Li, 5; see W. A. Laidlaw, 'Otium,' Greece and Rome 2nd ser., 15/1 (April 1968): 42-52,
here 43-4.
53
Vickers, 'Leisure and idleness,' 15; J.-M. Andre, L'otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle
romaine des origins a I'epoque augusteenne (Paris, 1966), 381.
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Petrarch's equation of the otiurn otiosum with accidia is particularly evocative of the
Christian elaboration of classical wariness of unoccupied leisure, and has a parallel in other
fourteenth-century treatments of this theme, such as Andrea Bonaiuti's 'The Way to
Salvation' in the Spanish Chapel of S. Maria Novella in Florence, which depicts idleness as
the vestibule of sin. The moral frame of reference for Petrarch's otium is ultimately
Christian, and the importance of virtue as a love of God runs through the four texts examined
above. For Evagrius and John Cassian, for example, as for Petrarch, idleness was the
vestibule of acedia,54 and in later centuries, St. Benedict and St. Bernard of Clairvaux,
amongst others, came to condemn the otium otiosum as the enemy of the soul and as an
obstruction to virtue.55 Similarly, Petrarch's distinction between the two types of otium,
while clearly informed by classical thought, also betrays hints of later influences. It is
interesting to note, for example, that in distinguishing between the otium otiosum and the
otium negotiosum in the De remediis utriusque fortune, Ratio employs St. Augustine's
contrast between utor and fruor,56 while in the Secretum, Augustinus' discussion of
productive leisure integrates allusions to Horace and Ovid into a broader treatment of self-
knowledge and the meditatio mortis.
3. The object of otium and the notion of respite in the De otio religioso
As in the Secretum and the Invective contra medicum, Petrarch examines otium as a
component of the virtuous life in the De otio religioso and similarly presents it as a freedom
from worldly desires. Unlike the other texts, however, the De otio religioso considers the
concept in relation to the acquisition of knowledge essential for salvation. Having explained
his intentions, Petrarch takes as his text for the tract a line from Ps. 45: vacate et videte
quoniam ego sum Deus - 'have leisure and see that I am God.'57 Although this can be
understood as a description of the relationship between peace in this world and the next,58
Petrarch wished it to be understood in a more sophisticated, but not unrelated fashion. For
Petrarch, 'videte' could be viewed as a synonym for 'noscete' and hence the verse referred to
54
Cassian, De institutis coenobiorum, X, 21; Vickers, 'Leisure and idleness,' 108; Wenzel, The Sin of
Sloth, 19-22; Wenzel, 'Petrarch's Accidia,' 39-40.
55 St. Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione, II, 13; St. Benedict, Regula, 48; quoted in Vickers,
'Leisure and idleness,' 108.
56 On this distinction, see St. Augustine, De Doctrinci Christiana, I, 7-10; O. O'Donovan, 'Usus and
fruitio in Augustine De Doctrina Christiana I,' Journal of Theological Studies 33 (1982): 361-97; W.
R. O'Connor, 'The uti/frui Distinction in Augustine's Ethics,' Augustinian Studies 14 (1983): 45-62.
57 De otio, I, 1: 'Unde vero nunc ordinar, seu quid primum semiabsens dicam, nisi quod totus presens
dicere volui, illud nempe daviticum: "Vacate et videte," quod, ut nostis, in psalmo quarto et
quadragesimo regius propheta et prophesticus ille rex posuit?' Rotondi, 2,11.23-6; quoting Ps. 45: 11.
58 De otio, I, 1; Rotondi, 4,11. 23-4.
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the knowledge of God which merited the vera felicitas. Accordingly, Petrarch read 'vacate et
videte' both as an indication that vacatio should have salvation as its object,59 and also as a
recognition that vacatio - properly exercised - was inextricably bound up with the
acquisition of the knowledge which was essential for salvation.60
Petrarch's exegesis of Ps. 45:11 - in which vacatio is used as the direct equivalent of
otium - accords otium the same function as in the Secretum and the Invective contra
medicum. To achieve otium is to recognise in God the one source of felicitas, and to
apprehend that knowledge which is necessary for salvation. In Petrarch's more prosaic
terms, a man should
have leisure, for in having leisure, you will be at peace, and in being at peace,
you will see [i.e., know], and in seeing you will rejoice, and indeed 'in rejoicing
about the truth' you will be happy. There is no happiness more certain or more
sublime.61
That man was capable of knowing God, Petrarch had no doubt. Not only was it perfectly
possible for any human being to recognise in God the source of his salvation, but it was also
feasible for a man to know God even though his faculties were imperfect. Although no man
is able to see God in the same way as the Apostles did, Petrarch explained that we can 'see'
God 'in the work of His miracles, unless we close our eyes.'62 The triumph of Christianity
over heresy and the destruction of false idols are a demonstration of God's unlimited
mercy.63 Just as His will can be seen in the course of history, so His mercy could be accessed
by all men. Evoking the spirit of St. Augustine's doctrine of divine illumination, Petrarch
argued that there is an 'internal light' which allows devoted souls to see Christ always in
their minds with a form of 'spiritual vision'.64
59 De otio, I, 1; Rotondi, 2,11.26-9.
60
De otio, I, 1; Rotondi, 4, 11. 24-26; c.f. Augustine, De vera religione, liii, 103, quoting I Cor 13:9-
10.
61
De otio, I, 1: 'Vacate ergo, nam vacando utique quiescetis, quiescendoque videbitis, videndoque
gaudebitis, "gaudendo" autem "de veritate" felices eritis; qua nulla certior felicitas, nulla sublimior.'
Rotondi, 5, 11.22-5, quoting I Cor. 13:6. The quotation from this chapter of I Cor when following an
argument so similar to that of the De vera religione does seem to raise the question of whether
Petrarch intended to remain so close to St. Augustine at this point.
62 De otio, I, 5: 'Cristum in carne non vidimus eo modo quo apostolis est visus, quamvis eum in
operibus mirabilium suorum, nisi oculos claudimus, assidue videamus. ' Rotondi, 32,11.4-6.
63 De otio, I, 5; Rotondi, 32, 11.25-30. Earlier in the chapter, Petrarch (I, 5; Rotondi, 31, 11. 11-16)
quotes Augustine, De civitate Dei, xviii, 53 in support of the view that God's hand could be seen
behind the turning of the world towards Christ.
64
De otio, I, 5: 'Nobis vero iam, gratis illi qui usqueadeo immeritos nos dilexit, hec omnia sine ullis
externis testibus clara sunt et ita se oculis fidelium divine lucis radii infundunt, ut nemo tarn cecus sit
qui non "iustitie solem" Cristum mente perspiciat; et quamvis ab ipsa veritate verissimum dictum sit
"Beati oculi qui vident que vos videtis," ego tamen hanc ipsam interni luminis claritatenm, qua post
Cristi reditum ad celos et nunc et usque in finem seculi devote anime non carneis oculis sed spiritus
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Despite this, however, Petrarch was conscious that there were obstacles to
happiness. Implicit in his exegesis is a recognition of human fallibility and throughout the De
otio, Petrarch bemoaned a range of flaws. He concentrates, however, on humanity's capacity
for self-deceit and distraction. Citing St. Ambrose as his authority, he wrote that
the journey of life is beset by an unforeseen infestation of demons or a
multitude of thieves, with whom invisible subverters of souls prepare fearful
traps on all paths for the deaths of innumerable people.65
These 'demons', 'thieves' and supplantores invisi are the falsehoods which could entice the
unwary away from the path of true knowledge. Elaborating further on their identity, Petrarch
urged the monks of Montrieux to resist the 'impious devices' of such 'enemies' and warns
them to be particularly wary of
the three varieties of the enemies' weapons: the snares of the world, the lures of
the flesh and the wiles of demons. The first promises the most useless of things,
the second flatters as a familiar, and the third whispers dreadful counsel to
mortals ... the world fools you, the flesh appeases you, demons drive you on:
from the first, you have no hope; from the second, you have no pleasure; from
the third, you have no guidance. All conspire equally for your destruction and
death.66
If a person is to attain to the knowledge necessary for salvation, he must necessarily avoid
these weapons of falsehood. Insofar as otium is - as Ps. 45:11 suggests - a predicate of
knowledge, it is evident that Petrarch intended it to be at least in part a form of 'leisure' from
such falsehoods.67 To possess a vacatio a mendacibus was to possess the peace which was
necessary to 'see' the divine truth clearly by the 'inner light' of the soul.
Petrarch's preliminary description of otium places it, as in the Secretum and the
Invective contra medicum, between virtue and vice. Its position, however, is more specific
than in either of the other texts. Developing a theme latent in the Secretum, Petrarch begins
to define otium in stark opposition to the absence of hope, and to the illusory pleasures of the
world. It is, he indicates, bound up with the perception of the divine truth and entails the
negation of the 'wiles of demons', the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh'.
acie Cristum videbunt, illi corporee visioni quadam ex parte non imparem demonstrabo.' Rotondi, 29,
11.12-21.
65 De otio, 1,3: 'Quando, ut ait Ambrosius, iter vite occulta demonum infestatio vel latronum obsidet
multitudo, quibus per omnes vias supplantatores invisi animarum laqueos tendunt innumerabilium
mortibus expavescendos...' Rotondi, 18, 11.16-19. It is unclear which of St. Ambrose's writings
Petrarch had in mind in this passage.
66 De otio, I, 3: 'Occurrite paratibus impiis et vitate tria in primis hostium atque armorum genera,
mundi laqueos, carnis illecebras, demonum dolos. Ille vanissima spondet, hec familiariter blanditur,
illi autem pessima consilia mortalibus insusurrant. ... Mundus fallit, mulcet caro, demones impellunt:
nulla vobis inde spes, nulla hinc voluptas, nullum inde consilium: omnes pariter vestram in perniciem
mortemque conspirant.' Rotondi, 15, 1.28- p.16,1.2.
67
e.g. De otio, I. 3; Rotondi, 16,11.10-12, quoting John, 8:44; c.f. Dante, Inferno, xxiii, 144.
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Whereas in the Secretum, otium is discussed in the context of an enumeration of the seven
deadly sins, in the De otio religioso, it is considered as a response to the traditional scheme
of the Three Enemies of Man, which had become a commonplace in moral literature
following the ascetic impulses in monasticism which had arisen since the tenth century.
Indeed, Petrarch's description of the Three Enemies closely mimics those given by St.
Bernard and Hugh of St. Victor and, while the implied grouping of the seven deadly sins into
these three categories allows a parallel with the Secretum to be maintained, it is clear that he
intended to define otium in relation to a conventional monastic conception of vice and the
threats to divine knowledge.
Petrarch's initial treatment of the theme is, however, only very lightly sketched and
it is unclear whether otium entailed the 'active' intellectual negation of competing thoughts
and desires, or required a more physical form of peace from external stimuli. In order to
establish the identity of otium with greater precision, it is necessary to look more closely at
the manner in which Petrarch's otium constituted a respite from the 'snares of the world', the
'lures of the flesh' and the 'wiles of demons' which together threatened the perception of
truth.
4. Otium as a respite from the 'wiles of demons'
Petrarch's first concern is with the threat posed by 'demons'. Through out the first book of
the De otio, these 'demons' are described in the manner of St. Augustine.68 Peddlers in
deceit, they are portrayed as mediators always anxious to seduce a man away from the truth.
Perhaps recalling the temptation of Christ, Petrarch suggests that 'demons' endeavour
constantly to erode man's belief in his capacity to redeem himself.69 Although the coming of
Christ and of Christianity had struck fear into Satan's heart,70 that 'sly old spirit' would
never cease trying to obstruct those striving for salvation and would continue to put doubt in
the way of faith.71
In describing the 'demons', Petrarch's wording is deliberately cautious. It is not that
the Devil and his minions delude men into doubting that God is merciful, but rather that the
satanic hordes cause human beings to doubt their own capacity for redemption.72 In an
68
Augustine, De civitate Dei, IX, 18 describes daemones as 'falsi autem fallacesque mediatores'.
Quillen, Rereading the Renaissance5163.
69 c.f. Matt. 4:9.
70 De otio, I, 5; Rotondi, 32, 1.35 - 33,1.4, quoting Lactantius, Div. Inst., I, 9.
71
De otio, I, 3; Rotondi, 21, 11.1-4.
72 Petrarch accepts that there are many people who deny that in the person of Christ, God provided
man with the facility to merit salvation and specifically mentions the Jew, Muslims, Averroists,
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awkwardly worded passage, Petrarch argues that while God has provided man with every
opportunity to redeem himself, and while it is possible for man to 'see' Christ,
this matter is in doubt for many people, [because] there is such a cloud of
suspicions, such a dizziness of minds and such torpid diffidence. This is not
because anyone entirely doubts the power of God - unless he is mad - but
because man distrusts his own merit and does not dare wish or hope for as
much as he sees freely granted to him without his having asked and therefore,
comparing the magnitude of the heavenly blessing with his own unworthiness,
he begins to ask himself whether his happiness is real, or whether he is
deceived by an illusion and as it were some blessed dream - as if human merit
had any part in this and it were not wholly by God's mercy not only that we are
fortunate but that we are.73
While a man may believe in Christ, in other words, he might still doubt his capacity to tread
the path that had been revealed to him.
As suggested by his earlier assertion that they remove hope, Petrarch's 'demons'
correspond to the malady of despair. Seduced into the traps of the satanic hordes, a man may
feel that he is unable to do anything, despite the fact that God had created the opportunity for
humankind to redeem itself. Consumed with a false sense of powerlessness, he succumbs to
despair.74 This has a very obvious parallel in Franciscus' accidia in the Secretum. Knocked
back by fortuna, Franciscus found himself despairing of the possibility of happiness, despite
his apparent acceptance of God's mercy, and is paralysed by his accidia.15
But Petrarch's 'demons' also have broader resonance. The use of the image to
denote despair is consonant with an iconographical and theological tradition stretching from
Manicheans and Arians as 'enemies' of the truth in this respect. However, Petrarch's primary concern
in this section of the tract is with Christian doubters: those who believe in Christ as redeemer, but who
doubt their own capacity to achieve salvation. De otio, I, 4; Rotondi, 23, 1.2 - 24, 1.11. These
examples of the 'enemies' of truth are not randomly chosen: the Jews and Muslims actively denied
Christ's divinity, and the Arians were generally accepted to deny the same, while the Manicheans
conceived of Christ as 'a manifestation of the Saving Intellect or Nous'; G. Bonner, St. Augustine of
Hippo: Life and Controversies, 3rd. ed., (Norwich, 2002), 161. The Latin Averroists of Petrarch's day
believed that man could achieve salvation merely through the application of his intellect and, at the
least, gave the impression of seriously undervaluing the role of Christ. For a useful introduction to
Latin Averroism, see S. Ebbesen, 'The Paris arts faculty: Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia,
Radulphus Brito,' in J. Marenbon, ed., Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 3, Medieval Philosophy
(London, 1998), 269-90. On Siger of Brabant, see, for example, E. P. Mahoney, 'Sense, intellect and
imagination in Albert, Thomas and Siger,' in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, eds., The
Cambridge History ofLater Medieval Philosophy (Cambidge, 1982), 611-22.
73 De otio, I, 5: 'Que licet ita sint ut diximus, multis tamen adhuc res in dubium redit, tanta
suspitionum nubes, tanta vertigo mentium, tantus diffidentie torpor inest; non quia de potentia Dei
quisquam omnino, nisi amens, dubitet, sed quia de suo merito diffidit homo neque tantum vel optare
audeat vel sperare, quantum sibi ultro videt impensum, ideoque magnitudinem beneficii celestis cum
indignitate sua conferens hesitare incipit secumque disquirere vera ne felicitas sua sit, an prestigio et
velut beato quodam somnio eludatur, quasi ulle prorsus in hoc humani meriti partes sint et non totum
misericordie Dei sit, non modo quod felices sumus, sed quod sumus.' Rotondi, 33,1.31 - 34,1.4.
74 De otio, I, 6; Rotondi, 37,11.12-24, quoting Hab. 3:2.
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the desert fathers to the fourteenth century. Developing a theme in early Christian
demonology, Evagrius, for example, spoke frequently of the 'demon of dxqdia' and 'the
spirit of dxqSia'.76 The assaults of demons plagued the monk with particular vigour at noon
and, filling him with a hatred for everything, induced despair and the desire to quit the
ascetic life. Later, Isidore of Seville described despair as a trick used by the Devil,77 and
from at least the fourteenth century onwards, the idea of accidia or tristitia as a weapon of
demons recurs often, as, for instance, in The Cloud of Unknowing and the English treatise,
Agayne Despayre,78 Within the scheme of the Three Enemies of Man, acedia was accorded a
variety of roles, but during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, it was commonly
defined as a temptation of the Devil, and notable examples can be found in the sermons of
Jacques de Vitry, Robert Grosseteste's Templum domini and Jean de Journi's La Dime de
penitance, as well as in the Cursor mundi and the Speculum morale,79
The inclusion of despair in discussions of otium was, moreover, not uncommon.
Unproductive leisure - the otium otiosum - was causally connected with melancholy and
spiritual sloth in monastic literature. Indeed, as Brian Vickers has observed, '[o]nce the
seven deadly sins had been codified as an entity for homilectics it was inevitable that otium,
being already equated with pigritia, ignavia and desidia, should be subsumed under
acedia.'80 Following the example of John Cassian and Gregory the Great, theologians from
the thirteenth century onwards customarily included otium or otiositas among the progeny of
acedia, and unproductive leisure appears prominently in Alvarus Pelagius' fourteenth-
century description of the branches of acedia alongside negligentia, tarditas, indevotio,
tristitia and tedium vite, amongst others.81
Beginning with Cassian, this association between otium and acedia served as the
basis for recommending a productive leisure - otium negotium - which entailed labour,
primarily in a monastic setting.82 Connected with the proverbial image of the slothful man
placing his hand in his bosom, the pairing otiosus - acedia was to be remedied by physical
labour, or work with the hands.83 In placing productive otium in opposition to acedia,
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23.
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Petrarch participated in the spirit of this tradition, but in the context of the tension he
identified between the 'wiles of demons' and the perception of divine knowledge, he appears
to be closer to the thought of the desert fathers, and seems almost to have Latinised the
positive meaning attached to the Greek term a7td0£ta. Brought into Christian moral theology
from Greek Stoicism by Clement of Alexandria, the term came to be associated with a
freedom from the passions (7td0r|), the use of reason and the attainment of divine
knowledge.84 For the desert fathers, the object of cmd0sta was a form of peace (f]av/viu) in
which 7id0r) were kept under the sway of reason.'85 Indeed, with demonic dxpSta in mind,
Evagrius wrote that '[t]he Kingdom of Heaven is the owtdOeta of the soul, with a true
knowledge of the things that exist.'86
Petrarch was confident that the danger posed by 'demons' could be remedied.
Towards the end of the first book of the De otio religioso, otium becomes a solution to
despair. Rather than being a form of manual labour, however, it was an active leisure which
recalls the slothful to their capacity for redemption, and restores the grounds for hope. At
several points in the text, Petrarch stresses that in the face of numerous deceptions, it is
essential neither to forget God's limitless power and mercy, nor to lose hope.87 Being able to
do anything, God has also done everything to facilitate the salvation of mankind and it is this
particular fact which in Petrarch's view must be recalled.88
The recollection which Petrarch recommends relies for its effectiveness on the value
of reading and meditation. Satan's 'deceitful language'89 can most effectively be resisted
with the 'sharp arrows of a powerful [God] together with the coals of desolation.'90 The
'sharp arrows' and the 'coals of desolation' need to be distinguished.
The 'sharp arrows' are 'the Apostles and their messages' and they constitute
Petrarch's primary solution to doubt and despair.91 A close reading of Scripture and a sincere
contemplation of the meaning of the Apostles' words can, Petrarch argues, help the
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of medieval spirituality.
90 De otio, I, 7: 'Inde igitur talia suadente illo, quid detur aut quid apponatur nobis ad linguam
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despairing believer to understand more fully the fallacy of his doubt and the extent of God's
power. Confronted with Satan's 'deceitful language'
You will turn to the divine counsels and arm yourself with the words of Christ
himself. For you will hear foretold by Him the troubles, labours, dangers and
scandals of this life and whatever you must endure in this span of time. From
the opposite side, you will hear [about] the rewards of a better life and the
consolations promised to those who work to the end. This is given to you and
stands opposed to a deceitful tongue.92
The words of God, which foretell the hardships of this life, provide a true heuristic for
understanding man's position in this world, while the act of reading itself is less significant
than the internalisation of the message.
Should a man still have doubt, however, Petrarch advises him to have recourse to the
'coals of desolation'.93 Addressing the monks of Montrieux, he explains that this term -
which perhaps evokes the spiritual language of St. John of the Cross - is the example
provided by 'ardent and burning souls of those who have preceded you in this holy
endeavour.'94 While maintaining a sincere admiration for the achievements of the saints,
Petrarch invites the monks to consider whether they were any weaker than these holy men
and women. 95 Reading the lives or writings of saints can, he suggests, help a person to
recognise that his humanity need be no bar to the most holy of virtues and can give the
despairing greater strength in their pursuit of God. The act of reading was, in this case,
secondary to the process of experiential identification.96
The 'sharp arrows' and the 'coals of desolation' provide an intriguing insight into
the nature of otium in relation to doubt and despair. Placed between virtus and despair, otium
can be understood in two ways. At one level, the concept appears to be relatively
straightforward. Petrarch recognises in 'demons' a threat to the apprehension of truth, and
calls upon the monks of Montrieux to 'manage' their leisure in such a way that they may yet
ascend to eternal rest.97 This 'management' of leisure must necessarily involve the setting
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aside of time for reading. In this sense, Petrarch's understanding of otium is fairly
conventional and seems to correspond both to the emphasis on study in most monastic rules,
and to the artistic tradition of representing the reading of holy books as a defence against the
wiles of demons in the late Middle Ages, itself a continuation of the iconographical
connection between demonic temptation and despair.98 The reading of Holy Scripture was,
for example, explicitly recommended as a response to acedia by Alvarus Peraldus in his
Summa de vitiis et virtutibus." As we have seen, however, Petrarch's treatment of reading as
a response to doubt and despair had a more subtle dimension. Despite the vividness of his
imagery, demons were for Petrarch never anything more than a convenient emblem for an
intellectual infelicity, a cipher for the obstruction doubt and despair posed to the perception
of truth. The remedy which he prescribes is similarly intellectual. Rather than the act of
reading itself acquiring any intrinsic meaning, it is the associated intellectual processes of
inculcation and identification which serve to combat the reader's doubt and despair. As a
result, this component of Petrarch's otium acquires a more interior meaning than might
initially appear. Indisputably an otium whose object is the apprehension of a higher truth, it
involves the negation of mental obstructions. Its operative component, although rooted in the
physical activity of reading, is ultimately an intellectual exercise. Through an absorption of
Scripture, a man may place himself in relation both to the world and to the eternal; by
identifying himself with the humanity of the saints, he may comprehend and trust his
capacity to transcend the mortal and merit the vera felicitas of the next life. In that he placed
emphasis on experiential identification as a prelude to virtue, Petrarch appears to pre-empt
trends in later humanistic attitudes towards the writing and reading of saints' lives.
Examining the Forty Martyrs of Sebaste as an inspirational model for the troops of Alfonso
V of Aragon, Lorenzo Valla implicitly recognised that it was the authentic and human reality
of these pre-Constantinian martyrs which allowed them to be fully imitable models.100 So
too, for Raffaele Maffei, the benefit of reading saints' lives lay in the reader's capacity to
identify themselves with real - and occasionally flawed - exemplars of virtue.101 Proposing
early Christian saints as models for imitation by secular figures, Tomasso d'Arezzo and
Antonio degli Agli not merely achieved a 'broadening of the religious vision' comparable to
98 In an illustration by Jean Fouquet for the Heures d'Etienne Chevalier (c. 1450-60), for example, St.
Bernard is depicted being tempted by the deceits of a hideous winged demon. Visibly rejecting the
demon's wiles, St. Bernard remains dedicated to the study of an unknown book at his reading desk.
For the development of this view during the Renaissance, see T. Hampton, Writing from History: The
Rhetoric ofExemptarity in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca, 1990).
99 Alvarus Peraldus, Summa de vitiis et virtutibus, V, 1, 2; cited in Wenzel, The Sin ofSloth, 195.





Petrarch's own enterprise, but also relied on experiential identification to achieve this end in
the same way as Petrarch employed the same method in the De otio religioso.102
5. Otium as a respite from the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh'
The impression that Petrarch's otium was conceived as an interior leisure which was not
essentially connected to the influence of physical circumstances, but which was built on the
active removal of intellectual obstacles is repeated when he turned to consider otium as a
response to the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh'.103
Petrarch's description of the nature and negation of the 'snares of the world' and the
'lures of the flesh' is highly involved and frequently repetitious. His explanation of the
manner in which these temptations threatened virtue, however, is relatively simple, and it
quickly becomes clear that, like the 'demons' of the first book, they are products of the
agent's mind rather than the result of physical contact.
As in the Secretum, Petrarch considered the desire for corporeal things to be a
submission to the fleeting and the ephemeral. Wealth, glory and renown captivate men, but
are nevertheless insubstantial and unenduring. All worldly things change and the high prizes
so earnestly sought are ultimately lost through death.104 The fine tombs of great men finally
contain nothing but ashes, snakes and worms.105 Evoking Heraclitus' notion of flux
elsewhere, Petrarch felt that it was foolish to seek happiness in fleeting things.106 It was,
however, the contrast between the transience of the temporal and the permanence of the
eternal which shaped his criticism most significantly. In looking at the shifting world around
him, the ambitious man loses sight of the one true happiness, and of the virtue which will
carry his immortal soul to heaven. In a powerful lament, Petrarch exclaims
The sum of all things returns to nothing, and [still], o, the madness, o, the
blindness! With so much enthusiasm do [men] accumulate perishable riches
and how great is the care for property which will neither endure nor follow us:
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the virtue that will accompany [us] to the end and that will carry [us] to Heaven
is neglected.107
Forgetting that he is the recipient of God's grace, the man who devotes himself to the
'instruments of mortal fame' makes himself 'like the foolish beasts of burden' and forsakes
his own unique capacity for redemption.108 Referring to the Aeneid, Petrarch asserted that
those who are seduced by temporal snares and lures seem to have drawn something from
each of the rivers of Tartarus. 'They seem,' he wrote,
freely to have drawn a forgetfulness of one's better nature from the Lethe, a
ferment of anger and desires from the Phlegethon, a fruitless penitence and
grief from the Acheron, sorrow and tears from the Cocytus and enmity and
hatred from the Styx.109
Petrarch explains that this 'forgetfulness of one's better nature' should be equated with an
abandonment of the divine gift of reason. 'Desire,' he contended,
commands not only that God, who may not be observed except with the most
pure eyes, cannot be seen, but [also] that there is no place within for reason or,
as a logical consequence, for humanity (humanitati), which can neither exist
nor be understood without reason [. I]ndeed, the character of the man having
been stripped away, the mind is made savage and arrives at such misery that he
turns the most splendid gift of God - the reason [that is] sent from Heaven - to
the dark and foul indulgence of desires, 'like the horse and the mule, in whom
there is no understanding.'110
As Petrarch had explained in the previous chapter using the rivers of Babylon as a point of
comparison, those who take pleasure in the 'errors, instabilities and flight of temporal things'
are swept far away from the 'regal city' in which salvation lies.1"
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Petrarch's description of the danger posed by the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures
of the flesh' to some degree complement his earlier use of 'demons' to denote despair and
his suggestion in other texts that unproductive leisure was the gateway to vice. Placed in
opposition to the otium negotiosum which Petrarch sought to recommend, the 'snares of the
world' and the 'lures of the flesh' are implicitly tied to the otium otiosum. Idleness is thus
tied to sinfulness just as closely as it is to despair. This is, of course, consonant with the
Secretum, in which accidia is discussed in relation to Franciscus' vices, but also has
analogues in the association of otiositas, acedia and sin in medieval and patristic literature
and is intrinsic to the scheme of the Three Enemies of Man. Commonly paired with the
otium otiosum or otiositas, acedia was for the duration of the medieval period 'almost
always found only in connection with the other capital sins, whether in a mere enumeration
or in more extensive treatments.'112 Indeed, there was often a clear causal relation between
unproductive otium, sinfulness and despair. In the Vulgate, St. Jerome used otium to connote
the idleness from which vice sprang,113 while despair was later seen as the 'last stage in a life
of sin'114 and appears as the product of habitual sin in the works of St. Gregory the Great and
St. Thomas Aquinas.115 Idleness with regard to virtue led to sinfulness, and to despair. All,
moreover, are associated with a preference for the world over God and, in later literature,
were often rectified with reference to the ars moriendi.116
The precise terms in which Petrarch describes the opposition of the 'snares of the
world' and the 'lures of the flesh' to virtue are important for our examination of otium. Once
again, otium is placed between virtus and voluptas, but in a manner which puts it in close
relation to self-knowledge and reason. In the opening chapters of the second book of the De
otio religoso, the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh' are presented as inimical to
the pursuit of felicitas not because physical objects are capable of transmitting vice, but
because, in succumbing to his desires, a man forsakes that part of his nature which would
Canz■ 114. The suggestion is recommended by the discussion of the flux of cities a few paragraphs
later, which includes a further citation of Babylon, but this time as a specific, emblematic city - De
otio, II, 1; Rotondi, 60,1.16ff. It is worth noting that the image of Babylon as 'confusion' is repeated
at Fam. XV, 9, 16: 'Babilon, hoc est confusio.' On the theme of Babylon in the Canzoniere in
particular, see N. Iliescu, II Canzoniere Petrarchesco e Sant'Agostino, (Rome, 1962), 133-140; A. H.
Hallock, 'The Pre-Eminent Role of Babilonia in Petrarch's Theme of the Two Cities' Italica 54/2
(Summer): 290-297; A. Lee, 'Sin City? The Image of Babylon in Petrarch's Canzoniere,' in J.
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allow him to merit salvation. Permitting himself to seek wealth, to covet power, and to wish
for empty honours, he forsakes the natural reason which would allow him to recognise the
true source of happiness and merit salvation.
Although Petrarch makes passing reference to salutary reading,117 his solution to the
danger posed by the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh' focuses on contrasting
the fleeting pleasures of this life with the eternal happiness of the next. Death is at the heart
of this contrast. Not only does death highlight the ephemeral nature of the objects of men's
desires, but it also stands as the point of transition from one sphere of existence to the next,
and hence serves as a powerful reminder of the life to come. Using the Delphic injunction to
'know thyself, therefore, Petrarch urges the monks of Montrieux to reflect constantly on
their mortality as a means of comprehending how fleeting is worldly existence, and how
readily they would be reduced to nothing if they did not abide in God."8
If it is to be efficacious, however, the meditation on death must conform to a certain
pattern and inspire a particular mode of living. Many people, Petrarch suggests, regard their
mortality incorrectly, and their meditation becomes simply an affirmation of their
enslavement to the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh'. Petrarch railed against
those who entertain an 'empty horror of death' because of their 'imprudent lust for [this]
life'."9 If a man is to meditate properly on the meaning of death, he must recognise that it
has a significant bearing on the relationship between the mind and the body, and between
reason and desire.120
Although the mind and body are distinct, they are nevertheless linked and frequently
pull in different directions.121 Where the mind or spirit is subjected to the body, a man
ultimately only suffers 'corruption and death', but where the body is subjected to the mind,
'sanctity and eternal life' follow.122 Deliberately emulating St. Bernard, Petrarch argued that
the person who appreciates the meaning of death leaves his body behind and lives only as a
spirit while on earth. For 'there is,' he says,
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120 c.f. Petrarch's allegorical discussion of Aeolus and the winds, Secretum, II; Prose, 122-124
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that universal platonic idea in the Phaedo - 'philosophy is nothing other than a
meditation on death' - where two deaths are portrayed: the one according to
nature, the other for the sake of virtue. They say that the first of these should
not be summoned or feared, but awaited with a calm mind; the second should
be sought with all enthusiasm. Your [brothers] have made especial use of this
type of dying, forgetful of all pleasure and desire, living in the body as if they
had already escaped the private prison of its members.123
To meditate properly on death, then, is not merely to comprehend the fallacy of temporal
desires, but is also to understand the need to live as a pilgrim in the body. This was
understood, at least, by Ss. Hilarion, Jerome and Francis, each of whom combated his urges
by treating the body as an enemy that had to be beaten into submission.124 Excising his
desires in this manner and subjecting his body to his mind, a man will be able to exercise his
natural capacity for reason and, as a result, will come to know the truth. In this way, Petrarch
contends, the unobstructed application of reason allows the soul's immortal potential to be
realised even though the foulness of the mortal body may remain.125
The impression of otium which emerges from this discussion of the 'snares of the
world' and the 'lures of the flesh' therefore has two components. It is true that in one sense,
Petrarch intended his exhortation to otium to serve as a continuation of a literal interpretation
of Ps. 45:11 and the concept involves a sense that one should 'take time' to combat the
dangers of worldly desire. Although this cannot be ignored, however, Petrarch's analysis
goes far beyond the literal sense of 'vacate' and the 'activity' appropriate to otium casts the
notion in a definitively intellectual light. Since the remedy for the 'snares of the world' and
the 'lures of the flesh' is based on a distinctive form of the meditatio mortis, the otium which
Petrarch describes entails not a literal form of rest, but rather a state of being free from
desire, of being free to exercise the reason necessary for salvation. This element of otium,
bound up with the idea of living as a pilgrim in the body, is very clearly identifiable with an
unobstructed intellectual capacity for the rational pursuit of virtue.
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6. All in the mind: the sources and meaning of otium in the De otio religioso
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that Petrarch's presentation of otium in the De otio
religioso is more subtle than the rather literal English translation of the word might suggest.
Conceived as an otium negotiosum, it was discussed as a respite from the Three Enemies of
Man. It was defined in opposition to a traditional understanding of the 'wiles of demons', the
'lures of the flesh' and the 'snares of the world', and Petrarch's elaboration of the dangers
posed by these Three Enemies made extensive use of imagery in moral treatises from the
desert fathers to the fourteenth century. Firmly rooted in the context of patristic and monastic
conceptions of sin and vice, otium had as its object the negation of obstacles to the
apprehension of truth and involved not only experiential identification in reading, but also
the substitution of reason for desire following a meditation on death.
In that the treatise offers a response to the Three Enemies of Man, the De otio
religioso is located within a long tradition of Christian thought that continued to have great
relevance for monastic life in the fourteenth century. This is clearly of relevance for
Petrarch's understanding of leisure, but in that he used the distinctive Latin term 'otium' and
associated it with a specific set of productive activities, it appears to draw inspiration from
the rich classical and monastic heritage of this concept and its analogues (quies, vacatio etc.).
There are, indeed, numerous parallels to be drawn and, at the level of mere bibliography, it is
telling that Petrarch was not only well acquainted with key classical and monastic texts, but
was also prepared to exploit their general compatibility.126 The first list of Petrarch's
preferred reading, assembled several years before the composition of the De otio religioso,
contained some of the most important works on otium by Latin moralists.127 Cicero's works
obviously constituted a significant corpus of information, but it is worth pointing out that the
Senecan texts known to Petrarch - notably the Epistolae ad Luciliam, the De tranquillitate
animi, the De consolatione ad Polybium and the De brevitate vitae - presented the concept
in a far more systematic fashion. Direct quotations in the De otio religioso indicate that
Petrarch was certainly prepared to mine this seam, with Cicero's works being named or
quoted on no fewer than twenty-four occasions, and Seneca's writings on a further nine. By
the same token3 Petrarch was also familiar with the teachings of key figures in the monastic
tradition. In addition to referring to a number of important personalities - such as St.
126 On the conceptual continuity between the classical and monastic traditions, see J. Leclercq, Otia
monastica: Etude sur le vocabulaire de la contemplation au moyen age, Studia Anselmiana 51,
(Rome, 1963), 13-62.
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25; R. Pfeiffer, History ofClassical Scholarship from 1300 to 1850 (Oxford, 1976), 10
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Macarius, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. Maximus, St. Bruno and St. Bernard - Petrarch cites
a range of Christian authorities on otium, and leans most heavily on Lactantius' Divinae
Institutiones and St. Jerome's letters.128 From his other writings, it is also apparent that he
had also familiarised himself at the very least with the works of St. Gregory the Great129 and
St. Bernard130 before the De otio religioso was completed.
The bibliographical evidence is mirrored by conceptual parallels. Like Petrarch, both
Latin moralists and Christian theologians were adamant that otium was bound up with the
establishment of an inner peace. As Ronald Witt has pointed out, Seneca's otium signified
'the way of life leading to spiritual enrichment.'131 In his letters, Seneca described worldly
pleasures as a distraction from virtue.132 Being transient, temporal objects are meaningless
when compared to the good, and he affirms that a conscious effort should be made to resist
the 'goads' of worldly delights.133 This is, Seneca believed, a relatively easy matter. 134 All
that was required was a dedication to philosophical inquiry and a commitment to literary
learning.135 Throughout the letters, he describes exercise of reason and a devotion to study as
necessary for the suppression of voluptas and fear.136 When a man practiced these activities
and banished contrary sentiments from his being, he achieved the wellbeing of his soul -
euthymia- an internal metamorphosis which was, in turn, identifiable with a productive
137
otium. '
Seneca's view of otium as involving the establishment of inner peace through
meditation and reading was repeated in those Christian writings which helped to shape the
thought of the later Middle Ages. Although the term otium itself was most frequently used in
a pejorative sense by writers drawing on the Latin Bible,138 many works invest the associated
concept of vacatio with the characteristics integral to Seneca's otium}9'9 Ps. 45:11 was a
pivotal text for this conceptual transition. In his Moralia, St. Gregory the Great used the
verse to explain that the Sabbath was, in one sense, a purely interior concept, and went to
128
Trinkaus, 'Humanist treatises', 19: '...even in book I, where the state of life and the conflicts
within the monastery walls are the main stress of his sermonizing, he falls back mainly on the
classical Christians for support - on Augustine, Lactantius, and Jerome.'
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define it as a spiritual leisure (vacatio) devoted to the contemplation of God.'40 In an
anonymous twelfth-century commentary, the crucial phrase vacate et videte was interpreted
as an exhortation to rid the mind of everything that was contrary to the contemplation of God
(desire, doubt etc.) and to establish peace in the heart.141 As St. Bernard argued, it was only
through the nullification of worldly desires and the establishment of an interna quies that it
was possible to participate in a 'union with the Father and the Son'.142 This entailed not
merely a rigorous commitment to meditation on the divine and abstention from useless or
vain thoughts, but also serious study of Scripture and of salutary texts.143
There are obvious parallels to be drawn with the De otio religioso and its resonance
with both the Senecan concept of euthymia and the monastic identification of vacatio with
quies mentis need not be laboured. The comparison, however, cannot be sustained beyond
this point. Although both classical and later Christian writers accorded otium or vacatio an
interior dimension, each tradition associated this with specific physical practices in a manner
that was entirely alien to the De otio religioso. As we have already seen, Seneca - along with
Livy and Sallust -firmly believed that places could communicate vice. In his attack on the
luxuria of Baiae, he argued that 'we ought to see to it that we flee to the greatest possible
distance from provocations from vice'.144 For Seneca, therefore, otium involved a very
physical withdrawal from the world and from the vita activa. Although Seneca's writings on
this point were often couched in a deliberately cautious fashion,145 the monastic tradition
which drew from his notion of otium expressed this notion of a vita contemplativa in a more
ambitious and unambiguous manner. It is not necessary to review medieval monasticism in
exhaustive detail, but it is valuable to point out that the injunction 'vacate et videte' was
accorded an ascetic meaning which more than matched its interior meaning. For another
anonymous writer of the twelfth century, 'vacate et videte' inferred not merely a respite from
useless preoccupations, but also a rest from 'perverted action'.146 Since thought and deed
were linked, the excision of worldly desires entailed an aversion from the world itself. For
the Cistercian Aelred of Rievaulx it was the absence of pointless labours, the absolute
dedication to God, the disregard for the body and the communal existence which made the
140 St. Gregory the Great, Moralia, V, 55; P.L. 76, col. 927.
141 J. Leclerq, Analecta monastica, I, Studia Anselminana, 20, (Rome, 1948), 98.
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cloister the natural home of the one true leisure and the only place in which mental vacatio
could properly be exercised.147
This understanding of otium as a physical leisure was quite out of keeping with
Petrarch's elaboration of the concept. As we have seen, Petrarch's otium was an intellectual
response to affective obstructions to the truth. Physicality played no significant role in this:
quite the opposite. The reading of Scripture and other salutary texts was an effective remedy
for 'demonic' doubt and despair not because the physical process of study was conducive to
virtue - as Cicero and Seneca had suggested - but because the personal process of
identification could strengthen the reader's belief in his capacity to redeem himself. More
importantly, the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh' could be combated not by
eremitic retreat, but by recognising the fallacy of looking for happiness in the transient.
Otium becomes an acknowledgement of corporeal mortality and a recognition of the primacy
of the rational in the context of grace.
Given the operative component of Petrarch's otium was so distinctively mental in
character, it is perhaps unsurprising that he should also have broken with classical and
monastic traditions in distancing the concept more clearly from physical seclusion. In the
first book, he warns the monks of Montrieux against the view that particular surroundings
can guard a person against vice. Implying that the Carthusian monks could fall prey to
complacence in their cloistered environment, he delivers a stern warning. 'You should not
infer that you are safe,' he thundered,
because you live in Christ's fortress; for although you campaign under the best
leader, and your encampments are the strongest and best defended, no place
should be thought to be entirely free from danger, with unsleeping and fierce
enemies lying in wait and making noise on every side unless armed guards,
vigorous in mind and body, keep watch on the rampart against the attacks and
ambushes of the enemy.148
Despite the exploitation of the imagery in this passage, it is evident that Petrarch did intend
'in castris CristV and 'nullus ... locus' to be understood in their literal and physical sense.
The monks of Montrieux may have entered the monastery as soldiers of Christ and,
separated from the world, may be in a positive location from which to defend themselves
against doubt and voluptas, but they should not be deluded into thinking that their physical
147 Aelred of Rievaulx, Sermones inediti, ed. C. H. Talbot, (Rome, 1952), 88, quoted in Leclerq, Otia
monastica, 107.
148 De otio, I, 3: 'Neque vero vos tutos arbitremini quia in castris Cristi agitis; quamvis enim sub
optimo duce militetis et castra munitissima ac fortissima sint, nullus tamen locus ad plenum tutus
extimandus est quern insomnes et feri hostes obsident atque circumsonant, nisi pro vallo excubent
armati vigilcs contra insultus insidiasque hostium animis atque corporibus intenti.' Rotondi, 14, 11. 20-
25.
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surroundings actually protected them. It is their devotion to Christ and their constant
watchfulness against the 'insultus insidiasque hostium', rather than their cloistered
environment which is their best defence against falsehoods.149
To some degree, the form of interior peace to which otium pointed evokes the
f|afr/Jra sought by Evagrius and the desert fathers, struggling against dyj|8ia and 7id0r|, but
Petrarch's development of the concept appears both to be a more specific response to the
Three Enemies of Man and a more programmatically developed idea. A closer parallel can
be found in the works of St. Augustine, who himself elaborated on many of the themes
inspired by Greek philosophy assimilated by early Christian thought. Although Augustine's
works in general do not display much evidence of his having responded directly to the
classical tradition of otium,150 his sermon on Ps. 45:11 nevertheless describes a form of
productive leisure which discreetly continues Latin archetypes in a manner quite different
from that of later Christian discussions of vacatio.151 Deconstructing the apparently simple
Psalmic verse, Augustine explains that if man - whose power is so limited - is to be
redeemed, he must see (videre) that it is through God alone that he will be reformed.152 The
truth, however, is invisible when the mind is consumed by a 'struggling tumult'.153 When it
is said 'vacate et videte' therefore, Augustine explains that what is meant is a vacatio a
contradictionibus - a respite from the contradictions that cloud the mind achieved through
conscious intellectual endeavour and used for the sake of the recognition of the truth.154
It is not unreasonable to see Augustine's vacatio as a form of the otium negotiosum
and it seems fair to suggest that he was indeed contributing - perhaps unconsciously - to a
classical tradition of attributing positive value to productive leisure. Nevertheless, his
understanding of vacatio/otium is self-evidently idiosyncratic and stands at a distance from
the otium negotiosum advocated by those like Seneca.
149 c.f. De otio, I, 3; Rotondi, 17, 11. 3-8, quoting James 4:7, 8.
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Although Seneca's conception of the otium negotiosum involved the suppression of
contrary desires for the attainment of intellectual solace, St. Augustine's vacatio was a more
explicitly interior concept. Rather than seeing man as an actor 'goaded' to evil deeds by
physical objects, Augustine portrays human beings as capable of confusing - and even
'blinding' - themselves with contradictions of mind. The implication of this distinction is
significant. The explanatory exhortation 'reprimite animos vestros a contradictionibus'
which concludes the exegesis makes vacatio a personal resolution of an intellectual tension
and refers the concept directly to the opposition between voluptas and ratio in relation to the
truth. In the De civitate Dei, this is made more obvious. Discussing the law of the heavenly
and earthly cities, Augustine explains that pure contemplation of the truth is impossible
without peace. Peace, in turn, cannot be had without the suppression of animal desire and the
supremacy of the rational soul.155 When - in the Enarrationes in psalmos - Augustine urged
his listeners to have peace in themselves by resolving the contradictions of their minds, he
therefore communicates a sense that vacatio must necessarily involve the recognition of the
futility of mortal things and the aspiration to rational existence. An observant reader, not
overly troubled by issues of textual chronology, would have no difficulty in seeing the rather
generalised exhortation of the Enarrationes as compatible with the moral theology of the De
vera religione and the Soliloquies,156
In direct contrast to the classical tradition and - to an extent - with later monastic
thought, the 'active' component of Augustine's vacatio requires no reference to the physical
world and, as such, is capable of sustaining translation into a highly flexible form of the
otium negotiosum. Directed towards the extinction of voluptas and the exercise of reason, it
required no concern be given to external reality beyond that which is necessary for a
comfortable existence. Provided the inner tumults of the mind were stilled, it did not matter
what a man's surroundings or occupation might be. Although there were different forms of
living, Augustine did not seem to express a preference:
The dress or manner of life adopted by whoever embraces the faith that leads to
God does not matter to the Heavenly City, provided that these things do not
contravene the divine precepts. Hence when philosophers become Christians,
they are required to change their false doctrines, but they are not compelled to
change their dress or their customary mode of life, for these are not an
impediment to religion. Thus, the behaviour which Varro noted as a defining
characteristic of the Cynics does not matter in the least, provided that there is
nothing indecent or immoderate about it. As for the three kinds of life - the life
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of leisure, the life of action, and the combination of both, a Christian might
conduct his life in any of these ways and still attain to everlasting rewards,
provided that he does so without prejudice to his faith. And it is, of course,
important also that he loves the truth and performs the duties of charity.157
Although vacatio was necessary for the perception of the truth, the attainment of virtue was
not conditional on a physical withdrawal from the world. The intellectual dimension was of
primary importance. In a passage from the De vera religione which Petrarch quoted with
great approval towards the end of the first book of the De otio religioso, Augustine further
glosses 'vacate et videte'. 'Do not strive against being accustomed to material things.' he
says,
Conquer that habit and you are victorious over all. We seek unity, the simplest
thing of all. Therefore let us seek it in simplicity of heart. 'Take time and know
that I am God.' This [leisure] is not the stillness of idleness but of thought, free
from space and time. Swelling, fleeting phantasms do not permit us to see
abiding unity. Space offers us something to love, but time steals away what we
love and leaves the soul crowds of phantasms which incite desire for this or
that. Thus the mind becomes restless and unhappy, vainly trying to hold that by
which it is held captive. It is summoned to stillness so that it may not love the
things which cannot be loved without toil. So it will master them and not be
held by them.1"8
Petrarch's description of the manner in which the 'wiles of demons', the 'snares of the
world' and the 'lures of the flesh' are overcome continues themes present in Christian moral
treatises from the desert fathers to the fourteenth century, but is nevertheless located within
the context of St. Augustine's understanding of the relationship between voluptas and ratio.
As such, despite the literary connotations and heritage of the term, Petrarch's otium stands in
close relation to Augustine's development of vacatio. Uniquely like Augustine, Petrarch's
157
Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX, 19: 'Nihil sane ad istam pertinet civitatem quo habitu vel more
vivendi, si non est contra divina praecepta, istam fidem, qua pervenitur ad Deum, quisque sectetur;
unde ipsos quoque philosophos, quando Christiani fiunt, non habitum vel consuetudinem victus, quae
nihil inpedit religionem, sed falsa dogmata mutare compellit. Unde illam quam Varro adhibuit ex
Cynicis differentiam, si nihil turpiter atque intemperanter agat, omnino non curat. Ex tribus vero illis
vitae generibus, otioso, actuoso et ex utroque composito, quamvis salva fide quisque possit in quolibet
eorum vitam ducere et ad sempiterna praemia pervenire, interest tamen quid amore teneat veritatis,
quid officio caritatis impendat.' trans, from Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. and
trans. R. W. Dyson, (Cambridge, 1998), 948.
158
Augustine, De vera religione, xxxv, 65; trans. Burleigh, 258. Petrarch quotes this passage from the
De vera religone in his discussion of 'demonic' doubt which obviously evokes the spirit of the
Enarrationes in psalmos: De otio, I, 7; Rotondi, 43, 11.11-13, quoting St. Augustine, De vera
religione, xxxv, 65. His awareness of the overlap between the two works seems palpable, particularly
since it ultimately serves as a continuation of an Augustinian gloss on 'vacate et videte'. Vickers,
'Leisure and idleness,' 113, notes the link to the De vera religione, but omits to connect the text with
the Enarrationes in psalmos.
80
otium is founded in the mind. Its operative components - evocative of the young saint's
moral theology - are based on the suppression of voluptas and the supremacy of rational
endeavour in the context of grace. As in the De civitate Dei and the De vera religione,
Petrarch uses these active elements to strip his otium of any physical associations: by virtue
of his emphasis on intellectual endeavour, otium loses its literal sense of leisure and instead
becomes an interior form of peace.159
It is Petrarch's dual insistence on the intellectual activities proper to otium and the
concept's lack of physical meaning which marks him out most clearly as having been
influenced by St. Augustine, and his acceptance of the Enarrationes in psalmos as the surest
guide to the Davidic verses in a letter to Boccaccio seems to add further weight to this
argument.160 Although his use of the word otium and manipulation of the connotations of
productive leisure are reflective of the spirit of the classical tradition, his description of it as
an interior condition dependent on experiential identification, the meditatio mortis and the
role of reason places the De otio religioso at some distance from classical Latin archetypes.
By the same token, the notion of otium also stands at some remove from the monastic
tradition. While otium is defined as a response to the Three Enemies of Man, and the De otio
religioso ostensibly addresses the leisure he had witnessed at the monastery of Montrieux,
his exhortation to live as a pilgrim in the body marks the furthest limit of his direct
absorption of monastic writings on otium. He was certainly prepared to draw support from
the lives and works of holy men such as St. Bernard, but the interior nature of Petrarch's
otium precluded him from using the concept to draw a necessary connection between the
exercise of otium and the regulated seclusion of a cloistered life, or with the manual labour
conventionally prescribed as a remedy for otium otiosum.m
Whereas some scholars like Kristeller, Trinkaus, Lokay, Seidlmeyer and Constable
have viewed the De otio religioso as a comment on the monastic life which either idealises
or excoriates a cloistered existence, this impression of otium casts the text in a different light.
Although there are indeed grounds for seeing the text as a reflection on the status of the
159 A further instance on which this interpretation of Petrarchan otium is suggested appears during the
discussion of demonic doubt. Shortly after Petrarch first warns the monks of Montrieux against
complacency, he reminds them once again of the universality of the 'fragile warfare of life'. This
leads him to question whether it is, in fact, profitable for the monks to have a literal 'quies' and to
believe that they are without an enemy. Although it would be difficult to offer too strident an
interpretation on the basis of a relatively short passage, it appears that otium can be had even when
surrounded by the objects of all corporeal desires. Indeed, there is the suggestion that otium is almost
better where it is enjoyed surrounded obviously by the danger of the passions. De otio, I, 3; Rotondi,
20,11. 19-24.
160 Fam. XVIII, 3.
161
Leclercq, Otia monastica, 37-40; H. J. Sieben, "Quies' et 'Otium" in Dictionnaire de spiritualite
ascetique, mystique, doctrine et histoire (Paris, 1985), 12: 2748-51.
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religious, Petrarch's description of an interior, intellectual otium explores a facet of moral
living which may be shared by both the secular and the religious life, and which transcended
the confines of the cloister. Called forth by a visit to the monastery at Montrieux, the De otio
religioso nevertheless presented a form of active leisure based on identification, the
meditatio mortis and reason in the context of grace which could be applied in all walks of
life. Basing his concept of otium on Augustine's vacatio, Petrarch explored linguistic and
conceptual similarities between the classical and monastic traditions to produce a text which
- while of great relevance to the monastic life - was able to serve as a model for virtuous
living applicable even to those who, like him, inhabited the secular realm.
7. The De otio religioso and the Secretum
Although the De otio religioso is framed around the traditional motif of the Three Enemies
of Man and makes use of a radically different style, it is notable that the treatise appears to
correspond well with the early-Augustinian advice dispensed by Augustinus in the Secretum.
The similarity between the moral preoccupations of the two texts need not be laboured.
Despite each making use of different constructions of the seven deadly sins, both the
Secretum and the De otio religioso deal with the opposition of voluptas and virtus and
engage with the problem by concentrating on the perception of the truth. Whereas
Augustinus treats the seven deadly sins in turn in the Secretum, laying particular emphasis on
accidia, love and the desire for glory, Petrarch uses three broad groups to describe the same
vices in the De otio religioso and, following an established medieval tradition, continues to
place considerable emphasis on despair while associating the totality with the obstruction of
truth. Each text expresses confidence that the divine truth can be perceived using reason and
is unambiguous in its certainty of man's capacity for redemption, but laments the fact that
men can deceive themselves so readily.
The moral programmes which the two texts propound are similarly related. As in the
Secretum, Petrarch's remedy for the 'snares of the world' and the 'lures of the flesh' is based
on a recognition of corporeal mortality. Once a person has recognised that an adherence to
the transient not only leads him further away from felicitas, but also puts him at a distance
from his distinctive humanity, he will naturally wish to pursue the eternal and exercise his
unique capacity for rational endeavour. While the De otio religioso's emphasis on salutary
reading is not matched by similarly explicit statements in the Secretum, the means by which
'demonic' despair may be combated is clearly related to the role of reading presupposed by
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the dialogue and persuasively analysed by Victoria Kahn and Carol Quillen.162 In the same
way as Augustinus invites Franciscus to identify with him as an author, and just as the
dialogue itself is intended to educate a particular moral state, so the De otio religioso invests
the practice of reading with an intellective meaning.
The parallelism of the Secretion and the De otio religioso seems to illustrate that
otium itself was employed to denote the moral condition which the dialogue was intended to
inculcate, and which Augustinus himself briefly describes as an ideal to which Franciscus
should aspire. Sharing an identical moral philosophy, derived from St. Augustine's works
and cloaked by allusions to classical, patristic and medieval traditions, the Secretion and the
De otio religioso appear to point towards the cultivation of a particular form of interior
peace. In each case, the idea of an inner peace appears as the extension of an early-
Augustinian understanding of felicitas and virtus, and has a series of distinct characteristics.
As a form of activity, each text describes a form of otium which involves the negation of
deleterious desires through salutary reading, a meditation on mortality and the exercise of
reason. No substantial significance is accorded to place or occupation in either text. As a
condition, otium appears not so much as a means of describing a contemplative or eremitic
existence, but rather as a manner of expressing a mens quieta, an unburdened mind free from
the distractions and troubles of the world.
162
Kahn, 'The Figure of the Reader'; Quillen, Rereading the Renaissance.
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3
The hidden life of solitude
1. Solitude and the vita contemplativa
Begun no more than a year later, the De otio religioso was composed as a companion-piece
to the De vita solitariaAddressing the monks of Montrieux, Petrarch pointed out that the
De otio religioso was related to the De vita solitaria both in subject and style. Describing the
mode of living appropriate to the man who would be virtuous, the two texts were, he
claimed, intended to demonstrate that 'it is the mark of mortal madness which rejoices more
in labour than in the fruits of labour.'2
The congruence of the De vita solitaria and the De otio religioso is sustained by the
apparent interchangeability of the terms 'otium' and 'solitudo' in the two works. As in both
the Rerum memorandarum libri and the Invective contra medicum, 'otium and 'solitudo' are
used almost synonymously throughout the De vita solitaria, and the impression of a shared
semantic space is implicit in the use of both 'solitarius' and 'otiosus' to describe the man
who is free from occupationes in the first book.3 Indeed, 'otium' and its derivatives appear
An early version of this chapter was presented at the Spirit of the Age Conference at the University of
Kingston on 4th July 2007. I am also indebted to Dr. William Rossiter (School of English, University
of Liverpool) for his many helpful suggestions.
1
For the dating and composition of the De vita solitaria, see B. L. Ullman, 'The composition of
Petrarch's De vita solitaria and the history of the Vatican manuscript,' Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati,
4, Letteratura classica e umanistica, Studi e testi 195, (Vatican City, 1946), 107-42; A. Avena, 'La
composizione del trattato De vita solitaria,' Rivista critica delta letteratura italiana 12 (1907): 193-
202; G. Martellotti, 'Nota critica al testo del De vita solitaria,' in Prose, 1166-8. Latin text for the De
vita solitaria, ed. G. Martellotti, Prose, 286-593; English translation, Life of Solitude, trans. J. Zeitlin,
(Illinois, 1924). In what follows, references to the De vita solitaria will indicate the relevant portion of
text according to Jacob Zeitlin's translation (Z), according to the division of the work by Guido
Martellotti in Prose (P), and according to the page number in the Prose edition {Prose). For comment
on Zeitlin's translation, see O. Shepard, 'Review of Petrarch's Life of Solitude by Jacob Zeitlin,'
Journal of English and Germanic Philology 24 (1925): 560-74. All translations are my own, unless
otherwise stated.
2
De otio religioso, I, 1: 'Sileo que sequuntur, nam et ea me scripsisse recolo in eo libro, quern huic et
materia et stilo valde cognatum de solitaria vita nuper edidi, qui hunc et tempore, sic serie rerum preit,
et omnia ad unum tendunt, ad notam scilicet mortalis insanie magis labore gaudentibus quam laboris
fructu.' Rotondi, 6, 11.27-32. c.f. De otio religioso, I, 8: 'Non est animus nominatim hie reliquos
attingere, quorum nomina satis in secundam Solitarie vite partem congessisse videor.' Rotondi, 48,
1.34-49,1.1.
3
e.g. De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 1; P I, ii; Prose, 302; Z I, iii. 1; P I, iii; Prose, 318.
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on more than eighty occasions in the De vita solitaria and are, in fact, employed more
extensively than in the De otio religioso. Similarly, the implication of conceptual co-
dependence is latent in Petrarch's use of 'solitudo' to introduce his theme in the first book of
the De otio religioso.4
Like otium, solitudo has virtue as its object in the De vita solitaria. For Umberto
Bosco, solitude was 'the "vestibule" of all virtue',5 while for Arnaud Tripet, it was 'the
condition of all virtuous ways'.6 Although Petrarch used 'otium' to denote an intellectual
freedom from desire and despair, however, scholars viewed 'solitudo' as more closely
connected with the pursuit of a peaceful retirement in the countryside dedicated to study in
the company of a select group of friends.7 Rather than being a continuation of the
Augustinian idea of vacatio, solitude is commonly interpreted as a humanistic development
of the classical notion of a vita contemplativa, defined in opposition to the active
engagement in civic life, a vita activa.
In the introduction to his translation of the De vita solitaria, Jacob Zeitlin argued
that Petrarch abhorred the city and longed for the innocence of the countryside, in a manner
reminiscent of Horace's Satires,8 Far from the hateful mob, Zeitlin suggests, Petrarch held
that a man might find peace and virtue on the verdant banks of a rolling stream and,
surrounded by oaks and beeches, find happiness.9 This distance from the vice of the city,
however, did not equate to isolation from friends. Zeitlin contends that Petrarch - like Cicero
- seems to have had a horror for that lonely form of solitude and felt that a few good-hearted
friends could contribute as much to the attainment of virtue as the separation from vulgar
hordes and the vicious goads of the city.10 Among good people, Zeitlin argues, Petrarch
believed a man could move more readily towards the good. The same appears to have been
true of the company of books and the anticipated society of readership." As Zeitlin points
out, Petrarch openly shares Seneca's view that solitude without literary endeavour would be
like a living death.12 Separate from all the distractions of public life, a man could follow the
4
De otio religioso, I, 1; Rotondi, 2,11. 7-10.
5 U. Bosco, Petrarca, (Bari, 1961), 109.
5 A. Tripet, Petrarque ou la connaissance de soi, Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance XCI,
(Geneva, 1967), 41 ; c.f. Constable, 'Petrarch and Monasticism,' 63.
7 J. Zeitlin, 'Introduction,' in Life ofSolitude, trans. Zeitlin, 55.
8
Zeitlin, 'Introduction', 55-7; Tripet, Petrarque ou la connaissance de soi, 49. c.f. Horace, Sat. II, 6.
On this satire and its Epicurean associations see, for example, N. Rudd, The Satires of Horace,
(London, 1994), 243-257, esp. 250-1.
9 See also Tripet, Petrarque ou la connaissance de soi, 49.
10
Zeitlin, 'Introduction', 62; Wilkins, Life ofPetrarch, 54; Bosco, Petrarca, 110.
11
Literary endeavour and companionship are treated as equivalent in Bosco's study of Petrarch's life
and it is interesting that they are seen as being facilitated solely by distance from the city and attendant
impediments. Bosco, Petrarca, 110-11.
12
Seneca, Ep. lxxxii, 4.
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Stoic philosopher in learning much from reading improving works and writing texts of great
value to humanity. By the same token, he could emulate Virgil in presenting the countryside
as the perfect setting for the vita contemplativa and the ideal environment for poetic
composition."
In Zeitlin's view, Petrarch's conception of solitudo is derived entirely from classical
archetypes. There is, in Zeitlin's opinion, 'scarcely a trace' of 'Christian mysticism' in the
De vita solitarici and Petrarch's image of rural seclusion could well be described as 'un¬
christian'.14 Indeed, even in treating the 'Christian votaries of the solitary life' in the second
book, Zeitlin argued that Petrarch actually betrays a distaste for the practices of his 'monkish
heroes' and reveals a secular and Horatian preference for 'the avoidance of slovenliness and
boorishness, and for the middle course in all things.'15 Although approaching the text from a
somewhat different perspective, Tripet similarly affirms that Petrarch's solitudo was in all
significant respects modelled after the classical idea of a vita contemplativa, and most
closely resembled aspects of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy.16
Since the publication of Zeitlin's translation, many scholars have come to question
the degree to which Petrarch neglected patristic and monastic thought in the De vita
solitaria, and have drawn attention to the compatibility of classical and Christian traditions.
Although expressing himself rather tentatively, Guido Martellotti pointed to the concord
achieved between competing 'pagan' and Christian strands in the text.17 Developing this
view further, Giles Constable has suggested that the classical images deployed in the De vita
solitaria were manipulated in such a way that they actually supported a monastic view of
solitude.18 Similarly, Charles Trinkaus has contended that Petrarch's apparent predilection
for Stoic and Epicurean thought was not incompatible with either monastic writings or with a
celebration of the life of the religious.19 Pursuing a similar line of argument (although
writing some time before Martellotti, Trinkaus and Constable), Bosco not merely suggested
that Petrarch's Stoic and Epicurean references were compatible with Christian theology, but
also attempted to forge a link with the exhortation 'vacate et videte' in the De otio religioso
by suggesting somewhat clumsily that there is a parallel between the bucolic virtue of
classical philosophy and the apprehension of divine knowledge.20
13 M. O'Rourke Boyle, Petrarch's Genius. Pentimento and Prophesy (Berkeley, Los Angeles and
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Despite the parallels which have been drawn between the De vita solitaria and
monastic thought, Fritz Schalk has nevertheless accurately summarised consensus in arguing
that the Christian content of Petrarch's solitudo is subordinate to its more direct Stoic and
Epicurean inspiration.21 There may be parallels which can be observed between Petrarch's
solitude and monastic - and even Augustinian22 - thought, but it is generally agreed that the
De vita solitaria's emphasis on rural seclusion, the company of friends and the literary
endeavour marks it out as having been composed primarily under the influence of Stoic and
Epicurean thought. Solitude, it is held, is conceived in direct imitation of a classical vita
contemplativa, overlaid with the admiration of the countryside and hatred of the city which
characterised the moralising satires of the Lucilian tradition.23 As such, regardless of
Petrarch's intention that the two texts should be complementary, there appears to be a
significant gap between the otium we have observed in the De otio religioso and the solitude
of the De vita solitaria.
2. Stoic and Epicurean themes in Petrarch's solitudo: the background of the
De vita solitaria
There is, indeed, much to recommend the suggestion that the classical notion of a vita
contemplativa provided the inspiration for Petrarch's conception of solitudo in the De vita
solitaria. With the slight exception of Cicero's notion of the ideal statesman,24 Stoic and
Epicureans during the late Roman Republic and early Empire were united in advocating the
pursuit of a vita contemplativa - dedicated to friendship and philosophy - in preference to a
vita activa - devoted to negotium and occupationes.
For the Epicureans, it was fruitless to look for security in public affairs.25 Since the
quest for public acclaim and civic prominence required men to depend on others from whom
no loyalty could be expected, an active life in the city - vulnerable to the fickleness of fate -
was fraught with worry and fear.26 Although Juvenal distanced himself from Epicureanism in
21 F. Schalk, 'Zu Petrarcas «De vita solitaria» (Buch II),' in G. Billanovich and G. Frasso, ed., 11
Petrarca ad Arqua. Atti del Convegno di Studi nel VI Centenario (1370-1374) (Padua, 1975), 257-68,
here, 261.
22
q.v. for example, Augustine, De civitate Dei, VIII, 4; Contra Faustum, XXII, 52.
23 For a useful introduction to the Lucilian tradition of satire, see M. Coffey, Roman Satire, 2nd ed.,
(London, 1989), 35-148.
24 Cicero, De re publico, I, vi, 11; I, viii, 13; I, ix, 14f.
25
Diogenes Laertius, X, 143, xiv; c.f. Plutarch, Moralia, XIV, lxxv.
26 Ammianus Marcellinus, XXX, iv, 3.
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Sat. XIII,27 Umbricius' complaints about the corruption and disrepute of Rome in Sat. Ill28
and the invective against the ambition and avarice of the city in Sat. X are reflective of this
strand of Epicurean thought.29 Faced with the uncertainties and vices of the city, it was far
better for the Epicurean to withdraw to the countryside.30 There, a man could dedicate
himself to philosophy and could cultivate strong friendships in a beautiful and peaceful
environment where fear and concern would have no place.31 Through philosophy, which
allows him to minimise the influence of the body, he could understand how little he really
needs, learn how to enjoy what he has, and to free himself from the fear of loss.32 In
friendship, he could find the only secure form of human contact and great pleasure.33
For the later Stoics who placed great emphasis on the exercise of 'muscular' virtues
and the doctrine of the will, such a line of reasoning was understandably anathema,34 but the
attraction of a vita contemplativa was still regarded as valid. Having decried the deleterious
effects of towns like Baiae in his letters,35 Seneca recommended a solitary life of study35
initially on the grounds that it was the surest means of remaining focussed on virtue.37 Only
when all occupationes had been cast aside, and the depraved ways of the town left behind
did Seneca believe that it would be possible for a man to engage freely in the philosophical
enquiry which would lead to wisdom and virtue.38 Away from the thronging crowd,
exercising moderation and continence,39 and in the company of books and good friends, a
man could come to understand the concatenation of all creation, and hence know both the
good and the fallacy of fearing death. Conscious that critics might accuse him of diverging
from the path of virtue and duty laid down by Zeno and Chrysippus,40 however, he added
that the solitary man's philosophical inquiries could be of benefit to the whole of humanity
and thus be seen as a dutiful parallel to participation in public affairs.41 Surrounded by the
27
Juvenal, Sat. XIII, 121-3. For an interesting and useful discussion of this point, see G. Highet, 'The
Philosophy of Juvenal,' Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 80
(1949): 254-70.
28 Juvenal, Sat. Ill, 164-231.
29 Juvenal, Sat. X, 12-27, 56-113.
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Martial, Epigrams, I, lxxxvi, 11.8-10; II, xc; II, liii, 11.3-10.
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Seneca, Ep. viii, 7.
33 Cicero, Definibus, I, xx, 67-70; Seneca, Ep. ix, 8-9.
34
e.g. Cicero, De re publica, I, vi, 10-11.
35
e.g. Seneca, Ep. li.
36 Seneca, De otio, I, 1.
37 Seneca, De otio, I, 1. See also Ep. viii, 7-8, in which the overlap between Stoic and Epicurean
thought is evident, although Seneca's divergence is also made plain.
38
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for example, Seneca, Ep. lxxxix, 7-8.
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e.g. Seneca, Ep. xvii, 3-5; xviii, 2-7, 9-11.




peace of the countryside, a wise man could not only be free of the distractions of vice, but
could also serve the wider human community.
Petrarch's description of the circumstances in which the De vita solitaria was
composed, and his treatment of solitude in some of his letters and metrical epistles from the
same period are apparently redolent of Stoic and Epicurean thought.42 Seemingly framed
around a contrast between the vice and instability of the city, and the peace of rural seclusion
in the company of books and friends, the image of solitude which emerges appears to
reproduce many of the features of the vita contemplativa common to these two philosophical
schools.
The prefatory letter to Philippe de Cabassoles indicates that the De vita solitaria was
intended to celebrate the solitude which Petrarch and the Bishop of Cavaillon had enjoyed
together at Vaucluse in early 1346.43 Although few details of the visit are given in the text,
an insight into Petrarch's apprehension of that solitude is provided by a metrical epistle - the
Exul ab Italia'14 - sent to Philippe apparently by way of invitation in the January of that
year.45 The contrast between city and countryside is immediately made apparent. In the
opening lines, Petrarch reveals that he had come to Vaucluse 'partimque volens, partimque
coactus', having been driven out of Italy by [funis civilibus' in Parma.46 Despite the
proximity of Avignon, he found the Provencal valley a delightful refuge.47 In Vaucluse, he
claims, are sylvan glades, streams and all the leisure of the countryside.48 Everything a man
could need can be found near the source of the Sorgue. Neither conflict nor the confusions of
42 For an interesting introduction to Petrarch's own pursuit of the life of solitude, see J. Petrie,
'Petrarch solitarius,' in M. McLaughlin, L. Panizza and P. Hainsworth, eds., Petrarch in Britain.
Interpreters, Imitators and Translators over 700 Years, Proceedings of the British Academy 146,
(Oxford, 2007), 29-38.
43
De vita solitaria, 'Ad Philippum Cavallicensem Epyscopum': 'solitarie scilicet otioseque vite
preconium, quam cum sepe olim solus, turn precipue nuper mecum brevi quidem nec nisi dierum
quindecim spatio degustasti.' Prose, 290-92.
44
Ep.Met.Var. 3; text in Poesie minori del Petrarca, ed. D. Rossetti, 3 vols. (Milan, 1829-1834), 2:
60-6. Rossetti erroneously numbers it Ep. Met. I, 6 on the basis of the editions of 1554 and 1581.
There is a readable English translation in Petrarch at Vaucluse: Letters in Verse and Prose, trans. E.
H. Wilkins, (Chicago, 1958), 179ff.
45 On the dating of the Exul ab Italia, see E. H. Wilkins, 'Petrarch's Exul ab Italia,' Speculum 38/3
(July, 1963): 453-460. See also E. H. Wilkins, The "Epistolae Metricae" of Petrarch: A Manual,
Studi Eruditi, 8, (Rome, 1956), 12, 16.
46 On 23rd February 1345, Petrarch had fled from Parma. The city, the lordship of which Azzo da
Correggio had recently sold to Obizzo d'Este, was at that time besieged by the forces of the envious
Marquis of Mantua and the Visconti. Faced with mounting civic unrest, Petrarch feared for his safety,
partly due to his friendship with Azzo. Wilkins, 'Petrarch's Exul ab Italia', 453-4, 457-8. c.f. Fain. V,
10.
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a lawsuit disturb the peace which even the weary Muses had seen fit to enjoy.49 At Vaucluse,
loyal friends are all that Petrarch lacked.50
The beginning of the Exul ab Italia has echoes of Propertius,51 but appears most
strongly to recall Horace, Sat. II, 6 and, pregnant with the suggestion of a comparison
between Petrarch's house at Vaucluse and the satirist's desires, seems to hint strongly that
the solitude which inspired the De vita solitaria was conceived as a classical vita
contemplativa. Petrarch has what Horace always wished for - a house near the source of a
perennial stream, close to a little woodland52 - and it is striking that, like the country mouse
in the fable,53 he is content to be away from the insidious life of the city. His fare is simple -
recalling the dinner offered to the town mouse54 - but, as we have seen, he has everything
that he needs to live comfortably. In the company of the Muses (which indicates the
importance of literary endeavour to this rural retreat) he is free from ambition55 and wants
for nothing except the companionship of a good friend, a deficiency which he hoped would
soon be remedied.
Petrarch almost seems to present himself as the fulfilment of Horace's ideal56 and
this appears to add weight to the sense of parallelism between solitude and the vita
contemplativa. Although Horace and Petrarch each removed themselves 'from the city to a
mountain citadel',57 Petrarch has the sense not to ask for anything beyond the presence of a
friend. Unlike Horace, he does not ask for his livestock to be fattened and does not invite the
gods to protect him against change.58 Since he has no wish to return to the city, he has no
49
ibid., 11. 8-14.
50 ibid., 1. 4: 'Sed fidi comites absunt vultusque sereni'.
51 Jennifer Petrie has drawn attention to Propertius' dream that he 'lived on Mount Helicon, and was
led by Apollo to a cave where the Muses taught him his vocation as a love poet.' Propertius, II, xiiia,
3-4; III, v, 19-20. J. Petrie, Petrarch: The Augustan Poets, the Italian Tradition and the Canzoniere
(Dublin, 1983), 88. It seems, however, that the emphasis on material satisfaction present in the Exul
ab Italia is absent from Propertius and the parallel is somewhat imperfect. For Petrarch's knowledge
of Propertius, unusual for the fourteenth century, see de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'humanisme, 1: 170-3;
B. L. Ullman, 'The Manuscripts of Propertius,' Classical Philology, 6/3, (July 1911): 282-301; E. H.
Wilkins, 'Notes on Petrarch', MLN 32/4 (1917): 193-200, esp. 193-96. It is interesting to note that
Petrarch regarded Propertius as one of the four great love poets of Antiquity (alongside Catullus,
Tibullus and Ovid), on which see Fam. IX, 4; Trionfo d'amore, IV, 19-24; De remediis utriusque
fortune, I, 69.
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reason to sigh for the countryside or wonder when he will have the opportunity to be among
his books again.59
The contrast between rus and urbs so important to Stoic and Epicurean notions of
the vita contemplativa is similarly visible in other letters written during the composition of
the De vita solitaria. In a letter written on 15th February 1353, for example, Petrarch invited
Niccolo di Paolo dei Vetuli, Bishop of Viterbo to join him and Socrates [Ludwig van
Kempen] in Vaucluse and, as in the earlier metrical epistle to Philippe de Cabassoles, uses
the most vivid images to describe the solitude into which the prelate would be welcomed. 'I
know of nothing,' Petrarch wrote towards the end of the letter,
which can compare to this solitude, in which our Socrates and I are most
eagerly awaiting you. Supported by divine labour, you will easily be able to
reinvigorate your body and clear your mind. For here there is no threatening
tyrant and no intemperate citizenry; [you will not find] the biting language of a
frenzied detractor, nor anger, nor a faction of citizens, nor complaints, nor traps,
nor noise, nor the clamour of men, nor the din of crowds, nor the rumpus of
lovers; what is more, [there is] no avarice, no envy, absolutely no ambition, no
home for pride to be approached with fear; [there is] but joy, simplicity,
freedom, and the happy state between wealth and poverty; [there is] but sober,
humble and gentle rusticity, a harmless people, an unarmed peasantry, a pacific
region, the bishop of which [Philippe de Cabassoles] - the best of men, a true
friend to good people - will have you as a brother, since he has us as sons.60
Here, solitude is free from the fearful tribulations, worrisome divisions and unpleasant noises
of the city. Far from the avarice, envy, ambition and pride which stalk urban streets, Petrarch
and Ludwig van Kempen enjoy peace and happiness by following a moderate and humble
way of life in each other's company. Their rectitude is associated with and reflected by the
simplicity of their rustic existence.
In a letter written to Guido Sette from San Columbano on 21st October 1353,
Petrarch developed the contrast between rus and urbs yet further.61 The beauty of his
surroundings put him in mind of Vaucluse and, sustaining the parallel, he juxtaposes the
59
ibid., 60-62.
60 Fam. XVI, 6, 20-22: 'nichil quod sciam, posse nunc cum hac solitudine comparari, in qua te
Socrates noster et ego cupidissime expectamus, ubi facile divina ope suffultus et corpus recreare et
serenare animum queas. Nullus hie tyrannus minax, nullus civis insolens; non obtrectatoris rabidi
lingua mordacior, non ira, non civilis factio, non querimonie, non insidie, non clamor, non strepitus
hominum, non tubarum clangor, non fragor armorum; nulla preterea avaritia, nullus livor, nulla
prorsus ambitio, nullum superbi limen cum tremore subeundum; sed gaudium et simplicitas et libertas
et inter divitias pauperiemque status optabilis; sed sobria et humilis et mansueta rusticitas, gens
innocua, plebs inermis, regio pacifica, cuius presul vir optimus et bonorum amicissimus consequens
erit ut te in fratrem habeat, quoniam nos habet in filios.' c.f. Fam. VI, 3 written to Giovanni Colonna
on 30lh May 1342.
61 Fam. XVII, 5. On Petrarch's visit to San Columbano, see E.H. Wilkins, Petrarch's Eight Years in
Milan (Cambridge MA, 1958), 4If.
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troubles of Milan with the peace of San Columbano. The splendid environment62 is 'indeed
the place of peace, the home of leisure, the repose of labours, the lodging of tranquillity, the
workshop of solitude.'63 It is quiet, safe and free, quite distant from the concerns of the city,
almost the perfect place in which to rest the mind and give rein to other sweet occupations.64
Set in such a place, and utterly removed from the disturbances of the town, a country
dwelling would, for Petrarch, be 'a fortunate, heavenly, angelic dwelling'65 and he felt that
he wrote not so much in the guise of a poet or philosopher, as with the feeling of a king.66
Petrarch's imagery seems to have many obvious parallels in classical literature. It recalls, for
example, Seneca's observations on Baiae,67 and Virgil's celebration of the country-dweller's
life in the second Georgic,68 but also invites comparison with Martial's epigrams and
Juvenal's Satires.69 The contrast between city and countryside, between the sins which come
from an involvement with the affairs of others and the good which springs from simplicity
and self-sufficiency, however, are strikingly evocative of Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of
the vita contemplativa.
If the solitude which Petrarch depicted in his letters to Guido Sette and Niccolo di
Paolo dei Vetuli seems to have the character of a vita contemplativa defined in opposition to
61Fain. XVII, 5, 7.
63 Fain. XVII, 5, 4: 'vere rus illud locus est pads, otii domus, requies laborum, tranquillitatis
hospitium officina.'
64 Fain. XVII, 5, 6.
65 Fain. XVII, 5, 7: '... habitatio est felix celestis angelica...'
66 Fain. XVII, 5, 15.
67
Seneca, Ep. li, 4 ; c.f. Fain. XVI, 6, 20.
68
Virgil, Georgics, II, 458-540, esp. 490-99. On the connection between Virgil, Georgics, II and the
De vita solitaria, see L. Panizza, 'Active and Contemplative in Lorenzo Valla: The Fusion of
Opposites,' in B. Vickers, ed., Arbeit, Musse, Meditation: Betrachtungen zur vita activa und vita
contemplativa, (Zurich, 1985), 181-223, here 192-201. A great deal of ink has been spilt over this
episode from Georgics, II. Seeing it as the key to understanding the programme of the whole of the
Georgics, scholars have been divided between 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' readings. Despite these
divisions, however, it remains true - as Leah Kronenberg has observed - that 'most readings have
focused on understanding several presumed contrasts highlighted by the passage: the contrast between
the ideal and the real country life, [and] the contrast between the active and the contemplative life...'
L. J. Kronenberg, 'The Poet's Fiction: Virgil's Praise of the Farmer, Philosopher, and Poet at the End
of "Georgics II",' Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 100 (2000): 341-360. For interesting
perspectives on the vita contemplativa and the countryside in the second Georgic, see, for example,
P.J. Davis, 'Vergil's Georgics and the Pastoral Ideal,' in A. J. Boyle, ed., Virgil's Ascraean Song:
Ramus Essays on the Georgics (Melbourne, 1979), 22-33; M. C. J. Putnam, Virgil's Poem of the
Earth: Studies in the Georgics (Princeton, 1979), 142-164; J. Strauss Clay, 'The Argument at the End
of Vergil's Second Georgic,' Philologus 120 (1976): 232-45; L. P. Wilkinson, The Georgics of Virgil:
A Critical Survey (Oklahoma, 1997), esp. 92-3; R. F. Thomas, 'Vestiga Ruris: Urbane Rusticity in
Virgil's Georgics,' Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 97 (1995): 197-214. For an introduction to
Petrarch's knowledge of Virgil's bucolic verse, see de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'humanisme, 1:147-8.
69 For Petrarch's knowledge of Juvenal, see de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'humanisme, 1:186-7. De
Nolhac notes (1:186) that the majority of Petrarch's citations from Juvenal are anonymous. It would
not be unexpected for unattributed echoes to appear in the letters. De Nolhac's assertion that
'[Petrarque] l'imite jusque dans ses ceuvres italiennes' is, I think, open to some question.
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the hateful vice of an urban vita activa in the manner of classical authors, it is also
noteworthy for its distinctive activities, which are again redolent of Stoic and Epicurean
thought. In the later part of his letter to the Bishop of Viterbo, Petrarch attempted to entice
his prospective guest to Vaucluse by offering a more detailed description of the valley itself
and went to some length to emphasise its beauty. Evoking the spirit of Virgil's Georgics and
Eclogues70 in his sensitivity for his natural surroundings,71 Petrarch described the valley as
like an 'earthly Paradise' or the Elysian fields.72 Peace and tranquillity could be found in
abundance and, as he affirmed in a letter to Philippe de Cabassoles written two years earlier,
such an enclosed valley was the most perfect environment for study.73 Although the lifestyle
was simple, Petrarch's vast library could provide Niccolo with all the 'riches' that a studious
mind could desire, while the setting would allow him to 'converse' freely with the 'saints,
philosophers, poets, orators and historians' of the past.74 Repose and study are clearly
identified. This association is repeated in Petrarch's marginal notes to Virgil's first eclogue
in the Codex Ambrosianus. At the very end of the verse, Tityrus tells Meliboeus that he
'might have rested here with me on the green leafage' and draws attention to the simple, but
ample fare that they might eat.75 The passage caught Petrarch's attention and above
'requiescere' he wrote 'otiari, studere,' thus indicating a connection between the verdant
setting, peace, leisure and study and signalling not merely his intimate relationship with
Virgil's bucolic verse, but also apparently pointing towards the Stoic association of study
and rusticity.76
70 On the subject of poetry and rusticity in the Georgics, see, for example, Kronenberg, 'The Poet's
Fiction'; C. M. Perkell, The Poet's Truth: A Study of the Poet in Virgil's Georgics, (Berkeley, 1989);
F. Muecke, 'Poetic Self-Consciousness in Georgics II,' in Boyle, ed., Virgil's Ascraean Song, 87-101;
E. W. Leach, 'Georgics 2 and the Poem,' Arethusa 14 (1981): 35-48; D. O. Ross Jnr., Virgil's
Elements: Physics and Poetry in the Georgics, (Princeton, 1987). For poetry and rusticity in the
Eclogues, see, for example, B. F. Dick, 'Vergil's Pastoral Poetic: A Reading of the First Eclogue,'
American Journal ofPhilology 91/3 (July 1970): 277-93; R. B. Rutherford, 'Virgil's Poetic Ambitions
in Eclogue 6,' Greece and Rome, 2nd ser., 36/1 (April 1989): 42-50. More generally, see, for example,
C. Fantazzi, 'Virgilian Pastoral and Roman Love Poetry,' American Journal of Philology 87 (1966):
171-91.
71 Fam. XVI, 6, 23.
72 Fam. XVI, 6, 24: 'tale esse ut in Paradiso delitiarum, sicut theologi loquuntur, sive, ut poete, in
campis Elysiis natum putes'.
73 Fam. XI, 4, 2.
74 Fam. XVI, 6, 25: 'Postremo, ne singula prosequar, hie tibi quies exoptata et votiva tranquillitas et,
qua nulle studioso animo divitie cariores, librorum copia ingens adest... . Versaberis cum Sanctis cum
philosophis cum poetis cum oratoribus cum historicis'.
75
Virgil, Eel. I, 79-81.
76 M. L. Lord, 'Petrarch and Vergil's First Eclogue: The Codex Ambrosianus,' Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology 86 (1982): 253-276, here 269. This relationship between rusticity and literary
endeavour is further indicated by the comment adjacent to 1. 74 ('ita meae, quondam felix pecus, ite
capell[a]e'). Petrarch gives 'libelli' as a gloss for 'capellae'.
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3. Stoic and Epicurean themes in Petrarch's solitudo: the occupatus and the
solitarius
In addition to the contrast between rus and urbs in the epistolary evidence, and the emphasis
on the peace and tranquillity which might be enjoyed in the idyllic surroundings of the
countryside, Petrarch's description of the contrast between the occupatus and the solitarius
in the first book of the De vita solitaria gives credence to the suggestion that solitudo was
conceived as a vita contemplativa in imitation of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. Indeed,
the terms in which Petrarch erected the contrast at the heart of the first book of the De vita
solitaria are redolent of Stoic and Epicurean thought. As Martellotti has pointed out, the
term 'occupatus', juxtaposed with 'solitarius', is used most frequently in the works of
Seneca,77 and it appears that Petrarch's description of each of these two emblematic figures
bear the hallmarks of the Stoic/Epicurean conception of the vita activa and the vita
contemplativa respectively.
As in both Stoic and Epicurean treatments of the vita activa, Petrarch's urban occupatus
is preoccupied with the affairs of others and is involved in every kind of vice. From the very
first moment of his waking, he is committed to involving himself with others,78 driven on by
ambition and focussed entirely on treachery.79 In this he is undiscerning and, like Juvenal,80
Petrarch presents him as capable of thinking about corrupting a bargain, betraying a friend,
and seducing the chaste wife of a neighbour equally.81 This is no more evident than at the
courts, where much of his morning is spent. There, before the magistrates, he mixes truth and
falsehood to the detriment of others and to his own shame, harming the innocent and
furthering the guilty as he does so.82
Returning home for lunch, the occupatus presides over a scene filled with disgusting
manifestations of excess. Munificence and luxury is combined with degradation and
disorder, while wealth is displayed ostentatiously alongside privation and low standards.
'Silver plate, [wrought] with gold flies through the hall,' Petrarch wrote echoing similar
descriptions in Latin literature,83
77
Martellotti, Prose, 300, n. 1.
78
De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 1; P I, ii; Prose, 300-2.
79 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 1; P I, ii:; Prose, 300.
80
e.g. Juvenal, Sat. Ill, 30; 41-2.
81 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 1; P I, ii; Prose, 300.
82 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 2; P I, ii; Prose, 302. It is striking that this passage appears to repeat
Petrarch's account of his own experiences in the Posteritati. Sen. XVIII, 1.
83 c.f. Cicero, Pro S. Roscio, 133-4; Horace, Sat. II, ii, 23-52; II, iv, 11-88; II. vi, 100-5; II, viii;
Juvenal, Sat. V, 24-155.
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and drinking cups fashioned from hollowed-out gems [. T]he bench is clothed
with silk, the wall with purple, the ground with tapestries, while a suite of
unclothed servants shiver. With the line of battle having been drawn up, the
signal for the fight is given by a clarion. The captains of cookery join battle
with the captains of the dining hall, a huge din rises up, dishes sought out from
land and sea are carried in, and wine trodden during the time of ancient consuls.
Wines both Italian [nostre] and Greek glow red in the gold; mixed together in
one cup are Gnosos and Meroe, Vesuvius and Falernus, the hills, of Sorrento
and of Calabria: nor is [this] enough unless Ausonian Bacchus, steeped with
Hyblaean honey or the juice of the eastern cane, and made fragrant with
blackberries, has changed his nature through art. In another part [of the hall]
may be seen an equal procession of a different kind: horrible beasts, unknown
fish, unheard-of birds, smeared with ground spices and forgetful of their old
homeland, certain [of them] testifying to their origin only with their designation
and now retaining only the name of the Phasian.84 Spectacular dishes for the
diners that have experienced all the caprices of the cooks smoke: if a hungry
man were to see with what filth and with how much meretricious wheedling
[lenocinio] they were concocted, he would rise satisfied by the sight alone.85
After several hours devoted to this meal, the occupatus once again returns to his deceitful
machinations. Quoting Juvenal, Petrarch points to the fact that he is impatient to return to his
deceitfulness, cupidity, anger and lusts.86 Unwilling to brook any restraint or waste any
opportunity to further his desires, he sets to his task with a renewed energy and redoubled
ingenuity. Passing some time in this way, he eventually finds that he has to venture outside
to further his wicked ends and Petrarch uses this as an opportunity to locate him firmly
within an urban context. As in Horace's self-portrait in Sat. II, vi,87 the occupatus is
portrayed as having to force his way through streets strewn with every kind of filth, pushing
his way through the crowd, sweating and panting all the way.88
Despite the vigour with which he involves himself in others' affairs and indulges his
passions, however, Petrarch seems to follow the Epicureans (and, to a lesser extent, the
Stoics) in emphasising the fact that the busy man is wracked by fear. Throughout his
activities and in the midst of his indulgences, he has been tormented by concerns, both
84 Pheasant? It is possible that Petrarch intends to suggest that pheasants come from around the River
Phasis.
85 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 3; P I, ii: '...volat atriis argentum auro infectum et pocula cavis gemmis
expressa, scamnum serico vestitur, ostro paries, terra tapetibus, dum servorum nuda interim cohors
tremit. Instructa acie datur tandem lituo signum pugne. Coquine duces aule ducibus concurrunt,
ingens fragor exoritur, convehuntur terra marique conquisite epule et vina priscis calcata consulibus.
Ardent rutilo in auro nostre graieque vindemie, uno in scipho Gnosos et Meroe, Vesevus Falernusque
miscentur, Surrentinique colles et Calabri. Nec satis est, nisi Bacchus Ausonius, vel Hibleo melle vel
Eoe suco medicatus harundinis, baccisque nigrantibus odoratus, naturam arte mutaverit. Parte alia par
diversi generis pompa conspicitur: fere horribiles, pisces incogniti, volucres inaudite, pulvere precioso
oblite et oblite veteris patrie, quedam voce testantes originem, nomenque iam solum de phaside
retinentes. Fumant ipsis edentibus stupenda fercula et omne cocorum passa ludibrium, que siquis
valde licet esuriens cernat quam fede quantoque sint coagulata lenocinio, solo spectaculo satur
adscendat.' Prose, 306.
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De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 5; P I, ii; Prose, 312, quoting Juvenal, Sat. XIV, 176-7.
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Horace, Sat. II, vi, 27-31.
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De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 6; P I, ii; Prose, 314. c.f. Invective contra medicum, II, 99; Marsh, 80.
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because he fears treachery or loss,89 and because he is on occasions pricked by the last
vestiges of his conscience.90 Though he conducts his life with fervour, it brings him no
pleasure and when he retires at night, he is torn by conflicting emotions.91 He lies in bed,
Petrarch claims, tormented by the memories of the day. Although he will certainly wake with
a familiar eagerness to return to his wicked ways, the darkness brings remembrance of
'clients deceived, the poor oppressed, farmers pushed from their land, deflowered virgins,
betrayed wards, despoiled widows, the innocent harried and killed,' and, thinking of the
Furies punishing him, he frequently cries out in horror from his sleep.92
Representing the very opposite of the occupatus, Petrarch's solitarius appears to
manifest the key features of Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of the vita contemplativa. As in
the works of his classical antecedents, the solitary man, living away from the city and cut off
from the affairs of men like St. Jerome,93 St. Benedict94 and Pope Celestine V,95 experiences
peace, enjoys moderation, offers regular prayers and occupies himself with study. Unlike the
occupatus, Petrarch writes that the solitarius
is filled with virtuous joy, filled with sacred hope, full of pious love - not like
Nisus' [love] for Eurialus, but like Peter's [love] for Christ - filled with a sound
conscience, a sense of security among men, a fear of God, free from noxious
foods and useless cares, alone, quiet, tranquil, like an angel, beloved of God,
causing fear to no-one, loved by all..
Living without concern for res aliena, he 'envies no-one, [and] hates no-one.' A self-
contained figure like a Stoic or Epicurean sage, he is, indeed,
content with his own lot and inaccessible to the injuries of fortune, he fears
nothing, desires nothing; he knows that poison has not been sprinkled over his
vessels, he knows that a little suffices for a man's life, and that the true and
greatest wealth is to wish for nothing, the greatest power to fear nothing; he
lives a happy and peaceful life, tranquil nights, leisurely days and secure meals;
he wanders freely, he sits down without fear, he neither plots anything nor fears
e.g. De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 3; P I, ii; Prose, 306.
90 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 2; P I, ii; Prose, 302, referring to Cicero, Phil. Ill, ix, 22; De vita solitaria,
Z, I, ii, 4; P I, ii; Prose, 310.
91 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 8; P I, ii; Prose, 316.
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De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 8; P I, ii: 'Turn diurna negotia, deceptos clientes, oppressos pauperes,
pulsos finibus agricolas, stupratas virgines, circumscriptos pupillos, spoliatas viduas, afflictos
necatosque innoxios, cumque his omnibus ultrices scelerum Furias videt; sepe itaque dormiens
exclamat, sepe conqueritur, et sepe metu subito somnus abrumpitur.' Prose, 316.
De vita solitaria, ZII, iii, 6; P II, v; Prose, 440, quoting Jerome, Ep. XXII.
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De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 9; P II, vi; Prose, 450.
95 De vita solitaria, ZII, iii, 18; PII, viii; Prose, 474, referring to Dante, Inf. Ill, 60.
96 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 8; P I, ii: 'Iste [solitarius] autem plenus honesto gaudio, plenus sancta spe,
plenus amore pio, non Euriali ut Nisus, sed ut Petrus Cristi, plenus conscientie integritate, securitate
hominum, Dei metu, nocituri cibi et inutilium vacuus curarum, solus, tacitus, tranquillus, angelo
simillimus, Deo carus, formidabilis nemini, cuntis amabilis...' referring to Virgil, Aen. IX, 176ff,
Prose, 316.
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any plots against him; he knows that he is loved for himself and not for his
possessions. He knows that his death is of use to no-one, that his life is not
harmful to anyone, and judges it to be of great interest not how long he lives,
but how well he lives. Nor does he bother much about where or when he will
die, but esteems only the manner of his death. On one thing only is he intent
with his greatest desire: that he will conclude with a beautiful ending the tale of
a good life.97
This peace is intimately bound up with the manner in which the solitary man conducts his
day. Whereas the occupatus devotes hours to involving himself in others' affairs, deceiving
everyone he meets as he rushes around the city, the solitarius lives for the glory of God and
for edifying study.98 Spent in the company of the birds besides a murmuring stream, he
follows the example of St. Bernard99 in filling his days with humble prayers.100 In keeping
with his prayer for continence, his meals are of modest fare served in a simple setting and,
sitting at a table of innocence, his conscience is a paradise.101
4. Quid tamen ego certius novi, qualis solitarie vite status interior sit?
Although Petrarch described the contrast between the occupatus and the solitarius, and
between rus and urbs using language and imagery which seem to have been drawn from his
sources for Stoic and Epicurean thought, it would not be valid to infer conceptual
dependence from literary similarity. The fact that Petrarch included many of the
characteristic features of a Stoic or Epicurean vita contemplativa alongside motifs drawn
from Latin bucolic verse in the De vita solitaria conceals underlying conceptual differences
and a divergence from the foundations of Stoic and Epicurean thought.
Petrarch's relationships with his sources was far from slavish and he was not averse
to castigating classical authors for their views on solitude in the De vita solitaria. In keeping
with his general understanding of imitation, Petrarch agreed with Quintilian that - with
particular respect to classical works on solitude - emulation should not be confused with
uncritical reproduction, and contended that it is easier to surpass an author than merely to
97 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 3; P I, ii: 'Nulli penitus invidet, nullum odit; sorte contentus sua et fortune
iniuriis inaccessus, nichil metuit, nichil cupit; scit non spargi venena fictilibus, scit vite hominum
pauca sufficere, et summas verasque divitias nil optare, summum imperium nil timere; letum agit
atque tranquillum evum, placidas noctes, otiosos dies et secura convivia; it liber, sedet intrepidus,
nullas struit aut cavet insidias, scit se amari et non sua. Scit mortem suam nulli utilem, nulli
damnosam vitam, neque multum interesse arbitratur quam diu, sed quam bene vivat, nec ubi aut
quando moriatur magni exstimat, sed qualiter; in id unum summo studio intentus, ut bene actam vite
fabulam pulcro fine concludat.' Prose, 308-10.
98 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 1; P I, ii; Prose, 302.
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De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 14; P II, vii; Prose, 462.
100 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 2; P I, ii; Prose, 304.
101 De vita solitaria, Z I, ii, 4; P I, ii; Prose, 310.
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replicate his views.10" Although he admired Cicero,103 Virgil, Horace104 and Seneca,105
Petrarch did not aver from finding fault with their writings and challenging their conceptions
of solitude. In a discussion of whether all men are suited to a life of solitude, Petrarch noted
that Seneca had advised Lucilius to avoid not merely the many, or the few, but even
individuals.106 While he agreed that the multitude should be avoided, however, Petrarch
disagreed with the suggestion that solitude should entail isolation.107 Indeed, reviewing
Seneca's life in the second book, Petrarch openly admitted that he disliked Seneca's view of
solitude.108 Quintilian, too, was criticised, although in more deferential terms. For Quintilian,
the groves and woods of the countryside were unsuited to literary endeavour, although
retirement itself was to be desired by all writers.109 Despite implicitly accepting that such a
view was in tension with his own, Petrarch denied that their opinions were completely at
variance and, by allowing Quintilian to retain some claim to authority in this regard, clung to
his own enthusiasm for the countryside.110
This willingness to criticise classical authors reflects a deeper divergence from the
moral philosophy on which Stoic and Epicurean notions of the vita contemplativa were
based and Petrarch appears to have integrated images and motifs appropriated from classical
literature into a quite different conceptual framework. Whereas both the Epicureans and the
Stoics based their conception of the vita contemplativa on the assumption that specific
activities and locations could communicate moral qualities, Petrarch's understanding of
solitude does not involve so strong an emphasis on action or physicality. Particularly with
respect to countryside imagery in the Canzoniere and the further elaboration of solitude in
the De vita solitaria, Petrarch's attitude towards landscape and occupationes was far more
fluid than in the works of his classical antecedents. Implicitly rejecting the division between
a vita activa and a vita contemplativa as the basis for his treatment of solitude, Petrarch
placed greater stress on the internal condition of the agent, and as such positioned solitudo in
close relation to otium, discussed in the previous chapter.
Petrarch' divergence from the conceptual basis of Stoic and Epicurean notions of the
vita contemplativa is first suggested by the development of the rus-urbs motif in the
Canzoniere. Repeating some of the imagery familiar to classical treatments of the theme,
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De vita solitaria, Z II, vii, 2; P II, xii; Prose, 528-32.
105 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 2; P I, vii; Prose, 386.
106 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 3; P I, vii; Prose, 370-2, quoting Seneca, Ep., x, 1.
107 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 3; P I, vii; Prose, 372.
108 De vita solitaria, ZII, viii, 1; P II, xiii; Prose, 534, referring to Seneca, Ep. x, 1.
109 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 1; P , vii; Prose, 362, quoting Quintilian, Inst. Orat. X, iii, 22-5.
110 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 1; P , vii; Prose, 364.
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Petrarch railed against the vice of the city and yearned for the countryside, occasionally
exploiting opportunities to develop parallels with the eschatological language of Revelations.
Describing Avignon as 'Babilonia', he presented it as the city 'whence all good has flown,
the dwelling of sorrow, the mother of errors,' 1 and decried its inhabitants as 'those deaf and
blear-eyed minds that have lost the path to Heaven.'112 Given over to every form of iniquity,
Petrarch could not help but express his disgust.113 Juxtaposing city and countryside, he called
on the riverbanks, meadows and woods in Canz. 259 to testify that he had sought out the
solitary life in order to avoid those ignorant of virtue.114 Expressing the same sentiment in a
metrical epistle written to Giacomo Colonna in 1338, he voiced his hatred of the querulous
mob that thronged the city and made plain his desire to return to the countryside, where he
could enjoy the company of good friends.115
Despite its apparent similarities with Stoic and Epicurean thought, however,
Petrarch's development of the rus-urbs motif undermines the comparison. In contrast to both
the Stoic and the Epicureans, Petrarch indicates that physical separation from the city and
from occupationes contributed little to the attainment of peace. As I have argued elsewhere,
by representing Avignon as 'Babilonia', Petrarch presented it not as a literal city of vice, in
which physicality and moral identity could be equated, but as an emblem for worldly desire
and a mirror in which he could examine his own conscience.116 The same is true of the image
of the countryside. Despite finding a certain delight in the beauty of the countryside, Petrarch
experienced nothing more than a change of scenery while he persisted in his love for Laura.
In Vaucluse, he was free from the valgus and from the sways of Fortune,117 but - with Love
still leading him on118- he was tormented by the indifference of his beloved and filled with
sorrow.119 Wandering alone 'per campagne et per colli', he was consumed by care and felt
burdened with love and grief.120 Indeed, so long as he was plagued by his affection, the
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solitude, see Petrie, 'Petrarch solitarius', 31-2.
116
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come' e pungente et saldo
cost vestisse d'un color conforme,
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landscape itself manifested his sorrow. Although he was able to think on higher things121 in
the comfort of the rosy wood,122 the persistence of his love made him see Laura everywhere
and enhanced his distress.123 The appropriation of Ovidian metamorphosis throughout the
Canzoniere serves to project both Laura and his love onto the landscape. A full survey is
unnecessary, but it may be noted that Petrarch himself figures, like Acteon, as a stag fleeing
the hounds,124 while Laura, even after her death, appears 'in the clear water and on the green
grass and in the trunk of a beech tree and in a white cloud.'123 His interior condition not only
prolonged his sense of misery, but even shaped his apprehension of his surroundings. Even if
- at most - Petrarch's physical dislocation from the city and separation from occupationes in
the quiet of the countryside may be seen as helping to create the potential for the attainment
of peace, the positive solitudo to which he was so attached evidently consisted not in the
landscape, but in his interior condition.
The priority which Petrarch accords to an inner moral condition, and the degree to
which it should be separated from location in understanding solitude is developed more fully
in the De vita solitaria. Digressing from a biographical sketch of St. Francis of Assisi,
ch' avria parte del caldo
et desteriasi Amor la dov' or dorme;
men solitarie l'orme
foran de' miei pie' lassi
per compagne et per colli,
me gli occhi ad ogn'or molli,
ardendo lei che come un ghiaccio stassi
et non lascia in me dramma
che non sia foco et fiamma.'
M. A. M. Flansburg, 'Landscape Imagery in Petrarch's "Canzoniere": Development and
Characterization of the Imagery and an Illustration in the Virgil Frontispiece by Simone Martini,'
Unpublished PhD thesis, (University of Oklahoma, 1986), 115: "Petrarch converted his affection for
the woodlands and the beech and laurel groves of the valley into the seductive and dangerous
Virgilian groves of love [c.f. Aen. 6, 132-148]. His amorous woods do not copy the claustrophobic
darkness or golden boughs of the Underworld; however, Petrarch distorted his personal affection for
Vaucluse and his love for nature. His woods are deceptively green and shady and the projected object
in a most beautiful flower or tree. As in Virgil, danger of thorns and snares and other obstacles mark
the course to his object, but he is compelled to advance regardless of foreknowledge of his peril.
Petrarch's obstacles are usually more specific metaphors than the darkness and terrain of Hades; they
are barbs and vines that encroach insidiously to entangle and pain him." This is an extremely
interesting suggestion, but there seems to be some question as to the extent to which a Virgilian
parallel can be sustained by the available material. If a comparison is to be made, it must be confined
to the snares and traps that the wood contains. It does not seem possible to see how Petrarch could
have adapted Virgil's description of Aeneas' escape from the wood in a satisfactory manner.
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Canz. 129,11.1.40-3: 'I' l'o piu volte (or chi fia che mi '1 creda?)
ne l'acqua chiara et sopra l'erba verde
veduto viva, et nel troncon d'un faggio
e 'n bianca nube.'
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Petrarch argues that there are three types of solitude: one of place (solitudo loci), one of time
(solitudo temporis) and one of mind (solitudo animi).m Since the solitudo temporis is that
which all people experience at night - 'when there is solitude and silence even at the rostra'
- Petrarch essentially distinguishes only between the solitudo loci and the solitudo animi.
This is in itself a significant break from Stoic and Epicurean notions of the vita
contemplativa. For both the Stoics and the Epicureans, there was no need to speak of a
solitudo animi separate from a solitudo loci: the two were in every sense identical. For
Petrarch, however, it is possible for a man to possess one and not the other, and his
discussion of this point reveals his distance from these two classical traditions of thought.
Having described their respective days, Petrarch reiterated that he had placed before
Philippe de Cabassoles a view of the man of action (occupatus) and of the man of leisure
(.otiosus).127 Despite the resonance this appears to have with the classical distinction between
the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, however, Petrarch almost immediately subverts it.
It is, he admits, possible for some occupati to live virtuously in the world.128 Although this is
rare, it is nevertheless exceptionally praiseworthy and Petrarch is led to reflect further.
Engaging directly with Seneca, he juxtaposed selective quotations to illustrate the difficulty
of agreeing entirely with the philosopher's view of occupationes and the vita contemplativa.
Misrepresenting the sense of Ep. lv, Petrarch initially claims that Seneca had argued that
places contribute nothing to tranquillity,129 and then suggests - quite rightly, under the
circumstances - that this is contradicted by another passage in which Seneca indicated the
need to flee from the very sight of the Forum.130 Satisfied that he has 'proved' Seneca's
inconsistency, Petrarch then further misrepresents his source material by 'agreeing' that 'it is
the mind which must make everything agreeable to itself' and denying that there is much to
be found in places.131 While he briefly accepts that a composed mind makes allowances for
126
De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 12; P II, vi: 'Triplex, nempe, si rite complector, solitudo est: loci scilicet,
de qua maxime michi nunc sermo susceptus est; temporis, qualis est noctium, quando etiam in rostris
solitudo silentiumque est: animi, qualis est eorum qui vi profundissime contemplationis abstracti luce
media et frequenti foro quid illic geratur nesciunt, qui quotiens et ubicunque voluerint soli sunt.'
Prose, 454.
127 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 1; P I, iii; Prose, 318.
1-8 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii; Prose, 322.
129
De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii; Prose, 324, quoting Seneca, Ep. lv, 8.
130 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii; Prose, 324, quoting Seneca, Ep. li, 4 and Ep. xxviii, 6. It is
worth noting that Zeitlin (127) almost inverts the meaning of this passage by according 'nam ut
loca...parum salubria' to Petrarch and not to Seneca, Ep. xxviii, 6.
131 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii: 'Est in locis aliquid, pace Senecam dixerim, est multum, sed
non totum, fateor. Illud quidem, ut sibi videtur, in animo est. Nam sic ait: "Animus est, qui sibi
commendat omnia.'" quoting Seneca, Ep. lv, 8; Prose, 324. This gnomic quotation is nothing short of
a total misrepresentation or misunderstanding of Ep. lv. In this letter, Seneca drew attention to
Servilius Vatia, a wealthy Roman aristocrat who completely isolated himself at his country villa.
Although men who had been ruined by friendship or enmity in public life praised Vatia for his good
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its surroundings,132 Petrarch challenges the view that occupationes and location preclude
virtue and accords primacy to the condition of the mind.
That the mind may allow a man to be virtuous despite being in the city is illustrated
by a frank confession a little earlier in the text. Unable to stay in Vaucluse all the time,
Petrarch was sometimes obliged to live in the city. While there, however, he was free from
the fears of which Stoic and Epicurean writers were so conscious. Shutting off his senses, he
was able to create a solitude within himself and could walk the streets untouched by the
turpitude of the vulgar mob.133 The same could be said of St. Francis of Assisi. St. Francis
experienced not merely the solitude of the night and the solitude of place, but also possessed
the solitude of mind in abundance. Although he was at home in the wilderness, Petrarch
argues, he was equally serene in the city. His body might have been jostled by the mob, but,
Petrarch contends, he was nevertheless granted great serenity because his mind was fixed on
heavenly things.134
The greater importance of the solitudo animi compared to the solitudo loci is further
confirmed a little later in the text at Z I, iv, 6. Following a passage discussing Plotinus'
hierarchy of virtues135 - which Zeitlin highlighted as clear proof of his 'remoteness from
mystic thought' and enthusiasm for a classical vita contemplativei136 - Petrarch asks
What ... do I know more certainly than the inner nature of the solitary life?
Caves, hills and groves are accessible to all equally; no-one shuts out those
entering, no-one drives away those going in, there is no doorkeeper, no guard
for [this] unpopulated place. But of what value to me is the entrance to places
alone, what of the fact [that] winding streams carry me along, what help are the
lustrous woods, what use are the fixed mountains, if wherever I go, my mind
follows, to the same extent in the woods as in the towns? It is that [the mind]
which before all else must be put aside; that, I say, that must be left behind at
home, and it must be humbly begged of the Lord that he make a pure heart
sense, Seneca criticised him for having known how to hide, but not how to live {Ep. lv, 3-4) and
perhaps deliberately intended to present him as having lived in accordance with some poorly-
understood form of Epicureanism. It was not vice or dissolution which attracted Seneca's ire, but
rather the fact that Vatia had shut himself away from all human company and devoted himself to food,
sleep and lust out of fear. {Ep. lv, 5) Seneca's criticism rests not on Vatia's practices per se, but on the
error of believing that the person who lives for no-one lives only for himself. As a result, the letter
becomes a demonstration of the importance of friendship to solitude. If Lucilius sustains his
friendships in his mind, Seneca argues that there is no need for him to fear following Vatia's example
at his country villa. It is in the sense of the remembrance of friends that Seneca used the phrase
'animus est, qui sibi commendat omnia', and not in the sense suggested by Petrarch.
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De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 3; P I, iii: 'Itaque quod de locis dixi, de animo repetam: esse in illo
aliquid, multum esse, totum minime, sed in eo tantum, qui oportunitatem locis tribuit, animo
rationem.' Prose, 324. In his edition of the text, Martellotti capitalises 'eo', but it seems difficult to
agree with this decision, and more plausible to suggest that 'eo' agrees with 'animo'.
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De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 3; P I, iv ; Prose, 336.
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De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 12; P II, vi; Prose, 454-6.





within me, and to renew an upright spirit in this heart. Only then will 1 penetrate
the hidden life of solitude.137
Although this passage is - like so many others - suffused with an enthusiasm for the beauty
of the countryside, Petrarch nevertheless carefully distinguishes between the solitudo loci
and the solitudo animi. While all men may retreat to the woodland and enjoy the ambiti
amnes and lustrate silve, such surroundings are of no value so long as the mind carries its
concerns with it, as Petrarch's poetic persona in the Canzoniere so readily illustrates. It is
only with a pure heart and an upright spirit that a man may penetrate to the 'inner nature of
the solitary life', the 'hidden life of solitude'. It is his interior nature that determines the
agent's relationship with his environment and it is this 'hidden life of solitude' - identical to
the solitudo animi - which constitutes the one true solitude.
5. Understanding the solitudo animi: the problem of res aliena.
Petrarch's description of the 'hidden life of solitude' in terms of the solitudo animi clearly
marks him out as having diverged from the structures of Stoic and Epicurean thought.
Abandoning the emphasis on the separation of a contemplative life from an active life, he
appears to participate in a classical tradition only at the level of imagery. Despite this,
however, it might nevertheless be argued that the solitudo animi still displays features
characteristic of a Stoic or Epicurean vita contemplativa and this is a line of argument which,
although couched in slightly different terms, is central to both Zeitlin and Tripet's
interpretation of the De via solitaria}38
For both Zeitlin and Tripet, Petrarch's understanding of the true nature of solitude
was heavily dependent on the Stoic/Epicurean critique of involvement in res aliena and their
concomitant emphasis on subjective self-awareness. As we have seen, the Epicurean
rejection of the vita activa was based on the belief that involvement in the affairs of others
would not only leave a person vulnerable to anxiety, but would also distract him from the
things which would certainly bring him joy. Where a man made himself dependent on
another's will, he forsook his own identity, and made himself subject to the fickleness of fate
137 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 6; P I, v: 'Quid tamen ego certius novi, qualis solitarie vite status interior
sit? Antra, colles et nemora eque omnibus patent; nemo arcet intrantes, nemo pellit ingressos, deserti
nullus est ianitor, nullus custos. Sed quid locorum solus introitus, quid ambiti vehunt amnes, quid
lustrate iuvant silve, quid insessi prosunt montes, si quocunque iero, animus me meus insequitur, talis
in silvis qualis erat in urbibus? Ille ante omnia deponendus, ille, inquam, ille domi relinquendus erat,
suppliciterque poscendum a domino ut cor in me crearet mundum, et spiritum rectum his in visceribus
innovaret. Turn demum vite solitarie abdita penetrassem.' Prose, 344.
138 Zeitlin, 'Introduction', 60-1; Tripet, Petrarque ou la connaissance de soi, 40-5.
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and to worry. This line of argument was developed further by the Stoics and the stress on
subjective ends is repeated in sources known to Petrarch. Writing about the god in all men,
Seneca attempted to demonstrate that 'no man should glory in anything except in that which
is his own.'139 Where a man made himself subject to the will of another, even that of a god,
he became forgetful of his own true self and of the ends for which he was suited. It was
better, Seneca contended, for a person to live according to his own nature, and to pursue the
ends for which he was intended by birth.140
Although Petrarch did not share their scepticism for the divine, there is some
evidence to suggest that he attempted to emulate the Stoic and Epicurean treatment of
subjectivism. In keeping with his frequent description of the occupatus as one who 'se se
atque alios involvat,']4] the central portion of the first book of the De vita solitaria displays
an acute consciousness of the deleterious effects of involvement in the affairs of others and
decries the attendant loss of selfhood in a manner which seems to evoke the two schools of
classical philosophy. As in both Stoic and Epicurean thought, Petrarch was troubled by the
fact that such people subject themselves to another's mind and was aware that this would
entail the substitution of another's objectives for their own subjective ends. Explaining the
vice and sorrow of most busy men, Petrarch wondered ironically whether
the condition of those who are occupied with another's business, who are ruled
by the nod of another, and who learn what they ought to do from another's
look, is happier. For these people, everything is another's: another's house,
another's roof, another's sleep, another's food and - what is most serious -
another's mind, another's outlook; they do not cry or laugh by their own choice,
but, having put aside their own, put on the disposition of another; in short, they
direct themselves towards another, they think another!'s thoughts], they live
another's life].142
As Tripet has argued, Petrarch seems to follow Stoic and Epicurean critiques of the vita
activa in suggesting that a man who was involved in res aliena would become forgetful of
his true end and would lose his moral autonomy.143 Having forgotten his true nature and
139 Seneca, Ep. xli, 7.
140 Seneca, Ep. xli, 7-8.
141
see note 78, above.
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De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 1; P, I, iii: 'Nisi forte felicior est illorum conditio, qui alienis negotiis
occupantur, alieni nutus arbitrio reguntur, et quid agere illos oporteat in aliena fronte condiscunt.
Omnia illis aliena sunt: alienum limen, alienum textum, alienus somnus, alienus cibus, et, quod est
maximum, aliena mens, aliena frons; non suo iudicio flent et rident, sed abiectis propriis alienos
induunt affectus, denique alienum tractant, alienum cogitant, alieno vivunt.' Prose, 318. Zeitlin's use
of punctuation and translation of this passage (122) is again questionable and leads to some degree of
misunderstanding.
143
Tripet, Petrarque on la connaissance de soi, 47.
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concerned only with another's affairs, Petrarch suggests that the occupatus nevertheless only
accrues sin for himself.144
The life of the solitary man is praised in similar terms. Petrarch seems to celebrate
the fact that - cut off from other people's business and having only himself for a master - the
solitary man enjoyed a fullness of selfhood. Thinking back to the fear of living at another's
beck and call, Petrarch rejoices that the solitarius is not required to attend a banquet when he
does not wish to eat, is not obliged to speak when he would rather remain silent, is not held
up by the pointless bustle of the city, and is not prey to the petty sniping and offences of the
majority of occupati.]45 Acknowledging that men have been created so that they might find
peace in Christ, Petrarch marvels at how wonderful it is to live according to one's own will,
wandering in the countryside as one wishes and belonging to oneself at all times.146
Zeitlin appears correct in affirming that while Petrarch Christianised the concept
appropriately, '[tjhe virtue to which the solitary erects his shrine is the self-centred virtue of
the Epicureans, and time and again the Epicurean sentiment breaks through in the
phrasing.'147 As in Stoic and Epicurean philosophy, a sense of subjectivism is made a
predicate of a truth to one's end in the same way as the loss of autonomy entailed a rejection.
Following this line of argument, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Petrarch
conceived of the solitudo animi as a form of mental subjectivism. Simply using a new term
to describe a barely Christianised version of a classical idea, it seems fair to suggest that the
solitudo animi was an intellectual detachment from the affairs of others, a sense of
psychological oneness which evokes Seneca's belief that 'no man should glory in anything
except that which is his own'.148
A Stoic/Epicurean reading of Petrarch's solitudo animi is not unattractive. Although
it may have been applied differently from the intentions of its original authors, such a
'classical' understanding of the solitudo animi would have allowed Petrarch the conceptual
flexibility to transcend the literalism of the contrast between rus and urbs, while still
remaining true to the idea of a vita contemplativa. It would, moreover, have fitted not only
with Petrarch's willingness to observe sorrow in rustic seclusion and virtue in urban
surroundings, but also with his enthusiasm for rustic beauty.
Despite its appeal, however, such a reading of the solitudo animi is open to some
question. Although the passages considered above are remarkable for the degree to which
144 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 1; P I, iii ; Prose, 318-20.
145
De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 9; P I, vi; Prose, 354, c.f. Sen. XVII, 2.
146 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 9; P I, vi; Prose, 354, referring to Dante, Par. I, 5-6.
147 Zeitlin, 'Introduction', 57.
148
Tripet, Petrarque ou la connaissance de soi, 41-2.
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Petrarch's treatment of res aliena appears to reproduce elements of the Stoic and Epicurean
critiques of the vita activa, this interpretation omits to take full account of the broader system
of moral philosophy which forms the context of the discussion.
As we have already observed, Petrarch explained the condition of the occupatus as
the product of his failure to understand the true aim of man. 'Truly,' Petrarch wrote,
we who are accustomed to show the correct path to others ... [are] the blind led
by the blind, are carried off along precipitous ways, and revolve around
another's example, unaware of what we might desire; for - so that I may pursue
my undertaking - an ignorance of our end (finis) creates all this evil, whether
our own, or more particularly of all people. Imprudent men do not know what
they should do; and so whatever they do turns to nausea as soon as they have
begun.149
The end of which fneonsulti homines' are ignorant is identified as lying with Christ. In the
very first lines of the De vita solitaria50 and again at Z I, iv, 9, Petrarch affirmed that all
men had been created by Christ 'to that end that we might find peace in [Him].'151
Notwithstanding certain structural similarities with classical thought, Petrarch's elaboration
of this theme contains no trace of Stoicism or Epicureanism and the echoes of Augustine's
Confessiones in the identification of the true end of man at Z I, iv, 9 already hints at the
source of inspiration for his understanding of the solitudo animi.i52
The condition of the unhappy occupatus is described variously as a terrible mental
confusion,153 and a contagion of the mind.154 Following St. Augustine's argument in the De
vera religione, Petrarch makes it clear that this confusion is centred upon a failure to
recognise the foolishness of seeking contentment in the worldly. Pursuing pleasure as much
in old age as in his youth,155 the occupatus lives as if he had been born for his belly and gives
himself up to the flesh.156 So enamoured, indeed, were such people of their enthusiasms that
at disputations they would proudly ask what would be done if sleep, sex, food and drink
were taken away from them, and would even query the value of a life without such
149 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 4; P I, viii: 'Nempe qui aliis iter rectum ostendere solebamus... ceci cecis
ducibus, per abrupta rapimur alienoque circumvolvimur exemplo, quid velimus nescii; nam, ut ceptum
exequar, totum hoc malum, seu nostrum proprium, seu potius omnius gentium comune, ignoratio finis
facit. Nesciunt inconsulti homines quid agant; ideo quicquid agunt, mox ut ceperint, vergit in
nauseam...' referring to Matt. 15:14; Prose, 394.
150 De vita solitaria, Z I, i, 1; P I, I; Prose, 296.
151 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 9; P I, vi: '... quamquam, bone Iesu, ad hunc finem creati abs te ut in te
requiescamus, ad hoc nati et sine hoc inutiliter atque infeliciter nati sumus...' referring to Dante, Par.
I, 5-6; Prose, 354.
152
Augustine, Conf. I, i.
153 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 1: P I, viii; Prose, 380.
154
De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 4; P I, iii; Prose, 328.
155 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 2; P I, viii; Prose, 382.
156 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, I; P I, viii; Prose, 382.
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enjoyments.157 For all his abandon and apparent pride, however, the occupatus is inevitably
unsatisfied, troubled, tired and worried: despite his public satisfaction, he admits to himself
that he does not know where to turn.158 This combination of wanton worldliness and
dissatisfaction is no surprise to Petrarch, who follows St. Augustine in observing a paradox
at the heart of such a lifestyle. In committing himself to bodily pleasures, the occupatus
enters a vicious circle: hunger, thirst and carnal desires may temporarily be relieved, but
cannot ever fully be satisfied, since the urge will return as long as he lives. The busy man
fails to recognise that contentment can be found only by relinquishing such desires, not by
vainly pursuing and unattainable satiety. '"Those people for whom the health of the body is
vile,'" Petrarch writes, quoting the De vera religione directly
"would prefer to eat than to be satisfied, and would rather enjoy their passions
than to suffer no such excitement; there may even be found those who would
rather sleep than not sleep; [but] at the same time, the object of all this pleasure
is not to hunger and thirst, and not to desire congress, and not for fatigue to
come to the body." Not long after this, [Augustine] writes: "Those who wish to
thirst, to hunger, to burn with lust and to grow tired, so that they may freely eat,
drink, copulate and sleep" ... he does not say: they love misery and sorrow -
no-one is so averse to health that they love the name of sorrow and misery -,
but "they love," he says, "indigence, which is the beginning of the greatest
sorrows." It is clear that, just as the effect is in the cause, so the love of the
effect is contained in the love of the cause; thus [Augustine] concludes terribly:
"In them shall be perfected that which they love, so that lamentation and the
grinding of teeth shall fall unto them." You see that he deduces the effect from
the cause: since they love indigence, they shall find misery. ... Hence the hatred
of life, hence the root of weariness, hence that inquietude of mind, than which a
mortal man may suffer nothing worse while he lives.159
Vainly pursuing his desires, and experiencing an inevitable dissatisfaction, the occupatus
fails to recognise the transience of this life, and omits to realise that it is simply a lodging
and not a home.160 In loving only fleeting things, he does not appreciate the implications of
his own mortality and fails to understand that he has been promised an immortal life in the
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De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 1; P I, viii; Prose, 382.
158 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 1; P I, viii; Prose, 380, quoting Terence, Eunuchus, 73.
159 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 2; P I, viii: 'De his in libro De vera religione Augustinus: "Quibus" inquit
"vilis est corporis salus, malunt vesci quam satiari. et malunt frui genitalibus quam nullam talem
commotionem pati; inveniuntur etiam qui malint dormire quam non dormire; cum omnis illius
voluptatis finis sit non esurire ac sitire, et non desiderare concubitum, et non esse fatigato corpore."
Nec longe post: "Qui sitire" inquit "et esurire volunt et in libidinem ardescere et defatigari, ut libenter
edant et bibant et concumbant et dormiant" ... non dixit: amant miseriam et dolorem - nemo est enim
tarn aversus a salute ut doloris et miserie nomen amet -, sed "amant" inquit "indigentiam, que est
initium summorum dolorum." Constat autem, sicut effectus in causis, sic in amore causarum amorem
effectuum contineri; itaque concludens terribiliter: "perficietur ergo" inquit "in eis quod amant, ut eis
ibi sit ploratus et stridor dentium." Vides ut ex causa effectum elicit: quia amarunt indigentiam,
miseriam consequentur. ... Hinc vite odium, hinc tedii radix, hinc ilia inquieludo animi, qua nil peius
patitur mortalis homo dum vivit.' Prose, 384, quoting Augustine, De vera religione, liii, 102; liv, 104
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company of God after death in which all longings and wants are satisfied, a fact well known
to the solitarius.]b]
In this life, Petrarch contends, real happiness can only be had in the apprehension of
the truth of a man's nature - the truth of his mortality and of the perfection of the immortal
life which has been promised to his soul. Indeed, Petrarch asserts that if a person were to see
into the heart of those orators whom the crowds admire, he would recognise that temporal
happiness consists in the inward possession of the truth, and not in any of the deeds or things
to which occupati commonly aspire.162 Observing the overlap between Cicero's philosophy
and Augustine's theology, Petrarch suggests that this truth - latent in all people in the sense
that Christ is present within everyone - can only be apprehended with the suppression of the
senses and the application of reason.162 Directly following St. Augustine's De vera religione,
Petrarch once more clarified that the occupatus' 'contagion of mind' is an 'illness' only
insofar as he improperly attached himself to phantasms accessible to the senses rather than to
the truth apprehensible through reason.164
Although Petrarch describes his rustic sorrow in very different terms in the
Canzoniere, his understanding of the cause of his personal sense of dissatisfaction and
inquietude displays an exact parallelism with his explanation for the unhappiness and
discontentment of the occupatus in the De vita solitaria. Despite emulating the imagery and
style of Ovid's Metamorphoses165 and Virgil's bucolic verse, Petrarch subsumes the
treatment of his unrequited love into an identifiably Augustinian meta-theme.166 Indeed, as
Sara Sturm-Maddox has put it, 'Petrarch's representations of amorous psychology ... are
161 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 7, P I, v; Prose, 346-8, referring to Ps. 54:16; c.f. Augustine, De vera
religione, liii, 103.
162 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 3; P I, iii; Prose, 326, quoting Cicero, Tusc., I, xvi, 37-8.
163 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 8; P I, v; Prose, 352; Z I, vi, 6 ; P I, ix ; Prose, 400 ; Z I, v, 5 ; P I, vii;
Prose, 378.
164 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 2; P I, viii; Prose, 382-4; c.f. Augustine, De vera religione, liv, 104.
165 On Petrarch's use of Ovidian motifs, see, for example de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'humanisme,
1 :176-80; P. Blanc, 'La poetique de la metamorphose chez Petrarque,' in G. Demerson, ed.,
Poetiques de la Metamorphose, (Saint-Etienne, 1981), 37-51; D. Dutschke, Francesco Petrarca:
Canzone XXIIIfrom First to Final Version, (Ravenna, 1977), 78-221; S. Sturm Maddox, Petrarch's
Metamorphoses. Text and Subtext in the "Rime Sparse", (Columbia, MO, 1985), 9-38; P. Hainsworth,
Petrarch the Poet. An Introduction to the Rerum vulgarium fragmenta, (London and New York,
1988), 85-6, 134, 138-40, 187-8, 210. For Petrarch's knowledge of the medieval commentary
tradition, see Calcaterra, Nella selva del Petrarca, 38-40. Also of interest is the relationship between
Laura and Daphne in the Canzoniere, for which see, for example, Bernardo, Petrarch, Laura and the
"Triumphs", 27; M. Cottino-Jones, 'The Myth of Apollo and Daphne in Petrarch's Canzoniere: The
Dynamics and Literary Function of Transformation,' in A. Scaglione, ed., Francis Petrarch, Six
Centuries Later, (Chapel Hill, NC and Chicago, 1975), 152-76; P.R.J. Hainsworth, 'The Myth of
Daphne in the Rerum vulgarium fragmenta,'' Italian Studies 34 (1979): 28-44; U. Dotti, 'II mito
dafneo,' Convivium 32 (1969): 9-23.
166 On the relationship between Ovidian (and stilnovist) themes and Augustinianism in the
Canzoniere, see, for example, Sturm-Maddox, Petrarch's Metamorphoses, 97f; D. Diani, 'Petrarque:
Canzoniere 132,' Revue des Etudes Italiennes 18 (1973): 111-67.
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imprinted with Augustinian formulations,'167 and there is a strong sense that Petrarch not
only recognised, but also advertised St. Augustine's assertion of the opposition of worldly
desires and the apprehension of the soul's true end through the use of reason.168
Petrarch's appropriation of Augustinian moral theology in explaining his sorrow in
the Canzoniere is most apparent in Canz.. 264, written during his third period of residence at
Vaucluse (late 1345 - 20th November 1347).169 This poem, which takes the form of an
imagined dialogue between Petrarch and an inner voice,170 is inspired by a consciousness of
the proximity of death171 and concentrates on the foolishness of worldly love. Speaking of
his love for Laura, the inner voice reminds Petrarch that he has been 'tired and disgusted by
the false fleeting sweetness which the treacherous world gives' and asks him why he places
his hopes in temporal affections.172 The continuation of such desires is not merely likely to
bring him no peace,173 the voice implies, but is also certain to imperil his soul. Laura set
Petrarch's heart afire, but he must remember that if he found some measure of happiness
among such ills in the transitory world, the heavens contain a happiness which is 'immortal
et adorno\ 4 In comparison to the eternal life, the pleasures of the mortal world are an
illusory obstruction.
Speaking using his own voice in the verse, Petrarch uses words which affirm the
transience and falsehood of worldly desires. His temporal affections are 'ombre' (1.72), while
he caricatures himself as '[wrc] uom che sogna' (1.88) and depicts his vision as being clouded
by do corporeo veto' (1.114).175 At the same time, however, he also indicates that he feels
167
Sturm-Maddox, Petrarch's Metamorphoses, 104.
168
Durling, 'Introduction' to Petrarch's Lyric Poems, trans, and ed. Durling, 20-21.






ibid., 11.27-30: ' "Se gia e gran tempo fastidita et lassa
se' di quel falso dolce fuggitivo
che '1 mondo traditor puo dare altrui,
a che ripon' piii la speranza in lui'
trans. Durling, 426.
173 Canz. 264., 1.31.
174
ibid., 11. 45-54: ' "Ella l'acesse, et se l'ardor fallace
duro molt'anni in aspettando un giorno
che per nostra salute unqua non vene,
or ti solleva a piu beata spene
mirando '1 ciel che ti si volve intorno
immortal et adorno;
che dove del mal suo qua giu si lieta
vostra vaghezza acqueta
un mover d'occhi, un ragionar, un canto,
quanto fia quel piacer, se questo e tanto?" '
c.f. Secretum, prohem.; Prose, 22.
175 On the image of 7o corporeo velo', which recurs throughout the Canzoniere, see D. Marks, 'The
Veil and the Knot: Petrarch's Humanist Poetics,' in J. M. Hill and D. M. Sinnreich-Levi, eds., The
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unable to renounce his worldly love for the woman who circumscribed his steps on heaven
and on earth.176 In the opening stanza, he introduces the image of the crucified Christ's
outstretched arms, ready to receive him mercifully, but states that he felt fearful of following
the example of others, and sensed another force spurring him on.177 A thought ldolce et agro'
is enshrined within his soul, pressing on his heart with desire and putting it to graze on
hope.178 This thought has grown in Petrarch since his youth and will, he suspects, drag him
to the grave.179 Although he wishes to 'embrace the truth' and to 'abandon the shadows', his
love for Laura leads him to forget his own best interests and draws him away from virtue.180
This is clearly expressed in the second half of the poem, in a passage in which Petrarch
combines an allusion to Ovid with a distinctly Augustinian treatment of the opposition of
desire to reason:
For in the manner of a man who dreams
I have death before my eyes,
and [though] I want to mount a defence, I have no weapons.
That which I do I see, and a poorly understood truth
does not deceive me,181 [but] rather Love forces me
who never allows anyone
that believes him too much follow the path of honour
[He] who loves a mortal thing with such faith
as ought to belong to God alone -
the more he desires honour, the more it is forbidden to him.
And this with a loud voice still recalls
[my] reason, led astray after the senses;182
Rhetorical Poetics of the Middle Ages: Reconstructive Polyphony. Essays in Honor of Robert O.
Payne, (London, 2000), 241-57.
176 Canz. 127, 193. For an interesting, but incomplete discussion of this point, see Sturm-Maddox,




Canz. 264,11.55-8: 'Da l'altra parte un pensier dolce et agro,
con faticosa e dilettevol salma
sedendosi entro l'alma,
preme '1 cor di desio, di speme il pasce'.
179
ibid., 11.63-5 The idea of sinfulness growing from youth appears to echo the sentiments of
Augustine, Conf. I, vii; II, i-ii.
180 Canz. 264,11.72-80: 'vorre' i ver abbracciar, lassando l'ombre.
Ma quell' altro voler di ch' i' son pieno
quanti press' a lui nascon par ch' adugge,
et parte il tempo fugge
che scrivendo d'altrui di me non calme;
e '1 lume de' begli occhi che mi strugge
soavemente al suo caldo sereno
mi ritien con un freno
contra cui nullo ingegno o forza valme.'
181 c.f. Ovid, Met. VII, 92-3. On which connection, Hainsworth, Petrarch the Poet, 85-6.
182 c.f. Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, I, 77-80, on which see Sturm-Maddox, Petrarch's
Metamorphoses, 101.
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but although [reason] hears and thinks
to return, its bad habit drives it further183
and depicts for my eyes
her who was born only to make me die,
because me and herself she pleased too much.184
This fills Petrarch with a sense of helplessness and grief, and the poem as a whole is shot
through with the feeling of woeful paralysis and self-deception. Terms expressing confusing,
conflict and sorrow occur throughout the verse: self pity (una pieta ... forte, 1.2), tears and
sighing (lagrimar, 1.4; sospiro ... lagrimar, 1.10), an allegorical fall (chipossendo star cadde,
1.12), fear (temeza, 1.16), trembling (tremor, 1.17) all occur in the first stanza, while words
communicating instability and intranquillity dominate the second. This infuses Petrarch's
poetic character with a sense of desperation which is transformed into a plea for help that
again has an Augustinian flavour. In the opening lines, Petrarch reveals that he has fruitlessly
begged God for 'those wings with which our intellect lifts itself from this mortal prison to
Heaven.'185 At the close of the verse, the supplications of the past are renewed and, with
Death by his side, Petrarch seeks 'new counsel' for his life, unable to lay hold of the good
which he sees.186
Petrarch's treatment of the unhappiness of the occupatus in the De vita solitaria and
analysis of his own sorrow in the Canzoniere diverges from Stoic and Epicurean thought. As
183 c.f. Augustine, Conf. VII, xvii. Compare also the role of 'bad habits' in Augustine, Conf. II, viii;
VI, xii. It is worth noting that Augustine differed from classical authors in seeing consuetudine as
contrary to the pursuit of virtue. On 'habit' in Augustine's moral theology, see J. Prendiville, 'The
Development of the Idea of Habit in the Thought of Saint Augustine,' Traditio 28 (1972): 29-99.
184 Canz. 264,11.88-94, 99-108: 'Che 'n guisa d'uom che sogna
aver la morte inanzi gli occhi parme,
et vorrei far difesa et non o l'arme.
Quel ch' i' fo veggio, et non m'inganna il vero
mal conosciuto, anzi mi sforza Amore
che la strada d'onore
mai nol lassa seguir chi troppo il crede
[...]
Che mortal cosa amar con tanta fede
quanta a Dio sol per debito convensi
piu si disdice a chi piu pregio brama.
Et questo ad alta voce anco richiama
la ragione sviata dietro ai sensi;
ma perch' ell' oda et pensi
tornare, il mal costume oltre la spigne
et adli occhi depigne
quella she sol per farmi morir nacque,
perch' a me troppo et a se stessa piacque.'
185 ibid., 11.5-8: 'che vedendo ogni giorno il fin piu presso,
mille fiate o chieste a Dio quel' ale
co lc quai del mortale
career nostr' intelletto al Ciel si leva.'
Note the reference to 'mortale career ; c.f. Boethius, Cons. Phil., II, pr. 6, 23.
186 Canz. 264,11.133-6.
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we have seen, in contrast to both schools of philosophy, Petrarch understood the condition of
the busy man to be the result of his attachment to worldly desires and failure to recognise
that contentment may only be found in God. Petrarch further explained that true happiness
could only be found by shunning corporeal desires and by attaining to the truth of Christ and
the soul through reason. Clearly rejecting the scepticism intrinsic to Stoic philosophy and the
emphasis on pleasure which defined Epicurean thought, Petrarch's examination of the
occupatus' condition seems to derive from a reading of the early works of St. Augustine,
especially the De vera religione, a reference which is stated explicitly.187 While this is in
itself a significant point - a point which shall be discussed further later in this chapter - it is
particularly relevant to Petrarch's treatment of res aliena in that it allows an understanding
of the nature of his relationship with this apparently Stoic/Epicurean theme and
contextualises his use of ostensibly classical motifs.
Although Zeitlin and Tripet are quite correct to draw attention to Petrarch's assertion
that those who involve themselves in others' affairs do not know where their true end lies, it
is perhaps misleading to suggest that this is reflective of an assimilation of the
Stoic/Epicurean critique of the vita activa or to infer that it testifies to a subjectivism of
similar provenance. Whereas the Stoics and Epicureans each affirmed that an involvement in
other people's affairs would inevitably cause confusion and anxiety, Petrarch's treatment of
res aliena indicates that such an involvement is actually a symptom of the occupatus''
unhappiness.
The symptomatic nature of res aliena is apparent in Petrarch's treatment of the
theme at Z I, vi, 2. Since worldly pleasure and the ignorance of the soul's true nature
inevitably lead to dissatisfaction and insecurity, Petrarch found it unsurprising that occupati
waver in their actions, undertaking task after task in vain hope.188 Always unsatisfied, these
men are cheerful one moment, depressed the next, and as a result, alter everything with a
relentless regularity. One day, they wear a garment which reaches the ground, but the next
they put on something too scantily cut; they change their manners, their written style, and
even their speech without a second thought.189 'Without doubt, having brought them in,
nothing more than precipitous and importunate imitation,' Petrarch continued in the
following chapter,
187 Gerosa observes - with reference to Augustine's commentary on John's Gospel - that '[l]a
solitudine di cui parla Agostino e veramente quella che intende il Petrarca' but the Augustinian roots
of the De vita solitaria are not examined in detail. Gerosa, Umanesimo cristiano del Petrarca, 142.
1S8 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 2; P I, viii; Prose, 384-6.
189
De vita solitaria, Z I. vi, 2; P I, viii; Prose, 386.
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never content to be constrained by limits, has nourished and magnified these
odious and horrid good-for-nothings. For how is it possible for those people to
remain fixed on the same uninterrupted course of living who do not subject
themselves to being ruled by virtue, by their better judgement, or to being
governed by the advice of friends, but to emulation, to being whirled about by
the madness of others and the frenzies of the stupid? In short, those who set
aside their true nature, abandon the mores of their forefathers, [and] venerate
nothing except the alien and the foreign ought to change as often as they admire
something which presents itself. There is no rule to the changing, since there is
no rule to imitation; everything of another's pleases them, everything of their
own displeases them; they would rather be anything than what they are...190
Having rejected virtue and their better judgement, the occupati subject themselves to a
corporeal world which can never satisfy them. They continually chase after something that
they can never attain and, while accruing sin, seem at the same time to be tortured by a
sorrowful melancholy. It is not that res aliena necessarily distracts them from virtue, as the
Stoics and Epicureans had suggested; rather, it is the occupati''s alienation from virtue which
drives them towards res aliena, as St. Augustine had argued in the De vera religione.
Petrarch's willingness to subsume his treatment of res aliena into an early-
Augustinian explanation of the occupatus' unhappiness is mirrored by his description of the
condition of the solitarius. Once again, his often circumlocutory and rhetorical descriptions
of the solitudo animi conceal an appreciable departure from classical notions of the vita
contemplativa.
In examining St. Augustine as an exemplar of solitude in the second book of the De
vita solitaria, Petrarch concentrates on the saint's time in Milan just prior to his retreat to
Cassiciacum in September 386.191 There, shut away in a secret corner of the garden, 'sobbing
and crying', the saint 'tore his hair and beat his chest' while he battled with his inner self,
desperate to find some respite from his grief.192 Finally, Augustine realised that which was to
be of delight to him for ever after. 'Expounding St. John's Gospel,' Petrarch wrote,
[St. Augustine] says: 'It is difficult to see Christ in a crowd: a certain solitude is
needed for our mind, [since] God is seen with a particular solitude of intention.
190 De vita solitaria, Z I, vi, 3; P I, viii: 'Nimirum has odiosas et inamenas nugas nichil magis quam
preceps et importuna nec suis unquam contenta finibus invexit imitatio, invectasque aluit auxitque.
Quomodo enim fieri potest, ut vivendi tenor idem maneat his qui non se virtuti, non suo iudicio, non
amicorum consiliis regendos, sed emulatione, sed aliene dementie stultorumque furoribus se
volvendos tradunt? Denique qui naturam propriam exuunt, patrios mores abiciunt, nichil nisi
peregrinum atque adventitium venerantur, totiens mutentur oportet, quotiens aliquid occurrerit quod
mirentur. Nullus itaque mutandi, quia nullus imitandi modus: cunta illis aliena placent, sua omnia
displicent, quidlibet esse malint quam quod sunt... ' Prose, 388.
191 De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 5; P II, iv; Prose, pp.438-40. See Brown, Augustine ofHippo, 69-120.
192 De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 5; P II, iv: 'Ubi amarissime secum loquens, inter singultus et lacrimas,
inter vulsum capillum percussamque frontem et consertis digitis amplexum genu, et quecunque
magnus ac sanctus dolor elicit, tandem semel de se statuit unde in perpetuum exultaret.' Prose, 440,
referring to Augustine, Conf. VIII, viii, 20.
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A crowd is noisy; that vision requires privacy.' You hear how cautiously he
says that nothing except a solitude of application is necessary to see God,
intending to mean that, while the human mind has within itself crowds and
disturbance, physical solitude contributes nothing to the sharpening and
purifying of the eyes for such a light.193
Clearly repeating the separation of solitudo loci and solitudo animi, this passage provides a
telling comment on the latter. The solitude which St. Augustine himself embodied was not a
physical seclusion, but rather a privacy of mind. He was, Petrarch suggests, able to see God
more clearly by putting aside the mental disturbances associated with a preoccupation with
the physical world.
The image of sight, which has a parallel in the language of the Soliloquies,194 is
developed further to forge a direct connection between the solitudo animi, the apprehension
of truth, and the application of reason. That felicitas consisted in the inward possession of
Veritas,195 Petrarch had no doubt, but this was a matter of 'seeing' Christ within the self.196
The 'sight' of truth, however, was directly impeded by a dependence on the bodily senses.
Observing a certain parallelism between Cicero and St. Augustine, Petrarch affirmed that it
takes a powerful intellect to free the mind from the senses.197 The inner Christ could only be
'seen' only with the 'eyes' of the intellect, and only with reason could truth be recognised.
This use of reason is intrinsic to Petrarch's understanding of the solitudo animi. 'Now you
understand,' he wrote, addressing Philippe de Cabassoles,
to whom I refer all that has been said or ought to be said about solitude. But,
since it is not given to all people to excel either by sanctity or by scholarship,
[or] by distinguished otium to merit the love and recognition of posterity, so
that neither present glory not the fame of ages to come - for which many have
voluntarily poured out their lives and in return have become famous - ought to
elicit excitement, how much use is it to you ... that this briefest
(quantuluncunque) period of life, for which no hope of recalling and repairing
remains once it has lied, is yours? Moreover, no person with moderate learning
is forbidden from acquiring through reflection and reading a mind which is
healthy, sustained by peaceful concerns and unimpeded by the chains of
[worldly] things, subject to God and to reason, but in other respects free, and
also a body brought away from its heavy yoke and serving only the mind...198
193
De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 5; P II, iv: 'Is ergo evangelium Iohannis exponens: "Difficile est" inquit
"in turba videre Cristum: solitudo quedam necessaria est menti nostre, quadam solitudine intentionis
videtur Deus. Turba strepitum habet; visio ista secretum desiderat." Audis ut caute videndo Deo
necessariam non quamlibet sed solitudinem dixit intentionis, intelligi volens, dum suas intus turbas
tumultusque suos humana mens habeat, acuendis ad tantum lumen purgandisque oculis solitudinem
corpoream nil prodesse.'Prose, 440, quoting Augustine, In lohanis Evangelium, P.L. 35, col. 1533.
194
Augustine, Soliloquies, I, 12.
195
De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 3; P I, iii; Prose, 326.
196 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 8; P I, v; Prose, 350-2.
197 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 8; P I, v; Prose, 352, quoting Cicero, Tusc. I, xvi, 37; I, xvi, 38.
198 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 4; P I, vii: 'lam intelligis ad quos quecunque de solitudine dicta seu
dicenda sunt referam. Verum quia non omnibus est datum vel sanctitate vel literis excellere,
preclaroque otio posteritatis amorem ac notitiam promereri, ut nec presens gloria nec sequentis evi
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Despite some superficial similarities with Stoic and Epicurean thought, therefore, it does not
seem unjustified to suggest that Petrarch's understanding of the solitudo animi was at some
remove from the notion of a vita contemplativa he would have encountered in his sources for
classical philosophy. Whereas the vita contemplativa was conceived as a pursuit of
philosophy in opposition to the idea of a vita activa, itself defined in terms of the anxiety
arising from involvement in res aliena, Petrarch's solitudo animi was based on a moral
theology apparently derived from St. Augustine's early works which understood the pursuit
of felicitas and the cause of unhappiness in quite different terms. As we have seen, the
unhappiness of the occupatus sprang from his fruitless attachment to temporalities, and
ignorance of his true end and of true happiness. His involvement in other people's affairs
was just one manifestation of this reliance on corporeal things and false belief that satiety
could be found in a fleeting world. In Petrarch's analysis, as in that of St. Augustine, he
could only overcome his sorrow by forsaking his senses for the intellect, and using his
reason to recognise the truth of his own nature, the truth that the vera felicitas lay in Christ
alone. Consequently, in opposition to the classical notion of the vita contemplativa, Petrarch
uses the term 'solitudo animV to describe the condition of the person who had renounced the
errors and sorrows of the occupatus. The person who possessed a solitudo animi paid no
heed to corporeal things, exercised his reason, recognised the truth that his end and the one
happiness lay only in Christ. He lived, in every sense, as a pilgrim in the world, observing
his surroundings at a mental distance, paying no heed to the physical. He possessed a
solitude of the mind in the sense that his intellect was uncrowded by the effects of corporeal
desires, and could exist in the world almost oblivious to its many fleeting allurements.
6. Petrarch and the countryside
Although Petrarch associates the solitudo animi with a person's interior condition, and
stresses the primacy of the solitudo animi over the solitudo loci, it is nevertheless hard to
ignore the fact that he places a high emphasis on rusticity in his treatment of solitude. As we
have already seen, Petrarch's sensitivity for natural beauty heavily informs his description of
the solitary life he enjoyed at Vaucluse, and played a significant part in the invitations he
fama solicitet, pro qua multi vitam voluntarie profuderunt et ob id ipsum clari sunt habiti, quanti
facias ... hoc quantulumcunque vite tempus, cuius cum semel effluxerit recolligendi reparandique spes
nulla relinquitur, tuum esse? quodque nulli mediocriter erudito vetitum est, cogitando saltern
legendoque placidis fotum curis et rerum vinculis explicitum animum habere, Deo et ratione
subditum, cetera liberum; corpus quoque gravi iugo eductum animoque soli serviens ... ' Prose, 376-8.
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extended to friends in the Familiares. Similarly, natural imagery is an intrinsic part of the
contrast between rus and urbs in the De vita solitaria and the beauty and tranquillity of the
countryside are integral to the life of the solitarius. This stress on the countryside raises
questions not merely about the separation of the solitudo animi and the solitudo loci, but also
about the relationship between Petrarch's apparently Augustinian moral philosophy and his
use of classical source materials. On the one hand, the reader is obliged to ask why, if true
solitude was a purely internal condition, Petrarch persisted with such a marked enthusiasm
for the rural environment and gave such prominence to the countryside in describing
solitude. On the other hand, although there is no evidence to suggest that either Stoic or
Epicurean philosophers based their exhortations to rural retreat on a sensitivity for natural
beauty, the role played by natural imagery in Petrarch's writings clearly has antecedents in
classical literature and the priority this is accorded must be queried.
In the most general sense, Petrarch's manipulation of the rus-urbs contrast may be
seen as a convenient means of representing the internal conditions of the occupatus and the
solitarius. Although the physicality of city and countryside do not themselves contribute to
the unhappiness of the one and the contentment of the other, they act as a convenient means
of depicting the moral status of the two figures. While the degradations and confusion of city
life are not the cause of the occupatus'' misery, his attachment to them reflects his inner
insecurity and improper desires. By the same token, the tranquillity of the countryside cannot
be viewed as the predicate of the solitarius'' peace, his retreat to the fields and murmuring
streams is an expression of his disinterest in the pleasures of the town.
That is not, however, to say that Petrarch envisaged the solitary man as living
anywhere but the countryside. Rather than being the source of his contentment, his
withdrawal to a rural environment appears to be a consequence of his inner condition.
Having substituted reason for the senses, Petrarch seems to have foreseen that the solitarius
would seek out country living as the setting most congenial to his state of mind and moral
condition. The river banks and woodland groves do not appear to enhance his state, but
rather the solitarius finds such a place appropriate to his position. It is for this reason that, at
the very beginning of the De vita solitaria, Petrarch stressed that he did not seek to praise the
name of solitude, but the good things which are proper to solitude: far from hating men, he
merely despised sin, especially his own.199 Similarly, later in the text, he speaks of his desire
to escape the crowd because of a discrepancy of tastes, or perhaps because of his wish to
avoid cultivating gossipy witnesses to his life.200
De vita solitaria, Z I, i, 3; P I, I; Prose, 300.
200
De vita solitaria, I, iv, 8; P I, vi; Prose, 354.
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While the separation of the solitude of mind and the solitude of place is preserved by
the solitarius' general relationship with the countryside, however, two specific aspects of
Petrarch's enthusiasm for the countryside merit further consideration. In addition to
providing a convenient literary expression for the contrast between the occupatus and the
solitarius, and furnishing the solitary man with an environment befitting his condition,
Petrarch explicitly associates the countryside with both poetic composition and religious
meditation. It is with respect to these two associations that the separation of the solitudo
animi and the soiltudo loci, and the role of classical literature must be questioned most
carefully.
The identification of rustic retreat with literary endeavour and particularly with
poetic composition runs throughout Petrarch's discussion of solitude. In the Exul ab Italia,
he signalled the connection by highlighting the face that in Vaucluse he was in the company
of the Muses,201 and this is mirrored by the fact that, even tormented by love, he was able to
'gather now rhymes and verses, now herbs and flowers' in the Canzoniere.202 Echoing the
sentiments of the Familiares, Petrarch responded to Quintilian's views in the De vita
solitaria by suggesting that provision should be made for access to woods and fields, and -
'what is especially pleasing to the Muses' - to the bank beside a murmuring stream, so that
in such a setting one could sow the seeds of new projects in the field of genius.203
There are clearly classical parallels to be observed, and the associations - already
noted - need not be laboured. The connection between rusticity and composition seem to
point to Petrarch's willingness to borrow motifs from such sources as Virgil's bucolic verses
and Ovid's Metamorphoses. Similarly, in Ep. II, 2, for example, Horace links the attractions
of the countryside not merely with a freedom from cares,204 but also with a freedom for study
and writing. All writers, he claims, despise the town and yearn for the 'sacred grove.'205
Despite the literary associations which Petrarch's pairing evokes, however, it would
not necessarily be valid to assume from the repetition of imagery that his conception of
solitude as an interior condition should be qualified by granting place a determining
influence on a solitary life which involved composition. Far from conflicting with Petrarch's
solitude, the image of the countryside as the home of the Muses may be seen to complement
201 See n.55 , above.
202
Canz■ 144,1.6: 'or rime e versi, or colgo erbette et fioro'.
203 De vita solitaria Z I, v, 1-2; P I, vii: 'Itaque si inter tantas voces audior consiliumque novum non
despicitur, et hos sequor et, longius evectus, si loci optio integra est, scripturum novi aliquid admoneo,
quotiens se exemplo Demosthenis includet, illud ante provisum sit ut, post secundos ingenii
successus, egressu facili in silvas et loca virentia, quoque nichil est Musis amicius, queruli amnis in
ripam gravedinem possit fatigationemque deponere...' Prose, 366.
204 Horace, Ep. II, 2,11. 12-15.
205 ibid, 11.77-80.
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the distinction between the solitudo animi and the solitudo loci. There is no reason to doubt
that Petrarch genuinely believed that the countryside was the most fitting place for poetic
composition, and that the Muses indeed resided beside the murmuring streams. In approving
of Quintilian's views in the De vita solitaria, Petrarch pointed out that while the genius of
poets may flourish in any setting, it flourishes most readily in 'free and open places', as
Virgil, Cicero and even St. Cyprian attested.206 This, however, was a part of a solitary life
devoted to the active cultivation of virtue. In the same passage, Petrarch points out that
poetic composition was 'an active rest and a restful work' and, in doing so, evokes the spirit
of the opening chapters of the De otio religioso.201 The solitary man is still presented as
seeking the peace of the countryside because it reflected his interior condition, but the poetic
composition which he could also pursue in a rural environment is presented as an adjunct to
his cultivation of virtue. Having spent his days composing verses in the fields and glades,
Petrarch suggest that the solitarius could then return to the 'narrow and secret chamber'
beloved of Demosthenes without having wasted any time or effort.208 Augustine himself,
Petrarch observes, longed for 'vines and branches and leaves and reeds' and recognised that
while they also befitted his virtue, they were also suitable for the profitable exercise of
literary ability.209 Where a man has achieved the solitudo animi, Petrarch seems to infer, he
could readily exercise his poetic talents in the countryside which reflected his inner condition
as part of his pursuit of virtue. The classical motifs which Petrarch so willingly emulated
thus supplement, rather than supplant his underlying moral philosophy.
Poetic composition, however, plays only a relatively minor role in the De vita
solitaria. A far greater emphasis is placed on the rural landscape as the proper setting for
religious meditation. As we have already noted, in the first book, the solitarius chooses the
countryside as the location for his prayers, and reflects on the persons of the Trinity on a
206 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 2; P I, vii: 'Equidem ut huic tandem articulo finem faciam, et Marcus
Tullius et Virgilius Maro, quos eloquentie principes latine nemo eloquens negabit, huic consilio
herebant; dum alter cum sepe alias turn presertim ad tractatum legum civilium accessurus, frondosas
quercus et delectabiles secessus, quodque ibi scriptum memini "ripam et umbram", et procerissimas
populos, et concentum avium, et strepitum fluviorum, atque equas in partes scissi amnis in medio
insulam parvam et huic nostre simillimam quereret; alter autem suum Alexim, quisquis is est, pastorio
carmine laudaturus, "inter densas umbrosa cacumina fagos" assidue veniens, solus in montibus et
silvis id faceret... Cyprianus, fide autem prior et martyrio clarus nec obscurus eloquio, tale quiddam et
sensisse videtur et scripsisse...' quoting Cicero, De legibus, I, iv, 14; Virgil, Eel., II, 3 (arguably Eel.
II, 3-4: Petrarch gives 'assidue veniens'' for Virgil's 'assidue veniebat'); Prose, 366-8.
207 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 2; P I, vii: '... et actuosa requies et quietus labor ...' ; Prose, 366.
208 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 2; P I, vii: '... nec ideo minus in arvum ingenii rerum semina iacere, et
inter ipsum quietis reparandique animi tempus venturo labori materiam preparare, utile simul et
iucundum opus, et actuosa requies et quietus labor, ut cum ad angustam illam Demosthenis ac
secretam aream reditum fuerit, sententiarum sementem, inutilibus excussis, votiva verborum messis
equiparet; atque ita nullum studio tempus iners aut inane preterfluat.' Prose, 366.
209 De vita solitaria, Z I, v, 2; P I, vii; Prose, 368.
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hilltop or in a grassy meadow. In the second book, figures from Scripture in particular testify
to the association. Abraham,210 Jacob,211 Elijah212 and Moses213 are all mentioned as having
received the Lord and His angels in the simplicity of the countryside rather than in the
splendid surroundings of the city. Speaking of Isaac's manner, Petrarch concludes that
nowhere is more suitable for the meditative man than 'agrestis solitudo' H and points out
that while Christ had no need of solitude, He nevertheless sought out the countryside for
both teaching and meditation.215 Other personalities, such as Jerome, further evidence the
connection. Feeling that it reflected his own experiences and preferences, the example of St.
Bernard of Clairvaux was especially dear to Petrarch. St. Bernard is praised for having had
no masters other than the oaks and beeches, and for having learned all the literature he knew
in the woods and the fields. Writing in Vaucluse, surrounded by his many books, Petrarch
felt a particular sympathy with this holy example.216
As with poetic composition, the association between religious meditation and the
countryside is less firmly rooted in the classical emphasis on the importance of place than
initially appears. Discussing exemplary figures from ancient history towards the end of the
second book, Petrarch rhetorically questioned whether philosophers and poets of his own
time and of ages yet to come would not shun cities and seek quiet seclusion. 'Often,' he went
on to explain,
a place provides a stimulus for the mind; therefore an open and free [place] is to
be wished for those who apply their mind - which the innumerable forms of
vanity [to be found] among people weigh down and tear apart - to elevated
matters, and [seeing that] the death which will come in finds a thousand ways in
through the windows.217
The precise wording of this passage is important and undermines the possible suggestion that
it might call into question the separation of the solitudo loci and the solitudo animi. In
contrast to the physics of Stoic and Epicurean moral philosophy, Petrarch declines to suggest
that 'an open and free place' is related to the contemplation of 'elevated matters' in an
exclusively causal fashion. Rather than 'an open and free place' serving as the predicate of
210 De vita solitaria, Z II. ii, 3; PII, ii; Prose, 418-20.
21'
De vita solitaria, Z II, ii, 5; PII, ii; Prose, 420-22.
212 De vita solitaria, Z II, ii, 7; PII, iii; Prose, 424-6.
213
De vita solitaria, Z II, ii, 5; PII, iii; Prose, 422-4.
214
De vita solitaria, Z II, ii, 4; P II, ii: 'Nullus enim locus, nulla pars etatis aptior meditanti, quam et
agrestis solitudo et, iuvenili fervore preteritio relictisque, ut ita dixerim, a tergo meridianis horis,
placatioris vite tranquillitas iam vergentis ad vesperam.' Prose, 422.
215 De vita solitaria, Z II, v, 2; P II, x; Prose, 504.
216
De vita solitaria, Z, II, iii, 14; P II, vii; Prose, 460-2.
217 De vita solitaria, Z II, vii, 1; P II, xii; 'Sepe locus ingenio stimulos admovet; ideo apertus et liber
optandus est his, qui animum rebus altis applicuere, quern in populis innumere vanitatum forme
deprimunt atque discerpunt, et mille vias per fenestras ingressura mors invenit.' Prose, 526.
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meditation, Petrarch clearly states that such a location may stimulate the minds of those who
already apply themselves to 'elevated matters'. The location is, in other words, congenial to
the mental condition of the philosopher or poet who wishes to contemplate higher matters; it
serves as a stimulus rather than as a cause. By the same token, the 'innumerable forms of
vanity' which are found among people do not inevitably prevent the philosopher from
applying his mind to 'higher matters', but they may stimulate his ail-too human failings. In
emphasising the position of 'those who apply their minds to elevated matters', Petrarch
continues to place the moral autonomy of the agent and his interior condition at the very
heart of solitude; the separation of the solitudo animi and the solitudo loci is preserved.
This is an impression which appears to be given credence in the rhetoric of praise
which Petrarch deploys elsewhere in the second book. In a passage inserted at the suggestion
of Giovanni degli Abbarbagliati, Grand Prior of the Camaldolese Order, and included many
years after the De vita solitaria was begun, Petrarch recalled an episode from Peter Damian's
hagiographical work on the founder of his order.218 While still a young man, St. Romualdus
would, it was said, often stop in the 'silent recesses of the woods' while hunting and
'transfixed, as though struck by a desire for heaven,' would exclaim
O what a delectable [place]. How tranquil and how opportune a location for
those wishing to serve God! How much more happily the friends of God might
live here than in the cities!219
This quotation infers that those whose orientation is already known would find the 'silent
recesses of the woods' an environment fitting for their endeavours and a respite in which
they might actively continue their service of God. Again, the setting is congenial to the
interior condition of the amici Dei, rather than a cause of their virtue. Petrarch carefully
avoids suggestion that a life in the service of God was impossible in the city, but indicates
that the rustic environment would better reflect their inward search for the divine. Indeed, it
is perhaps apposite that Petrarch drew inspiration from the Camaldolese tradition, which
combined both coenobitic and eremitic elements. For Romualdus, the whole world was a
hermitage, but the countryside was nevertheless a congenial environment in which to serve
God.220 Appropriately for Petrarch - who briefly sought to establish a quasi-monastic
community at Vaucluse - Peter Damian also recorded that Romualdus was originally a lay-
~
q.v. Sen. XVI, 3; Wilkins, Life ofPetrarch, 231-2.
219
De vita solitaria, Z II, iii, 16; P II, viii: 'Itaque dum venanti sepe taciti nemorum recessus
occurrerent, celesti mox desiderio percussus herebat, atque ad se versus aiebat: "O quam delectabilis,
quam tranquillus et quam Deo servire volentibus oportunus locus; quanto melius hie amici dei quam
in urbibus habitarent.'" Prose, 464.
220 H. Leyser, Hermits and the New Monasticism. A Study of Religious Communities in Western
Europe 1000-1150 (London, 1984), 1,25.
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hermit who established religious societies in a rural setting for canons 'who had been living
in a secular fashion ... to live together as a community.'221
Although Petrarch's association of religious meditation and the countryside is not
incompatible with the natural imagery of classical bucolic, it is similarly commensurate with
the division between the solitudo animi and the solitudo loci which he developed out of his
reading of St. Augustine's early moral theology. Presenting the countryside as an
environment fitting to the outlook of a man who had suppressed desire and embraced reason
in his pursuit of virtue, Petrarch was careful to ensure that prayer and contemplation were
not portrayed as reliant on rural tranquillity, but rather as suited to the grassy fields and
woodland groves. The primacy of the solitude of mind is assiduously preserved - often only
subtly in delicately-worded, but telling phrases - and it appears clear that it is the inward
peace of the solitary man which determines his appreciation of the natural world, rather than
the beauty of the countryside which shapes his inner condition.
As Petrarch suggests in the many parallels he draws with patristic and medieval
figures, this has a strong Christian heritage and it is perhaps not unexpected that his
appreciation of the countryside should have complemented his description of true solitude in
terms of the opposition of desire and reason. The idea of rustic retreat was, indeed, an
important part of Christian thought from late Antiquity to the foundation of the mendicant
orders in the central Middle Ages. Although for the desert fathers, the pursuit of holiness was
often to be associated with an ascetic life in a barren environment, other traditions of
observance drew from classical thought an affection for the natural world, but transforming
it into the delight in a setting which reflected inner peace and the celebration of God's
creation. As we have already seen, through his reading of the De doctrina Christiana,
Petrarch himself observed that St. Augustine saw an affinity between inward peace and
verdant surroundings. Garden imagery runs through the Confessiones, and it is important to
note - as Petrarch so clearly identified - that Augustine depicts one of the defining moments
in his religious development as occurring in the green and peaceful garden in Milan. It is,
moreover, tempting to speculate that the utility of rusticity might have had a parallel in the
thought of St. Francis of Assisi - so important in Petrarch's description of the solitudo animi
- for whom the countryside was a favoured place for prayer and reflection, even though his
mendicant life led him often to cities. Perhaps more so than for any other medieval figure, St.
Francis saw in the natural world a very real expression of God's ineffable love, and found in
the countryside a setting which could reflect - rather than condition - his inward striving for
virtue.
221 ibid., 47, 90.
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7. Solitude and otium.
Although the De otio religioso and the De vita solitaria display many differences, they
nevertheless appear to describe very similar concepts. Like otium, solitude seems to denote
the moral programme which the Secretum was designed to inculcate. Despite being cast in a
language which is at variance with that of the De otio religioso, and expressed in a manner
which is in many ways less rigorous, the idea of the solitudo animi is based on the use of
reason to apprehend God and the suppression of the worldly desires which engender
confusion and obscure truth. A mental concept more than a description of a physical
condition, like otium, it is opposed to the temptations of the world and the vicissitudes of
fortune, and is predicated on the instability and falseness of the temporal. Just as otium
describes not a literal form of leisure, but an inward vacatio a mendacibus, solitude indicates
an isolation of the self from worldly desires, an inward, psychological and moral solitude at
some distance from the literal meaning of the word. The two concepts, as Jennifer Petrie has
observed, each relate to specific activities - meditation, prayer and study - which help the
otiosus or the solitarius to expunge his attachment to the world and embrace virtue more
fully.222
In common with the idea of otium explored in the previous chapter, Petrarch's
solitudo is based on a moral philosophy which closely resembles the theology of St.
Augustine. As with his exploration of otium, Petrarch appropriated classical imagery and
exploited similarities between classical literature and Christian theology while propounding
a deeply Christian understanding of the life of virtue. At some distance from both Stoic and
Epicurean notions of a vita contemplativa, Petrarch's solitudo is - like otium - a cipher for
the practical application of the moral programme described in the Secretum and reliant on a





The holy passion of friendship
1. Petrarch and friendship
Friendship was extremely important to Petrarch and he valued his friends very highly. From
his youth, he was continually finding new friends and building relationships which were as
pleasurable as they were enduring. Fie was not loath to reveal his strength of feeling on the
subject. Writing to Giovanni d'Incisa, a Florentine relative, on 10th April 1348, he described
friendship as being 'much rarer and more precious than gold'.1 Similarly in a letter to the
grammarian Zanobi da Strada2 written some four years later, he explained his attempt to
reconcile a quarrel between Niccolo Acciaiuoli and Giovanni Barrili3 by asking rhetorically
whether there was anything among men which was greater than friendship except virtue
itself.4 Indeed, a few months earlier, he had advised the same Niccolo that even a man as
mighty and exalted as a king should hold nothing barring God and virtue as dear as
friendship.5
Petrarch's friendships have been the subject of great scholarly interest and his
attachment to his friends has frequently been observed. In the portrait with which he
concluded his biography of Petrarch, for example, E. H. Wilkins asserted that:
Never did any man form and cultivate a richer store of friendships; never did
any man draw deeper devotion from his friends, or maintain a deeper devotion
to them. ... Nothing short of proven unworthiness could lead to a withdrawal of
friendship - not the blows of a cruel fortune, not even the rare wounds given
him in friendly faithfulness, not even the rare necessity faithfully to wound his
friends. He rejoiced when actual companionship with friends was possible; but
An early version of this chapter was presented at the Society for Italian Studies Interim Conference at
the Institute of Germanic and Romance Studies at the University of London (25th April 2008). I am
grateful for the many helpful comments and suggestions received at that event.
1 Fam. VII, 11,4: 'Multo rarior multoque preciosior res est amicitia quam aurum...'
2 On Petrarch's friendship with Zanobi da Strada, see, for example, P. Guidotti, 'Un amico del
Petrarca e del Boccaccio: Zanobi da Strada, poeta laureato,' Archivo storico italiano 13, (1930), 249-
93.
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through the powers of his memory and his imagination he felt them present
even in absence, even if they had never met.6
Few have matched Wilkins' eloquence, but he is nevertheless reflective of historical opinion.
Aldo Scaglione, to take another example, is both accurate and typical in having described
Petrarch as 'an ideal friend, ever ready to help and to do so graciously,'7 while Bosco
similarly encapsulates the impression conveyed by Petrarch's correspondence in concluding
that he was a person for whom hatred was alien.8
If the importance of friendship in Petrarch's life has been well appreciated, however,
Petrarch's conception of friendship has received only very little scholarly attention.
Although there are many illuminating studies of his relationship with individual figures or
groups,9 his understanding of the term 'amicitia' seems to have aroused almost no interest
within the field.10 Even major texts on the concept of friendship in the late Middle Ages and
early Renaissance grant Petrarch no more than a fleeting reference. Reginald Hyatte, for
example, refers to Petrarch on only two inconsequential occasions" and he merits no serious
examination in E.D.H. Carmichael's recent important study.12 Besides a brief paper
published by Gabriel Maugain in 1928,13 the only significant attempt to engage with
Petrarch's notion of amicitia amongst modern scholars is Claude Lafleur's 2001 study.14
It cannot be denied that the evidence reveals that Petrarch's friendships had a very
practical and pragmatic dimension. There are many instances of Petrarch intervening on
6
Wilkins, Life ofPetrarch, 252.
7 A. Scaglione, 'Petrarca 1974: A Sketch for a Portrait,' in A. Scaglione, ed., Francis Petrarch, Six
Centuries Later. A Symposium, (Chapel Hill and Chicago, 1975), 1-24, here 19.
8
Bosco, Petrarca, 181.
9 The bibliography for Petrarch's friends and friendships is vast, but see, for example, ; U. Berliere,
Un ami de Petrarque, Louis Sanctus de Beeringen (Rome, 1905); H. Cochin, Un amico del Petrarca:
lettere del Nelli al Petrarca, trans. Le Monnier (Florence, 1901); C. Felisari, 'Un amico del Petrarca:
Paganino da Bizzozzero,' Studi petrarcheschi, n.s. 1 (1984): 205-51; P. G. Pisoni, 'Gugliemo
Maramaldo commentatore di Dante e amico del Petrarca,' Studi petrarcheschi, n.s., 1 (1984): 253-58;
Guidotti, 'Un amico del Petrarca e del Boccaccio: Zanobi da Strada'; L. Lazzanni, 'Amici del Petrarca
a Venezia e Treviso,' Archivo Veneto 14 (1933): 3-16; A. Pertusi, Leonzio Pilato tra Petrarca e
Boccaccio (Venice and Rome, 1964); M. Vattasso, Del Petrarca e d'alcuni suoi amici (Rome, 1904);
E.H. Wilkins, 'Petrarch and Giacomo de'Rossi,' Speculum 25 (1950): 347-78; G. Zaccagnini, 'Guido
Sette amico del Petrarca,' in Parma a Francesco Petrarca (Parma, 1934), 237-42.
10 Petrarch's library, indeed, appears to have attracted more attention than his reading of and reaction
to specific texts. See, for example, J. Leclerq OSB, 'L'Amitie dans les lettres au Moyen Age: autour
d'un manuscript de la bibliotheque de Petrarque,' Revue du Moyen Age Latin 1 (1945): 391-410. It is
remarkable that Trinkaus devotes an entire chapter to discussing Petrarch's 'Critique of Self and
Society', but almost completely neglects to consider the concept of friendship. Trinkaus, The Poet as
Philosopher, 52-89.
" R. Hyatte, The Arts of Friendship. The Idealization of Friendship in Medieval and Early
Renaissance Literature (Leiden, 1994), 1-2, 142.
12 E. D. H. Carmichael, Friendship. Interpreting Christian Love, (London and New York, 2004).
13 G. Maugain, 'Petrarque et Part de l'amitie,' Melanges de litterature et d'histoire (1928): 49-69.
14 C. Lafleur, Petrarque et I'amitie. Doctrine et pratique de I'amitie chez Petrarque a partir de ses
textes latins (Paris and Quebec, 2001).
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behalf of a friend, representing another's interests, or offering advice on particular problems.
Using his own influence to good effect, he was, for example, only too willing to ask Emperor
Charles IV to show favour to Lello di Pietro Stefano dei Tosetti, whom Petrarch tellingly
called 'Laelius'.15 His relationship with Laelius is, indeed, indicative of his depth of
attachment to his friends. Petrarch first met Laelius and Ludwig van Kempen ('Socrates') on
a visit to Giacomo Colonna, Bishop of Lombez, in 1330.16 The three were fast friends and,
although there appear to have been some squabbles over the years,17 their nicknames are a
testament to the esteem in which Petrarch held their amity,18 and the bond between Laelius
and Socrates is commemorated in the Triumphus Cupidinis as a tantalising example of
I'amore perfetto,19 They were, indeed, so dear to him that Petrarch not merely dedicated the
Familiares to Socrates,20 but even considered establishing a quasi-monastic community at
Montrieux in late 1347.21 There are, moreover, cases of Petrarch creating a textual
community which allowed him to enjoy certain reciprocal benefits from his friends. This is
perhaps most evident in his friendship with Giovanni Boccaccio, from whom he received an
unexpected metrical epistle in 1350.22 Although Petrarch was apparently rather slovenly in
replying, Boccaccio's bold statement of respect was the beginning of a rich and rewarding
literary friendship which was marked by openness and liberality. Among the countless gifts
which the two exchanged in later years, Boccaccio sent Petrarch Leontius Pilatus' Latin
translation of Homer's Iliad,23' and in turn, Petrarch - who was not easy to impress - showed
his admiration for the younger man's talent in translating the story of Griselda from
Boccaccio's Decameron into Latin.24
15 Fam. XIX, 4; 'Laelius' was a reference to Gaius Laelius, regarded by Cicero and others as the
epitome of the loyal friend for his relationship with Scipio Africanus during the Second Punic War.
Hyatte, The Arts ofFriendship, 31 -4, 37, 171,196, 210-11.
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Wilkins, Life ofPetrarch, 9.
17
q.v. Fam. XX, 13; XX, 14; XX, 15.
18 'Socrates' carries with it a sense of wisdom, obviously, but also reflects the degree to which the
Socratic dialogues provided an important source (direct and indirect) on friendship for medieval and
Renaissance authors. Hyatte, The Arts of Friendship, 10-16; S. Bowd, 'Swarming with Hermits:
Religious Friendship in Renaissance Italy, 1490-1540' in A. Brundin and M. Treharne, eds., Forms of
Faith in Sixteenth-Century Italy (Ashgate, forthcoming).
19
Triumphus Cupidinis, IV, 67-78.
20 Fam. I, 1, 11.
21 E. H. Wilkins, 'Petrarch's Ecclesiastical Career,' Speculum 28/4 (Oct. 1953): 754-775, here 762-3;
Berliere, Un ami de Petrarque, 14-15, 40-1. Petrarch petitioned the pope to allow Socrates to join this
community, but there was no mention - and no need to mention - Laelius. How he fitted into this
arrangement, if at all, is unclear. The proposed community never materialised, primarily because of
Petrarch's decision to return to Italy in November 1347, for which see Eel. VIII.
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Wilkins, Life ofPetrarch, 93.
2 For the relationship between Petrarch, Boccaccio and Leontius Pilatus, see Sen. VI, 1. See also
Pertusi, Leonzio Pilato.
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Sen. XVII, 3; Hyatte, The Arts of Friendship, 142. For Petrarch's translation of the tale of Griselda,
see, for example, V. Branca, 'Per il testo del «Decameron». La prima diffusione del «Decameron»',
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But just as Richard Trexler has demonstrated that the operative and reciprocal
aspects of the later friendship between Lapo Mazzei and Francesco di Marco Datini rested
on an underlying conception of an idealised friendship and a web of self-perceptions, so in
Petrarch's friendships, the real interpenetrates with the ideal.25 As Kenneth Gouwens has
observed, Petrarch
took on the role of "moral therapist" for whom "[l]anguage itself could be used
in such a way as to become affectively therapeutic. He sought knowledge of
himself and the world in a dialogic context, in which conversations (whether
real or imagined) facilitated his own personal growth ... [[Introspection and the
interpersonal ... thus complement each other... Viewed in [this light], the
symbiosis of humanist moral enquiry and the social world of the sodalities
becomes manifest.26
Friendship for Petrarch was not merely a fact of life, but an intrinsic part of his
lebensweisheit, a component in the practical philosophy of living, and was intimately
connected with his moral sentiments. His thoughts on the subject are not, it is true, collected
in a single text. There is nothing comparable to the De otio religioso or the De vita solitaria
to be found for friendship. His writings - especially the Familiares and the Seniles - are,
however, littered with sentiments which point to an active and conscious engagement with a
rich literary tradition, and peppered with remarks which indicate a deliberate effort to make
friendship an integral part of a systematic body of practical moral philosophy. In the
Familiares, for example, where classical and patristic texts provide a constant source of
reference, Petrarch was preoccupied with the question of how to distinguish between true
and false friends - itself bound up with the nature of true love27 - and seldom tired of
pointing out the connection between friendship and virtue.28 The question of friendship,
indeed, is the subject of seven chapters in the two books of the De remediis utriusque fortune
and receives some of the most detailed and philosophically challenging analysis in the entire
Studi di filologia italiana 8 (1950): 54-61; idem, 'Sulla diffusione della «Griselda» petrarchesca',
Studi petrarcheschi 6 (1956): 221-24; idem, Boccaccio medievale (Florence, 1986), 388-94; G.
Albanese, 'La 'Griselda', in M. Feo, ed., Codici latini del Petrarca nelle bib'ioteche fiorentine.
Mostra 19 Maggio - 30 Giugno 1991, (Florence, 1991), 432-5; G. Albanese, 'Fortuna Umanistica
della Griselda,' Quaderni petrarcheschi 9- 10 (1992-3): 571-628; M. Hernandez Esteta, 'Lecturas del
relato de Griselda: "Decameron" X, 10 y "Seniles", 10, 3,' Rivista di letteratura italiana 9 (1991):
373-99.
25 R. C. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (Ithaca and London, 1991), 131-58.
26 K. Gouwens, 'Perceiving the Past: Renaissance Humanism after the "Cognitive Turn", American
Historical Review 103/1 (Feb. 1998): 55-82, here 76-7, quoting C. Trinkaus, 'Italian Humanism and
Scholastic Theology,' in A. Rabil Jr., ed., Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms and Legacy, 3
vols., (Philadelphia, 1988), 3: 327-48 at 330.
27 For which see M. Feo, 'L'amore perfetto,' in R. Cardini and D. Coppini, eds., Petrarca e Agostino,
(Arezzo, 2004), 109-130.
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e.g. Fam. XVIII, 8, 4: 'Virtus est amicitie fundamentum...'
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text.29 Similarly, we have already seen that the De vita solitaria makes frequent reference to
friendship. Although Petrarch conceived of solitude as a solitudo animi, the practice of living
as a solitarius was evidently very closely bound up with the active exercise of friendship.
Petrarch's prefatory letter to Philippe de Cabassoles indicates that it was both pleasurable
and helpful to have a friend for company. The cause and dedication of the book, together
with the implication of its opening remarks reveals that - in a way which must be explored
more closely - a friend could help kindle the divine fire of a man's soul and, by extension,
also bask in its warmth.
In attempting to place the concept of friendship in a moral, as much as a practical
context, Petrarch actively participated in a long intellectual tradition, and was familiar with a
range of the most important texts on the subject, stretching from Aristotle,30 Cicero and
31 32 • 33 34
Seneca, to Ambrose, Augustine and Bernard of Clairvaux. Unwilling to see Petrarch's
understanding of amicitia as having significant relevance for his broader moral philosophy,
Lafleur has contended that his literary treatment of the theme is essentially aphoristic.
Drawing from this rich literary heritage, Lafleur suggests that Petrarch avoided the
temptations of rigor and systematisation and offered instead a series of axioms relating to
particular aspects of friendship.35 The fact that Petrarch cited Cicero and Seneca more than
any other authorities, however, seems in Lafleur's eyes to demonstrate that these authors
exercised a decisive influence on his conception of amicitia, even though he rejected the
Stoics' dogmatic attachment to virtue.36 Of the two, Cicero was of primary significant and
the general tone of Petrarch's writings on friendship is, for Lafleur, essentially Ciceronian.37
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1156a-b; 5-7, 1157b-1159a; De remediis utriusque fortune, II, 31; referring to Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, IX, 9, 1169b 18. There are also numerous possible references to the Nicomachean Ethics and
the Eudemian Ethics in De remediis utriusque fortune, II, pref.
31
For a list of references to Cicero and Seneca (as well as to other sources) in Petrarch's writings on
friendship, see Lafleur, Petrarque et I'amide, 11-32, esp. 13-6, 23-4.
32
See, for example, Petrarch's indication of his knowledge of Ambrose's De officiis ministrorum at
De vita solitaria, II, ix, 5; Prose, 552. For his understanding of other texts, including apocrypha, see,
for example, Prose, 476 n.l, 490, n.4, 512, n.2.
33 Note Petrarch's interesting citation of Augustine's friendship with Ambrose in relation to his own
attitude towards his friends, De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, I, 13; quoting Augustine, Conf. V,
xii, 23.
34 In the De remediis utriusque fortune, Carraud has found thirty two direct references to eleven of St.
Bernard's works, in addition to sixteen references to three pseudo-Bernardian texts. A close
knowledge of St. Bernard's life and works is observable at Contra eum qui maledixit Italie, 46-9, 52,
54, 68-9, 75, 114. For a brief discussion of Petrarch's knowledge of and attitude towards St. Bernard,
see A. M. Voci, Petrarca e la vita religiosa: il mito umanista della vita eremitica (Rome, 1983), 61-5.
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2. Virtus est amicitie fundamentum: the role of Ciceronianism
It must be granted that there is much to recommend Lafleur's identification of a primarily
Ciceronian flavour in Petrarch's writings on friendship. At a merely bibliographical level, it
is necessary to acknowledge that Cicero's De amicitia was a natural point of reference for
Petrarch. Although other Latin authors, such as Seneca and Valerius Maximus, must
necessarily also be acknowledged, Cicero's dialogue - in which Gaius Laelius discusses his
friendship with the recently departed Scipio - was, as Hyatte observes, 'one of the most
widely read classical works on amicitia perfecta along with Latin versions of the
Nicomachean Ethics after the twelfth century,' and represents possibly the most thorough
theoretical exploration of friendship known to Petrarch.38 As the lists of his favourite books
demonstrate, he knew the work possibly as early as 1333, and perhaps indicates his
appreciation of the text by listing it fourth among Cicero's works on the first list (after the
De re publica, the Tusculan Disputations and the De officiis) and third on the second list
(again after the Tusculan Disputations and the De re publica, but before the De officiis).39
Indeed, Petrarch openly expressed the esteem in which he held Cicero with particular
reference to the dialogue in letters to King Robert of Sicily on 26th December 1338 and to
Jacopo da Firenze on 1st April 1352.40
The impression given by Petrarch's reading is borne out by the many direct citations
of the De amicitia and numerous instances of conceptual similarity in Petrarch's writings.
Much of the treatment of friendship, especially in the Familiares and the Seniles appears to
bear the hallmarks of Cicero's understanding of amicitia. Drawing significantly on
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics,41 Cicero had argued that friendship should be valued above
all other human things not merely because it is suited to our nature, but also because it is a
unique form of relationship that is capable of adjusting itself to all circumstances.42 While
human beings are naturally drawn to society, the bond which unites only a few is strongest,
since it involves both caritas and benevolentia in the highest degree. 'For friendship,' Cicero
claims, 'is nothing other than an agreement in all things human and divine, with benevolentia
38
Hyatte, The Arts ofFriendship, 26.
39
Ullman, Studies in the Italian Renaissance, 117-137.
40 Fam. IV, 3, 7; XII, 8, 8.
41
Theophrastus and Panaetius of Rhodes have also been suggested as influences on the work,
although both are subject to some doubt.
42 For much of this paragraph, I follow Carmichael, Friendship, 26-28 and Hyatte, The Arts of
Friendship, 26-33. What follows is far from a complete account of Cicero's conception of friendship,
but only those elements which are pertinent to the forthcoming examination of Petrarch have been
included. Cicero, De amicitia, VI, 22; c.f. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 1-3, 1155a-1156b.
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and caritas.''47' This bond of friendship, in which benevolentia and caritas played such an
important role, could not be based on any form of utility - since such an interest would risk
taking priority over the friendship itself44 - but only on the love of virtue.45 Human beings
are drawn to a person whose character is like their own, because in him we see a lamp of
virtue46 and because there is nothing more attractive than virtue, nothing which induces us to
affection more.47 For Seneca as much as for Cicero and Aristotle, love for a friend is its own
reward,48 and it is perfectly possible to love as a friend even someone that we have never
The repudiation of utility and the primacy of caritas led Cicero - following in
Aristotle's wake50 - to suggest that loving a friend was akin to loving oneself. 'We naturally
love ourselves, simply because we are dear (carus) to ourselves, not because we expect to
gain from that love (caritas). We shall never find a true friend unless we transfer the same
attitude to friendship, for a true friend 'is, as it were, another self.'51 Having stated that a
person sees in a friend a likeness of himself and the lamp of virtue, he loves that friend in the
same way as he loves himself and the virtue he possesses. Since one learns self-love by
clinging to virtue and rejecting all vice, one learns to love friends by searching for the same
attributes in another.52
Differences of social class had no place in a friendship based on a mutual love of
virtue. Granting that the friend is an alter idem, parity must always be observed. Cicero's
Laelius hold Scipio up as an example of this attitude and expresses the view that all people
should imitate his capacity to lift up his social inferiors in friendship.53 If in friendship no
differences can be observed, and two people are united in love, then, if loyalty (fides) is to be
nurtured, it logically follows that nothing can be held back. There is no room for secrecy or
dissembling. In friendship, Cicero argues, the obligation to love and be loved infers that it is
necessary both to show and to see an open heart.54 This, indeed, was a view to which Seneca
43
Cicero, De amicitia, VI, 20: 'Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque
rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio.'; c.f. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 4-6, 1166a-
1167b.
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Cicero, Definibus, III, xxi, 70; De officiis, III. x, 43. c.f. Cicero, De amicitia, VIII, 28.
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Seneca, Ep. ix, 10-11; c.f. Cicero, De amicitia, IX, 31; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 8,
1159a.
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Cicero, De amicitia, VIII, 28.
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q.v. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 8, 1168a-1169b.
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Carmichael, Friendship, 31, quoting Cicero, De amicitia, XXI, 80.
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Cicero, De amicitia, XXI, 79; XXII, 82; c.f. Seneca, Ep. vi, 7.
53
Cicero, De amicitia, XIX, 69-XX, 71. c.f. Seneca, Ep. ix, 18; xlvii, 16.
54
Cicero, De amicitia, XXVI, 97.
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was also attached. Although it was wise always to choose a friend with care, and to be slow
in embarking upon a friendship, fides - which was the basis for the endurance of a friendship
- could only be ensured if trust and openness were exercised for the sake of the love of
virtue.55
True friends were admittedly rare,56 but where two people were united by amicitia,
the bond was immortal. At the very beginning of the De amicitia, Cicero's Laelius tells his
companions that he is happy despite Scipio's death, because he had spent his life with a
friend with whom he shared everything, and with whom he enjoyed such great pleasure in
pursuits, in public actions and in opinions.57 The friendship which he had treasured in life
stayed with him still. Had it been based on need, it would certainly have dissolved, but
because it was founded on virtue alone, Laelius' friendship with Scipio could not die.58
As in Cicero's dialogue, virtue is the foundation of friendship in Petrarch's
description of the relationship between Scipio and Laelius in the Africa. Just as Publius
Cornelius recommends Laelius to his son because of the active virtue and lofty spirit that
make him the peer of any senator, Laelius himself praises Scipio to Syphax in similar terms.
Scipio, Laelius proclaims, has no regard for worldly riches, spurns earthly pleasures59 and
scorns the hollow praise of the vulgar mob, treasuring only 'true glory' and dear friends.60
These qualities, rather than his 'ethereal aura', 'tranquil majesty', 'luxuriant locks' and
towering stature, recommend him most as a friend.61 . Writing to Niccolo da Lucca in 1351,
he justified his letters by quoting 'that commonly known and splendid opinion of Cicero's:
"There is nothing more lovable than virtue, and nothing that attracts us more.'"62 Similarly,
55
Seneca, Ep. iii, 2-3.
56 Aristotle went so far as to argue that it was impossible to be a true friend to many people at the
same time, thus demonstrating that true friendships had to be rare by definition. Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 6, 1 158a, c.f. VIII, 4, 1156b; IX, 10, 1170b-l 171a.
57
Cicero, De amicitia, IV, 15.
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Cicero, De amicitia, IX, 32.
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Although it is not explicitly related to friendship (in the Africa, at least), Petrarch has Scipio
indicate his contempt for earthly pleasures in a later passage. Rebuking Massinissa for bigamously
marrying Sophonisba, the wife of the captive Syphax (who had by this point broken his alliance with
Rome to assist Hannibal, and been defeated), Scipio modestly affirms that no virtue makes him more
proud than his ability to keep a tight hold on the reins of pleasure, before delivering a searing attack
on the effects of the evil of carnal desires. Africa, V, 370ff . The gentleness of the rebuke is in itself
worthy of note: c.f Sen. II, 1, 73.
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Africa, IV, 86-9: 'Rebus in ambiguis, rebus tranquilla secundis
spernit opes, populi ventosos spernit honores,
gloria vera placet, dulces conquirit amicos:
he sibi divitie sunt...'
61
Africa, IV, 46-59.
62 Fam. IX, 11,2: 'Michi autem cogitanti quibus artibus familiaris epystola de nichilo texeretur,
mirantique quid michi tecum rei esset ac scribendi causas et materiam requirenti, nichil in animum
prius venit quam vulgata ilia Ciceronis ac preclara sententia: "Virtute nichil amabilius nichilque quod
130
in a long letter to Francesco il Vecchio da Carrara written on November 28th 1373 (Sen. XIV,
1), he stated that he agreed with 'pagan philosophers' that there could be no friendship
without wisdom and virtue.63 Adding a more personal note, Petrarch claimed in a letter to the
Neapolitan knight Gugliemo Maramaldo, that his friendship with the musician Floriano da
Rimini was founded on virtue, although the same could not unfortunately be said of
Floriano's son referred to only as 'Orpheus'.64
In suggesting that virtue was the foundation of friendship, Petrarch followed Cicero in
simultaneously expressing a suspicion for utility. Friendship had no reference to need,
although it was possible for friends to help one another from love. Mirroring the De amicitia
in the Africa, Petrarch's Laelius and Scipio had no need of each other, finding in their
friendship all the reward they needed, although - as the De viris illustribus illustrates - they
aided each other greatly.65 Extending this further, Petrarch contended that utility was even
antithetical to friendship. In the De remediis utriusque fortune, Gaudium is rebuked by Ratio
for displaying pride in an abundance of friends. 'Doomed are those friendships,' Ratio
declares,
of which pleasure or utility is the foundation! for they tremble while they are
standing and come to ruination when they fall: it is not so much possible, as
very easy - rather almost necessary, indeed - for the most part of these to
follow Fortune, or age and beauty, than which nothing is more uncertain.66
Utility and virtue are placed in stark opposition, and the tension between the two is restated
in an earlier discussion of the friendship of kings. The man who believes himself beloved of
monarchs, Ratio argues, necessarily value his soul, virtue, renown, quiet, otium and security
little. The friendship of kings cannot be called true friendship since it encourages a man to
neglect all things, to take on a servile attitude, to foster lust and to harbour avarice.67 For
magis alliciat," tantumque eius esse vim ut eos sepe, quos nunquam vidimus, diligamus.' quoting
Cicero, De amicitia, VIII, 28; c.f. Sen. VI, 3, 4, referring to Cicero, De amicitia, VI, 20.
63 Sen. XIV, 1, 30: 'Neque vero ipsi gentium philosophi opinati sunt posse veram amicitiam sine vera
sapientia ac virtute consistere.
64 Sen. XI, 5.
65 De viris illustribus, XI, 7-8, referring to Cicero, De amicitia; Livy, Ab urbe condita, XXVII, xvii, 8;
text from the edition by Martellotti in Prose, 218-266, here, 242; c.f. Cicero, De amicitia, IX, 31. For
a discussion of this passage in the context of Scipio as a poetic hero, see Bernardo, Petrarch, Scipio
and the Africa, 110.
66 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 50: 'RATIO: Caduce amicitie, quarum delectatio vel utilitas
fundamentum est! nam et stantibus illis tremunt et cedentibus ruunt: id non possibile tantum sed
perfacile, immo vero prope necessarium, quod hec plerumque vel fortunam sequuntur vel etatem
formeque gratiam, quibus nichil incertius.'
67 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 49.
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Petrarch, as for Aristotle and Cicero, the only reward of a true friendship lay in freely loving
and being loved.68
Believing that true friendship could be based only on virtue, Petrarch seems to have
followed Cicero in contending that it was perfectly possible to strike up a relationship with
someone whom one has never met. Indeed, given the large number of letters which Petrarch
received from people seeking to make his acquaintance, it appears that he emphasises this
dimension of friendship even more than his classical antecedents. Writing to Francesco
Orsini in response to just such a letter on 10th February 1368, for example, Petrarch indicated
that a friendship based on virtue did not require friends to see each other. Lulled into a
pleasant daze by Francesco's youthful benevolentia, Petrarch emphasises that each saw in
the other the lamp of virtue, and despite modestly understating his own character, begs to be
numbered amongst Francesco's friends.69 In the chapter of the De remediis utriusque fortune
dealing with just this issue, Ratio reminds Gaudium that Massinissa, although initially an
enemy of Rome, became a friend of Scipio's on the basis merely of his renown.70
Petrarch's apparently Ciceronian emphasis on the allure of virtue and horror for utility
had the effect of making love of self like the love of another. In a letter to Francesco Nelli
written in 1355, he explicitly approved of Cicero's view that a friend is an alter idem,1] and,
giving further credence to this, wrote in a later letter that he felt that his Socrates had been
born for him in another part of the world, so much did his countenance, mind and virtue
make them of one mind.72 There was, indeed, 'nothing false, no dissembling, nothing
duplicitous, but only what is pure, candid and open,' as he put it in a letter to Francesco il
Vecchio da Carrara.73 A true friend, who was an alter idem in the sense intended by Cicero,
was for Petrarch,
a light of the soul, a leader in advice, a torch for study, a pacifier of discord, a
partner in labours, a companion in travel, one who calms you when at home;
neither assiduous merely at home but in the countryside, on campaign, on land
and at sea; nor a companion merely in the space of [this] life, but beyond the
grave a living and immortal solace ... 74
68 Sen. X, 5.
69 Sen. XI, 6.
70 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 51.
71 Fam. XVIII. 8, 2.
72 Sen. I, 3, 4.
73 Sen. XIV, 1, 30: 'Cuius consumate quidem ac perfecte, etsi paucissima numerentur amicorum paria,
in quibus preclarissimum nomen habenl Africanus minor et Lelius, tamen est et hec ipsa communis
bonorum hominum amicitia dulcis ac placida, in qua nulla habeat locum adulatio, nulla contumelia aut
contemptus, nulla discordia, nulla discrepatio, nisi de amici commodis aut honore, sed pax et
consolatio et convictus. Nichil denique in hac fictum, nichil duplex, nichil occultum, sed pura omnia
atque simplicia et aperta.'
74
Fam. IX, 9, 4: 'Et ad summam amicus est alter idem, status nostri basis, animi lux, consilii dux,
studii fax, dissidentum pax, curarum negotiorum particeps, peregrinationum comes refrigeriumque
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Indeed, if one was to build loyalty (fides) in a relationship,75 it was necessary, Petrarch
believed, to love and to be loved in equal measure, as Seneca had advised, and to open one's
heart entirely to a friend.76 No difference in social class could be acknowledged and, writing
to Philippe de Cabassoles - then Cardinal Bishop of Sabina on 5th May 1372 - Petrarch
remarked that the Emperor Augustus not merely allowed, but also wished that Horace should
be called his friend, despite his humble origin.77
Like Cicero, Petrarch accepted that true friendship was a rare commodity. In the De
remediis utriusque fortune, Gaudium boasts that he seems to have innumerable friends. In
reply, Ratio asks whence came such an opinion when true friendships are rare indeed.78 This
statement is repeated almost like a mantra both in other portions of the text and in Petrarch's
other writings.79 Despite the caution which is intrinsic to this view of the incidence of
amicitia, however, we should not be tempted to think that he necessarily advocated anything
approaching a 'bunker' mentality amongst friends. Although the importance of friendship
compelled him to follow Seneca in arguing that the moral qualities of a man should be
examined carefully before making him a friend, and inspired his utterly Ciceronian
injunction to be slow in forming friendships,80 Petrarch's view of amicitia was informed both
by a positive view of humanity and by an apparently Stoical pragmatism.81 In an undated
letter, he warned a litigious friend not to be so quick to dismiss people as unworthy of
friendship and not to be so set on befriending only the entirely good. 'I say that, if you will
make all good people your friends,' he wrote, 'they will be few indeed.' For, he continued,
quoting Juvenal, 'The good are certainly rare; they are scarcely as numerous as i the gates of
Thebes or the mouths of the rich Nile.'82 All people, Petrarch went on to say, are troubled by
the perturbations of worldliness: the best man, as Horace correctly pointed out, is he who is
domesticum, neque domi tantum sed ruri militieque assiduus et terris et pelago, neque solum spatio
vite par sed post busta vivax atque immortale solatium ... '
75 For Petrarch, as for Cicero, fides was intrinsic to amicitia and gave both strength and lustre to any
friendship. It was, however, a subject about which he spoke relatively little. When it is mentioned, it
takes its place alongside other qualities of friendship, q.v. Fam. I, 6, 6.
76
De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 50.
77 Sen. XVI, 4. Petrarch is - surprisingly - incorrect in claiming that Horace was a freedman: it was
Horace's father who had been a freedman. Note also Sen. VI, 4, 1.
78 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 50.
79 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 49; I, 50; Fam. VII, 11,4.
80 Fam. XII, 2, 15-16, quoting Seneca, Ep. lii, 2; Cicero, De amicitia, XXI, 76.
81 Sen. XIV, 1, 30, referring to Cicero, De amiticia, V, 18.
82 Fam. Ill, 15, 1: 'Studeto bonis omnibus esse carissimus, neque verendum est ne nimios habeas
amicos aut nimium tibi negotii obiciam. Ita dico, si omnes bonos amicos tibi feceris, pauci erunt.
Rari quippe boni; numero vix sunt totidem quot
Thebarum porte vel divitis ostia Nili.'
quoting Juvenal, Sat. XIII, 26-7.
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moved least.83 Instead of being excessively judgemental, therefore, it is necessary to look for
the good in people. In forging friendships, Petrarch argues, we should bear in mind that it has
been found from experience that no spirit, however tranquil or healthy, is not occasionally
moved by perturbations and agitated by the disturbance of human things.84 True friendship
might be rare, in other words, but we will only find it by looking for the good in imperfect
people.
Once it had been forged, Petrarch believed that a true friendship was immune to
separation or death.85 Since amicitia vera was founded on virtue alone, the presence or
absence of a friend was immaterial to the endurance or strength of the friendship.
Considering absent friends in the De remediis utriusque fortune, Ratio counters Dolor's
sorrow by arguing that the delight of friendship is to be found in the contemplation of
another's virtue, and since this may be kept in mind always, it is impossible for an amicus to
be snatched away by absence or even death.86 Indeed, Ratio notes with approval that Cicero,
Epicurus and Seneca found that a lively correspondence with friends - in which the amicus
is almost made present both in reading and writing - could further help to eliminate distance
in a vera amicitia based on virtue.87 Following Cicero's De amicitia closely in the section of
the De remediis utriusque fortune dealing with the death of a friend, Ratio observes that
If - as you ought - you have loved the virtue in [your] friend, that certainly will
never be lost, nor will it die. For this reason they say that true friendships are
immortal, because they are never dissolved by discord between friends, and are
not even dissolved by death. Just as virtue conquers discord and the vice of all,
nothing conquers virtue.88
Continuing in this vein, Ratio alludes to the opening passages of the De amicitia. 'You have
heard,' the character says to Dolor,
in the writings of Tully, that Laelius reassures himself that just as Scipio lived
for him [in life], neither the fame nor the virtue of his deceased friend are
extinguished in his memory. What prevents your Scipio from living for you
now? ... Death is able to take the body of your friend, but not the friendship nor
83 Fam. Ill, 15, 3, quoting Horace, Sat. I, iii, 68-9.
M Fam. Ill, 15,4.
85 For a charming and eloquent statement of this, see, for example Fam. VI, 3, 64.
86
De remediis utriusque fortune, II, 53.
87
ibid., quoting Cicero, Ep. ad Quintum., I, i, 45; Seneca, Ep. xxv, 5; c.f. De vita solitaria, I, iv, 8;
Prose, 348-50.
88 De remediis utriusque fortune, II, 52: 'RATIO: Si ut debes, in amico virtutem amasti, ilia certe non
perditur, nec moritur. Ideo veras amicitias immortales dicunt, quod nullo unquam dissidio amicorum,
nec ipsa demum morte solvuntur. Sic discordiam vitiumque omne vincit virtus, ipsa vero nulla re
vincitur.' c.f. De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 50.
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his mind: for they belong to the category of things that defer neither to death
nor to fortune, but [only] to virtue ...89
Indeed, as Petrarch observed in a letter of consolation to Philippe de Cabassoles in on 25th
February 1338, mourning for a dead friend was to be avoided both as a product of false love
and as an example of the opinions of the mob.90 The death of a friend - or even a brother, in
Philippe's case - was perhaps to be greeted with joy.91 Even Cicero (a pagan, no less) had
recognised the immortality of the soul and acknowledged that the virtuous would find a
heavenly repose after death.92 As a result, as Cicero had observed, to mourn the death of a
person was to show oneself to be a self-lover rather than a friend and even to give way to
93
envy.
This clinical dissection of the subject is given a more human face in a letter to Giovanni
Colonna, probably written in about 1336. In this letter, Petrarch gently rebukes the
Dominican friar for having complained that he was saddened by the absence of friends, and
was no longer able to enjoy their 'wonderful' company.94 'Innumerable causes might
separate friends,' he wrote,
but none rends true friendship asunder. When this is present, a friend cannot be
absent. For however great the distance between places separates us from the
conversation of friends, by the same degree do we shatter the misfortune of
absence with assiduous recollection.95
The example of Laelius and Scipio once again proves instructive, and gives credence to
Virgil's observation that 'looks and words cling fast within the breast' and that though
absent, a man could yet been seen and heard as the result of love.96 In the De amicitia,
89 De remediis utriusque fortune, II, 52: 'RATIO: Audisti apud Tullium, se solantem Lelium, ut illi
Scipio suus vivit, ut, in memoria eius, nec extincti amici fama, nec virtus extinguitur. Quid Scipionem
tuum tibi nunc vivere prohibet? .... Amici corpus eripere mors potest, non amicitiam nec animum: sunt
enim ex illorum genere, que nec morti nec fortune subiacent sed virtuti ... '
90 Fam. II, 1,6.
91 Fam. II, 1,9.
92 Fam. II, 1,20-21.
93 Fam. II, 1, 28, quoting Cicero, De amicitia, IV, 14.
94 Fam. II, 6, 2: '...cuius lamentationis summa est, te acerrime atque inconsolabiliter doluisse, quod
huius exoptatissimi atque optimi ducis nostri meamque et amicorum faciem videre desieris.'
95 Fam. II, 6, 3: 'Innumerabiles cause segregant amicos, amicitiam veram nulle; qua presente, amicus
absens esse non poterit. Quantum enim locorum intervallis ab amicorum conversatione disiungimur,
tantum absentie detrimentum assidua commemoratione discutimus.'
96 Fam. II, 6, 3-4: '... cuius si tanta vis est, ut morte superata, defunctos etiam amicos pro viventibus
celebremus - quod post obitum iunioris Africani, sapientissimo et omnium Romanorum in amicitia
gloriosissimo viro Lelio docente, didicimus -, quid tarn magnum est, si, absentia similiter victa, longe
positos amicorum vultus pro presentibus habeamus? Apud poetam scriptum est,
haerent infixi pectore vultus
Verbaque;
et iterum
absentem absens auditque videtque.'
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Petrarch recalled, Cicero's Laelius had told his listeners that he had loved Scipio's virtue,
which could never die.97 Although it would be 'inhuman and bestial' to deny the pleasure
which comes from seeing a friend in the flesh, the delight of friendship is not restricted to the
physical. If friendship were so governed, and affected by death, prison, illness and
separation, it would be very short-lived, whereas, Petrarch claimed, 'it ought to be not only
as long as the longest life, but it also ... behoves friendship to survive beyond.'98
3. Amabit enim sapiens Deum ... amabit et proximum, amabit virtutem ...
amicos
Although Petrarch's debt to Cicero and - to a lesser extent - Seneca cannot be denied, it is
nevertheless possible to question Lafleur's contention that he adhered uncritically to a
Ciceronian notion of amicitia. While it is important to acknowledge Petrarch's frequent
references to the De amicitia, it is necessary to recognise that while this text played a pivotal
role in the development of late medieval and early Renaissance conceptions of friendship, it
was not regarded as incompatible with Christian ideas of friendship in Christ, and from the
fourth century onwards the classical language of friendship was appropriated for different
quoting Virgil, Aen. IV, 4-5; 83. These lines from the Aeneid speak of Dido's love for the recently
departed Aeneas. Although the identity of the sentiment (woman-man) is inappropriate, the sense of
parallelism inherent within the quotation is tantalising. On the one hand, it is tempting to postulate the
pairings Dido-Laelius, Scipio-Aeneas which would certainly be plausible when one considers the
degree to which both Scipio and Aeneas were used by Petrarch as paragons of virtue. On the other
hand, however, such an identification of characters seems not merely tendentious, but also puzzling.
The pairing of Dido and Laelius appears especially troublesome, since at first sight, this might suggest
an implied association between carnal love and amor virtutis, which would certainly cause difficulties
for Petrarch's notion of friendship. An interesting sidelight on this issue is provided in the Africa and
in the Ambrosian Virgil. Whereas Virgil's Dido is essentially licentious, Petrarch observes in two of
his glosses to Aen. IV in the Ambrosian manuscript that Seneca had amended IV, 3 ('cupidineo
amore') to 'honestam admirationem viri egregii'. Rather than having been consumed by foolish love
in Africa, II, Petrarch's Dido is determined to preserve her chastity after the premature death of her
husband and refuses the hand of numerous suitors. For the remainder of her days, she devoted herself
to virtue and loved Aeneas in the most chaste fashion, for the sake of his moral qualities. Viewing the
motivation of her love in this fashion, the pairing of Dido and Laelius does not seem so implausible or
problematic, q.v. Africa, II, 418-27; c.f. Triumphus pudicitie, 154-59. For an interesting discussion of
Petrarch's Dido, see Kallendorf, In Praise ofAeneas, 40-9.
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Fam. II, 6, 4, quoting Cicero, De amicitia, XXVII, 102.
98 Fam. II, 6, 7-9; 'Nec ego quidem adversor dulcissimam esse presentiam amicorum; quis enim hoc
negaverit, nisi inhumanus idem ac ferus? Sed nec tu michi negabis absentiam quoque suas habere
voluptates, nisi totam fortassis amicitie pulchritudinem, que latissime patet, ad oculos solos
restringimus et a sede eius, que est in animo, sevocamus; quodsi fieri ceperit, angustissima quidem
area restabit, ubi se amicorum caritas oblectet. Ut enim mortem, ut carcerem, ut egritudines, ut
necessitates, somnum famem sitim estus algores lassitudinem, quis studiorum aliarumque rerum
occupationes innumeras explicet, quibus etiam in eadem domo, ne dicam urbe, degenitum nec vultus
aspicere nec semper voces audire permittimur? Ita evi brevissimi reperietur amicitia, quam longissime
vite non equevam modo, sed, ut dixi, superstitem esse decuerat.' c.f. Augustine, De vera religione,
xlvi, 88.
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ends. 99 Despite the fact that Cicero's De amicitia exercised a strong influence on St.
Ambrose's exposition of friendship in the De officiis ministrorum, an essentially classical
vocabulary is imbued with new meaning, and a recognisably new conception of amicitia is
fashioned from inherited materials.100 St. Augustine also began his treatment of friendship
with a discussion of Cicero's De amicitia and in his letter to Marcianus offered a novel and
Christian understanding of the concept while referring directly and with approval to Cicero's
definition.101 In later centuries, this process of assimilation and adaptation continued and the
words used to describe friendship - amicitia, amor, caritas, benevolentia, etc. - gradually
acquired new meanings more attuned to structures of Christian theology. As Hyatte has
observed,
[t]hroughout the medieval period, the Ciceronian-Senecan terminology of
amicitia vera persisted in large part as the basic vocabulary of amicitia
Christiana and also of secular sorts of friendship in Latin and vernacular works.
The pagan terminology persisted, but its semantic content was radically
altered.102
In the works of St. Aelred of Rievaulx, for example, Cicero's De amicitia appears as an
important source of inspiration, but could only be understood as a text prefiguring the
precepts of the later Christian faith,103 and in the works of later authors, references and
allusions to Ciceronian and Senecan notions of friendship were employed more with an eye
to stylistic considerations than out of a concern to reproduce the intellectual content of the
original texts.104
While it would certainly be incorrect to dismiss Petrarch's references to Cicero and
Seneca as insincere concessions to stylistic considerations, it is not unreasonable to entertain
the possibility that, as in medieval reinterpretations of the classical idea of amicitia, they
could have been integrated into a Christian understanding of friendship, and to posit that
what Lafleur has described as an aphoristic approach lacking in consistency and
philosophical depth may in fact reflect a willingness to adapt Ciceronian and Senecan ideas
99
Hyatte, The Arts ofFriendship, 45-6; c.f. B. P. McGuire, Friendship and Community: The Monastic
Experience 350-1250 (Kalamazoo, 1988).
100
Carmichael, Friendship, 45; L. F. Pizzolato, 'L'amicizia nel De officiis di Sant'Ambrogio e il
Laelius di Cicerone,' Archivio Ambrosiano 27 (1974): 53-67; M. Dorothea, 'Cicero and Saint
Ambrose on Friendship,' The Classical Journal 43/4 (Jan., 1948): 219-222.
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Augustine, Ep. 256; Carmichael, Friendship, 58-9; J. McEvoy, 'Anima una et cor unum: friendship
and spiritual unity in Augustine,' Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale 53 (1986): 40-92;
M. A. McNamara, Friendship in Saint Augustine (Fribourg, 1958).
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103 ibid., 48.
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to a different set of intellectual concerns, concerns which would more closely relate to his
general conception of virtue.
At a general level, it is important to observe that Petrarch was not above adapting
Cicero's idealised friendship in a manner to suit his underlying moral and aesthetic
concerns.105 In the Africa, for example, Petrarch freely attributed to both Scipio the Elder and
Laelius characteristics which Cicero clearly associated with their homonymous descendents.
This tendency is reflected in other, more telling ways and Petrarch's use of vocabulary in
creating a rhetoric of friendship is striking. Although the words 'caritas' and 'benevolentia'
- so important to Cicero's concept of friendship - do appear in his writings, their number is
dwarfed by the incidence of 'amor' and its cognates. Throughout his writings on the subject,
friendship is described primarily in terms of the amor shared between two or more people,
and questions regarding the implications of friendship are tackled from the same perspective.
Although the portions of the De remediis utriusque fortune dealing with amicitia appear to
display a marginally lower ratio of such words to 'cantos'-terms10 - perhaps due to the
more pragmatic nature of the work - the evidence of the Familiares and the Seniles strongly
suggests that Petrarch perceived there to be a strong linguistic and semantic connection
between amor and amicitia. On the one hand, this is perhaps unsurprising. 'Amor' is, after
all, both the etymological and conceptual root of 'amicitia', and Cicero himself drew
attention to the association in the De amicitia}01 On the other hand, however, Petrarch's
preference for 'amor' and its cognates seems to recall later traditions of friendship. Despite
his etymological aside, Cicero deliberately avoided using 'amor', and instead employed
'benevolentia' and 'caritas'. This was, indeed, a preference which was inherited by later
generations. In the writings of St. Ambrose, for example, 'caritas' and 'benevolentia'
continue to dominate the discussion of friendship, even though they are employed almost
synonymously and are infused with the connotations of the equivalence of ayajiq and
'caritas' in the vocabulary of late antique Christianity.108 While Petrarch's choice of
vocabulary does not signal a rejection of Cicero's influence, it nevertheless seems to suggest
a willingness to engage with lexical norms common to a later, Christian treatment of
friendship and to discuss Cicero's understanding of friendship in the language of patristic
and medieval readers of the De amicitia.
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See, for example, Bernardo, Petrarch, Scipio and the Africa, 116-7, 121-6.
106 In the seven relevant chapters of the De remediis utriusque fortune, 'amor' and its derivatives
appear on 26 occasions, and are used as nouns, verbs and adjectives in roughly equal proportion.
'Caritas' and related words appear on 19 occasions, but it is noticeable that the word 'caritas' itself
only appears twice. For the most part, Petrarch uses the adjective 'cams' which does not occupy the
semantic space of the related noun. 'Benevolentia' is not used at all in these chapters.




At a conceptual level, there is much to suggest that Petrarch consciously integrated
Ciceronian and Senecan ideas into a distinctively Christian context. In the section of the De
remediis utriusque fortune devoted to love affairs, Petrarch's characters scrutinise the word
'amor' in relation to a passage from Cicero's Tusculan Disputations and offer a telling
insight into friendship. Although expressing himself with characteristic subtlety, Petrarch's
treatment of amor skilfully navigates the linguistic space shared by different traditions and
unveils a conception of amicitia which, though owing an appreciable debt to Cicero,
ultimately stems from a Christian reinterpretation of the semantic content of amor.
The relevant passage of this chapter of the De remediis utriusque fortune begins
when Gaudium asserts that he loves only what he is able to see.109 Echoing sentiments
expressed in Fam. IX, 11 and Sen. XVI, 4,110 and referring to II Cor. 4:18, Ratio argues that
to love the temporal is to love the ephemeral and the base. If Gaudium wishes to love in this
fashion, Ratio claims, he will love nothing great. More importantly, he will set himself
against St. Paul's view that one should want to love 'not those things which are seen, but
those which are not seen; for those things which are seen are temporal, while those which are
not seen are eternal.'111 With a blind spirit and with a devotion to the bodily senses, he will
neither love anything eternal nor comprehend anything correctly. Despite Gaudium's
accusation that he is dragging youthful games into calumny and is unfairly refusing to grant
any indulgence,112 Ratio develops his position by pointing out that youth is no defence
against sin.113 The sin which results from such love brings only misery. If it is miserable to
sin, it is more miserable to delight in the crime, and it is most miserable to excuse and to love
such sinfulness. This misery will only be used up when Gaudium arrives at a more honest
estimation of his enthusiasm for pleasure.114
109 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 69.
110
Fam. IX, 11, 3-4; Sen. XVI, 4, passim. A similar line of argument occurs in the De amicitia, but it
would be mistaken to see this as the sole source of inspiration. Although he mentions the fallacy of
loving only those things which are visible, and asserts the superiority of those things which cannot be
seen with the eyes, he does not do so in the same manner and certainly does not mention either the
soul or God. c.f. Cicero, De amicitia, VIII, 27-8. Note also the absence of 'cantos' from Petrarch's
descriptions.
nl De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 69: 'RATIO: Si nichil amas, nisi quod cerni potest, nichil igitur
magnum amas. Quid quod directe obvias precepto illi vulgatissimo: nolite amare "que videntur, sed
que non videntur: que enim videntur temporalia sunt, que autem non videntur eterna." Vos autem, ceci
animo deditique oculis, eternum nichil non dicam amare, sed nec intelligere nec cogitare quidem
ydonei, vobiscum peritura sectamini et pudendos affectus honesto tegentes velo libidininem dicitis
amorem: ilium colitis, ilium - fandi licentia - Deum facitis, ut probra verstra, que vix celum tegit,
excuset.' quoting II Cor. 4:18.
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Although it is expressed in a somewhat different fashion, it is not difficult to see that
in its major respects - the tension between the temporal and the spiritual, the association of
worldliness with sin and misery, the role of self-knowledge - this shares much in common
with the moral dilemma which the Secretum addresses and the threats to virtue examined in
the De otio religioso, and discussed in chapters one and two respectively. Indeed, Gaudium's
condition seems to parallel that of Franciscus, and Ratio's dissection of the problem
complements that of Augustinus. Gaudium's determination to love only what is perceptible
to the senses leads inevitably to vice and to misery, just as Franciscus' persistence in staring
'at the ground with eyes veiled with darkness'115 leads him to incur the weight of sin and the
burden of accidia. The alleviation of their woes begins in each case with sincere self-
analysis. Whereas Franciscus' condition is initially explored through a discussion of voluntas
and ratio, however, it is examined in the De remediis utriusque fortune through a discourse
on love. This is entirely consistent with Petrarch's absorption of St. Augustine's moral
theology. The opposition of the love of God and the love of self or the world is a
commonplace of St. Augustine's writings and, indeed, in the opening chapters of the De vera
religione, it is possible to find a similar line of argument to that in the De remediis utriusque
fortune expressed in terms of love with specific reference to II Cor. 4:18.116
The preliminary discussion of love - so reminiscent of St. Augustine - provides the
introduction to Petrarch's commentary on the idea of friendship in the Tusculan
Disputations,117 Love may be found, Petrarch argues, not merely amongst the common herd
but also in learned writings in both Latin and Greek. Although Sappho is excused, Greek
poets are sweepingly condemned as dealers in lascivious verse, and Anacreon and Alcaeus
are singled out in imitation of Cicero.118 The Latin poets are just the same and - paralleling
Cicero's reference to Ibycus of Rhegium - Gaudium is directed to consider Catullus,
Tibullus, Propertius and Ovid, whose poems contain almost nothing except a vulgar, base
form of love.119 The philosophers were apparently no better and even Plato is attacked for
displaying a shocking licentiousness.120 That is not to say that such men were wrong in their
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Secretum, proem.: 'Satis superque satis hactenus terrain caligantibus oculis aspexisti; quos si
usqueadeo mortalia ista permulcent, quid futurum speras si eos ad eterna sustuleris?' Prose, 22.
116
Augustine, De vera religione, iii, 4.
117 See the appendix for a detailed comparison of the two passages.
"s
De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 69. On Alcaeus and Anacreon, c.f. Cicero, Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 71. It
is also possible that Petrarch could have derived some of his knowledge from corollary references in
Ovid: on Alcaeus in relation to Sappho, c.f. Ovid, Heroides, XV, 29-30; on Sappho, c.f. Ovid,
Heroides, XV, 3; 155; 183; 217.
119 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 69. c.f. Fam. IX, 4, 14.
120 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 69: 'RATIO: ... Apud illos [philosophos], autem, non comunes
quosque, sed severissimos philosophorum stoicos, ipsumque - quod misaberis - Platonem, in hoc
errore versatos scimus.' c.f. Cicero, Tusc. IV, xxxiv, 72. It is perhaps curious that Petrarch should
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opinions about love, but their persistent conflation of amor and licentia led them into
dangerous waters. In that they believed that the wise man should love, the Stoics were quite
correct, but only insofar as one is agreed about the nature of love. For Ratio, there is no room
for doubt in this matter. The only proper object of love is not lust, but God himself and those
things which He wills us to love:
The wise man will love God, as I have said, and he will love his neighbour; he
will love virtue, wisdom, country, parents, children, brothers and friends, and if
he is truly wise, he will also love his enemies, not for their own sake -1 admit -
but for the sake of Him who wills it.121
There is in these things no place for following the belief - which Petrarch misleadingly
yokes to Cicero - that 'love is the endeavour to form a friendship inspired by the semblance
of beauty.' 122 Age, beauty and their seductions are without doubt inappropriate to friendship,
and are more properly called 'libido', a fact which may readily be observed if one looks with
open and healthy eyes.
Conceived as a commentary on the Tusculan Disputations, this passage from the De
remediis exhibits many points of commonality between Petrarch's friendship and Cicero's
amicitia. Like Cicero, Petrarch distances himself from the view that friendship should be a
function of any corporeal considerations and affirms that amicitia must be viewed as the
corollary of a love of virtue. This, however, is far from being the complete picture. In
prefacing his discussion of amor with an exegesis of II Cor. 4:18, and in introducing a
reference to the primacy of God's love in friendship, Petrarch appears to be reading Cicero
through the lens of later Christian thought, exploiting the possibility of integrating an
amended version of Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 70 - xxxiv, 72 with a Christian theology of amicitia.
Having followed St. Paul in asserting that we ought to love only that which cannot be
seen with the eyes, and having equated the sensible with misery in the De vera religione, St.
Augustine argued that those who are 'ablaze' with love for the eternal shall necessarily hate
relationships founded purely on the temporal.123 The reason for this is simple. The man who
loves only that which he cannot lose will not merely be unconquerable, but will also be
even implicitly have grouped Plato with 'severissimos philosophorum stoicos', but this might best be
thought of as an infelicity arising from his close use of the Tusculan Disputations and from Cicero's
potentially misleading 'Philosophi sumus...et ...quidem nostro Platone'.
121
De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 69: 'Ratio: ... Amabit enim sapiens Deum, ut dixi, amabit et
proximum, amabit virtutem, sapientiam, patriam, parentes, filios, fratres, et amicos et, si verus sapiens
fuerit, inimicos etiam amabit, non propter illos - fateor - sed propter Eum qui hoc iubet.'
122 De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 69: 'RATIO: ... In his omnibus, oro te, quis locus est pulchritudini?
Sic enim in Ciceronis Tusculano diffinitum legimus: "Amorem ipsum conatum esse amicitie faciende
ex pulchritudinis specie.'" quoting Cicero, Tusc. IV, xxxiv, 72. It is important to note that the phrase
quoted in this extract is a fragment.
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Augustine, De vera religione, xlvi, 89.
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tormented by none of the envy which would bring him misery. The man who loves God with
his whole being will, by extension, also wish to follow Christ's injunction to love his brother
as himself. For Augustine, the term 'frater' was in this context synonymous with 'amicus',
'socius' and - in distinct contrast to Cicero124 - 'proximus'. For, Augustine argued, allowing
for a reconfiguration of the idea of the alter idem,
He cannot lose his neighbour whom he loves as himself for he does not love
even in himself the things that appear to the eyes or to any other bodily senses.
So he has inward fellowship with him whom he loves as himself.125
Augustine was not alone in pursuing this line of argument and, in different ways, it is
common to much Christian thought on the subject of friendship. In the twelfth century, St.
Aelred of Rievaulx was similarly willing to use a discussion of the different forms of love as
an opportunity of shedding light on a form of friendship which retained links to Cicero's
amicitia while resting on the foundations of Christian theology. Arguing that amicitia should
be founded not on the object of worldly desires, but on the congruence of its nature with
Christian love, and on the love of God, Aelred believed that friendship
should be desired, not for consideration of any worldly advantage or for any
extrinsic cause, but from the dignity of its own nature and the feelings of the
human heart, so that its fruiting and reward is nothing other than itself. Whence
the Lord in the Gospel says: 'I have appointed you that you should go, and
should bring forth fruit," that is, that you should love one another.'126
Where it is viewed as an extension of the exegesis of II Cor. 4:18, the understanding of amor
which emerges from Petrarch's gloss on the Tusculan Disputations appears to reflect
Christian reinterpretations of classical notions of friendship. Like Augustine, St. Paul and
Aelred of Rievaulx, Ratio rejects the view that man should love those things which are
perceptible to the senses and, in a manner which recalls the early Augustinianism of the
Secretum, endorses the love of the eternal which may be arrived at through self-knowledge.
In the face of Gaudium's objections, however, Ratio is obliged to demonstrate more clearly
the fallacy of loving the temporal. Cicero's treatment of lust at Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 70-xxxiv, 72
provided a convenient framework for this discussion. Adapting Cicero's words to a Christian
purpose, Ratio illustrates that the 'love' found in the works of classical poets and
philosophers is a worldly love, and asserts that God is the only proper object of amor. A man
who loves God also loves virtue, his neighbour, his family, his friends and even enemies out
124 Cicero had argued that friendship excels propinquitas. q.v. Cicero, De amicitia, V, 19.
12:1
Augustine, De vera religione, xlvi, 86.
126 Aelred of Rievaulx, Spiritual Friendship, trans. M. E. Laker, (Kalamazoo, 1977), I, 45-46, quoted
in Hyatte, The Arts ofFriendship, 63.
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of obedience.127 As in Augustine's De vera religione and Aelred's De spirituali amicitia,
Petrarch contends that friendship - that spiritual friendship which involves loving another as
a result of a love of God - cannot involve a love of the temporal and is intimately bound up
with self-knowledge. The love of God and the love of Christ which spring from a true
understanding of self are the true foundation of all friendship. In a letter written to Francesco
Nelli on 13th January 1352, the point of reference in friendship is always God, 'who made us,
who made friends, who made even the name of friendship itself, and this stands in contrast
to the subjectivism which underpins a Ciceronian concept of amiticia. 128 Elaborating on the
same theme in a letter written to Francsco il Vecchio da Carrara, Petrarch agrees with
Pythagoras' opinion - reported in the De ojficiis - that a man should act towards friends so
that it seems 'several persons are gathered in one',129 and follows 'pagan philosophers' in
affirming that there can be no friendship without wisdom and virtue.'30 This, however, is
located firmly within the context of Christian thought and Petrarch uses a quotation from the
Acts of the Apostles which occurs frequently in late medieval discussions of friendship to
develop his point.131 'Likewise,' Petrarch wrote, pointing to what he perceived to be the
compatibility between his text and Pythagoras' view,
the conditions of true friendship are expressed in Holy Scripture, where ... it is
written 'The company of those who believed and who loved one another in
Christ was of one head and one soul, and no-one of them whatever he
possessed, claimed it for his own use, and all their property was held in
common.' [Acts 4:32] If someone were to define friendship as being faithful
lovers in Christ, I certainly would not contradict him, because I do not believe
there can be friendship, or any firm and stable relationship for that matter,
except that Christ be the foundation.132
127 c.f. Trinkaus' rather surprising contradiction of this point. Trinkaus, The Poet as Philosopher, 75.
128 Fain. XII, 4, 2: 'Si enim amicum vel audire vel cernere usqueadeo delectat, quid futurum rear ubi
Ilium videbimus qui et nos et amicos et ipsum amicitie nomen fecit? si se ipsum quisque sique alios
tarn obnixe amat, si pretereuntibus tarn iocunde utitur, qualiter Is amandus fruendumque Illo erit qui
cuique nostrum et quod amet et quo amet, quo fruatur Se, qua fruatur animam dedit? sed ineffabilis
atque immensa res est et solo difficilis cogitatu.'
129 Sen. XIV, 1, 30: 'Hec fere omnium summa est: nil humanis in rebus amicitia dulcius, nil sanctius
post virtutem, eosque qui maxime potentia ac virtute prepolleant, maxime etiarn anticis indigere, cum
quibus et prospera et adversa participent: ab amico turpe nichil expetendum, pro amico nichil turpe
faciendum, honestum amico nichil denegandum: his pro fundamento positis, debere amicorum omnia
esse communia, unum animum, unam voluntatem, nec spe ulla nec metu nec periculo distrahendam:
amandum amicum ut se alterum et omnem conditionis imparitatem exequandam: denique omnibus
modis id agendum quod Pithagoras iubet; ut unus fiat ex pluribus.' referring to Cicero, De officiis, I,
xvii, 56.
130 Sen. XIV, 1, 30; see note 63, above.
131
Hyatte, The Arts of Friendship, 59; also idem, 45, 59-60, 64; c.f. McGuire, Friendship and
Community. Note that Aelred attached particular importance to this passage as the ideal of the
monastic community, q.v. Aelred of Rievaulx, Spiritual Friendship, II, 21.
132 Sen. XIV, 1, 30: 'Que ipsa numquid non satis Uteris sacris expressa sunt, ubi inter Actus
apostolicos scriptum est: "Multitudinis credentium et in Cristo sese amantium erat cor unum et anima
una, nec quisquam eorum, que possidebat, aliquid suum esse dicebat, sed erant illis omnia
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Petrarch's subsequent protestation that he nevertheless agrees with 'pagan philosophers' is
reduced merely to the status of a literary pretension: the quotation from Acts indicates that he
cannot have seen virtue and wisdom as anything other than as functions of a love of Christ.
Although pagan philosophers had no access to the truth of Christ, the flexibility of their
terminology, and the imprecision of the statement attributed to Pythagoras allowed Petrarch
to present them as complementing a Christian conception of friendship.
Although Petrarch's understanding of the relationship between amor and amicitia
places him in close relation to Augustine and Aelred of Rievaulx, and sets him at a distance
from classical notions of friendship, that is not to say that he used the works of Cicero and
Seneca insincerely, or rejected their contributions to the concept entirely. Rather, he seems to
have seen classical and Christian ideas of amicitia as essentially complementary, and -
adopting a rather teleological approach - appears to have viewed Cicero and Seneca as
having to some degree anticipated the role of friendship in Christian moral theology.
Exploiting the degree to which classical texts served as the point of departure for later
thought, Petrarch was able to mine Cicero's treatises and Seneca's letters for gnomic
quotations and allusions, confident that in a Christian conceptual context, they would prove
complementary and consistent. Ciceronian and Senecan propositions, which had already
been adapted by theologians in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, could readily be
assimilated into Petrarch's notion of amicitia without compromising his Christian
reinterpretation of amor or his underlying attachment to a notion of virtue derived from the
early works of St. Augustine.
A sense of this teleological method of reading can be gauged from the fact that a
notion which appears to be unmistakably Ciceronian or Senecan in one letter is frequently
couched in terms of Christian amor and early-Augustinian notions of virtue in another letter
from a proximate period. An excellent example of this is provided by Petrarch's responses to
the death of friends. Although, as we have seen, Petrarch's assertion that friendship cannot
be dissolved by death appears to reproduce the sentiments of the De amicitia, the similarities
seem to be primarily linguistic and reflect Petrarch's willingness to read terms such as virtus,
amicitia and immortals as if they were imbued with a Christian meaning, irrespective of their
original context. While Petrarch believed friendship to be immortal because it is a bond
founded on virtue, the nature of that bond, and the meaning of both virtue and immortality
communia"? Et, siquis dicet amicitiam illam fuisse credentium et in Cristo sese amantium, nec ego de
alia loquor, nec amicitiam stabilem nec omnino aliquid firmum reor cui non Cristus fuerit
fundamentum.' quoting Acts. 4:32; trans. B. G. Kohl, in Kohl and Witt, eds, The Earthy Republic, 67.
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reflect his reorientation of the term amor in the De remediis. In a letter written to Socrates on
23rd June 1359, Petrarch wrote
I know that you greatly desire to hold on to me, even though our minds are
joined by virtue, as Jerome put it. There is nothing which may separate those
who are joined by the glue of Christ; not place, not time, not forgetfulness, not
boredom, not hope, not fear, not envy, not anger, not hatred, not fortune, not
prison not chains, not wealth, not poverty, not sickness, not death, not the tomb
and the reduction of the body to ashes. For this reason true friendships are
immortal ...I33
The language here is congruent with that used both in letters examined earlier in this chapter
(e.g. Fam. II, 6, 7-9), and also in Cicero's works. Petrarch's point of reference, however, is
neither Cicero nor Seneca, but Jerome, and the role played by virtue in uniting friends is
described entirely by 'Cristi glutino\ True friendships are indeed immortal because they are
founded on virtue, but that virtue is described by the love of Christ.
In the same fashion, Petrarch's Christian-Augustinian reinterpretation of amor can
be seen lurking behind the apparently flagrant Ciceronianism of Fam. II, 1. Although
Petrarch seems to have Cicero, De amicitia, IV, 14 in mind when he upbraids Philippe de
Cabassoles for mourning for his recently deceased brother, and even quotes briefly from the
text,134 an identical use of the same passage in a letter written in late 1352 or early 1353
indicates that this passage was chosen purely for the sake of an appropriate quotation.
Attempting to console the Paduan clergy on the death of Bishop Hildebrand, Petrarch
carefully avoided offering advice to such men,
but it should nevertheless not be allowed that you should weep for the death of
such a man, lest - following the opinion of Cicero - it should be seen to be
more because of envy than because of friendship that [you] bewail [this] happy
man. For who except an envious man mourns the passing of a friend from the
flesh to the spirit, from earth to heaven, from labour to peace, from death to life,
from temporal afflictions to blessed eternity?135
As in Fam. II, 1, Petrarch's use of Cicero, De amicitia, IV, 14 is appropriate and seems
consistent with the sense of the original. On closer examination, however, Petrarch's
133
Fam. XXI, 9, 22: 'Scio te magno mei desiderio teneri; etsi enim animos virtute coniunctos utque ait
Ieronimus. Cristi glutino copulatos nichil sit quod separet, non locus non tempus non oblivio non
tedium non spes non metus non invidia non ira non odium non fortuna non career non vincula non
divitie non paupertas non egritudo non mors non sepulcrum et resolutum corpus in cineres, ideoque
vere amicitie immortales sint...' quoting Jerome, Ep. 53, 1.
134 Fam. II, 1, 28; see note 93, above.
135 Fam. XV, 14, 36; 'Non audeo quidem hortari, imo vero nec permittere ut talis viri exitum ploretis
ne iuxta sententiam Ciceronis, invidie potiusquam amicitie videatur complorare felicem. Quis enim
nisi invidus amicum lugeat de carne ad spiritum, de terris ad celum, de laboris ad quietem, de morte
ad vitam, de temporalibus erumnis ad eternam beatudinem transisse?' referring to Cicero, De amicitia,
IV, 14.
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consolation is markedly different from Cicero's understanding of why a man should not
grieve for the death of a friend. In the De amicitia, Cicero's Laelius defends the view that it
was a mark of envy to mourn a friend's death by referring to the Stoic belief that death
entails no pain and should be greeted calmly. Since no sensation remains, Laelius claims,
there will be no good in death, but nor will there be any evil. For this reason alone, an
amicus (who wishes only the good for another) should rejoice, rather than grieve, at the
death of a friend.136 The good which Petrarch's amicus wills for his friend, however, is very
different from the sense in which Cicero intended in De amicitia, IV, 14. In Petrarch's view,
the Paduan clergy should rejoice at Bishop Hildebrand's death not because - sensu amisso -
he shall be free from both good and evil, but because he shall be delivered from the
wretchedness of worldly existence into the blessed peace of heaven. The pairing of opposites
reveals familiar preoccupations. It is the early Augustinianism of the Secretum and the
tension exposed by Petrarch's exegesis of II Cor. 4:18, rather than the Stoicism of the De
amicitia and the Tusculan Disputations that is manifested in 'camelspiritum , 'terrislcelum',
'temporalibus erumnis/etemam beatudinem'. While Cicero's text rendered a gnomically
appropriate quotation, the friendship of the clergy of Padua for their departed Bishop should,
for Petrarch, be bound up with an idea of virtue founded on the opposition of the worldly and
the heavenly, and a conception of amor similarly based on the tension between the temporal
and the eternal.137
If Petrarch was willing to translate Ciceronian and Senecan notions of amicitia into a
distinctively Christian setting, however, that is not to say that the structure of his thought on
this subject was confined by the limits of classical thought. Petrarch's teleological reading of
works such as the De amicitia and the Epistolae morales was based on a certain sense of
intellectual detachment: although he certainly perceived there to be a thread of continuity
connecting ancient philosophy with modes of thought current in the fourteenth century, he
nevertheless used classical texts only insofar as they suited his purpose, rather than deriving
his purpose from the writings of his classical antecedents. While a significant portion of
136
Cicero, De amicitia, IV, 14; c.f. Cicero, Tusc. I, xlix, 1 17-119.
137 There is a sense in which this is reflected in Petrarch's adaptation of Ciceronian terminology in
both the De remediis utriusque fortune and the Familiares. At De remediis utriusque forunte, I, 69,
Petrarch amends Cicero, Tusc. IV, xxxiv, 72 to give '... si sit amor quisquam in rerum natura since
solicitudine turpique desiderio sine suspiro et ardenti cura ... ' where the interpolation of 'turpique'
and 'ardenti' appear to indicate that 'amor' was to be understood in a fashion more closely related to
the early-Augustinianism of the Secretum than to Cicero's original sense. See Appendix. A similar
adaptation of terminology is visible at Fam. XXI, 15, 26. This passage, it is true, has nothing which
conflicts with Cicero's conception of friendship, but it is nevertheless striking that Petrarch uses the
words 'sanctius', 'celestius' and 'deiformius' (a distinctively medieval term unknown to classical
Latin and not found in English or Irish sources before c.870; Revised Medieval Latin Word List,
prepared by R. E. Latham, (London, 1965), 136) to describe amicitia, all of which are redolent of a
Christian adaptation of classical thought.
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Petrarch's conception of friendship inhabits the linguistic (if not the semantic) space shared
by classical and Christian traditions, there are some respects in which it displays traits which
have no place within the thought of Cicero or Seneca and appear to have been inspired by
later Christian theology.
An excellent example is provided by Petrarch's examination of the bond of
friendship with regard to the individual's more general relationship with humanity. As we
have seen, for both Cicero and Seneca, friendship was an exclusive relationship. Although
all of human society was united by a certain bond, Cicero had argued that this bond was
strongest between individuals who were close to one another. 'How great the power of
friendship is,' he contended,
may most clearly be recognised from the fact that, in comparison with the
infinite ties uniting the human race and fashioned by Nature herself, this thing
called friendship has been so narrowed (et adducta in angustam), that the bonds
of affection always unite two persons only, or, at most, a few.138
Friendship was, in other words, made valuable by the fact that it could only be shared by a
small number of people. While Petrarch admitted that friendship was rare, however, he was
not convinced of this exclusivity and, as we have seen, was not prepared to regard the
majority of people as strangers to virtue. In a letter written some time after 1338, Petrarch
offered Giovanni Colonna consolation on the difficulties of life. Confessing that the letter he
had received from Giovanni had moved him to tears, Petrarch suggested that the tears which
we shed for the sufferings of others are more honest than those which we shed for our
own.139 'Juvenal says that this can be said not merely about such friendships [as ours],' he
continued,
but about all human society, where no evil is irrelevant to a good man, and
teaches that tears were given to the human kind as proof of our respect. Terence
had said this a long time before:
'I am a man and I consider nothing human alien to me.'
Indeed, I do not deny that this is true. In this obligation of loving, however,
there are without doubt degrees, by which we are reduced from the widest (so
to speak) open space of human kindness into the narrow one of kinships and
friendships, and the universal love of all people is narrowed down to love of
and benevolence towards the few.140
138
Cicero, De amicitia, V, 20: 'Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex
infmita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in
angustam, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.' trans. W. A. Falconer.
139 Fam. VI, 3, 2.
140 Fam. VI, 3, 3: Idque non modo in tanta amicitia, sed ne in comuni etiam societate hominum dici
posse Satyricus ait, ubi viro bono nullum alienum malum, et humano generi pietatis ad indicium datas
a natura lacrimas docet. Quod tanto ante Comicus dixerat:
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Having observed the infrequency with which Petrarch used the words 'cantos' and
'benevolentia', this language of this passage is striking. Combined with the unusual phrase
'in angustam', Petrarch's 'caritate...ac benevolentia' seems deliberately to echo Cicero, De
amicitia, V-VI, 20. The sense, however, is the absolute opposite of Cicero's original and the
repetition of vocabulary seems designed to emphasise the difference between the two texts.
Rather than friendship benefiting from being a condensed version of the social bond, as
Cicero suggested, love - from which friendship derives its name - is limited when it is
restricted in this fashion. The concept of 'universalis amor' which implicitly underwrites this
passage appears to have as its source the second commandment, and a point of comparison
can be found in a letter written by St. Augustine to Proba in 412, known to Petrarch by the
name 'De orando Dei' and included on the list of his favourite books.141 In this letter,
Augustine repeated his belief that the love of God precludes the possibility of distinguishing
friends and neighbours. As a result, Proba could not restrict friendship to the few, but should
open amicitia to the whole of humanity. Amicitia 'embraces all to whom love and kindly
affection (amor et dilectio) are due,' Augustine wrote,
although the heart goes out to some of these more freely, to others more
cautiously; yes, it even extends to enemies, for whom we are commended to
pray. There is accordingly no-one in the whole human family to whom kindly
affection is not due by reason of the bond of a common humanity (communis
naturae societate), although it may not be due on ground of a reciprocal love.142
Augustine, like Petrarch, looked to Cicero for inspiration, but similarly diverged from his
source when it came to amicitia and human society. This is no mere coincidence. Their
shared willingness to project friendship outwards is a reflection of a common determination
to base amicitia on a form of Christian love which had its purest human expression in the
love for one's neighbour, rather than on a more antiquated, classical form of amor which was
intrinsically personal, subjective and exclusive.
While Lafleur is therefore not unjustified in drawing attention to aspects which
appear redolent of Cicero or Seneca, it does not seem possible to contend that Petrarch's
understanding of amicitia was necessarily either Ciceronian or Senecan in substance. It is,
moreover, equally difficult to sustain the contention that Petrarch's exploration of friendship
"Homo sum, humani a me nichil alienum puto."
Enimvero licet id verum esse non negem, tamen hauddubie, in hoc publico diligendi debito, gradus
sunt, quibus ex amplissima, ut ita dixerim, humanitatis area, cognationis amicitieque redigimur in
angustam, et universalis amor omnium singulari quadam caritate paucorum ac benivolentia
coarctatur.' referring to Juvenal, Sat. XV, 140-2, 130-1; quoting Terence, Heaut. 77; referring to
Cicero, De amicitia, V-VI, 20.
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Ullman, Studies in the Italian Renaissance, 117-137.
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Augustine, Ep. 130, vi, 13, quoted in Carmichael, Friendship, 60-1.
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was either aphoristic or lacking in coherence, or unrelated to the broader concerns of moral
philosophy. Although an emphasis on the specifically Ciceronian and Senecan features of
Petrarch's argument may give the appearance of the piecemeal construction of an incomplete
set of borrowed axioms, a recognition of the interpenetration of Christian amor and the
language of classical amicitia allows an appreciation of a more coherent and unified
approach to friendship which forms an active component of the wider moral concerns which
exercised Petrarch in the Secretum, the De otio religioso and the De vita solitaria.
4. Friendship and solitude: from the general to the particular
Although it does not occur as frequently as Zeitlin appears to suggest in the introduction to
his translation, friendship is very much a part of the De vita solitaria. The work itself was
inspired by a friend's visit to Vaucluse143 and it was conceived not merely as a tithe offered
to a local prelate, but also as a literary gift given as a token of friendship.144 As several
scholars have pointed out, solitude was never intended to involve complete social isolation,
and was from the first presented as being bound up with the presence of a small number of
good friends.145
At Z I, ix, 4, Petrarch outlined the relationship between friendship and his
understanding of the practice of solitude. Having upbraided Seneca for an apparent
inconsistency,146 he claims that he has never advised those people for whom solitude would
be advantageous to shun friendship. 'I say,' he writes, 'that crowds - not friends - should be
fled.' 7 In fact, provided the solitarius is not disturbed by large numbers, and is visited by
those who bring comfort and help to his otium, Petrarch would certainly not deny him
friends.148 True isolation could, after all, have a numbing effect on even the greatest
pleasures. Pointing to the De amicitia, he approves of Archytas of Tarentum's belief that no
man could be happy on earth, regardless of his affluence, or in heaven, with all the beauty of
the stars laid out before him, unless he had someone with whom to share such things.149
Without a friend, the isolation of literal solitude could be unendurable and it is this fact
which emphasises how much the solitarius should value friendship:
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De vita solitaria, 'Ad Philippum Cavallicensem Epyscopum'; Prose, 290-92.
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De vita solitaria, 'Ad Philippum Cavallicensem Epyscopum'; Prose, 290.
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e.g. Zeitlin, 'Introduction', 55; Bosco, Petrarca, 110; Constable, 'Petrarch and Monasticism', 64.
146 De vita solitaria, Z I, ix, 3; P I, vii; Prose, 370-72.
147 De vita solitaria, Z I, ix, 4; P I, vii: '... turbas non amicos fugiendos dico.' Prose, 372.
148 De vita solitaria, Z I, ix, 4; P I, vii; Prose, 372.
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De vita solitaria, Z I, ix, 4; P I, vii; Prose, 374, referring to Cicero, De amicitia, XXIII, 88.
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Since solitude - though adorned with such great goods - would seem
intolerable even to headstrong minds and to those who despise human
intercourse if it were without a confidant, how ought it appear to the mild and
those endowed with humanity? If a single person's conversation is believed to
bring such comfort to those ignorant of friendship, what will be brought to the
cultivators of true friendships by the conversation of a loyal friend, in whom
they may see themselves, from whom they may hear the truth, and with whom,
as the same Cicero says, they may talk as if with themselves...150
Although the mob, the wicked, the idle and the ignorant should always be avoided,151 there
was no doubt that a friend would enrich solitude rather than disturb it.1"'2
Having observed the Christian notion of amor which informed Petrarch's conception
of amicitia, the description of friendship at Z I, ix, 4 appears somewhat puzzling. In common
with many of the other works which we have examined, the passage bristles with references
to Cicero and Seneca. In contrast with other works, however, the manner in which these
classical references are manipulated seems to correspond more precisely with the sense of
the texts from which they were drawn than with the implications of a Christian
understanding of amor. As in the De amicitia, the friendship described at Z I, ix, 4 is
unashamedly exclusive. Framed in apparently subjective terms, friendship is presented as
something which should exist between a solitarius and only a few select companions. Far
from being warmly embraced, the majority of humankind are either silently excluded or
explicitly spurned. The wicked, the idle and the ignorant are not the sort of people with
whom a solitarius should share his solitude. It is difficult to think of something further from
the spirit of the second commandment and more firmly removed from the sense of De
remediis, I, 69.
Although Z I, ix, 4 seems to cause difficulties for our understanding of both solitude
and friendship in Petrarch's thought, the problems are much less troubling than they first
appear. By seemingly clinging to a superficially Ciceronian idea of a bond between only a
small number of friends153 to the exclusion of the wicked, idle and ignorant, Petrarch is
neither contradicting his Christian conception of amor, nor propounding a more faithful
interpretation of classical notions of friendship, but reflecting a caesura in Patristic thought
and medieval monastic theology. While, as we have seen, the Church Fathers and later
monastics placed a strong emphasis on the universality of amor, there was nevertheless a
150 De vita solitaria, Z I, ix, 4; P I, vii: 'Cum igitur tantis bonis ornata solitudo, si participc careat,
intolerabilis etiam ferocibus animis humanumque perosis commercium videatur, quid mitibus et
humanitate preditis videri debet? Quod si amicitie ignaris collocutor unus tantum solatii afferre
creditur, quid veris amicitie cultoribus fidelis amici conversatio allatura sit, in quo se se videant, ex
quo verum audiant, cum quo, ut Cicero idem ait, sic omnia loqui audeant ut secum...' Prose, 376.
151
De vita solitaria, Z I, ix, 4; P I, vii; Prose, 376.
152 ibid.
153 c.f. Cicero, De amicitia, V, 20.
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strong tendency towards the particular. The influence of Stoic and Ciceronian thought is
strongly felt, but it is overlaid with a sense of spiritual closeness which derives its meaning
from the soul's pursuit of Christian virtue. In his Rule, for example, St. Augustine absorbed
classical notions of perfect friendship, but located them within the context of early monastic
asceticism without in any way impinging on the Christian's obligation to love all humanity
for love of Christ.154 Although, as McGuire has observed, there is little evidence surviving
from the early medieval period, the works of Anselm of Bee signal a return to the line of
classically-inspired thought which Augustine had pioneered. Following Augustine, Anselm
began to explore the bond which could be formed between two (or at most a few) individuals
when each looked for virtue deep within his own soul.155 This recurred frequently in late
medieval monastic thought. For Aelred of Rievaulx, for example, seeking inspiration from
Aristotelian and Ciceronian ideas of amicitia perfecta,156 amicitia spiritualis had to be
viewed as an expression of a yearning for God, but could only be understood in contrast to
the more general forms of love which were incumbent upon the believer. A spiritual
friendship could not, for Aelred, apply to the entire of humanity, or even to the whole of a
monastic community. Rather, it was a form of friendship which
is clearly an exceptional instance reserved for very few monastics, the most
virtuous, disciplined and privileged. ... spiritual friends must have a place
where they can withdraw from their brothers in order to exchange
confidences.157
Given the relative paucity of the evidence in the De vita solitaria, it would be incautious to
draw conclusions too quickly. In light of the strong Patristic and monastic tradition of close
friendship between a restricted number of companions, however, it would be similarly
incautious to regard the apparent approbation of Stoic and Ciceronian thought in Z I, ix, 4
necessarily as a reflection of inconsistency. Petrarch's comments on amicitia in this passage
must be read in context - that is to say, through the lens of solitude.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, solitude - like otium - was primarily an
interior condition, a solitudo animi. Although it could manifest itself physically, in the desire
to seek out lonely places in the countryside (solitudo loci), for example, it consisted in the
expurgation of worldly desires and the orientation of the self towards the divine through the
154 G. Lawless, 'Augustine's Decentring of Asceticism,' in Dodaro and Lawless, eds., Augustine and
his Critics, 142-63, here 150. See also G. Lawless, Augustine of Hippo and His Monastic Rule,
(Oxford, 1987); R. A. Markus, 'Vie monastique et ascetisme chez Augustin,' in Congresso
internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario delta conversione, Roma, 15-20 settembre 1986,
(Rome, 1987), 1:119-25.
155
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use of reason. Despite numerous allusions to classical notions of the vita contemplativa, the
concept of solitude which emerges from the De vita solitaria is intrinsically Christian, and
Petrarch's reasoning in the text not only mirrors that in the De otio religioso, but also reflects
the early-Augustinian ethic found in the Secretum. As a result, it seems somewhat
unreasonable to suppose that Petrarch's reference to 'the conversation of a loyal friend' at Z
I, ix, 4 should be read as an unequivocal statement of an underlying Ciceronianism or
Stoicism. Given his willingness to exploit a certain overlap between the writings of St.
Augustine and classical texts, the combination of the rational expurgation of worldly desires
and the urge for the company of a restricted number of friends seems to fit well with late
medieval, classical and Patristic ideas of spiritual friendship.
The objection that there is no detailed explanation of the relationship between the
generality of the love of one's neighbour and the particularly of the love of a few select
friends should not be cause for disquiet. On the one hand, it is important to observe that a
detailed discussion of the love of one's neighbour would not have been germane to the
function of the De vita solitaria, while on the other hand, it is worth reflecting on the
sometimes ambiguous relationship between general and particular loves in medieval and
Patristic texts. Indeed, Petrarch's apparent willingness to explore both the amor
propinquitatis and the amor paucorum as separate forms of the same love in different texts
might readily be thought of as a deliberate dalliance with the parallelism of the same themes
within the Christian tradition of friendship.
Although passages referring explicitly to friendship are relatively rare in the De vita
solitaria, it is possible to adduce further evidence which illustrates the compatibility of Z I,
ix, 4 with sentiments expressed in his other works. Petrarch's willingess to adapt the terms of
classical friendship to a distinctly Christian context is demonstrated especially well at Z I, iv,
8. In this passage, Petrarch discreetly took issue with both Cicero and Seneca. He agreed
with the ancient philosophers that it was quite sensible to set a friend whose virtue you
admire to guard over you, and to act always as if there were a friend present to witness your
deeds.158 In contrast to Cicero and Seneca, who couched their advice in terms of the
imagined presence of a friend, however, Petrarch argued that 'it is not necessary for us',
presumably referring to Philippe de Cabassoles and himself.159 Christ is always present with
a Christian and hence is a 'true witness not only of our deeds, but also of all our thoughts.'160
158 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 8; P I, v; Prose, 348-50, referring to Cicero, Ep. ad Quintum, I, i, 46;
Seneca, Ep. xxv, 5-6; Ep. xi, 10.
159 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 8; P I, v: 'Et hoc quidem de imaginario teste vite philosophicum
consilium, inter suos non inutile nobis non necessarium.' Prose, 350.
160 De vita solitaria, Z I, iv, 8; P I, v: '... hunc in his literulis obtineat locum ut quod diximus
appareat, tali teste cristianum hominem non egere, cui non Epycurus aut Cicero, non Cato, non Scipio,
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Christ is, in a clearly classical fashion, the friend of the virtuous man, the friend of the
solitarius.
Despite the fact that comments specifically addressing friendship are uncommon in
the De vita solitaria, the place of amicitia in the tract is telling. The manner in which
intimate friendships with a select few is expressed and related to solitude, and the
appropriation of the Ciceronian-Senecan idea of the friend as witness and guide illustrate two
things.
First, both Z I, ix, 4 and Z, iv, 8 neatly encapsulate the heuristic attitude which
governed Petrarch's approach to amicitia and which we have observed supporting the De
remediis utriusque fortune and the letters. Although freely using a classical vocabulary of
friendship and alluding frequently to important Roman texts, these passages illustrate that
Petrarch was willing to read classical texts as pointing towards the Christian tradition of
thought on amicitia and to interpret them in the same teleological fashion as we observed in
our earlier analysis of the Secretum. While it is tempting to regard a quotation from Cicero's
De amicitia or Seneca's Epistolae, for example, as an instance of the assimilation of classical
notions of friendship, Petrarch's interpretative attitude was not governed by the historicist
assumptions underpinning such a line of thought. For him, a quotation, reference or word
derived its meaning from the perspective from which it was viewed. Cicero's De amicitia or
Seneca's Epistolae were texts which were mined for apposite quotations about friendship not
because the original intentional meaning of given passages was significant in itself, but
because passages could appear to convey a meaning appropriate to one writing from a later
Christian perspective, or because they pointed towards the full realisation of Christian
notions of friendship in the works of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Aelred of Rievaulx and
others.
Second, the place of intimate friendships within the context of solitude is in many
ways indicative of the unity of Petrarch's conception of the life of virtue. In previous
chapters, we have seen that the search for virtue is commensurate with the search for otium -
as an interior leisure from worldliness - and with the search for solitude - as a peacefulness
of mind. Petrarch's conception of friendship is similarly bound up with the notion of virtue.
Like otium and solitude, it is an expression of the orientation of the self towards God through
the application of reason. Similarly, the practice of true friendship is in some ways intrinsic
to the pursuit of virtue, in the same manner as otium and solitude. Where amicitia is
non Lelius imaginatione fingendus sed angelus bone vite custos comesque datus homini, quo
spectante, siquis est pudor, audere non debet quod coram homine non auderet. Et, quod summum ac
terribile dixerim, Cristus ipse locis omnibus atque temporibus est presens, non actuum sed et
cogitatuum omnium verus testis, quos etsi vere afforet testis epycurus, non videret.' Prose, 350.
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understood as a function of Christian amor, it is a necessary part of loving properly, and
hence an essential component of virtue itself. Just as in the case of otium and solitude,
however, the relationship between friendship and virtue involves individual effort and entails
subjective benefit. In the same way as the condition of otium requires leisure to be used for
'work' (such as the reading of saints' lives), the universal amicitia which is an expression of
a true amor Dei requires the cultivation of personal friendships. Despite the wise man's
obligation to love all humanity, it is a condition of his virtue that he attends closely to his




1. Rhetoric, Humanism, Renaissance
The Greek word pqxoptKt] is first recorded in Plato's Gorgias.1 At the beginning of the
dialogue, the sophist Gorgias argues that pr/TopiKrj should be understood as 'the work of
persuasion (KEidcbf ,2 Although in the course of its long history, pqropiKtj and its derivatives
have 'had changing associations with other subjects and disciplines that have significantly
affected the way [they themselves are] understood', Plato's identification of rhetoric with
persuasion remains at the heart of the concept.3 Adapting George Kennedy's distinction
between 'primary' and 'secondary' rhetoric, Ronald Witt has pointed out that rhetoric can be
applied in either an oratorical or a literary sense,4 but in either case the role of tzeiOcb is of
central importance. Intrinsically bound up with the need to persuade the listener or reader,
'rhetoric relates to invention, arrangement and especially to style - in other words to the
particular selection of words and their order'.5 While Plato used it to mean 'persuasion', it is
telling that TtsiOcb can also be used to describe a form of winning eloquence. The 'work of
persuasion' is, in other words, part of the art of speaking or writing well.
Since the publication of Paul Oskar Kristeller's article 'Humanism and
Scholasticism in the Renaissance', rhetoric has been seen as one of the most important
1 am indebted to Prof. Sir Brian Vickers for his kind guidance and would like to express my most
heartfelt thanks for his generosity and encouragement with respect to this chapter.
' G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern
Times, 2nd ed., (Chapel Hill and London, 1999), 1; G. A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical
Rhetoric, (Princeton, 1994), 12-13.
2
Plato, Gorgias, 453a2.
3 P. O. Kristeller, 'Rhetoric in Medieval and Renaissance Culture,' in J. J. Murphy, ed., Renaissance
Eloquence. Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and
London, 1983), 1-20, here 1.
4
Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 2-4; R. G. Witt, In the Footsteps of the Ancients. The Origins of
Humanism from Lovato to Bruni (Leiden, 2003), 8-9. For a critique of 'primary' and 'secondary'
rhetoric see also M. C. Wood, 'The Teaching of Writing in Medieval Europe,' in J. J. Murphy, ed., A





distinguishing characteristics of Renaissance humanism.6 Although in later years he was
careful to emphasise that humanism was far from 'reducible to rhetoric alone',7 Kristeller
nevertheless argued that '[t]he humanistic movement did not originate in the field of
philosophical or scientific studies, but ...arose in that of grammatical and rhetorical studies.'8
Although it is not possible to contend that humanists were ipso facto professional
rhetoricians,9 eloquence was the medium for - and sometimes inspiration of - the humanistic
interest in classical philology and philosophy.10 For Hanna Gray, '[t]he bond which united
humanists, no matter how far separated in outlook or in time, was a conception of eloquence
and its uses.'11
This conception of eloquence was not such that would allow humanistic writing to
be characterised pejoratively as 'merely rhetorical'. Mirroring the close relationship between
chairs of moral philosophy and rhetoric or poetry at Italian universities from the fifteenth
century onwards, the vera eloquentia was identified closely with ethical concerns and
contrasted with 'sophistry'.12 As Gray has observed, 'True eloquence, according to the
humanists, could arise only out of a harmonious union between wisdom and style; its aim
was to guide men toward virtue and worthwhile goals, not to mislead them for vicious or
trivial purposes.'13 The idea that 'true' eloquence should urge the listener or reader to adhere
6 P. O. Kristeller, 'Humanism and Scholasticism in the Renaissance,' Byzantion 17 (1944-45): 346-74,
reprinted in P. O. Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Rome, 1956), 553-83 and
idem, Renaissance Thought. The Classic, Scholastic and Humanist Strains (New York, 1961), 92-119.
All page subsequent references to this article will relate to Renaissance Thought. For an interesting
examination of the conceptions of the Renaissance offered by Kristeller and Eugenio Garin, see C.
Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians and LatinLegacy (Baltimore, 2004).
7
Kristeller, 'Rhetoric in Medieval and Renaissance Culture', 2.
8 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 100.
9
Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 102. See also the vigorous debate between Hans Baron and Jerrold
Seigel on this subject. J. Seigel, "Civic Humanism' or Ciceronian Rhetoric? The Culture of Petrarch
and Bruni,' Past and Present 34 (1966): 1-48; H. Baron, 'Leonardo Bruni: 'Professional Rhetorician'
or 'Civic Humanist'' Past and Present 36 (1967):21 -37.
10 The bibliography which has grown up around this point is too vast even for a pretence at
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to the good was the basis for the humanistic critique of scholasticism. While scholasticism
and humanism developed in parallel in Italy and did not clash over substantial philosophical
issues, humanists from the early fourteenth century were accustomed to attack the schoolmen
for the ugliness of their style and for their failure to concentrate sufficiently on the
inculcation of wisdom.14
Although the eloquence of the humanists retained many links with the rhetoric of the
medieval artes dictaminis, especially as a result of French influences, it is generally held that
this association between wisdom and eloquence - or between rhetoric and philosophy, as it is
sometimes expressed - was inherited primarily from classical treatises on the subject.15 As
John Ward has pointed out, the 'sustaining didactic curriculum behind this pursuit of
eloquence was classical rhetorical theory,' and - although Greek rhetoric was later to play an
increasingly important role - the primary texts remained Cicero's De inventione, Orator, De
oratore, Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria and the pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad
Herennium.16
In keeping with general interpretations of Renaissance rhetoric, Petrarch adopted a
broad and inclusive approach when writing about eloquence, and appears to have been
unwilling to distinguish between literary forms. Throughout his life, he used 'eloquentia'
and its cognates to refer to all species of literary composition and reflections of this semantic
flexibility can be glimpsed in telling incidental comments. In the De remediis utriusque
fortune, for example, Petrarch refers to the 'utriusque eloquii principes' ,17 whom he
identifies as Cicero and Virgil in the De vita solitaria and in a letter to the grammarian
14
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Zanobi da Strada.18 Prose and poetry could equally well be accommodated by 'eloquentia'.
But just as 'eloquentia' denotes a multiplicity of literary forms, 'poesis' - which 'shades off
into grammar as a result of its intimate relationship with grammar19 - was also used as a
synonym for 'eloquentia' in many of Petrarch's works, especially in the 1340s and 1350s.20
The flexibility of Petrarch's rhetorical lexicon is mirrored by what he seems to have
regarded as certain points of commonality between different fields of endeavour. Apparently
more interested in the uses of eloquence than in its technical dimensions, he was exercised
particularly by a perceived relationship between poetry and moral philosophy. In the
Posteritati, for example, he claimed that he had always had a particular aptitude for moral
philosophy and poetry, and, even though he admitted that he had abandoned the latter for the
former in later years, the two seem implicitly yoked together.21 Numerous works were
devoted to exploring this relationship and the problem of how - or if - the two might be
combined recurred throughout his life. In addition to the Invective contra medicum and the
De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia - in which his position as a poet was defended against
the claims of contemporary Aristotelians - Petrarch addressed the theme constructively in
numerous letters, in the De remediis utriusque fortune, and perhaps most strikingly in the
Coronation Oration and the Africa.
Petrarch occupies an important place in the historiography of Renaissance rhetoric
and is especially significant for interpretations of the development of the relationship
between eloquence and wisdom. Although, concentrating particularly on technical aspects of
the discipline, Witt has attempted to present him as part of a broader rhetorical trend,
contributors to which included Lovato dei Lovati and Albertino Mussato, Petrarch is
generally held to have played an important role in elaborating a set of intellectual tools for
navigating the waters between moral philosophy and rhetoric.22 Kennedy evokes general
historical opinion in attributing to Petrarch a pivotal role, contending that he 'envisioned a
synthesis of wisdom and eloquence in both civil and academic context, and this view was
taken up by some of his successors, including Coluccio Salutati and Lorenzo Valla.'23
18 De vita solitaria Z I, v, 2; P I, vii; Prose, 366-8; Fain. XII, 3, 18.
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(Cambridge, 1988), 715-45, here 715-24.
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Interpretations of Petrarch's rhetorical theory vary widely and any attempt to
synthesise them fully would perhaps be in vain, but although disagreement over detail
abounds, there is nevertheless broad consensus for the view that his thought on the
relationship was characterised by certain features. Despite implying a connection in the
Posteritati, Petrarch is seen to have perceived a tension between the persuasive function of
rhetoric and the demands or methods of moral philosophy. In attempting to resolve this
tension, he came to qualify his admiration for true philosophy by arguing that there were
circumstances in which eloquence was superior to, or even supplanted moral philosophy as a
source of truth. In formulating this resolution, it is held that Petrarch drew on a multiplicity
of sources, but - while his thought could nevertheless not be described as a simple copy of
Cicero's rhetorical theory - his understanding of the relationship between eloquence and
moral philosophy was based primarily on a Ciceronian model.
Although Petrarch was drawn to the idea of a simple and harmonious union, he was,
for Jerrold Seigel, deeply troubled by the possibility that the literary practices proper to
eloquence would lead him into self-contradiction.24 While he prized consistency highly,
Petrarch knew that 'a basic rhetorical principle directed the orator to fit his speech not only
to his subject, but also to his audience and circumstances. As these changed, so must the
orator's message.'25 Consequently, although Petrarch accepted that 'the ideal of wisdom was
more exalted than the ideal of eloquence ... he sometimes described true philosophy in a
way which suggested that it was dependent on genuine eloquence.'26 While the Stoic ideal of
virtue 'met with the highest standards of truth and consistency,' its rigorous strictures
sometimes proved so demanding that they could only be followed by transcending human
nature.27 The more flexible teachings of the Peripatetics - which were 'most relevant to the
lives of ordinary men' - were thus attractive where the unbending message of Stoic
philosophy might have been inappropriate.28 Drawing heavily on Cicero's works, Seigel
argues that Petrarch adopted both perspectives, giving priority to one or the other as
circumstances required. He was, then, able to speak 'as a philosopher on behalf of the Stoics
with as much force as he employed in speaking as an orator on behalf of the Peripatetics.'29
In The Poet as Philosopher, Charles Trinkaus implicitly accepts that the task of
eloquence was moral suasion, but conflates Petrarch's understanding of 'philosophy' with
dialectical reasoning in suggesting that he saw poetry as offering rival and superior access to
24







moral truths. Concentrating heavily on two of the invectives, Trinkaus contends that Petrarch
'proposed that poetic theology and rhetoric, rather than philosophy were the intellectual
instruments and disciplines best fitted for the pursuit of the Christian goal of salvation and
the cure of souls.'30 In part, this rests on the view that the practice of poetry was, like the
practice of philosophy, in some way associated with moral discovery. Responding to the
insults of the papal physician in the Invective contra medicum, Petrarch countered the claim
that poetry should be subordinate to medicine by substituting eloquence 'as the true medium
for philosophy and theology rather than the syllogistic demonstrations of dialectic used by
the scholastics.'31 Contrary to the doctor's assertions, rhetoric is of no value to one who
should cure the body, but is of great value to one who would cure souls. Although it was of
sometimes variable quality, poetry was the source of philosophical and theological truths,32
and it has been suggested elsewhere that Petrarch - like Boccaccio - seems to have believed
that 'the gift of poetry is divinely bestowed', while poets by their nature 'seek truth and
especially truth about God.'33 In part, however, it was poetry's persuasive role that allowed it
to supplant moral philosophy. In the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, Trinkaus argues
that since the function of rhetoric is to urge men to the good, and the will is the determinant
of virtue or vice, Petrarch believed that rhetoric must necessarily move the will. As in the
Invective contra medicum, this is expressed in opposition to a form of scholasticism.
'Aristotle's purpose coincides with Petrarch's,' Trinkaus suggests, 'but Aristotle does not
succeed in transforming the will ... Aristotle's is a rhetorical, not a philosophical failure.
One finds the needed force to activate the will instead in Cicero and Seneca and Horace.'34
While it is possible to gain greater learning from Aristotle, a man may derive a more intense
longing for the good from works which rely on the precepts of classical rhetoric, even where
those works were written by pagan authors. 5
It must be granted that the interpretations of which Seigel and Trinkaus offer the
fullest treatment are in many ways appealing, despite their differences. In each case, the
relationship between moral philosophy and eloquence described speaks to the question of
how to reconcile function and subject matter with the implications of oratorical style latent
30
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even in the treatment of ptjTopiKtj in Plato's Gorgias. When their methodology is considered
more closely, however, it does not seem unreasonable to treat these interpretations with some
caution.
Both Seigel and Trinkaus predicate their arguments on the contention that Petrarch
perceived a tension between eloquence and philosophy. Although in many ways instinctively
attractive, however, the identification of this tension appears in large degree to be a function
of the evidential approaches adopted. In Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism,
Seigel is initially prepared to countenance the possibility of eloquence and moral philosophy
having enjoyed a relatively close association, but comes to argue that, despite the
implications of the Posteritati, Petrarch was tortured by the possibility that the 'consistency'
of the philosophical positions which he aspired to manifest was compromised by the
potential for 'inconsistency' latent within eloquence itself. This idea, and its importance to
Petrarch's thought is first justified in relation to a confusion of stylistic imitation and the
emulation of virtuous figures, and to the suggestion that the single word 'consonas' in a
letter to Tomasso da Messina infers a preoccupation with logical consistency. Developing
the argument further, however, Seigel uses a reading of Petrarch's 'inner struggles' in the
Secretum as additional evidence for a tension between eloquence and moral philosophy.
Observing that Franciscus was tormented by the difficulty of reconciling his appetite for
glory with his desire for virtue, and associating much of Augustinus' recommendation of
virtue with Stoicism, Seigel infers that Petrarch saw a tension between his aspiration to
eloquence and his moral sentiments. Pursuing this method, the resolution of the perceived
tension - based on a pragmatic equivocation between different approaches - is then derived
from the supposed moral content of different works. Although, as some reviewers observed,
Seigel attaches a sometimes vague meaning to the word 'philosophy',36 it is striking that in
proposing the idea of a tension, he relies not on a searching analysis of Petrarch's actual
statements of the relationship between eloquence and moral philosophy, but on a
questionable reading of incidental remarks and a blurring of the distinction between moral
sentiments and rhetorical theory derived from a problematic understanding of key texts. The
confusion of apparently 'Stoical' and 'Peripatetic' maxims (attributions which are
themselves, as we have already seen, debateable) with the rhetorical strategies adopted by
those schools seems not only to erode the wider validity of Seigel's conclusion, but also calls
into question his evaluation of the nature of the tension between moral philosophy and
eloquence.
36 H. H. Gray, Review of Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism: The Union of
Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla by Jerrold Seigel, American Historical Review 75/4 (Apr.
1970): 1096-1098, here 1097.
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The idea of 'tension' is expressed in a rather different form by Charles Trinkaus, but
the questions which may be raised about his method of justification are nonetheless
troubling. In The Poet as Philosopher, Trinkaus' analysis is based almost exclusively on the
evidence of the Invective contra medicum and the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, and,
while this is not in itself improper, the reluctance to place these texts in a broader context
and to treat key terms with more precision appears to have coloured the conclusions drawn.
Although Petrarch's rebuttal of Aristotelianism deserves close attention in relation to his
conception of poetry, it seems somewhat unconvincing not only to conflate 'philosophy'
with dialectical reasoning, but also to infer from this that poetry was intended to supplant
moral philosophy tout court in Petrarch's wider understanding of the nature of eloquence. By
the same token, Petrarch's somewhat elusive prose may present the reader with a number of
interpretational problems, but it is nevertheless striking that Trinkaus seems to not
distinguish clearly between poetic composition and the reading of poetry, and thus
confidence in the assertion that poetry per se was for Petrarch the 'source' of philosophical
and theological truths seems to be weakened. Perhaps of greatest importance to Trinkaus'
argument, however, is the assumption of an underlying voluntarism in the De sui ipsius et
multorum ignorantia. The emphasis on the will as the determinant of virtue provides the
basis for Trinkaus' understanding of Petrarch' 'rhetorical' objection to philosophy. In
previous chapters, however, we have seen that - far from embracing the Stoic doctrine of the
will - Petrarch adhered to the moral theology of the young St. Augustine. Although the De
sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia and even the Invective contra medicum contain passages
which appear to be redolent of the New Academy, it has been shown that they may be
viewed as consistent with an ethical system which presents the rational apprehension of the
vera felicitas as the prelude to the abandonment of worldly desires and the formation of a
lasting love of God. Recognising this, it is necessary to question not merely Trinkaus'
assertion that poetry should supplant moral philosophy, but also his contention that the two
were intrinsically in conflict.
The inference of Ciceronianism in Petrarch's rhetorical theory appears to be more
robust. The esteem in which Petrarch held Cicero cannot, of course, be denied and it would
be ill-judged to dismiss the care with which he studied and quoted from texts such as the De
oratore, the Orator and the De inventione. The fact, however, that questions may be raised
about the approaches followed by both Seigel and Trinkaus, however, necessarily casts some
doubt on the validity of describing the relationship between eloquence and moral philosophy
outlined in his works as 'Ciceronian'. This is not to say that Petrarch's appeals to Cicero's
authority and frequent references to his rhetorical treatises were insincere, but in the absence
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of the voluntarism so important to Trinkaus, and the eclecticism relied upon by Seigel, it
would be incautious to infer from them that there was any deeper conceptual affinity. As
with the apparently 'Stoical' passages in the Secretum, it is perhaps too easy to overlook
Petrarch's capacity to have alluded to Cicero's works with propriety from within the context
of a quite different rhetorical tradition.
Despite the immense strides which have been taken in the field in the last sixty
years, it does not seem unjust to suggest that when referring to Petrarch there is still
something of a tendency to write the history of rhetoric - in Richard McKeon's words - 'as
the monotonous enumeration of doctrine, or preferably sentences, repeated from Cicero, or
commentators on Cicero.'37 Commenting on Seigel's Rhetoric and Philosophy in
Renaissance Humanism, reviewers observed a tendency to ' [leap] from Cicero to Petrarch as
if nothing had intervened in all that time'38 and to dismiss 'the specifically Christian
component ... of "wisdom"'.39 This tendency has, however, proved remarkably durable and
little effort has been made to examine more closely Cicero's role in later rhetorical theory in
relation to Petrarch's understanding of the relationship between eloquence and philosophy.40
There is little doubt that Cicero exerted an immense influence on the shape of
rhetorical theory from late Antiquity to the fourteenth century.4' It would, however, be
mistaken to suppose either that his understanding of rhetoric was treated in the same manner
at all times by all people, or that his influence was not in some respects matched or surpassed
by that of other figures. Although Cicero remained an important point of reference for
virtually all rhetorical theorists throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the history of the
use of his thought in this area is neither simple nor strictly linear, with portions of his
conception of eloquence having different resonance depending on the tradition
(philosophical, theological, rhetorical, logical etc.) from within which a particular author was
37 R. McKeon, 'Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,' Speculum 17/1 (Jan. 1942): 1-32, here 1.
38 J. J. Murphy, Review of Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism: The Union of
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169.
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40
Witt, for example, repeats Seigel's opinion without question and Trinkaus expressly indicates that
'[t]he discussion will not try to relate the poetic and rhetorical Christian culture of the Renaissance to
its many medieval precedents, at least from Augustine's De doctrina Christiana to the prescholastic
culture of the twelfth century. It assumes what is obvious, that the originality of statement made in a
polemical context is not to be sought in the literalness of statement but in relation to the larger
context.': Witt, Footsteps, 243 n. 38; Trinkaus, The Poet as Philosopher, 90 n.3.
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writing and the immediate end to which his efforts were directed. While it is unnecessary in
this context to explore the precise details of the reception and uptake of Cicero's rhetorical
works, it is important to note the degree to which he remained a significant point of reference
despite the changing valency of his thought and the different purposes which his works were
made to serve.
Cicero's treatises affected a multiplicity of fields, ranging from logic to theology,
but for many later writers on rhetoric, his suggestion than the orator should have a grounding
in that branch of philosophy which was concerned with life and mores proved to be of
particular significance and served as the basis for the elaboration of the relationship between
eloquence and philosophy in a number of different directions. In each case, a palpable
connection with the Ciceronian source material was preserved, even where the author
deviated from its sense. In Antiquity itself, Quintilian is of particular relevance and, together
with Cicero, came to exert a dominant effect on the development of literary rhetoric in the
Middle Ages.42 Responding to Cicero's treatises in the Institutio oratoria, Quintilian
presented the association between rhetoric and philosophy as a function of the orator's moral
condition. Recognising that Cicero 'was not primarily concerned with the moral aspect', and
perhaps distressed by the misuse of rhetoric during Domitian's reign, Quintilian adapted
Cicero's rhetorical theory to his own age by arguing that the orator should be 'v/r bonus
dicendi peritus' 43 Despite the fragmentary transmission of the Institutio Oratoria in later
centuries until Poggio Bracciolini's rediscovery of the complete text in 1416,44 the notion of
the 'v/r bonus' enjoyed considerable popularity and found admirers in Cassiodorus,
Fortunatianus and Isidore of Seville, all of whom were also devotees (to one degree or
another) of Cicero.
Other avenues of elaboration were also possible. Although of rather less importance
to the later evolution of literary rhetoric, Boethius' De consolatione philosophiae, a work of
considerable importance in the medieval grammar curriculum45 and the focus of an extended
42
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controversy during the Renaissance,46 strengthened the connection between poetry and
philosophy while drawing on Cicero's De inventione and Topica, as well as Aristotle's
Topics and the works of Themistius. Although some poetry - whose Muses were derisively
describes as 'scenicas meretriculas' - offered only the goads and disappointments of worldly
passions and deserved to be dismissed accordingly, there was another form of poetry -
whose Muses belonged to Lady Philosophy - which could serve as the handmaiden of reason
and the mouthpiece of truth.47 Writing some two centuries earlier than Boethius, Lactantius -
who is often described as 'the Christian Cicero' and had a marked impact on the emergence
of Christian humanism from late fourteenth century48 - rejected the idea that philosophy
could lead to truth, but argued that in combining the 'force of divine truth with the power of
Academic eloquence', the Christian orator, 'having dispelled and refuted public errors
[could] introduce among the human race a brilliant light'.49 Unique amongst the Church
Fathers for preserving - and even strengthening - Cicero's scepticism, Lactantius contended
that the orator was obliged not merely to cling to the truth revealed in Scripture, but also to
cultivate a deep knowledge of those philosophical schools whose falsehoods he wished to
defeat. Able to argue from all perspectives, he would catch his enemies in the inconsistencies
and contradictions of their own arguments and could thus tease out the truth.
St. Augustine, however, is worthy of particular note. Having received a thorough
grounding in the subject as young man in North Africa, Augustine himself ultimately
became a professor of rhetoric in Milan after teaching in Thagaste, Carthage and Rome.50 On
the eve of his conversion, he was truly a vir eloquentissimus and in his training, Cicero was
unquestionably the dominant influence.51 As Joseph Mazzeo has observed, St. Augustine
always remained under the influence of Cicero and treated all of the basic problems of
46
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rhetoric in Ciceronian terms, although he freely adapted his source to Platonic and Christian
contexts.'52
In the De doctrina Christiana, Augustine explained how the teachings of the Bible
could be apprehended and communicated to others, and Cicero's influence - alongside that
of Scripture itself - is pervasive.55 Having examined how meaning is to be recovered from
'signs' in the first three books, Augustine turned in the fourth book to explain how that
which had been discovered could be taught to others. In explaining the rules and types of
rhetoric, Augustine adapted Cicero to Christian homiletics, but in emphasising the
importance of ethos - the moral life of the orator - in convincing listeners, introduced a new
element into the Ciceronian tradition which went far beyond the sense of Quintilian's vir
bonus and which was inspired by Christian Neo-Platonism.54
Petrarch knew of a number of the traditions which drew most assiduously - if
selectively - from Cicero's rhetorical treatises for inspiration. There is, indeed, much
evidence to suggest that he was conscious of the extent to which later writers appropriated
aspects of Cicero's thought for their own purpose, and approved the products of this
intellectual parasitism, especially those texts which - tellingly - emphasise the moral
condition of the orator and the rational pursuit of felicitas in approaching eloquence. In a
series of marginal comments in his incomplete copy of the Institutio oratoria (Paris BN Lat
7720), for example, it is evident that Petrarch paid close attention to Quintilian's relationship
to Cicero55 and in a fanciful letter written on 7th December 1350, his awareness of the nature
of this relationship is made plain. While Cicero's achievement was in no way to be
deprecated, Petrarch argued that it was Quintilian who should be seen as having led oratory
'ad supremam eloquii arcem', and viewed almost as a fulfilment of the ideal towards which
Cicero had pointed.56 As the survival of his manuscript copy of Cassiodorus' Liber
52 J. A. Mazzeo, 'St. Augustine's Rhetoric of Silence,' Journal of the History of Ideas 23/2 (April -
June 1962): 175-196, here 176.
53
R. P. H. Green, 'Introduction' to Augustine, On Christian Teaching, trans. R. P. H. Green, (Oxford,
1997), vii-xxiii, here vii-viii.
54
Marrou, Saint Augustin, 521-31.
55 For Petrarch's knowledge of Quintilian, see de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'humanisme, , 2:83-93. In
Paris BN Lat 7720, it is worth noting that Petrarch remarks on Quintilian's proximity to ('Laus ingens
et vera M. Tulii Ciceronis' f.88, Inst. Orat. X, i, 108) and divergence from Cicero ('Modeste
admodum a Cicerone dissentif f. 106v, Inst. Orat. XI, iii, 123), and urges himself to remember
various comments in which Quintilian seems to cite, praise or refer to Cicero directly (e.g. f. 88, Inst.
Orat. X, i, 211; f. 95v, Inst. Orat. X, vii, 28; f. 1 lOv, Inst. Orat. XII, i, 20). For a detailed discussion
of Petrarch's immediate reaction to Quintilian, see M. Accame Lanzilotta, 'Le postille del Petrarca a
Quintiliano (Cod. Parigino lat 7720),' Quaderni petrarcheschi, 5 (1988): 1 -201.
56 Fam. XXIV, 7, 4: 'Ille enim suum oratorem per ardua causarum ac sumos eloquentie vertices agit et
iudicialihus bellis ad victoriam format; tu longius repetens, oratorem tuum per omnes longe vie flexus
ac latebras ab ipsis incunabulis ad supremam eloquii arcem ducis; placet, delectat et mirari cogit; eo
namque aspirantibus nichil utilius. Ciceroniana claritas provectos illuminat et celsum validis iter
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saeculorum litterarum suggests, his understanding of late antique rhetoric was no less
developed.57 In the Invective contra medicum, Petrarch appealed to Boethius and Lactantius
as authorities for his identification of poetry with philosophy,58 and recognises that
Augustine benefited significantly from having studied Cicero's treatises on oratory during
his time as a teacher of rhetoric.59 Petrarch had, of course, read Augustine's De doctrina
Christiana, and both the De civitate Dei and the Enarrationes in psalmos are cited as
authorities in the discussion of obscurity in the Invective contra medicum.60 A tantalising
preliminary study of techniques employed in the Invective by Conrad Rawski even suggests
that Petrarch consciously mimicked the rhetorical strategy which Augustine set out in the De
doctrina Christiana.61 But his knowledge of post-Ciceronian rhetorical theory extended yet
further. As Giuseppe Billanovich has shown, he was acquainted with the Rhetores Latini
Minores - such as Fortunatianus and Victorinus - who combined the Ciceronian tradition
with Greek elements, and was no less well versed in other texts studied equally closely in the
Middle Ages.62 Although it is difficult to find direct evidence for his knowledge of specific
medieval texts, it is apparent that in addition to having mastered the techniques of classical
eloquence and acquired a knowledge of early Christian rhetorical theory, Petrarch was also
highly skilled in the cursus, which itself suggest a thorough grounding in the didactic works
common to the grammar curriculum in the fourteenth century.63
signat, lua sedulitas ipsos quoque fovet invalidos et optima nutrix ingeniorum, lacte humili teneram
pascit infantiam.' Note also Fain. I, 8, 13-15; XVIII, 14, 11; XXIV, 2, 10; Sen. XVI, 1, 2; De vita
solitaria, Z I, iv, 3; P I, iv; Prose, 336.
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q.v. de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'humanisme, 1:205.
58 Invective contra medicum, I, 33-4 (Boethius); I, 36 (Lactantius); III, 117 (Boethius). There are, of
course, numerous other allusions to Boethius - De consolatione philosophiae and De Trinitate - in
Petrarch's writings, on which see de Nolhac, Petrarque et I'humanisme, 2:106-7.
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De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 126; Fain. XXIV, 6, 7.
60 C. E. Quillen, 'Plundering the Egyptians: Petrarch and Augustine's De doctrina Christiana,' in E. D.
English, ed., Reading and Wisdom: The De doctrina Christiana ofAugustine in the Middle Ages (Notre
Dame, 1995), 153-72; Invective contra medicum, III, 133, referring to Augustine, De civitate Dei, XI,
xv, 19; En.in psalmos, cxxvi, 11; cxliv, 12. Conrad Rawski has demonstrated that the Invective contra
medicum is based on a rhetorical strategy derived from Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. C. H.
Rawski, 'Notes on the Rhetoric in Petrarch's Invective contra medicum,' in Aldo Scaglione, ed.,
Francis Petrarch, Six Centuries Later. A symposium (Chapel Hill and Chicago, 1975), 249-77.
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Rawski, 'Notes on the Rhetoric in Petrarch's Invective contra medicum'.
62 G. Billanovich, 'II Petrarca e i retori latini minori,' Italia medioevale e umanistica 5 (1962):103-64,
republished in idem, Petrarca e il Primo Umanesimo (Padua, 1996), 297-361.
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Witt, Footsteps, 273, 509-14. For further details on Petrarch's use of the cursus, see, for example E.
Raimondi, 'Correzioni medioevali, correzioni umanistiche e correzioni petrarchesche nella lettera VI
del libro XVI delle Familiares,' Studi petrarcheschi 1 (1948): 125-33; G. Martellotti, 'Clausole e ritmi
nella prosa narrative del Petrarca,' in idem, Scritti petrarchesci, ed. M. Feo and S. Rizzo, (Padua,
1983), 207-19; on the grammar curriculum see, for example, G. Billanovich, 'L'insegnamento della
grammatica e della retorica nella universita italiane tra Petrarca e Guarino,' in J. Ijsewijn and J.
Paquet, eds., The Universities in the Late Middle Ages, (Leuven, 1978), 365-80.
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Rather than there being a necessary tension between moral philosophy and a form of
rhetoric modelled after Cicero, the use of post-Ciceronian rhetorical traditions would have
allowed a more flexible union of eloquence and moral philosophy to have been offered.
Instead of being obliged simply to turn away from espousing a definite ethical position on
occasions, or being forced to erect poetry as a rival source of truth to philosophy, Petrarch
had numerous precedents for the adaptation of Ciceronian precepts into the structure of
rhetorical theories which were developed out of - rather than in opposition to - a desire to
harmonise the personal apprehension of tmth and the exposition of a specific form of virtue.
The fact that methodological questions may be raised about the idea of 'tension' and
that Petrarch both knew and approved of a multiplicity of post-Ciceronian rhetorical
treatises, however, is in itself insufficient to support the suggestion either that he saw
eloquence and moral philosophy to be in harmony, or that he drew inspiration from the many
late antique and medieval texts available to him. Although Petrarch was conscious of a
number of rhetorical writings which propounded a closer relationship between eloquence and
moral philosophy, and was aware of the possibility of integrating elements of Ciceronian
rhetoric into a notion of oratory in which such an affinity was of central importance, a much
closer analysis of his understanding of this question is necessary before any firm conclusions
can be drawn.
2. Moral philosophy and eloquence: discord or harmony?
Despite the questions which may be raised about their arguments, Seigel and Trinkaus are
nevertheless quite correct to suggest that in considering the relationship between moral
philosophy and eloquence, Petrarch was exercised by the interplay between the function,
content and style appropriate to poetic composition, and its implications for the reading of
poetry. Rather than being in tension, however, an examination of a broader base of evidence
suggests that Petrarch saw moral philosophy and eloquence as enjoying a more harmonious
association, in which the literary devices proper to poetry were employed in relation to a
purpose and subject matter that overlapped significantly with moral philosophy.
Petrarch's thought on this subject appears to have undergone some development in
the period between the composition of the Africa and the completion of the Posteritati, a
point which has been overlooked in many studies.64 Although it would perhaps be incautious
64 A rare, but tentative exception is B. Vickers, 'The recovery of rhetoric: Petrarch, Erasmus,
Perelman,' History of the Human Sciences 3 (1990): 415-41, here 419-26. Vickers distinguishes
merely between an 'early' and a 'late' Petrarch.
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to attempt a more precise dating, three rough phases seem to be evident in the evolution of
his thought concerning eloquence: the first covering the period from early 1337 to late 1345;
the second extending from 1347 to around 1351; and the third covering the years 1353 to
1366. While these phases of development merit close consideration, however, Petrarch's
treatment of eloquence should not be thought of as having undergone any radical shifts: a
common thread runs through each of these periods, and was amplified and elaborated rather
than revised or distorted at each stage. Despite recognising that each could in its own way be
perverted, Petrarch's explicit engagement with the relationship between moral philosophy
and eloquence displays a consistent desire to present them as having a shared preoccupation
with the truth. Apparently viewing moral philosophy as a subjective search for the truth, and
poetic composition as a persuasive expression of the same truth, the stylistic devices
appropriate to eloquence serve to distinguish the one from the other, and responded to the
demands of changing audiences, but did not compromise the theoretical harmony of their
relationship as long as each discipline was properly conducted. Looking at the same
association from a different perspective, truth could either be accessed through the pursuit of
true philosophy, or apprehended by recovering the moral principles cloaked by poetic
language.
This underlying consistency is to some degree masked by a certain linguistic
inconsistency. In the same way as Petrarch was willing to use 'poesis' and 'eloquentia' as
synonyms, a broad vocabulary was brought to bear on the relationship between moral
philosophy and eloquence. Perhaps connected to the fact that he did not produce a single
treatise on rhetoric and elaborated his thought in a piecemeal fashion,65 he used a number of
different terms - few of which are fully defined in their immediate context - to signal the
connection he sought to draw. In some respects, this is in itself revealing. While in the
Posteritati, Petrarch specifically referred to 'moralem ... philosophiairi' and implicitly, if
vaguely identifies this with 'sacris Uteris delectatus', he was equally apt to refer to 'moral
philosophy' as the counterpart of 'physical philosophy', or to 'theologicC, or merely to
'philosophia'. On other occasions, terms such as 'philosophia' and 'theologia' are
discounted in favour of a more direct engagement with the language of virtus and its implied
contrast with voluptas, or with the vocabulary of Veritas. On yet further occasions, a mixed
lexicon is employed. Of course, in light of the preceding analysis of the Secretum, it is
somewhat tempting to see this linguistic ambiguity as a reflection of a willingness
deliberately to exploit what may have been perceived as a common semantic space shared by
these terms. While it would be incautious to make such an assumption, however, and it is
65
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necessary to acknowledge the exact terminology used in each context, it is equally
reasonable to posit that lexical variation was itself a part of Petrarch's exploration of the
relationship between eloquence and moral philosophy and that the vocabulary deployed
cloaks, rather than compromises, his consistency.
The first phase in the evolution of Petrarch's treatment of eloquence (1337 - late
1345) establishes a clear function for poetry, but partly as a consequence of his immediate
literary objectives, it is connected rather vaguely with other fields of endeavour. In perhaps
his first exploration of the theme in the Africa, Petrarch draws attention to the connection
between poetry and a range of other disciplines, and, speaking specifically of poetic
composition, indicates that the literary devices proper to that enterprise served to clothe the
truths it took as its subject and shared with its analogues. Invited to speak by Scipio in the
last book of the epic, Ennius moves from a mournful reflection on the condition of the
eloquence of his day to an exploration of the nature and function of poetry. Rather than
showing any concern for the approval of the crowd, he who is about to begin writing
(scripturum) must first lay down 'ftrmissima veri \ fundamenta' on which may then be built
more elaborate literary designs.66 Ennius then clarifies that
All such things
as trials that history records, the ways
of virtue, lessons taught by life,
of Nature's secrets - all such matters are
a poet's substance, not to be exposed
as elsewhere, but to be disguised beneath
a covering cloak, or better, a light veil
which tricks the watcher's eye and now conceals
and now discloses underlying truth.67
The same view is expressed in the Coronation Oration and, playing on a latent parallelism
between Ennius and Petrarch, the connection was probably deliberate.68 Although poetry is
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Africa, IX, 89-93: 'At nunc quod nostro poscis sermone doceri,
Accipe quam brevibus. Non ilia licentia vatum est
Quam multis placuisse palam est.
Scripturum iecisse prius ftrmissima veri
Fundamenta decet...'
67
Africa, IX, 97-101: '...quicquid labor historiarum est
Quicquid virtutum cultus documentaque vitae,
Nature studium quicquid licuisse poetis
Crede, sub ignoto tamen ut celentur amictu
Nuda alibi et tenui frustrentur lumina velo'
Translation from Petrarch's Africa, trans. T. G. Bergin and A. S. Wilson, (New Haven and London,
1977), 226.
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Kallendorf, In Praise of Aeneas, 27-8; W. Suerbaum, 'Poeta laureatus et triumphans: Die
Dichterkronung Petrarcas und sein Ennius-Bild,' Poetica 5 (1972):293-328; idem, 'Ennius bei
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distinguished by 'obliquis figurationibus', it nevertheless shares with other fields of
endeavour an over-riding concern for the truth. Responding to the common belief that poetry
deals only in fictions, Petrarch directly echoes Ennius' words. 'I could readily prove to you,'
he proclaimed,
that poets, under the veil of fictions, have set forth truths physical, moral and
historical - thus bearing out a statement I often make, that the difference
between a poet on the one hand and a historian or a moral or physical
philosopher on the other is the same as the difference between a clouded sky
and a clear sky, since in each case the same light exists in the object of vision,
but is perceived in different degrees according to the capacity of the
observers.69
As Lactantius had observed, the poet's task was to take real things and transform them using
allegorical figures.70
Perhaps because of his concentration on composition rather than reading, Petrarch is
comparatively reticent when it comes to explaining exactly what value accrued to the use of
'obliquis flgurationibus,, but a sense of his estimation of the merit of poetry emerges from
tantalising reflections on allegory, history and epideixis.71 In the Africa, Ennius' literary
relationship to Scipio is founded on the poet's capacity to 'proclaim the praise' of famous
men so that he might 'sing their virtues'. The relationship between the celebration of virtue,
the use of the allegorical devices appropriate to poetry and events in the lives of famous men
which is latent within this remark merits observation. Together with his statement of the
nature of poetry, it appears that Ennius uses allegory to transform real occurrences into a
form which will manifest and exemplify virtue to the reader. In the prohemium of the De
viris illustribus, which was probably composed at a similar time, Petrarch expressed this
point more directly.72 Although his work necessarily took historical truths for its subject
matter, his use of that material was determined by a desire to reveal to his reader the virtues
Petrarca. Betrachtungen zu literarischen Ennius-Blidern,' in Ennius, Entretiens sur l'Antiquite
Classique 17, (Geneva-Vandoeuven, 1972), 293-347; L. B. T. Houghton, 'A Letter from Petrarch,'in
W. Fitzgerald and E. Gowers, eds., Ennius Perennis: The Annals and Beyond, PCPS supplement no.
31, (Cambridge, 2007), 145-58.
69 Translation from E. H. Wilkins, 'Petrarch's Coronation Oration,' PMLA 68/5 (Dec. 1953): 1241-50,
here 1246. The Latin text for the Coronation Oration can be found in C. Godi, 'La "collation
laureationis" del Petrarca,' Italia Medioevale e Umanistica 13 (1970): 1-27. For a brief discussion of
the parallelism of the Coronation Oration and Africa, IX, see Bernardo, Petrarch, Scipio and the
Africa, 6-12.
70
Wilkins, 'Petrarch's Coronation Oration,' 1246.
71 ibid.
72 See B. G. Kohl, 'Petrarch's Prefaces to De viris illustribus,' History and Theory 13/2 (May 1974):
132-44. On the composition of the De viris illustribus, and of the prohemium in particular, see, for
example, G. Martellotti, 'II De viris illustribus. Modi e tempi della composizione,' in De viris
illustribus, ed. G. Martellotti, Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Francesco Petrarca, vol. II,
(Florence, 1922), ix-xiv; idem, 'La Prefazione A,' in ibid., cxxx-cxxxi.
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to be followed and the vices to be avoided.73 Poetry, which was in some ways defined by
'obliquis figurationibus\ sought to communicate virtue by allegorising the deeds of famous
men, or - we may presume - any other suitable subject connected with truth.
The issues first tentatively and generally touched upon in the Africa, the Coronation
Oration and the De viris illustribus were addressed with more clarity during the second
phase of Petrarch's thought (1347-c. 1351). The broad brushstrokes with which he painted
the relationship between poetry and other fields of endeavour were replaced with a more
refined and precise manner. Whereas Petrarch had previously described poetry as a mode of
writing which could be brought to bear on the truths revealed by a multiplicity of disciplines
for the inferred purpose of communicating virtue, he began to adopt a more specific
approach, presenting poesis more clearly as a re/vp which could express philosophical and
theological truths in a manner appropriate to stimulating virtue in the reader. In pursuit of
this, virtue itself is identified more explicitly as a Christian quality, bound up with the love
of God.
A particularly illustrative example of the greater precision and more explicitly
Christian concern with which Petrarch treated problems connected with eloquence is
provided by a letter written to his brother Gherardo on 2nd December 1348. Intended as an
introduction to and commentary on his first eclogue, this letter was designed to address the
relationship between 'theologia' and 'poesis'. Framed by a comparison between Petrarch's
enthusiasm for classical verse and his brother's monastic calling, it not merely casts light on
his understanding of poetry's function, but also offers an insight into poetry's capacity to
express theological truths through literary modes.
Extending some of the ideas explored in the Africa and the Coronation Oration,
Petrarch suggests that, far from being in tension with theology, poetry is most properly a
ts/vp used to express theological truths and praise pleasing to God. The language and
allegorical devices intrinsic to poetry were themselves instituted for the pursuit of
theological ends and the history of humanity's longing for the divine illustrates that poetic
modes were an intrinsic part of worship from the earliest days.
At the beginning of the letter, Petrarch recognises that on first inspection, Gherardo
might not appreciate the eclogue he had received since he would be inclined to view it as
discordant with his calling.74 But Petrarch warned his brother not to judge hastily. Contrary
to what Gherardo might think, poetry is not in fact opposed to theology.75 Both come from
God, and, by way of introduction, Petrarch points out that Christ himself spoke as a lion, as a
73
De viris illustribus, prohem., 6.
74 Fam. X, 4, 1.
75 ibid.
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lamb and as a worm, and Scripture is riddled with allegorical language. What is this, he asks,
if not poetry?76 All people desire a knowledge of the divine, and hence Aristotle was able to
say that the first theologians were poets.77 This, Petrarch claims, is evident in the name 'poet'
itself. There are many different interpretations of the origins of the term, but the etymology
which he finds most probable reflects the close connection between speech and praise. In the
distant past, Petrarch argues, men were crude and uncivilised, but they were nevertheless
filled with a desire for truth, for a knowledge, and for an understanding of the correct means
of worship.78 As a consequence, they constructed buildings for meditation, which they called
temples, established sacred ministers, whom they called priests, and made magnificent
statues, golden vases, marble tables and purple mantles. So that these marks of honour
should not be mute, it was seen that high-sounding words also pleased the divinity, that holy
blandishments - far from the common way of speaking - would carry to the highest reaches,
and that a certain rhythm would dispel weariness.79 These words were not of a vulgar form,
but crafted out of a new, artful and exquisite variety. Since the Greek word 'poetes'
(presumably meaning ' Ttotpxr]^) denotes both one who makes things and a writer, those who
used this new form of words to honour the divine were called 'poets'.80 This, Petrarch
contends, is borne out by Suetonius, Marcus Varro and Isidore of Seville, and is also
reflected in the words of Moses, David, Solomon, Jeremiah and Job.81 Gherardo was also
invited to consider the fact that Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome all made use of poetry and
rhythm, while the writings of other holy men - such as Prudentius, Prosper and Sedulius -
were known only through their 'metrica... opusculcC.82 He should not, therefore, regard with
horror those things which he knew pleased men both holy and beloved of Christ. Gherardo
should, Petrarch believed, concentrate on the meaning of particular works and, if they were
true and wholesome, should embrace them regardless of the style.83 Although Petrarch was
careful not to go so far as to say that poetr was to be preferred over all else, he nevertheless
felt that it was unnecessary to spurn it simply because it was in verse: to reject poetry
without considering that its style cloaked its meaning was similar to the madness or
76 Fam. X, 4, I -2.
77 Fam. X, 4, 2, referring to Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983 b 27.
78 Fam. X, 4, 3. For a discussion of this point in the context of the idea of the poeta theologus, see
Witt, 'Coluccio Salutati and the Conception of the Poeta Theologus,' 542-3.
79 Fam. X, 4, 4.
80 ibid.: 'Id sane non vulgari forma sed artificiosa quadam et exquisita et nova fieri oportuit, que
quoniam greco sermone 'poetes' dicta est, eos quoque qui hac utebantur, poetas dixerunt.'
81 Fam. X, 4, 5-6, referring to Isidore, Etym., 8, 7, 1-3.
82 Fam. X, 4, 8.
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hypocricy of praising food that was served in an earthenware vessel while being revolted by
the same dish presented on a golden platter.84
This serves as the basis for the following explanation of the first eclogue. Here,
Petrarch is primarily concerned to offer a reading of the bucolic verse which stresses the
parallelism of his own enthusiasm for classical verse (represented by Homer and Virgil) and
Gherardo's religious vocation.85 In not following a religious life, Petrarch may have followed
a more difficult path, but that is not to say that he was unable to access the truths of religion.
Through his reading of verse, he was able to attain an understanding of virtue: contrary to
expectations, the allegorical and historical modes of classical poetry allowed it to be read as
a reflection of a specifically Christian virtue, and permitted Petrarch to draw valuable moral
lessons from its stream.
Having pointed out that he is represented by Silvius and Gherardo by Monicus,86
Petrarch makes it clear that the fact that the two shared a single mother is not an allegory, but
the simple truth, just as they shared the same father.87 While his brother was shut away in
safety, far away from cities and men, however, Petrarch himself wandered uncertain and in
error.88 Accused by Monicus of seeking the inaccessible mountain peak which stands for the
rare fame which few achieved, Sivius is delighted by the babbling spring which represents
literature and eloquent men, and roams through deserted places which stand for his studies,
but which have been deserted by others either because they were abandoned out of a desire
for profit or because they were felt to be hopeless as the result of a sluggishness of talent.89
From these springs arise the streams of the various disciplines which run with a certain
enchanting sound. The delicate sound which Silvius applauds is the chorus of studies, and
the nymphs of the spring are the natural goddesses of human study.90 Although Monicus
invites him to cross his threshold, Silvius cannot do so: so, just as Gherardo enticed him to
enter the Carthusian monastery at Montrieux, Petrarch indicates that he could not.91
The distinction between the two is important for their relative appreciation of poetry.
As Petrarch explains, Monicus attempted to entice Silvius to enter his cavern in the eclogue
by claiming that there he will hear a sweeter song than that sung by the two shepherds whose
84 Fam. X, 4, 9.
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charms have captivated him.92 Rather than revealing the name of the shepherd who sings so
sweetly, Monicus describes describes his fatherland, mentioning first two rivers with a single
source in error, and then one river with two sources, both located in Asia.93 Recognising the
single river from the description, Silvius demonstrates his knowledge by calling to mind the
fact that it was in that river that a certain shaggy shepherd bathed Apollo.94 Monicus
responds by saying that it was there that his shepherd was born and, as Petrarch reiterates,
the two figures then heap praise on their respective shepherds.95
The shepherds whom Silvius admires, Petrarch explains, are Virgil and Homer,
while the shepherd whose song Monicus prefers is David, author of the psalms. Although
Monicus' first reference to the two rivers sprining from a single source denotes the Tigris
and the Eurphrates, his second - correct - reference to the one river coming from two
sources is the Jordan, in Judea, which is fed by the Jor and the Dan.96 It was in this river,
Petrarch reminds Gherardo, that Christ was baptised by John the Baptist, and this fact is
reflected in the allegorical words of the eclogue. The shaggy boy of the eclogue stands for
John, while Petrarch used Apollo to symbolise Christ, 'true God and true son of God'.97 The
choice of Apollo as a symbol for Christ is significant in that it allows Petrarch to connect
poetry written after classical modes with the central precepts of Christianity, in defiance of
his brother's views. Petrarch carefully underscores this point by explaining that he described
Apollo - the god of poetry - as the 'god of the intellect and wisdom, since, as noted in the
works of the theologians, the wisdom attributed to the collective and individual persons of
the Trinity is attributed to the Son and is the same wisdom as that of the Father.'98 The
Jordan was thus not merely indicative of David's fatherland, but also denoted the river in
which Christ was baptised, and, by implication, the river in which poetry was allegorically
bathed in the waters of Christianity. In David's harsh-sounding words is revealed the use of
history and allegory, but - despite Monicus' defence of the language of Scripture99 - the
same devices are employed in classical verse, which points to the same truths, and which
Petrarch prefers.100 The deeds of Scipio Africanus are highlighted in this regard, and tales of
the Roman general are held up as evidencing a divinely instituted virtue. This young man,
Petrarch points out, is called heavenly whether because of the heroic virtue which flourished
92 Fam. X, 4, 16.
93 Fam. X, 4, 17.
94 Fam. X, 4, 18.
95 ibid.
96 Fam. X, 4, 29.
97 Fam. X, 4, 30.
98 ibid.
99 Fam. X, 4, 32.
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greatly - the virtue which was called blazing by Virgil, fiery by Lucan - in him, or because
of the view that he had heavenly origins, which caused the Romans to admire him greatly.101
Despite their paganism - which seems to be recognised implicitly - classical poets and
figures from the ancient past could, Petrarch suggests, nevertheless prefigure Christian
virtues and this assumption lay behind his own composition of the Africa}02 Indeed,
although he never says so explicitly, it might also be suggested that in making this case,
Petrarch offers an allegorical reading of his first eclogue which itself indicates that a deep
attachment to Christian virtue could be expressed by a verse composed under the influence
of classical poetry. Regardless of Gherardo's initial prejudices, the technical devices
appropriate to poetry found in the eclogue cloak a defence of theological truth.
In attempting to defend his enthusiasm for poetry and in highlighting the
compatibility of theologia and poesis, Petrarch's letter to Gherardo suggests that allegory
allowed verse to be read in a manner which allowed theological truths to be accessed and an
understanding of virtue acquired. The idea that eloquence was a rexvtj which could be used
to give expression to Christian truths for the moral benefit of the reader was explored further
in a letter written to Tommaso da Messina on lbt May 1350/1. Conceived as part of a short
and thematically-linked epistolary series, the letter is an attempt to establish the importance
of the study of eloquence. Adopting a different approach to that he employed in writing to
Gherardo, Petrarch avoids discussing how he himself had derived benefit from eloquent
works, and defends erudite language from the perspective of inculcating virtue in others.
Unlike Fam. X, 4, there is little reference to allegory, and Petrarch instead treats eloquence
as the art of language itself, considered largely in contrast to action. There is a specifically
Christian flavour to his conclusion and, just as in his earlier epistle, he suggest that
eloquence is erected on the basis of a proper understanding of moral philosophy and has as
its purpose the stimulation of a love of God in other people. Having established that his
enthusiasm for classical verse had allowed him to access Christian truths despite wandering
in error in the world in his letter to Gherardo, Petrarch goes on to indicate that the orator's
personal apprehension of virtue was the necessary predicate of his ability to use eloquent
language to urge putative readers to derive the same benefits.
Quoting from Virgil in the first sentence, Petrarch notes that if one wishes to 'rise
from the earth and fly on the lips of men', it is necessary to foster both the philosopher's
concern for the soul and the orator's erudition of language.103 Just as eloquence must be
101 Fam. X, 4, 33.
102 Fam. X, 4, 34.
103 Fam. I, 9, 1: 'Animi cura philosophum querit, eruditio lingue oratoris est propria; neutra nobis
negligenda, si nos, ut aiunt, humo tollere et per ora virum volitare propositum est.' quoting Virgil,
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studied when the mind has been cultivated, Petrarch explains that there can be no value in
speech unless the mind has a certain dignity.104 The importance of this point, however, lies in
the reasons for which the condition of the mind should be nurtured and for which the powers
of speech should be developed. The connection between the two hinges on the relationship
between the self and others. 'For if [the study of eloquence] were unnecessary for us,'
Petrarch claimed,
and the mind, relying on its own strength and unravelling its benefits in silence,
did not require the support of words, labour would nevertheless be necessary
for the rest of those with whom we live.105
If, in other words, a man such as Tommaso were able to nurture virtue in his own mind
without the need for external assistance, he would still need to develop the skills of the orator
so that others may benefit. The capacity of eloquence to move others to virtue appears to be
motivated by and predicated upon the orator's personal apprehension of virtue.
Just as eloquent composition seems directed at instilling virtue, so the reading of an
eloquently written text is presented as an activity which allows for the recovery of a
potentially fruitful understanding of the good. Tommaso, of course, could object that actions
proverbially speak louder than words and that, provided with 'nostre virtutis exempla',
people may be seized by the desire to imitate.106 Although he does not deny this, however,
Petrarch indicates that eloquence nevertheless offers great assistance. There are many men
who, though unaffected by the writings of the past, may suddenly be awoken to the delights
of virtue by the words of others.107 For this reason, the pursuit of eloquence has an
unendingly important role: thousands of years may pass by and still 'ad amorem Dei, ad
odium voluptatum precepta' will never suffice.108 The language here is significant.
Prefiguring the rhetorical theory of the later Renaissance, Petrarch defines the function of
eloquence in terms of a desire to pursue virtue (virtus) and avoid vice (voluptas), each
Georg. Ill, 9. Note that, in addition to adapting the word order, Petrarch omits Virgil's 'victorque',
which perhaps lends the allusion the greater sense of humility appropriate to the 'animi cura'.
104 Fam. I, 9, 2.
105 Fam. I, 9, 4: 'Que si nobis necessaria non foret et mens, suis viribus nisa bonaque sua in silentio
explicans, verborum suffragiis non egeret, ad ceterorum saltern utilitatem, quibuscum vivimus,
laborandum erat...'
106 Fam. I, 9, 5: 'Instabis autem et dices: "Heu quantum et nobis tutius et illis efftcacius fuerat suadere,
ut eorum oculis nostre virtutis exempla preberemus, quorum illi pulchritudine delectati ad imitationis
impetum raperentur! Natura enim hoc habet, ut multo melius multoque facilius factorum quam
verborum stimulis excitemur perque hanc viam expeditius ad omnem virtutis altitudinem
consurgamus.'
107 Fam. I, 9, 6.
108 Fam. I, 9, 9: 'Decern adhuc redeant annorum milia, secula seculis aggregentur: nunquam satis
laudabitur virtus; nunquam ad amorem Dei, ad odium voluptatum precepta sufficient; nunquam acutis
ingeniis iter obstruetur ad novarum rerum indaginem.'
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conceived of in relation to the love of God. As a manner of speaking or writing in a manner
appropriate to a given audience, eloquence appears as a means of expressing to others the
results of Petrarch's private search for the truths of moral philosophy.
The impression that eloquence proceeds from a personal understanding of virtue,
and is reliant on the pursuit of moral philosophy is the key feature of the third phase in the
development of Petrarch's rhetorical theory (c.1353-c.1366) and is made explicit in the De
remediis utriuque fortune, begun only a few years after the composition of the letter to
Tommaso da Messina. As in Fam. I, 9, Petrarch sustains the inference that the man who
would be eloquent must cultivate both the philosopher's care for the soul and the orator'
erudition. Developing the implications of the Africa and the Coronation Oration, however, it
is suggested that elegant language must necessarily be erected on a solid apprehension of
virtue, and in this the character and learning of the orator play an important role.
Some years earlier, Petrarch had cautioned against engaging in public oratory
without first having taken care of the condition of one's soul in the De vita solitaria. In its
immediate context, this warning was intended to amplify the importance of cultivating virtue
through solitude, but - alongside Fam. I, 9 - it also represents an early expression of the
connection between eloquence and a personal apprehension of the good. There are, Petrarch
says, 'learned and eloquent men' who go about cities delivering speeches about virtue and
vice, and apparently excoriating the life of the occupatus}09 Although what they say may
indeed be useful, they do not practice what they preach.110 'The doctor who helps the sick
man with his advice, however, is not always healthy,' Petrarch contends, 'and he has often
died of the same malady from which he had freed many others.'111 While he certainly would
not disdain carefully considered and artfully composed words designed for the benefit of the
many, Petrarch believed that 'this is not a school of rhetoric, but of life.' Men should focus
not on the 'empty glory of language, but on a genuine peace of mind.'112 This serves as the
prelude to a recommendation of a solitary life, but it also indicates the impossibility of
separating eloquence and moral character. Regardless of how beneficial it might be for the
listener, an oration delivered by a man who does not care for the condition of his own soul is
109 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii: 'Multi sunt qui occupationes in comune utile et solitudine
qualibet santiores profitentur. ... Non inficior doctos quosdam et facundos viros, et qui multa subtiliter
adversus hec disputent. Ceterum non de ingenio, sed de moribus est questio; ambiunt civitates,
declamant in populis, multa de vitiis, multa de virtutibus loquuntur...' Prose, 322-4.
110
De vita solitaria, Z 1, iii, 2; P I, iii; Prose, 324.
]U
De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii: 'Sed non statim sanus est medicus, qui consilio egrum iuvat,
quin eodem sepe morbo, quo multos liberaverat, interiit.' Prose, 324.
112 De vita solitaria, Z I, iii, 2; P I, iii: 'Verba studio elaborata atque arte composita pro multorum
salute non respuo et, quicunque sit opifex, utile opus amplector; verum hec nobis non rethorice scola
sed vite est, nee inanem lingue gloriam, sed solidam quietem mentis intendimus.' Prose, 324.
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the product of a desire for the 'empty glory of language'. By implication, Petrarch would
prefer that an eloquent speech urge an audience to love virtue and spurn vice not merely by
using artful forms of words, but also by reflecting the moral character of the orator himself.
This passage from the De vita solitaria speaks to a distinction between loquacity and
eloquence, and it is precisely this topic to which Petrarch's interlocutors - Gaudium and
Ratio - turn in De remediis, I, 9. Despite Gaudium's predictable enthusiasm, Ratio warns
that eloquence has two sides. It is important, he counsels, to know how to use it."3 Ineptly
used, eloquence can be like a furiously flashing sword which is better sheathed and not used
at all.114 If the 'fulgor eloquentie' is to be glorious, however, it is necessary to temper it with
holiness and wisdom.115 Although the reasons for this are only gradually revealed, it serves
as the starting point for fuller reflection on the moral foundations of rhetoric. Responding to
Gaudium's claim that eloquence alone is sufficient, Ratio asserts that where it is pursued to
the exclusion of all else, especially wisdom, it is not eloquence, but loquacity.116 'For it is
impossible to be a true orator,' he claims, 'that is to say, a master of eloquence, unless one is
a good man.'117 This, indeed, was a view that both Cato and Cicero appear to have
endorsed.118 Without virtue and wisdom, it is not possible in giving praise to distinguish
between the good and the bad, and hence impossible to exhort others to forsake vice.119
Unless supported by an apprehension of virtue, the sweet and ornate nature of eloquence
speech is neither compelling nor sincere, but more like a whore's deceit or honeyed
poison.120 Hence, if anyone aspires to the title of 'orator' and to the true praise of eloquence,
Ratio advises that it is first necessary for him to study virtue and wisdom.121 With the benefit
of virtue and wisdom, the good man will be able to discriminate between the vices which are
to be excoriated and the virtues which are to be praised, and know clearly how to deploy the
literary devices appropriate to his eloquence. Provided that the orator is indeed a vir bonus,
there is no sense in which literary style should conflict with the demands of moral
philosophy.
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De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 9.
1,4 ibid.
115 ibid.: 'Et lugubres comete et infesti gladii et hostiles galee fulgent. Ut fulgor eloquentie gloriosus
sit, sanctitate et sapientia temperetur'.
116 ibid.






3. Lady Philosophy's Muses and the Invective contra medicum
In the most mature expression of his views, we have observed that Petrarch saw eloquence as
a xeyyr), a mode of communication which could be deployed to express truth so that others
might come to love the good. Making use of figurative devices and especially allegory, its
function was to persuade the reader, but was at the same time closely related to the virtue of
the orator himself. While a man could be eloquent, but not good, the moral quality of a
virtuous man informed his rhetoric and contributed to his capacity for persuasion more
powerfully than the inculcation of any rules. Far from being in tension with philosophy,
eloquence took the truths revealed through moral philosophy as its subject matter and,
mediated by the personal understanding of the orator, conveyed them in an appropriate form.
This interpretation of Petrarch's understanding of the relationship between
eloquence and moral philosophy stands in stark contrast to the readings offered by Trinkaus
and Seigel. Rather than being troubled by the possibility of an inconsistency arising from an
underlying opposition, as Seigel has argued, Petrarch's presentation of eloquence as a xkyyt]
and attachment to a clear sense of truth underpinning philosophy allowed a harmonious
association to be depicted. By the same token, as a xtr/vr] associated with specific literary
devices deployed in a fashion appropriate to the subject, it is difficult to support the
suggestion that eloquence was more exalted than philosophy.
The Invective contra medicum addresses many of the themes central to an
understanding of the relationship between eloquence and philosophy, and, having been
revised in 1355, dates from the final stage in the evolution of Petrarch's rhetorical thought.
Enraged by Petrarch's advice to the pontiff, the anonymous papal physician had not merely
attacked Petrarch for claiming to be a poet,122 but had also asserted that rhetoric should be
the handmaiden of medicine,123 whose practitioners offered 'the fruits of good health' and
were able to cure the body and the soul.124 Apparently presenting himself as a philosopher,125
the doctor had argued that since it revelled in obscurity126 and falsehood,127 poetry should be
denounced,128 and insinuatingly suggested a host of reasons why Petrarch might have offered
122
Invective contra medicum, III, 142; Marsh, 118.
123
Invective contra medicum, I, 14; Marsh, 12.
124
Invective contra medicum, I, 2: '... sanitatis fructum policitus...' Marsh, 2; Invective contra
medicum, II, 53: 'Se his artibus armatum, non tantum corporis sed animi vitia curaturum.' Marsh, 40.
125
Invective contra medicum, II, 521 Marsh, 40.
126 Invective contra medicum, III, 130; Marsh, 106.
127
Invective contra medicum, I, 36; Marsh, 28.
128 Invective contra medicum, III, 105-6; Marsh, 84; see also the reference to Boethius, Cons. I, pr.,1
at Invective contra medicum, III, 118-9; Marsh, 94-6.
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advice to the pope.129 In responding to these charges, Petrarch offered both a scathing
invective against the doctor and his profession,130 and a staunch defence of poetry. As we
have already noted, Trinkaus has argued that Petrarch upheld the view that medicine should
be subordinated to rhetoric. Attacking the doctor for his love of dialectic, Trinkaus suggests
that Petrarch substituted 'poetry as the true medium for philosophy and theology rather than
the syllogistic demonstrations of dialectic used by the scholastics.'131 Contrasting eloquence
with the pedantry of the schoolmen, Trinkaus views the Invective contra medicum as
evidence to support the contention that 'Petrarch ... proposed that poetic theology and
rhetoric, rather than philosophy, were the intellectual instruments and disciplines best fitted
for the Christian goal of salvation and the cure of souls.'132 That such a view challenges the
apparently harmonious relationship between eloquence and philosophy previously observed
need not be stressed: in Trinkaus' interpretation, the notion of eloquence as a rsxvrj is
subsumed by the perceived supremacy of rhetoric over philosophy.
There is, in part, much to recommend Trinkaus' reading of the Invective contra
medicum, despite its apparent divergence from some of the evidence already examined.
Responding to the doctor's charges, Petrarch consistently placed his concern for the cure of
souls at the centre of consideration. Although Petrarch might have disagreed with him on
many other points, they were apparently of one mind in regarding the salvation of souls as
being of considerable importance in determining the role of eloquence. For the doctor, body
and soul were intimately related and hence could be healed together by a medical
practitioner. Health in all its senses was a practical matter of 'things' which, it seems, were
held to have little to do with the fictions and fluctuations of poetry.133 Medicine was, as a
result, superior to rhetoric. For Petrarch, however, eloquence was intended specifically for
the cure of souls, while medicine concerned itself only with the body, and even then often
ineffectually. Just as reason allows the rational soul to command the body, the arts invented
for the sake of the soul command those invented for the body's sake.134 As Trinkaus has
argued, medicine was hence inferior to eloquence, since rhetoric alone addressed the health
of the soul. Indeed, expressing the same point in a slightly different fashion, Petrarch
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e.g. Invective contra medicum, I, 6, 7.
130 On Petrarch's attitude towards medicine in the Invective contra medicum, see G. Dell'Anna, 'II
Petrarca e la medicina,' in L. Rotondi Secchi Tarugi, ed., Petrarca e la cultura europea, (Milan,
1997), 203-22; F. Bausi, 'II «mechanicus» che scrive libri. Per un nuovo commento alle «Invective
contra medicum» di Francesco Petrarca,' Rinascimento 42 (2002): 110-11; N. Streuver, 'Petrarch's
Invective Contra Medicum-. An Early Confrontation of Rhetoric and Medicine,' MLN 108/4 (Sept.
1992): 659-79.
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Trinkaus, The Poet as Philosopher, 96.
132 ibid., 90.
133 Invective contra medicum, III, 113-15.
134 Invective contra medicum, III, 160; Marsh, 134.
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claimed that rhetoric had as its ultimate purpose the education of men in living well and, as a
result, was entirely happy for his works to be described as homilies.135
Trinkaus is similarly correct to suggest that Petrarch regarded poetry as the 'true
medium for philosophy and theology'. This is not, however, to say that poetry supplanted
philosophy. Contrary to Trinkaus' assertion, Petrarch's definition of eloquence as a te/vr/
allowed him to describe eloquence as a mode of expression applied to the truths of
philosophy while also castigating the doctor's use of dialectic for its predisposition to
unchristian error.
For Petrarch, the cure of souls through eloquence was possible only where rhetoric
was related to an understanding of the truth. Rather than being a source of philosophical
truth in itself, Petrarch argued that rhetoric was simply a means of approaching or expressing
truth: it was, in other words, a means and not an end. In this respect, it was similar to a
number of other fields of endeavour, a fact which the doctor appears to have missed.
Eloquence, dialectic and grammar are alike, Petrarch claimed, in that 'they are a path, rather
than a goal.'136 None of these disciplines should be thought of as containing, or being
equivalent to philosophy. They are each routes to philosophy. If any one is pursued as an end
in itself, confusion and error follow. So, in the doctor's case, in clinging to syllogisms so
resolutely, he has failed to distinguish between true and false philosophy, and has been led to
deny Christ by placing doctrines alongside one another indiscriminately.137
Philosophy, Petrarch claimed, is a tree with many branches and so there are also
many types of philosopher. There are true philosophers and false philosophers.138 Some, like
Epicurus and the Epicureans, are called philosophers, but are justly regarded as being tainted
with infamy.139 Others, like Jerome, Augustine and the Doctors of the Church, are true
philosophers since 'there never was, and never could be any philosophy higher than the one
leading to the truth' and in this regard, 'our own Christian philosophers prominently
surpassed the vigils and labours of all others'.140 As Petrarch's language and examples
135
Invective contra medicum, III, 146; Marsh, 122, quoting Isidore, Etym., 6.8.2. On the homily in
medieval rhetoric, see H. Caplan, 'Classical Rhetoric and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching,'
Classical Philology 28/2 (April 1933): 73-96, here 87.
136 Invective contra medicum, II, 83: 'Sed, o stulte, non hac careo: verum scio quid ei, quid ceteris
liberalibus artibus dandum sit; didici a philosophis nullam earum valde suspicere. Equidem, ut eas
didicisse laudabile, sic in eisdem senescere puerile est. Via sunt nempe, non terminus, nisi errantibus
ac vagis quibus nullus est vite portus.' Marsh, 64-6.
137
Invective contra medicum, II, 83-4; Marsh, 66; Invective contra medicum, II, 87; Marsh, 70.
138 Invective contra medicum, III, 122; Marsh, 98.
139
Invective contra medicum, III, 121; Marsh, 98.
140
Invective contra medicum, III, 121: 'Unde Paulus apostolus, verus Cristi philosophus, et post eum
clarissimus eius interpres Augustinus, multique quos enumerare non est necesse, philosophiam
laudatam ab aliis execrantur; cum tamen nulla unquam philosophia altior fuerit, aut esse possit, quam
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suggest, the true philosophy is unmistakably Christian and is bound up with the love of God.
Sharpening his criticism of the doctor, Petrarch reminds him that Augustine, echoing Plato,
had argued that 'if wisdom is God, who created all things, as divine authority and truth have
shown, then the true philosopher is one who loves God.'141 The implications of this evoke
the moral message of the Secretum. In order to love God, Petrarch indicates that the true
philosopher must first reflect on his own mortality and spurn the physical world for the
blessedness of the next life:
Now to meditate about death, to arm oneself against it, to prepare oneself to
disdain and accept it, to meet it when necessary, and to exchange with sublime
resolve this brief and wretched life for eternal life, for blessedness, and for
glory - all these things are true philosophy, which has been simply described as
the contemplation of death. Even though this definition was invented by
pagans, it belongs to Christians. For they should despise the present life, and in
their hope for eternal life, they should desire its dissolution.14"
Although rhetoric cannot be regarded as equivalent to philosophy any more than dialectic,
eloquence may nevertheless be seen as philosophy's handmaiden. Despite the doctor's
misinterpretation of the passage, Petrarch contends that this is evidenced by Boethius' De
consolatio philosophiae. Appearing before Boethius' literary alter ego, Lady Philosophy
recommends 'her' Muses. There is no doubt in Petrarch's mind that these Muses belong to
the poets, and that - as the possessive pronoun indicates - they serve the cause of
philosophy, that is to say, the true philosophy.143 Boethius' attack on the 'harlots of the
stage' refers not to all poets (as the doctor appears to have believed), but merely to the 'so-
called dramatic poets' whom practitioners of the poetic art revile with good reason.144
que ducit ad verum, qua nostri, celesti munere potius quam humano studio, ante omnium
philosophorum vigilias ac labores eminentissime floruerunt.' Marsh, 98; trans. Marsh, 99.
141
Invective contra medicum, II, 96: "'Porro enim,' ut Platonem sequens ait Augustinus, "si sapientia
Deus est per quern facta sunt omnia, sicut divina autoritas veritasque monstravit, verus philosophus
est amator Dei.'" quoting Augustine, De civitate Dei, VIII, I; Marsh, 76-8; trans. Marsh, 77-9.
142 Invective contra medicum, II, 88: 'Illam certe premeditari, contra illam armari, ad illius
contemptum ac patientiam componi, illi si res exigat occurrere, et pro eterna vita, pro felicitate, pro
gloria brevem hanc miseramque vitam alto animo pacisci, ea demum vera philosophia est, quam
quidam nichil aliud nisi cogitationem mortis esse dixerunt. Que philosophic descriptio, quamvis a
paganis inventa, Cristianorum tamen est propria, quibus et huius vite contemptus et spes eterne et
dissolutionis desiderium esse debet.' quoting Cicero, Tusc. I, xxx, 74 and referring to Hugh of St.
Victor, Didascalion, 2.1; Marsh, 70; trans. Marsh, 71.
143 Invective contra medicum, III, 118-9; Marsh, 94-6, referring to Boethius, Cons. I, pr., 1.
144Invective contra medicum, III, 124: 'Sed ut, omissis aliis, ceptum sequar, in ultimo agmine
poetarum quidam sunt quos scenicos vocant, ad quos pertinet illud Boetii, et quicquid a quolibet
contra poetas vere dicitur; et hi quidem ipsos inter poetas contemnuntur, qui quales essent Plato ipse
declaravit in sua Republica, quando eos censuit urbe pellendos. Ut enim constet non de omnibus eum
sensisse, sed de scenicis tantum, ipsius Platonis ratio audienda est ab Augustino posita...' Marsh, 100,
referring to Augustine, De civitate Dei, II, xiv, which cites Plato, Republic, III, 3981, X, 607b.
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Evoking the sentiments of Fam. X, 4, Petrarch argues that neither Homer nor Virgil
dedicated themselves to stage plays, but instead attempted to explain the "nature of people
and the world, the virtues, and human perfection.'145 Although it is possible to find fault with
some poetry, Homer and Virgil were concerned to communicate the truths of philosophy,
and thus could not be criticised using the doctor's erroneous reading of Lady Philosophy's
words in the De consolatio philosophiae. These truths are derived from God, yet He also
grants to some the gift of poetic expression.146 So, while the poets of Antiquity may have
been pagans, they were nevertheless also the unconscious recipients of this divine favour and
their works - as Petrarch had argued to Gherardo in explaining his first eclogue - contain
elements of the truth expressed in an appropriate form. 147
Although poetry takes the truths of moral philosophy for its subject, it is - as
Petrarch had previously suggested - nevertheless a rt/vp which aims at persuasion (nsiOcb),
and these characteristics are essential in understanding its capacity to mediate moral truths.
Rather than recommending the view that Petrarch saw eloquence as superior to philosophy,
this emphasis on figurative language only serves to highlight the manner in which poetry
was able to work in harmony with philosophy, and contribute to the salvation of souls.
Quoting Cicero, Petrarch reminded the doctor that 'the function of the rhetorical art is to
speak aptly with a view to persuading, and its end is to persuade by one's speech.'148 Using
Lactantius as an authority in the same manner as in the Coronation Oration, he further
suggests that 'the poet's function consists in translating actual truths into different forms
using indirect and figural language with a certain decorum.'149 This use of figural language,
however, may lead the critic to suggest that obscurity renders it unable to communicate such
truths effectively, and the doctor was apparently not slow to make such an accusation.
Far from obscuring truth, Petrarch indicates that the technical aspects of poetry
render it more powerful. In seeking to convey the precepts of true philosophy, poetry
145
Invective contra medicum, III, 125: 'Quando autem Homerus apud illos, quando Virgilius apud
nos, aut alii illustres scenicis ludis operam dederunt? Profecto unquam, sed de virtutibus, de naturis
hominum ac rerum omnium, atque omnino de perfectione humana, stilo mirabili et quern frustra tibi
aperire moliar, tractaverunt.' Marsh, 102; trans. Marsh, 103.
146 Invective contra medicum, III, 126; Marsh, 102-4, quoting Augustine, Soliloquies, I, xv, 27.
147 Invective contra medicum, III, 137; Marsh, 114, referring to Augustine, De civitate Dei, XVIII,
xxiv.
148 Invective contra medicum, II, 49: 'Certe, quod scolis omnibus est notum, rethorice facultatis
officium est "apposite dicere ad persuadendum, finis persuadere dictione".' quoting Cicero, Inv. Ret.,
I. v, 6; Marsh, 38-9.
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Invective contra medicum, I, 36: 'Audi ergo quid Lactantius, vir et poetarum et philosophorum
notitia et ciceroniana facundia et, quod cunta trascendit, catholica religione clarissimus, primo suarum
Institutionum libro ait: "Nesciunt qui sit poetice licenlie modus, quousque progredi fingendo liceat,
cum officium poete in eo sit, ut que vera sunt in alia specie obliquis figurationibus cum decore aliquo
conversa traducat; totum autem quod referas fingere, idest ineptum esse et mendacem potiusquam
poetam.'" quoting Lactantius, Div. Inst., I, xi, 24-5; Marsh, 28.
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benefits from the use of literary devices in that the recovery of meaning is made more
challenging and more rewarding. 'Poetic style,' Petrarch argued, 'serves as a stimulus for
more intense reflection and as an opportunity for nobler studies.'150 This is evidenced by
Scripture itself, and Trinkaus has correctly observed that Petrarch appears to adhere to
Curtius' notion of 'Biblical poetics'.151 The Bible contains many passages which are obscure
and perplexing, yet was nevertheless 'uttered by the same Spirit that created humankind and
the world'.152 Both St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great, Petrarch notes, saw that the
apparent obscurity of Scripture has the advantage of permitting numerous interpretations and
encouraging the reader to expend effort in studying the text.153 So with poetry more
generally, Petrarch wrote,
rather than begrudging those who can grasp our work, we offer them this
pleasant labour in order to promote their enjoyment and recollection of it. For
when we have acquired something with difficulty, we hold it more dear and
retain it more diligently.154
As the handmaiden of philosophy, Petrarch suggested that poetry was able to communicate
truths better using apparently 'obscure' devices. The harmony between eloquence and
philosophy was preserved, while those features which most clearly distinguished poetry
served to underscore its value to the education of the reader.
4. Aristotle's philosophy and Cicero's eloquence in the De sui ipsius et
multorum ignorantia
In the eyes of many scholars, the contention that Petrarch saw eloquence as superior to
philosophy is most strongly supported by the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, which
was finished in 1367 and similarly comes from the final stage in the development of
Petrarch's rhetorical thought. Identifying an apparently voluntarist ethic in the invective,
150 Invective contra medicum, III, 132: 'Quod, si forte stilus insuetis videatur occultior, non ea invidia
est, sed intentions animi stimulus, et exercitii nobilioris occasio.' Marsh, 108.
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Trinkaus, The Poet as Philosopher, 102; c.f. E.R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin
Middle Ages, trans. W. R. Trask, (New York, 1953), 40f.
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Invective contra medicum, III, 132: 'Quid sermo ipse divinus, quern et si valde oderis, tamen aperte
calumniari propter metum incendii non audebis? Quam in mutis obscurus atque perplexus est! cum
prolatus sit ab eo Spiritu qui homines ipsos mundumque creaverat, nedum, si vellet, et verba nova
reperire, etrepertis clarioribus uti posset?' Marsh, 108.
15 Invective contra medicum, III, 132; quoting Augustine, De civitate Dei, XI, xv, 19; En. in psalmos,
cxxvi, ll;cxlvi, 12; Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ez.echiel, VI, 1; Marsh, 108-10.
154 Invective contra medicum, III, 134: 'Apud poetas igitur o nimium rudis, stili maiestas retinetur ac
dignitas, nec capere valentibus invidetur, sed, dulci labore proposito, delectationi simul memorieque
consulitur. Cariora sunt enim que cum difficultate quesivimus, accuratiusque servantur...' Marsh, 110,
amended.
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Gray, Trinkaus and others have discerned an opposition between a rhetoric which activates
the will and a philosophy which touches only the intellect. Composed in response to the
charges of contemporary Aristotelians like the Invective contra medicum, the De sui ipsius et
multorum ignorantia is interpreted as containing an unequivocal endorsement of eloquence
as a source of truth which implicitly contradicts the notion of rhetoric as a rexvp in harmony
with philosophy.
Unlike the Invective contra medicum, in the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia the
argument revolves more closely around the weaknesses of Aristotle's philosophy as an
ironical but effective means of dismissing both the charge of ignorance and the pretensions
of Petrarch's four Venetian friends. In the fourth book, Petrarch offered a detailed
explanation of the moral errors arising from their Aristotelianism. As we have seen in
chapter one, Petrarch argued that while Aristotle may have expounded the nature of virtue
admirably, he had failed to recognise the true happiness and had no comprehension of the
one God. This contention serves as the focus of the subsequent discussion.
Having castigated Aristotle for his ignorance of the vera felicitas, Petrarch pre¬
empted any accusations of injustice by pointing out that he willingly levelled equally
stinging criticisms against other august figures, and highlighted Cicero as a particularly
illustrative example. In Cicero's works, Petrarch was always delighted to find 'the height of
eloquence and a great abundance of eloquent language', but was severely disappointed by
the errors which he encountered.155 '[Cjoncerning religion in general and the gods in
particular,' Petrarch explained, 'the more eloquently [Cicero] writes, the more vapid I find
his old wives' tales about them.'156 On occasions, it is true, Cicero could write like an
Apostle in a manner pleasing to any Christian,157 but, Petrarch felt, nevertheless returned to
his errors like a dog to its vomit.158 Although it was possible to adduce numerous examples
of instances on which Cicero pointed towards the conclusion that 'everything we see leads us
to believe that God exists as the creator and ruler of the universe,'159 Petrarch lamented the
fact that he abandoned his near-Christian sentiments160 for a deplorably pagan polytheism.161
155 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 56: 'Adhuc tamen poetarum et philosophorum libros
lego, Ciceronis ante alios, cuius apprime et ingenio et stilo semper ab adolescentia delectatus sum.
Invenio eloquentie plurimum et verborum elegantium vim maximam.' Marsh, 272; trans. Marsh, 273.
156 De sui ipsiut et multorum ignorantia, IV, 56: 'Quod ad deos ipsos ... quodque omnino ad
religionem spectat, quo disertius dicitur, eo michi inanior est fabella...' Marsh, 272; trans. Marsh, 273.
157 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 60; Marsh, 274; De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia,
IV, 60-70; Marsh, 274-84.
158 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 75; Marsh, 288; c.f. Prov. 26:11; 2 Peter 2:22.
159 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 70: '... quamvis et sepe alibi et illic presertim plurima
studiose operosissima disputatione perstrinxerit, ad hunc ipsum finem, ut ex his omnibus que
videmus, esse Deum et factorem et rectorem omnium cogitemus.' Marsh, 284.
160 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 73; Marsh, 286.
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While they may not have matched Cicero's eloquence, the same - or worse - may be said of
many others.162 To Petrarch, the singular and unitary nature of the true God is manifestly
obvious,163 but yet the ancient writers wasted their rhetorical skill on the false doctrines of
numerous gods.164 Plato and his followers may be excused,165 but Pythagoras' notion of
metempsychosis,166 and the idea of the existence of countless worlds put forward by
Democritus and Epicurus167 are used as examples of the false philosophies propounded in
defiance of truth.
Petrarch's subsequent return to Aristotle's philosophy constitutes a continuation of
the same theme. Rather than concentrating on their relative erudition, the comparison
between Cicero and Aristotle concentrates on the content of their works. Notwithstanding his
own limited understanding of Greek, Petrarch conceded that Aristotle's written style was
supposed to have been 'sweet, copious, and ornate',168 and - avoiding a potentially weak line
of argument - implicitly juxtaposes his works with those of Cicero, which were occasionally
capable of expressing truths pleasing to the Christian reader. Professing that he had read all
of Aristotle's works on ethics, Petrarch sharpened the criticisms already made by
distinguishing between knowledge and love, and between understanding and volition.169
Petrarch did not deny that Aristotle could teach the nature of virtue, but contended that
reading his works offered us
none of those exhortations, or only a very few, that goad and inflame our minds
to love virtue and hate vice. Anyone looking for such exhortations will find
them in our Latin authors, especially in Cicero and Seneca, and (surprisingly) in
Horace, a poet coarse in style but very pleasant for his maxims.170
161 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 75-6; Marsh, 288.
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De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 84; Marsh, 294.
163 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 80; Marsh, 292.
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De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 8 Iff; Marsh, 292ff.
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De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 87; Marsh, 296.
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De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 84; Marsh, 294.
167 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 86; Marsh, 296.
168 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 105: 'Equidem fateor me stilo viri illius, qualis est nobis,
non admodum delectari, quamvis cum in sermone proprio et dulcem et copiosum et ornatum fuisse,
Grecis testibus et Tullio autore, didicerim, ante quam ignorantie sententia condemnarer.' Referring to
Cicero, De oratore, III, xxxv, 141; Marsh, 312.
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De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 107-8; Marsh, 314.
170 De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 108: 'Docet ille, non infitior, quid est virtus; at stimulos
ac verborum faces, quibus ad amorem virtutis vitiique odium mens urgetur atque incenditur, lectio ilia
vel non habet, vel paucissimos habet. Quos qui querit, apud nostras, precipue Ciceronem atque
Anneum, inveniet, et, quod quis mirabitur, apud Flaccum, poetam quidem stilo hispidum, sed
sententiis periocundum.' Marsh, 314; trans. Marsh, 315.
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This led Petrarch to ask rhetorically what would be the value of knowing what virtue is if
such knowledge does not make one love it, and serves as the immediate prelude to the
treatment of will and intellect at IV, 111 discussed in a previous chapter.
Although Petrarch praised the written style of both Cicero and Aristotle, his
comparison of the two was not intended either as a direct comment on eloquence or as an
endorsement of the erudition of Cicero, Horace and Seneca, but rather as a demonstration of
the fact that without an understanding of the one God, Aristotle's analysis of virtue was
incapable of urging the reader to love the good. Contrary to the interpretations offered by
Gray and Trinkaus, Petrarch's remarks in this portion of the De sui ipsius et multorum
ignorantia do not illustrate the superiority of eloquence over philosophy, or the association
between rhetoric and voluntas, but instead underscore the essentially Christian characteristics
of the true philosophy.
That is not, however, to say that the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia does not
contain telling comment on the relationship between eloquence and philosophy and, perhaps
unsurprisingly, this is intimately related to Petrarch's discussion of literary style and
philosophical merit in Cicero's writings. In castigating Aristotle's philosophy Petrarch
recommends the works of Cicero, Horace and Seneca as aids to the cultivation of virtue, and
highlights Cicero as being of particular value. While it is true that Petrarch praised his
eloquence in the highest possible terms, it is not possible to infer from this that Cicero's
erudition alone made his works useful to the Christian reader. Cicero's writing always
displayed 'the height of eloquence and a great abundance of elegant language,' but yet
Petrarch emphasised that this literary skill could be applied both to truth and to falsehood. In
the same way as Horace was praised in spite of his 'coarse style', it seems that in
recommending Cicero's works, Petrarch intended to distinguish between the style and
content of the exhortations 'that goad and influence our minds to love virtue and hate vice'.
Preserving the idea of eloquence as a tsxvtj, Petrarch simultaneously points to it having a
close relationship with the true philosophy to which Aristotle had been oblivious.
There was no doubt, of course, that Cicero was a pagan whom Petrarch could not
regard as Christian even in part. Those works which reflected his adherence to an ancient
polytheism were, as we have seen, almost painful for Petrarch to read. Perhaps the
unconscious recipient of God's grace, however, Cicero was nevertheless able to adduce
arguments which could be seen to support the Christian faith. Despite Cicero's Stoic
concentration on virtue as an end in itself, Petrarch was able to read his works almost
teleologically, and saw that they contained a love for virtue which was of value to the
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Christian reader and which could not be found in Aristotle's Ethics. Explaining St.
Augustine's acknowledgement of his debt to Cicero's Hortensius, Petrarch pointed out that
Although our ultimate goal does not lie in virtue, where the philosophers placed
it, yet the straight path toward our goal passes through the virtues, and not
through virtues that are merely known, I say, but loved. Thus true moral
philosophers and valuable teachers of virtues are those whose first and last
purpose is to make their students and readers good. They not only teach the
definitions of virtue and vice, haranguing us about virtue's splendour and vice's
drabness. They also instil in our breasts both love and zeal for what is good, and
hatred and abhorrence of evil.171
While Cicero remained in ignorance of the one God, Petrarch suggests that his celebration of
virtue and condemnation of vice could, as a result of their congruence with the true faith,
induce the reader to love the good. Indicating that virtue should not be idolised for its own
sake, Petrarch saw that Cicero's love of virtue could be read as lying on the path to the end
to which all Christians should aspire. It is this palpable love of virtue - not his erudition or
elegance of language - which allowed Cicero to be counted amongst the 'true moral
philosophers' and which appears to have underpinned Petrarch's recommendation of his
works as aids to the cultivation of virtue.
Although cloaked by Petrarch's dominant invective concerns, and shrouded by his
comparison of Aristotle and Cicero, the impression of the relationship between eloquence
and philosophy which emerges from the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia is consonant
with the mature expression of his views previously observed. Just as 'true moral
philosophers' should aim 'to make their students and readers good', the texts of which
Petrarch spoke most highly had as their object the inculcation of a love of virtue and a hatred
of vice. They sought, in other words, to persuade their readers. Although not unconnected to
the elegance of the language in which texts were written, this capacity for persuasion was not
reliant solely on eloquence, but rested most firmly on the foundation of true philosophy.
Christian truths - which had as their only object the one God, but which 'passe[d] through
the virtues' - were the proper subject of eloquence and texts which contained such messages
justly deserved reading, even if written by pagans who occasionally drifted into more
treacherous waters. Although the true philosophy was its most proper subject, eloquence
itself remained a tsxvtj, a mode of expression capable of communicating either truth or
falsehood. Rather than usurping its role, Petrarch saw that eloquence could work in harmony
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De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, IV, 110: 'Etsi enim non sit in virtute finis noster, ubi eum
philosphi posuere, est tamen per virtutes iter rectum eo ubi finis est noster; per virtutes, inquam, non
tantum cognitas, sed dilectas. Hi sunt ergo veri philosophi morales et virtutum utiles magistri, quorum
prima et ultima intentio est bonum facere auditorem ac lectorem, quique non solum docent quid est
virtus aut vitium preclarumque illud, hoc fuscum nomen auribus instrepunt, scd rei optime amorem
studiumque pessimeque rei odium fugamque pectoribus inserunt.' Marsh, 316-8; trans. Marsh, 317-9.
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with philosophy, and held up Cicero as the acme of this principle. Despite being a pagan,
Cicero had received both the gift of expression and the inspiration of the truth from God, and
thus stood in stark contrast to Aristotle, whose works - although well enough written -
lacked the necessary basis in truth.
5. Eloquence and philosophy: the heritage of Petrarch's thought
Despite their instinctive appeal, the interpretations of Petrarch's rhetorical theory offered by
Seigel and Trinkaus appear to merit revision. On closer analysis, the relationship between
eloquence and philosophy in Petrarch's works seems to display none of the tension so
critical to the most common readings of key texts. Rather than occupying a position of pre¬
eminence or offering superior access to moral truths, Petrarch saw eloquence as the natural
partner of philosophy. Far from being an entirely separate field of endeavour pursued for its
own end, eloquence was a re/vp which allowed the virtuous orator or poet to communicate
moral truths so that others might love the good.
While the notion of tension may require emendation, however, the suggestion that
Petrarch's understanding of the connection between eloquence and philosophy was based on
a Ciceronian model nevertheless retains a certain attraction. Although he was certainly aware
of later traditions, Petrarch's treatment of eloquence and philosophy seems to have a strong
parallel with arguments found in Cicero's rhetorical treatises, albeit not in the fashion
envisaged by many of the interpretations discussed earlier in this chapter. Like Petrarch,
Cicero saw an intimate connection between eloquence and philosophy and demonstrated that
they could in many respects be regarded as co-dependent. In the Orator, for example, Cicero
asserted that since the orator was required to speak in a wide range of circumstances and to a
variety of different audiences, the study of philosophy was essential to the practice of
eloquence.172 In the De oratore, Crassus explains that if an orator was to speak die natura, de
vitiis hominum, de cupiditatibus, de modo, de continentia, de dolore, de morte,' it was
necessary for him to have the solid understanding of these concepts allowed by the study of
philosophy.173 Explaining this view more fully, Cicero's characters express the need for
philosophical learning in terms of the obligations of persuasion. Since eloquence has the
power of driving an audience forward in any direction, it must be combined with the
172 Cicero, Orator, IV, 14.
173
Cicero, De oratore, I, xv, 67.
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personal integrity and wisdom which stem from philosophy; anyone without these will not
be an orator, but a madman.174
Although they each saw a certain connection between eloquence and philosophy,
however, the suggestion that Petrarch's understanding of the relationship was based
primarily on a Ciceronian model is not as strong as may first be supposed. In several
important respects, Petrarch's thought on this subject diverges from Cicero's rhetorical
theory, and the appearance of similarity is undermined by deeper points of disagreement.
Unlike Petrarch, Cicero's assertion of the co-dependence of eloquence and philosophy was
derived from a belief that rhetoric should serve the good of the res publica. In the De
remediis utriusque fortune, Petrarch warned that 'eloquium torrens ... et rapidum' should be
set aside for the good of the res publica, but never developed the point further.175 Indeed, this
is the only mention of the res publica in relation to eloquence to be found in his works: in
pointed contrast to later admirers of his writing, Petrarch pointedly avoided ascribing a civic
function to eloquence and often scorned the use of oratorical skills for public functions, such
as pleading cases in court.176 Eloquence - connoting both poetry and prose - served only to
make men love the good for the sake of their own moral standing and the justified Christian
glory of the orator. For Cicero, however, eloquence - understood merely in terms of its
application to oratory - was to be connected with philosophy because of the service that can
be done for the res publica. Indeed, it is only because of the good which can accrue to the res
publica that Cicero seemed to connect eloquence with wisdom at all. 'Wisdom without
eloquence,' he wrote in the De inventione, 'does little to benefit states, but eloquence without
wisdom does too much harm and is never advantageous.'177
As a result of their divergence over the end of eloquence, Cicero and Petrarch also
differed over the meaning of the philosophy which is associated with eloquence, and over the
role of truth. For Petrarch, the belief that eloquence should take the Christian truths of moral
philosophy or theology for its subject was inextricably bound up with the suggestion that
eloquence should aim to inculcate a love of the good in others. Although pagan authors like
Cicero had expressed truth as a result of the action of grace, there was no doubt in Petrarch's
mind that eloquence should be associated only with the one true philosophy which gave
access to truth, and that other, 'false' philosophies should be repudiated. Despite Seigel's
174 ibid., Ill, xiv, 55.
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De remediis utriusque fortune, I, 9: 'Gaudium: Eloquium torrens est et rapidum. Ratio: Haud
inepte quidam stulti atque improbi eloquentiam furiosi gladio equiparant: utrunque enim reipublice
expedit inermem.'
176 Sen. XVIII, 1 \Fam. XXIV, 3, 2-3. See chapter 3, above.
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Cicero, De inventione, I, 1; Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 101; G.M.A. Grube. 'Educational,
Rhetorical and Literary Theory in Cicero,' Phoenix 16 (1962): 234-57; A. Michel, Rhetorique et
philosophie chez Ciceron (Paris, 1960), passim.
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attempt to detect the faint trace of Academic scepticism in his works, the philosophy which
Petrarch connects with eloquence has a singular and unmistakable identity. For Cicero,
however, a sceptical approach was preferable precisely because of the orator's obligation to
speak in a range of circumstances for the greater good of the res publico.118 In the De
oratore, Crassus argues that the orator's task is to convince, and points out that this requires
him to examine the detail of whatever matter is being discussed.179 Antonius, however,
challenges this view, claiming that the orator is a specialist and cannot hope to acquire the
universal knowledge that he presumes Crassus has recommended.180 In the second day's
debate, Crassus affirms that the orator should be able to adopt any position in the hope of
ultimately uncovering the truth. The notion that truth could be revealed from any perspective
the orator might be obliged to adopt colours Cicero's understanding of the philosophical
learning appropriate to the practice of eloquence. Surveying the various philosophical
schools of Antiquity while considering a rhetorical education, therefore, Crassus states that
his object is not to discover which was the truest, but which was the most appropriate to the
orator181 and, while advocating the necessity of a broad education, highlights Academic
scepticism as being of particular value. As an ironist, Socrates is held up for particular praise
and Crassus lauds his capacity to speak from a range of different perspectives in the hope of
uncovering the truth.182
Petrarch's distance from Cicero is further evidenced by his striking lack of interest in
the technical aspects of eloquence and, especially in his later writings, prioritisation of the
orator's own moral condition. In the De remediis utriusque fortune, it has been noted that
Petrarch attached more importance to the cultivation of virtue than to the inculcation of rules
in describing the education of the orator. Although this reflects his more general disinterest
in the divisions of oratory and preoccupation with the capacity of eloquence to communicate
virtue, it constitutes a divergence from Cicero's rhetorical theory. While Cicero had stressed
that it was necessary for the orator to be well-versed in the virtues,183 Winterbottom has
rightly observed that 'there is no doubt that [he] was not primarily concerned with the moral
aspect.'184 Throughout his works, Cicero devotes considerable time and energy to examining
178 On the role of truth in Cicero's understanding of philosophical learning, see, for example, A.
Leupin, Fiction and Incarnation. Rhetoric, Theology and Literature in the Middle Ages, trans. D.
Laatsch, (Minneapolis and London, 2003), 1-10.
179
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the technical dimensions of eloquence and the difference types of oratory. Perhaps because
his understanding of eloquence was founded on a notion of civic duty, Cicero seems - in
direct contrast to Petrarch - to have believed that rhetorical rules were of more importance to
the training of an orator than the development of personal virtue. Whereas for Cicero the
application of eloquence allowed the assumption of virtue and required a thorough technical
training, Petrarch held that although rules may be easily acquired through reading and
imitation, virtue was hard-won and crucially important.
It cannot be denied that traces of Cicero's rhetorical theory can be found in
Petrarch's works, and the impact of texts such as the De oratore, the Orator, and the De
inventione can be observed in frequent quotations and moments of conceptual similarity.
Cicero himself figures not merely as a textual authority to be cited with a certain reverence,
but also as an occasional exemplar of the proper relationship between eloquence and
philosophy. Although he remained in dialogue with Cicero's rhetorical theory in describing
this relationship, however, it does not seem justified to describe Petrarch's thought as having
been based primarily on a Ciceronian model. Despite Cicero's importance as an authority,
the conceptual similarities which can be observed with Petrarch's thought on this subject are
not only superficial, but also outweighed by the many differences which divide them.
If Petrarch cannot be said to have been a Ciceronian, that is not, however, to say that
he did not make selective use of gnomic quotations and principles while drawing inspiration
from other sources, and Cicero's decisive influence on later rhetorical traditions must be
recognised in this regard. On the one hand, Cicero's association of rhetoric and philosophy
played an important part in the shaping of late Antique and Christian notions of eloquence,
while on the other hand, the respects in which Petrarch seems to have diverged most
significantly from a Ciceronian model reflect strands in the later use and development of
Cicero's thought. While Petrarch may not have based his understanding of the relationship
between eloquence and philosophy on a Ciceronian pattern, his thought evokes elements of
later rhetorical traditions which drew succour from Cicero's treatises and which continued to
view the De oratore, the Orator, and the De inventione as authoritative sources despite often
challenging the ideas they contained.
Numerous parallels may be observed between Petrarch's works and post-Ciceronian
rhetorical traditions. These parallels reflect both his capacity to reach beyond the confines of
Cicero's thought and the breadth of his reading in rhetorical theory. Texts from the late
Middle Ages have a place alongside those from Antiquity in his treatment of eloquence, and
Petrarch seems to have read many either teleologically or inventively. In some respects,
Petrarch betrays the influence of comparatively recent strands of thought and seems to show
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himself to have been capable of writing from within a distinctively medieval context. The
use of 'eloquentia' to refer both to poetry and prose, for example, is characteristic of
Petrarch's writings, but is unfamiliar to both classical and late Antique thought. Comparing
him to Lovato dei Lovati and Albertino Mussato, Witt has argued that Petrarch's conflation
of prose and poetry shows him to have abandoned the association of poetry with the
grammarian's art.185 This is consonant with changes in conceptions of poetry since the
twelfth century and constitutes a continuation of a medieval trend which, though ultimately
based on Cicero's works, came to reject his more restricted understanding of eloquence. For
figures such as Cassiodorus, 'poetry, considered as metric, was a part of grammar, while as a
form of argument, it was a part of topic or dialectic'186; by 1200, however, 'the art of poetry
came to be considered ... not a branch of grammar, but alternately a kind of argumentation
or persuasion ... and a form of composition.'187
In other resects, Petrarch's thought recalls traditions which developed in parallel to
Cicero's rhetorical theory and which were of considerable influence during the later Middle
Ages. The impact of these traditions can be glimpsed when looking at Petrarch's emphasis
on truth and on the moral character of the orator. In suggesting that eloquence was a mode of
communicating truth persuasively, he could draw on numerous sources for inspiration, and -
despite the 'Christian Cicero's' sceptical methods - was able to quote Lactantius with
particular effect. Boethius' De consolatio philosophiae, however, seems to have been of
especial importance to Petrarch, and his discussion of Lady Philosophy's Muses in the
Invective contra medicum is both effective and textually accurate. Boethius' treatise, of
course, was of marked importance during the later medieval period, especially from 1300
onwards,188 and it would perhaps be unsurprising for Petrarch to have drawn inspiration from
a work which was the object of intense study in the grammar curriculum.189 Indeed, the
intimate connection between eloquence and truth in Petrarch's thought seems to echo
attempts - frequently inspired by Boethius - to counteract Aristotelian conceptions of
rhetoric between the early twelfth and late thirteenth centuries. The disagreement between
William of Conches and Hugh of St. Victor over the role of truth in the relationship between
rhetoric and philosophy, to take one striking example, appears to recall elements of
Petrarch's use of Boethius in the Invective contra medicum.19° In his commentary on the De
185 Witt, Footsteps, 243.
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consolatio philosophiae (which was also one of the most widely-used glosses in fourteenth-
century grammar education), William of Conches - like Petrarch - maintained that
eloquence and philosophy were distinct enterprises which were nevertheless connected by
their common relationship to truth.191 Associating philosophy with wisdom, William held
that while philosophy could be thought of as the knowledge of truth, eloquence was the
knowledge of how to state truth appropriately. 192 A similar parallel can be found in the
works of St. Bonaventure. In a manner which again recalls part of the argument of the
Invective contra medicum, Bonaventure challenged St. Thomas Aquinas' view that rhetoric
was a part of logic by arguing that it could instead be thought of as a form of truth which
moves to love or hate, and which may be seen as an analogue, rather than a subordinate, of
logic.193
Petrarch's contention that the moral character of the orator was of essential value to
rhetoric does not have an immediate point of reference in Boethius or the tradition which he
in part inspired, but does call to mind Quintilian's treatment of the 'vir bonus dicendi
peritus' in the Institutio oratoria,]94 which was quoted with such approval in the De remediis
utriusque fortune. Petrarch may not have reproduced the details of Quintilian's argument and
avoided defending moral character from a political or civic perspective,193 but nevertheless
replicated the importance he attached to the orator's virtue and adapted it to a Christian
context. This association between eloquence and moral character was assimilated by later
readers of the Institutio oratoria and, having read their works with care, it is not implausible
to suggest that Petrarch may also have drawn strength from intellectual heirs of Quintilian
such as Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville and Fortunantianus196, and was in this regard at least
superficially consistent with a strand of rhetorical theory running fro late Antiquity to the
Christian Middle Ages.
191 C. Jourdain, 'Des commentaires inedits de Guillaume de Conches et de Nicolas Triveth sur la
Consolation de la philosophic de Boece,' Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque
Imperiale et autres bibliotheques 20 (1862): 40-82, here 72. For William of Conches' views on
eloquence, see, for example J. Cadden, 'Science and Rhetoric in the Middle Ages : The Natural
Philosophy of William of Conches,' Journal of the History of Ideas 56/1 (Jan., 1995): 1-24, and 10
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Notwithstanding the parallels which may be observed with Cicero's rhetorical
treatises, Quintilian's Institutio oratoria, and the debates surrounding the role of rhetoric in
the works ofWilliam of Conches and other medieval scholars, Petrarch's understanding of
the relationship between eloquence and philosophy was informed most significantly by St.
Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. Indeed, the respects in which Petrarch appears to have
been closest to classical texts such as Cicero's De oratore and Quintilian's Institutio
oratoria, as well as those in which he appears to have differed most significantly from their
arguments seem to correspond with Augustine's own attitude towards the rhetorical theory
of Antiquity, while the manner in which he evoked the spirit of medieval thought similarly
dovetails with the use later scholars made of the De doctrina Christiana.
That Augustine's treatise was a potentially attractive source for Petrarch's
understanding of the relationship between eloquence and philosophy can be gauged from its
object and influence. Begun in 395 (although not completed until 426/7), the De doctrina
Christiana was a product of Augustine's self-conscious need to bury himself in Scripture and
communicate its message to others. Its concern is to explain, first, how one could teach
oneself the truths of Christianity, and, second, how one could teach those same truths to a
congregation.197 Offering both an introduction to the interpretation of linguistic 'signs' and a
treatment of rhetorical training, it is perhaps best seen as a guide for preaching.198 As in so
many of his other works, Augustine drew heavily on the corpus of classical literature and,
especially in regard to the forms of eloquence described in the later portions of the text, it
reflects his early experience as a professor of rhetoric in Milan. Cicero's influence looms
large and there is much to lend credence to the view that Augustine appropriated Ciceronian
rhetoric for Christian ends, although - as Henri-Irenee Marrou has suggested - it would be
quite wrong to view it as a mere enumeration of Ciceronian ideas.199 This adaptation of
Ciceronian rhetoric to Christian ends was in later centuries to be of significant importance,
and the De doctrina Christiana was avidly read during the Middle Ages not merely as a
guide to exegesis and homiletics, but also as a valuable link between Christian teaching and
classical modes. In the last centuries of Antiquity, for example, it was used by Cassiodorus
197 R. P. H. Green, 'Introduction', in St. Augustine, On Christian Teaching, trans. R. P. H. Green,
(Oxford, 1997), vii-xxiii, here vii-viii. Quotations from the De doctrina Christiana will refer to this
translation, which will hereafter be designated as 'Green'.
198 There is some disagreement about how best to encapsulate the De doctrina Christiana, but the most
prevalent interpretation regards it as an introduction to homiletics. See, for example, Hagendahl,
Augustine and the Latin Classics, 2:565-69; C. Mohrmann, 'St. Augustine and the Eloquentia,'' in
Etudes sur le latin des Chretiens, 2 vols., (Rome, 1961), 1:351-70; J. J. Murphy, 'St. Augustine and
the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric,' Quarterly Journal of Speech 46 (1960): 400-10. For the
opposing view, according to which the De doctrina Christiana is seen as a description of a specifically
Christian culture, see, for example, Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 380-5, 506.
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and Isidore of Seville, and during the Carolingian Renaissance enjoyed great popularity
among figures such as Angilbert of Corbie and Hraban Maur.200 Similarly, Peter Abelard and
Hugh of St. Victor, in the twelfth, and Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century
enthusiastically mined the work,201 while in later centuries, the De doctrina Christiana was of
sufficient popularity amongst humanistically-inclined clergy that it was the first book of
Augustine's to have been brought into print.202
Familiar with the De doctrina Christiana,203 Petrarch was certainly aware of
Augustine's assimilation of classical thought, especially with regard to eloquence. As has
already been observed in relation to the Secretum, and as Carol Quillen has noted,204 Petrarch
signalled his appreciation of Augustine's use of classical literature in a letter to Giacomo
Colonna. Had Augustine not clung to ancient authors so readily, Petrarch asserted, he would
never have drawn so much material from poets and philosophers nor would he have
'embellished them with so many ornaments from the orators and historians.'205 At a
rhetorical as much as at a philosophical level, Petrarch was conscious that Augustine offered
a bridge between classical and Christian writing, and constituted a precedent for the free
adaptation of the literary devices and rhetorical theory of pagan authors to Christian
purposes. Looking to the De doctrina Christiana for inspiration, it would not merely have
been consistent, but also almost natural for Petrarch to have referred frequently and openly to
the rhetorical thought of Cicero and Quintilian, for example, and to have treated them as
venerable authorities despite the divergence of his own thought from the conceptual
structures supporting their works. Similarly, the use of the De doctrina Christiana as a
potential source would have offered numerous opportunities for exploring parallels with later
authors whose works drew on Augustine's treatise in a comparable fashion.
The proximity of Petrarch's rhetorical thought to Augustine's De doctrina Christiana
is evident when one examines some of the key features of the relationship between
eloquence and philosophy in the work of the former. Developing an association between
200
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eloquence and truth already explored in the Coronation Oration and the Africa, Petrarch had
connected a personal apprehension of virtue with a need to communicate truth to others in
his letter to Tommaso da Messina. As we have seen, he contended that the philosopher's
concern for the soul should be married with the orator's erudition of language. In this,
Petrarch indicates that eloquence should be regarded as a xt/vq which - although it could
also express falsehood - should be deployed to educate others in virtue, teaching the good to
be pursued and the evil to be avoided. Furthermore, in Fam. X, 4 and the Invective contra
medicum, the literary devices which could be used to ornament such exhortations to virtue
are implicitly paralleled with the recovery of Christian truths from Scriptural passages rich in
allegorical language. This image of eloquence as a Te/vrj used for Christian purposes, and
founded upon a personal understanding of truth which could be recovered through reading
echoes an identical belief underpinning Augustine's treatment of homiletic rhetoric in the De
doctrina Christiana. Indeed, it is perhaps with respect to the relationship between eloquence
and truth that Augustine differs most significantly from his classical antecedents.
A comprehensively-conceived work, Augustine's treatise was intended to explain
'the process of discovering what we need to learn, and the process of presenting what we
have learnt.'206 An understanding of Christian principles derived from Scripture precedes and
is tied to the exposition of those truths: for Augustine a correct understanding of exegetical
practices was the essential predicate of effective preaching. Acknowledging that Scripture
consisted of complex 'signs' which must be correctly interpreted before the truth could be
understood, Augustine dedicated the second and third books of the De doctrina Christiana to
an explanation of how these signs should be approached. In the fourth book, Augustine
turned to address the communication of truth and the connection between the forms of
erudition proper to rhetoric and the truth recovered from Scripture. Teaching, he explained,
had as its object the inculcation of a love of God and virtue, and employed eloquence as a
it/vr] tied to a concrete understanding of the truth rather than as an end in itself.207
Consisting of certain rules regarding the form of words, Augustine - like Petrarch - could be
used to commend both truth and falsehood,208 but should be deployed in pursuit of the
former rather than the latter. 'Who,' he asked, 'could dare to maintain that truth, which
depends on us for its defence, should stand unarmed against falsehood?'209 Challenging those
who espouse untruths, eloquence should be used to 'communicate what is good and eradicate
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what is bad, and in this process of speaking must win over the antagonistic, rouse the
apathetic, and make clear to those who are not conversant with the matter under discussion
what they should expect.'210 Theological truths were the proper subject matter of eloquence,
but at the nexus of the relationship between the two lay a personal understanding of Christian
truths. In describing this, Augustine remodelled Cicero's assertion of the need for wisdom in
a manner which chimes with Petrarch's appropriation of Ciceronian notions in the De
remediis utriusque fortune. 'Even those who believed in teaching the art of rhetoric,'
Augustine wrote, 'declared that wisdom without eloquence was of little value to society, but
that eloquence without wisdom was generally speaking a great nuisance, and never
beneficial.'211 Rather than being related to any sense of civic duty or Stoic conception of the
good, this wisdom was unambiguously Christian: 'the wisdom of what a person says,'
Augustine explained, 'is in direct proportion to his progress in learning the Holy
Scriptures.'212 The Scriptures, moreover, should not merely be understood, but taken to heart
and in the same way as in the De vita solitaria, Augustine argued that the moral life of the
orator was of crucial importance to his use of eloquence, for while the wicked man might
educate 'those who are eager to learn', 'he is useless to his own soul.'213 The life of a good
man could in a sense become a source of eloquence in itself.214 It was, Augustine believed,
possible to 'visualise it as wisdom proceeding from its own home (...a wise person's heart)
and eloquence, like an ever-present slave, following on behind without ever having to be
summoned.'215
Despite the absolute importance Augustine attached to the study of Scripture, he did
not deny that the works of pagan authors could be of great use to a Christian orator seeking
to communicate the truth. Classical literature would, he believed, repay the effort of reading,
and contended that it could be of value to the Christian student not merely as an exemplar of
rhetorical techniques, but also as a corpus containing laudable opinions. Although Augustine
enthusiastically appropriated and adapted Cicero's treatment of the three functions of
eloquence (to instruct, to delight and to move),216 and the three styles of rhetoric (restrained,
• 217 ■ * * 218mixed and grand), he shared Petrarch's un-classical disdain for the learning of rules.
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The De doctrina Christiana avoids the detailed discussion of rhetorical rules common to
classical treatises219 and instead advises that 'given a sharp and eager mind, eloquence is
picked up more readily by those who read and listen to the words of the eloquent than by
those who follow the rules of eloquence.'220 Classical works could be mined for valuable
lessons, and this was as true of moral philosophy as of the details of rhetorical rules.
Prefiguring Petrarch's defence of Cicero's works against the Aristotelianism of his four
Venetian friends in the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia, and recommendation of Virgil
and Homer in Fain. X, 4, Augustine admitted that works by pagan authors contained much
that was deplorable, but nevertheless recognised that by God's grace they also contained
truths consonant with the Christian faith. 'Like the treasures of the ancient Egyptians,'
Augustine wrote,
who possessed not only idols and heavy burdens, which the people of Israel
hated and shunned, but also vessels and ornaments of silver and gold, and
clothes, which on leaving Egypt the people of Israel, in order to make better use
of them, surreptitiously claimed for themselves ... similarly all the branches of
pagan learning contain not only false and superstitious fantasies and
burdensome studies that involve unnecessary effort, which each of us must
loathe and avoid as under Christ's guidance we abandon the company of
pagans, but also studies for liberated minds which are more appropriate to the
service of the truth, and some very useful moral instruction, as well as various
truths about monotheism to be found in their writers.221
It was their occasional monotheistic content, rather than anything else, which formed the
basis of Petrarch's defence of Cicero's works in the De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia,
and it is striking that, like Augustine, Petrarch anxiously excoriated those passages in which
Cicero returned to his pagan tendencies.
Deriving divine truth from Scripture, and valuable points concerning the rules of
eloquence and monotheism from the works of pagan authors, it fell to the Christian orator to
communicate a knowledge of and love for the good222 by making clear to the reader what
had previously been hidden from him.223 Although he had little concern for formal rules,
Augustine nevertheless held that this task necessarily obliged the preacher to make use of
different rhetorical devices. It has already been observed that Augustine adapted Cicero's
notion of the three forms of eloquence, but his sophisticated appreciation of Biblical exegesis
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led him also to place emphasis on other techniques available to the orator. In a manner which
recalls Petrarch's defence of allegorical language in the Invective contra medicum and
definitions of the task of poetry (with reference to Lactantius) in the Coronation Oration,
Augustine spoke highly of the benefits of using imagery. 'No-one disputes,' he wrote, 'that it
is much more pleasant to learn lessons presented through imagery, and much more
rewarding to discover meanings that are won only with difficulty.'224 What held for the
reading of Scripture also held for the explanation of its messages: for, as Marrou has put it,
'le style chretien sera done un style biblique.'225 Just as Petrarch believed that it was poetry's
task to reveal truth through imagery, so for Augustine, Christian teaching benefitted from
figural language both in the reading and in the retelling.
6. The place of eloquence in the context of Petrarch's moral philosophy
In those interpretations which have seen rhetoric as occupying a more exalted position than
philosophy in Petrarch's rhetorical thought, the practice of eloquence seems unusual and
even puzzling when it is set alongside his broader moral concerns. The elevation of
eloquence to the status of an end in itself seems to present Petrarch almost as a literary
dilettante: dedicated to the pursuit of a purely literary art, he would appear to have been
without a compelling reason to yoke his erudition to moral concerns, yet with an excuse to
indulge the inconsistency of which he has so frequently been accused by historians.
As the preceding analysis has shown, however, Petrarch seems to have understood
the relationship between eloquence and philosophy to have been characterised more by
symbiosis and harmony than by tension and conflict. Committed to the communication of
truth and bound up with the moral condition of the orator or poet, he saw eloquence as a
re/vrj which involved the use of figural devices, and allegory in particular, to impart the love
of the good more effectively. Moral truth was the proper subject matter of eloquence, and its
principles were, for Petrarch, understood through moral philosophy and the cultivation of
personal virtue through the reading of texts both Biblical and classical. As such, the practice
of eloquence appears as a natural continuation of Petrarch's moral philosophy and
throughout his writings there is a clear sense that the moral impulse which drove him to seek
after virtue and the love of God was the same as that which drove him to impart a knowledge
of and affection for the good to others in his poetry and prose.
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Although drawing succour from classical and medieval thought, association between
eloquence and philosophy in Petrarch's works appears to be a consequence not of a
burgeoning Ciceronianism that foreshadowed the rhetorical theory of the later Renaissance,
but of the careful study of St. Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. Exploring connections
with Cicero, Quintilian, Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville and others from within an intellectual
framework evocative of the medieval reception of the De doctrina Christiana, Petrarch
developed a distinctly Christian understanding of eloquence modelled after Augustine's
treatise. Taking from the De doctrina Christiana a distinctive emphasis on the importance of
truth to the function and practice of eloquence, Petrarch - like Augustine - developed a
rhetorical theory which, despite its willingness to derive valuable lessons from the pagan
classics, prioritised a consistent moral message and related the personal search for virtue to
the obligation to communicate the good to others in an appropriate form. In this respect,
Petrarch's understanding of the relationship between eloquence and philosophy is in keeping
with his broader assimilation of St. Augustine's thought. Having developed a coherent
programme of personal moral reformation which emphasises the rational extirpation of
worldly desires and the pursuit of truth under the influence of St. Augustine in the Secretum,
the De otio religioso and the De vita solitaria, it seems logical that Petrarch should have also
seen these works as a prelude to and realisation of a rhetorical theory also developed in St




This study has shown that, far from having adopted an eclectic and unsystematic approach to
ethical questions as a result of his humanistic and literary interests, Petrarch propounded a
coherent and consistent moral philosophy which embraced the abstract, the practical and the
didactic.
Portraying man as being caught in a bodily prison which left him prone to worldly
desires and despair, Petrarch described the means by which he could embrace virtue and
merit the vera felicitas that could be enjoyed after death in a cogent fashion throughout his
works. Accidia and desire - together with the sorrow they produced - were, for Petrarch, the
consequence of an incorrect voluntas which stemmed from an attempt to find happiness in a
temporal world that was continually shifting and unstable. This voluntas, however, was itself
the consequence of a forgetfulness of the identity of the one true happiness, and an ignorance
of man's true nature. The vera felicitas was only to be found in the company of God after
death, and the realisation of this fact was intimately connected with a love of the divine, the
pursuit of virtue and the contempt for worldly things. As Petrarch explained in the Secretion,
earthly desires and despair could only be cast off, and a love of God fostered through a
meditation on death and the application of reason. By meditating on his own mortality, a
man would come to appreciate the foolishness of seeking happiness in a world which was
always subject to death, decay and the fickleness of fortune. By applying the gift of reason,
he would come to realise the truth of his own nature, a truth which affirmed that happiness
could consist only in the eternal. Abandoning worldly desires and recognising his own true
nature, a man would come to orient himself towards God and will only the good. This was
not to diminish the role of grace or the power of prayer. For Petrarch, rational self-
transformation worked in co-operation both with God's grace and the efficacy of prayer.
Man's struggle for virtue operates within the context of grace, while prayer performed the
important role of strengthening his resolve in an arduous and sometimes lonely quest.
Turning from an abstract consideration of virtue to a more practical philosophy of
living, Petrarch used the terms 'otium' and 'solitudo' to describe the virtuous life. In the De
otio religioso, Petrarch considered the same threats to happiness and virtue as in the
Secretum, but using imagery drawn from a long heritage of Christian ascetic thought on the
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'Three Enemies of Man'. As a response to the 'wiles of demons', the 'snares of the world'
and the 'lures of the flesh', otium embodied the moral programme which the Secretum was
intended to inculcate and - in addition to a form of salutary reading - was founded on the
belief that man could come to an understanding of his true nature through rational self-
examination and reflection on the fleetingness of the corporeal world. Otium, indeed, could
be thought of as a form of active leisure in that, while it required sincere intellectual effort, it
entailed repose from the accidia and desire which produced sorrow, and a mens quieta which
was able to 'see' God clearly. Although again expressed in different terms, solitudo was
similarly an emblem for the life of virtue envisaged in the Secretum. Carefully distinguished
from the solitudo loci and the solitudo temporis in the De vita solitaria, the true form of
solitude - the solitudo animi - was an intellectual concept more than a description of a
physical condition, and involved a freedom from the desire to involve oneself in res aliena.
Noting the restlessness, unhappiness and despair to which the occupatus was prey, Petrarch
saw solitudo - like otium - as a vacatio a mendacibus, and connected it not only with
meditation, prayer and study, but also with the rational pursuit of self-knowledge while
making extensive use of landscape imagery to reflect the peace which resulted.
An integral part of both otium and solitudo, friendship was for Petrarch a vital
component of the life of virtue and could be understood as an expression of virtuous living.
A function of Christian amor, friendship was presented as having been the consequence of
the love which arose out of an orientation of the self towards God. Like otium and solitudo, it
necessarily involved the pursuit of self-knowledge and a scorn for the blandishments of the
corporeal world, but was an interpersonal manifestation of a deeply personal moral quest.
Although the love of God obliged one to love humanity as a whole, Petrarch saw that the
cultivation of a few friendships could serve both as an aid to, and as an expression of virtue.
Despite the fact that they have frequently been presented as having been in tension,
Petrarch saw eloquence as the counterpart of moral philosophy and envisaged rhetoric -
which embraced both prose and poetry - as an essentially didactic tool that could be used to
communicate the moral truths which he had explored personally for the benefit of others. A
TE'/vq rather than an end in itself, Petrarch recognised that eloquence involved the use of
certain figural devices, but most properly took moral truth for its subject. Having engaged in
the practice of moral philosophy himself, and having studied Biblical and classical texts with
care, the orator could use his craft to inculcate in others a love for virtue and a hatred of vice.
Seeking to impart an understanding of virtue, eloquence, moreover, was not merely attached
to the orator's personal apprehension of moral philosophy, but was in many senses also an
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obligation imposed by the orator's virtue. Thus eloquence became both the medium for
Petrarch's moral philosophy and an expression of his own search for virtue.
Although Petrarch made frequent use of the works of classical authors ranging from
Cicero and Seneca to Virgil and Horace, this study has also demonstrated that the conceptual
foundations of his moral philosophy was based on a Christian theology derived principally
from the writings of St. Augustine. Rather than using such works as Cicero's Tusculan
disputations and Seneca's Epistolae morales as repositories of a philosophy the precepts of
which could be reproduced uncritically, Petrarch employed selective quotations in a gnomic
fashion, and appropriated imagery in a similar manner. Recognising that St. Augustine
himself had been heavily influenced by his knowledge of ancient thought - particularly
Cicero's Hortensius - Petrarch found in Augustine's works a precedent for integrating
references drawn from classical literature into the framework of Christian moral theology.
From works such as the De vera religione and the Soliloquies, Petrarch derived an
understanding of the opposition of the fleeting temporal world and the enduring truth of the
eternal, and an appreciation of the role of reason in determining virtue. In contrast to St.
Augustine's later, more fideistic writings, these works illustrated that while man was
continually drawn towards temporalities which could lead only to sorrow and dissatisfaction,
he possessed the capacity to orient himself towards God and merit the one true happiness by
recognising the inadequacy of the corporeal world and by using the divine gift of reason to
unveil the truth which resided within him. Using language which shared much in common
with Stoic philosophy, despite its renunciation of voluntarism and scepticism, Augustine's
early works provided Petrarch with a model for the role accorded to reason and the meditatio
mortis in the Secretum, while at the same time allowing the possibility for classical quotation
without fear of inconsistency.
Petrarch carried Augustine's early emphasis on reason and the transience of worldly
things into his treatment of otium and solitudo. Despite appropriating medieval tropes - such
as the 'Three Enemies of Man' and the imagery of asceticism inherited from the Desert
Fathers - in the De otio religioso, and employing classical motifs - such as the opposition of
the occupatus and solitarius, and the contrast between rus and urbs - in the De vita solitaria,
Petrarch appears to have modelled the two concepts after Augustine's notion of vacatio.
Each involving activities which bear the hallmarks of later traditions, Petrarch nevertheless
invested both otium and solitudo with the essential characteristics of Augustine's early
theology. Means of conceiving of the virtuous life, otium and solitudo were also a freedom
from cares in that they required the intellectual negation of desire and orientation of the self
towards God in the same way as for vacatio in St. Augustine's works.
205
Similarly, Petrarch's conception of friendship bears similarities with classical - and
especially Ciceronian - notions of amicitia. As this study has demonstrated, however,
Petrarch seems to have read classical texts not as archetypes, but as pointing towards a
Christian understanding of the concept, and as mines of convenient literary allusions.
Despite often using the language of Ciceronian amicitia, a close analysis of the texts reveals
that Petrarch's friendship was characterised by a reorientation of the word amor which was
deeply Christian. Viewing amor in a manner strongly evocative of St. Augustine's theology,
while also evoking the spirit of medieval monastic thought, Petrarch successfully integrated
amicitia into the framework of a moral system which depended on the rational extirpation of
worldly desires and the pursuit of divine knowledge, and made the cultivation of close
friendships a greater moral obligation than it was for Cicero or Seneca.
Petrarch's appropriation of St. Augustine's thought, and recognition of the scope
which it allowed for the exploration and use of classical literature is perhaps most strongly
evident in his understanding of the relationship between eloquence and moral philosophy.
Despite claims that Petrarch's conception of this relationship was based on a Ciceronian
model and prioritised eloquence over philosophical consistency, his emphasis on truth and
the moral condition of the orator, as well as his apparent disregard for rhetorical
technicalities in education sets him apart from classical thought. Parallels can, of course, be
drawn between elements of his concept of eloquence and rhetorical theories developed by
figures such as Cicero, Quintilian and Boethius, and points of similarity can also be observed
with later medieval traditions, but the co-dependence of eloquence and moral philosophy in
Petrarch's thought, combined with the greater importance attached to the orator's inculcation
of virtue than his understanding of rules seem to mark Petrarch's thought out as having been
influenced most strongly by a reading of St. Augustine's De doctrina Christiana. Offering
Petrarch a model for recommending both Biblical study and the reading of classical texts, the
De doctrina chrisiana also allowed him the possibility to present eloquence as an integral
part of a system of moral theology in which truth and virtue co-existed.
The re-evaluation of Petrarch's moral philosophy, and its debt to St. Augustine's
theology, which this study has offered has a number of important implications for our
understanding of Petrarch's life and of the intellectual development of the Renaissance more
generally.
In that Petrarch can be shown to have engaged more systematically with moral
philosophy than previously supposed, it seems reasonable to suggest that the trajectory of his
intellectual development would merit re-examination. The notion that Petrarch experienced a
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'crisis' based on a shift in his philosophical orientation during the 1340s is, as we have seen,
integral not only to many biographical studies, but also to the many attempts which have
been made to reconstruct the chronology of his writings and the compositional layers within
certain works. The concept of 'crisis' is, however, significantly challenged by the suggestion
that Petrarch propounded a coherent moral philosophy under the influence of St. Augustine.
Although this perhaps makes Petrarch's habit of continually revising his works more
pertinent a consideration, the greater consistency which many seem to express appears to
indicate that it might be more appropriate to speak of a gradual change in emphasis, rather
than of a radical shift occasioned by the rediscovery of particular texts when adopting a
biographical perspective. By the same token, the importance of certain events - particularly
the rediscovery of Cicero's letters to Atticus in the library of Verona Cathedral - and the
manner of reading classical texts, may also merit reconsideration. From a more philological
perspective, the dating of works in relation to a supposed intellectual crisis involving a
transition from one philosophical outlook to another appears to be brought into question by
the consistency of Petrarch's moral philosophy. This applies particularly to a number of
letters in the Familiares which have been thought to communicate either Stoical or fideistic
viewpoints, and to several of the poems in the Canzoniere, but relates most particularly to
the Secretum. As has been demonstrated, most recent attempts to date the Secretum have
relied on identifying compositional layers in the text and relating them to particular
conceptions of 'crisis'. Having demonstrated that the passages supposed to demonstrate a
later, Stoical pattern of thought can be viewed as consistent with a prevailing early-
Augustinian theology, however, the identity of compositional layers and the nature of
Petrarch's revisions seems to be brought into question. Together with problems which
surround several of the letters and poems used for comparison by those such as Baron and
Rico, it seems that the Secretum would reward further analysis.
Petrarch's persistent reputation as the 'first modern man,' and as a figure of
tremendous importance to the beginnings of the Renaissance are similarly brought into sharp
focus by this study. Where he is viewed less as an uncritical humanistic aphorist in ethical
matters and more as a systematic moral philosopher writing under the influence of St.
Augustine, Petrarch's position in historical thought may raise some questions both about the
nature of the interface between the 'Middle Ages' and the Renaissance, and about the
identity and development of humanism in Italy. Although Petrarch's intense interest in
classical literature and deep involvement in philological enterprises are beyond question, his
use of Augustinian theology and exploitation of resonances between Christian thought and
ancient writings seems to pose a challenge to attempts to present him as having helped to
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usher in an intellectual outlook at variance with earlier traditions, and to the meaning which
is attached to his humanism. If the Christian content of his thought may be seen as having
been much greater and more systematically applied than previously supposed, and his
relationship with classical texts more literary than conceptual, how significant was his use of
classical literature, and how different was his intellectual outlook from previous centuries?
By the same token, the Augustinian roots of his thought seem to raise issues connected with
Petrarch's reception in later centuries. We have already seen that many of his contemporaries
and near-contemporaries in Italy and beyond recognised and appreciated Petrarch's attempts
to propound a coherent moral philosophy in a Christian mould, but - having reconstructed
his thought - it is reasonable to ask how far that philosophical programme was understood
and reproduced. The manner in which Petrarch's moral philosophy was read seems to offer
an intriguing opportunity to trace moments of continuity and discontinuity in the works of
later humanists such as Coluccio Salutati, and in the emergence of such genres as villa
literature, which tended to address themes - such as solitude - which had been of such
importance to Petrarch. Similarly, where Petrarch's debt to St. Augustine's early works is
acknowledged, it seems not invalid to question how strong an influence this had, and - given
some of the Platonic and neo-Platonic resonances of his thought - it would certainly not be
unjust to examine the heritage of his thought in the development of later, more explicitly
Platonic forms of theology in the works of such figures as Marsilio Ficino.
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Appendix
A comparison of Petrarch, remediis
utriusque fortune, I, 69 and Cicero,
Tusculan Disputations
Petrarch Cicero
Ratio: Est hoc quidem de quo multa dici
possint; et quando hue me trahis, insistam.
Inter multas, fateor, mira hec amantium
amentia, non solum apud vulgus, ubi,
consuetudine in naturam versa, furor omnis
excusabilis, sed apud utriusque lingue
doctissimos. Nam et poetas Graiorum et
vestros quedam de alienis, multa de suis
amoribus plausibiliter conscripsisse
compertum est; atque unde morum
infamiam merebantur, eloquentie gloriam
consecutos.
Tolerabilior apud illos Sappho: etas, sexus,
animi levitas, puellam excusant.
Petrarch's reference to Sappho has no parallel in Cicero's original, but this is perhaps not
unexpected given the poets mentioned in the following sentences. Petrarch was certainly
aware of Sappho's place in the history of Greek love poetry (q.v. Fam. XXI, 8, 6) and may
also have known from Ovid that her influence on Alcaeus was considerable, (q.v. Ovid,
Heroides, XV, 29-30). Carraud (2: 322) also identifies Horace, Odes, II, xiii, 30-34 as a
possible source on the grounds that 'e'est Horace qui qualifie Sappho de toute jeune femme
(puellaY. This passage is again recommended by the pairing of Sappho and Alcaeus,
although it lacks the detail which Ovid provides. The fact that Petrarch excuses only Sappho
from amongst the Greek poets is, however, perhaps a little surprising. In the De otio
religioso, for example, Homer and Menander are set alongside Virgil and Terence (De otio,
I, 8) and Petrarch can think of almost no praise too high for Homer in a letter to Nicholas
Sygeros on 10th January 1354 {Fam. XVIII, 2, 10-12; see also Fam. XXIV, 12). The absence
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of Homer, Menander, Euripides and others might be explained by the conjecture that, unlike
Cicero, Petrarch intended lpoetas Graiorum' to refer only to love poets.
Sed quid Anacreonti facias? Quid Alceo?
Quorum uterque non poeta modo insignis,
sed vir fortis et rebus gestis in sua republica
clarus fuit.
[IV, xxxiii, 71] Fortis vir in sua re publica
cognitus quae de iuvenum amore scribit
Alcaeus/ Nam Anacreontis quidem tota
poesis est amatoria.
Petrarch's conflation of Alcaeus and Anacreon - via 'uterque'- is slightly puzzling,
especially as Cicero's original quite clearly indicates that 'fortis vir in sua re publico' refers
only to Alcaeus, who was closely involved in the politics of Lesbos. There is no possibility
that a true redaction of Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 71 could yield Petrarch's implied assertion that
Anacreon was also involved in public affairs. It is tempting to suggest that this apparent error
could be explained as a quotation from memory, but this seems unlikely.
Seu quid ex vestris Ovidio, Catullo,
Propertio, Tibullo, quorum nullum ferme
nisi amatorium est poema?
[IV, xxxiii, 71] Maxime vero omnium
flagrasse amore Rheginum Ibycum apparet
ex scriptis.
Here, Ovid, Catullus, Propertius and Tibullus obviously stand in place of Ibycus of Rhegium,
and mark a transition from Greek to Latin poets not found in Tusc. (Cicero's earlier
quotations from Caecilius and Apollonius of Rhodes at IV, xxxii, 68-9 indicate a blurring of
the distinction between the two, and permit him to keep the focus of his attack on Greek
modes.) Although Ratio's later remarks are dominated by references to Plato culled from
Aulus Gellius, Petrarch's decision to diverge from Cicero's original is comprehensible in
that it allows him not merely to repeat a familiar statement on Latin love poets (c.f. Fam. IX,
4, 14, noting the order) on the basis of knowledge, but also permits him to group classical
paganism under one heading. To have continued with Cicero's Hellenistic focus would
perhaps have opened Petrarch to accusations of imitation without understanding and of
implicitly excusing the Latin love poets.
Petrarch's continuation of Cicero's theme - albeit with a Latin twist - may suggest
that he was perhaps not quoting from memory, but following the text of Tusc. carefully and
deliberately. The inclusion of the phrase 'nisi amatorium est poema\ which mirrors Cicero's
'tota poesis est amatoria' in the previous sentence of Tusc., seems to add weight to this
argument, but infers either a hasty and careless reading, or the use of a corrupt redaction.
Although it is not inconceivable that Petrarch inverted and replaced 'tota poesis est
amatoria' while using an accurate redaction of the text, it seems unclear why he should have
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felt the need to do so having so neatly repeated Cicero's reference to Alcaeus and Anacreon
and having at his disposal the perfectly serviceable lMaxime vero omnium flagrasse
amore...apparet ex scripsis' which could easily have been amended to apply to any of the
four Latin poets mentioned.
Quanquam quid poetas, quibus, nescio
unde, maior licentia data est, et non potius
vitae duces arguam: philosophos?
[IV, xxxiii, 70] Sed poetas ludere sinamus,
quorum fabulis in hoc flagitio versari
ipsum videmus Iovem. Ad magistros
virtutis, philosophos, veniamus, qui
amorem negant stupri esse ...
The connection between Petrarch's 'Quanquam quid poetas...'' and Cicero's 'Sed poetas
ludere...' is speculative, but is not implausible. In Cicero's original, the argument has a
repetitive quality. At Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 70, Cicero uses the remarks quoted above to signal a
transition from his discussion of the comedies of Caecilius and the tragic poetry of
Apollonius of Rhodes to a scathing but erratic treatment of Greek gymnasia, philosophers
and Epicurus. By Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 71, however, the focus returns to poets and 'Fords vir in
sua re publico...' Having drifted from his subject, Cicero is then obliged at Tusc. IV, xxxiv,
72 once more to redirect the argument towards philosophers, particularly Plato and the
Stoics. What Petrarch loses in textual fidelity in repeating '... poetas ... philosophos...,'
therefore, he gains in coherence and his argument proceeds neatly from poetry to philosophy.
This would seem to provide further support for the contention that Petrarch wrote this
portion of the De remediis, I, 69 with a copy of Tusc. to hand, although its quality is still
difficult to determine.
Ubi, hercle, gaudeas gravitatis multo plus
vestris fuisse quam grecis; vix enim
occurret horum aliquis tarn perditus, qui
non dicam tale aliquid fecerit, sed non
libere totum hoc vanitatis genus irriserit
atque damnaverit.
Apud illos, autem, non comunes quosque,
sed severissimos philosophorum stoicos,
ipsumque - quod miraberis - Platonem, in
hoc errore versatos scimus.
[IV, xxxiv, 71] Philosophi sumus exorti et
auctore quidem nostro Platone, quem non
iniuria Dicaearchus accusat, qui amori
auctoritatem tribueremus.
This sentence may pick up the commentary on Tusc. which Petrarch was obliged to leave
after 'amatorium est poema' for the sake of coherence. Having removed Cicero's
unnecessary repetition, it is perhaps understandable that he should return to the original.
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Although this is necessarily speculative, it is nevertheless striking that Petrarch's
'...severissimos philosophorum stoicos...' echoes '...philosophi sumus where 'sumus'
permits the liberal interpolation of 'severissimos ... stoicos' on the not implausible
assumption - aided by the potentially misleading 'quidem nostro Platonem' that Cicero can
be represented as one of their number. 'stoicos' may also anticipate the following sentence in
Tusc., beginning 'Stoici vero...'
Petrarch's 'in hoc errore versatos scimus' seems to lend weight to the contention
that this sentence is a reversion to Cicero's original, as it forms a not unlikely parallel to
'quern non iniuria Dicaearchus accusaf. In this case, it is worth noting that Petrarch
implicitly groups himself with Cicero and Dicaearchus, and thereby indirectly lends the
weight of authority to his argument, especially if he anticipated that a reader of this portion
of the De remediis would recognise the source and nature of his amendment.
Amaturum quidem sapientem volunt stoici;
et sane, si de amore conveniat, non
falluntur.
[IV, xxxiv, 72] Stoici vero et sapientem
amaturum esse dicunt...
The clear parallelism of 'Amaturum quidem sapientem volunt stoici...' and 'Stoici vero et
sapientem amaturum esse dicunt...'' lends weight to the suggestion that Petrarch's 'Apud
illos..: follows Cicero's previous sentence, 'Philosophi sumus...' It is striking that Petrarch
once again inverts the three terms borrowed most directly from Cicero's original, giving
'Amaturum... quidem... stoici' for 'Stoici...sapientem amaturum.' In this case, however, the
possibility of a corrupt redaction can be dismissed. Petrarch's inversion evidently represents
a conscious alteration in the emphasis of the sentence. Whereas Cicero's emphasis naturally
lies with 'Stoici', the nature of the discussion between Ratio and Gaudium makes it natural
for Petrarch's emphasis to fall upon 'Amaturum'.
To speak of a shift in emphasis is, however, to anticipate slightly. Given the
parallelism of these passages, it is of considerable importance to note the fact that Petrarch
deliberately makes use only of the first portion of Cicero's original sentence. This adaptation
allows Petrarch a number of rhetorical and argumentative opportunities. From a rhetorical
perspective, his decision to use only that part of Cicero's original with which some
agreement can be found allows him to extend something of an olive branch to that school of
classical philosophy with which some rapprochement might be possible, and permits the
appearance of balance and reason. From an argumentative perspective, the reconfiguration of
Cicero's 'Stoici ...sapientem amaturum' allows Petrarch to move the discussion from a
rather generalised survey of licentious love in the poetry and philosophy of Greece and
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Rome to a specific discussion of the nature of their error. The shift in emphasis from 'StoicV
in Cicero's original to 'Amaturum' makes the identity of 'amor' of primary significance and
places it at the heart of Petrarch's analysis. This single amendment allows Petrarch to adapt
Cicero's somewhat difficult and rambling passage to his immediate purposes, and brings a
precision to his argument which is lacking in the original.
Amabit enim sapiens Deum, ut dixi, amabit
et proximum, amabit virtutem, sapientiam,
patriam, parentes, filios, fratres, et amicos
et, si verus sapiens fuerit, inimicos etiam
amabit, non propter illos - fateor - sed
propter Eum qui hoc iubet.
This sentence represents the core of Petrarch's argument. The concentration on the love of
God necessitates the earlier shift of emphasis from 'StoicV to 'Amaturum and requires that
the question of the meaning of 'amor' is made plain in the preceding passages. Although
Petrarch's loyalty to Cicero in surrounding passages is striking, there can be no question that
this interpolation is intended deliberately to alter the semantic content of the terminology
employed in the gloss.
Carraud (2:323) alludes to Scripture in his analysis of the previous sentence,
although it seems more appropriate to note the connection here. 'L'ironie evangelique
viendra ensuite prendre le dessus ; cf Matth 5, 44 : Diligite inimicos vestros, etc.'
It is also worth observing that Petrarch's remarks in this sentence directly contradict
Cicero, De amiticia, V, 19: 'Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati...'
In his omnibus, oro te, quis locus est
pulchritudini? Sic enim in Ciceronis [IV, xxxiv, 72] ... et amorem ipsum conatum
Tusculano diffinitum legimus: "Amorem amicitiae faciendae ex pulchritudinis specie
ipsum conatum esse amicitie faciende ex definiunt.
pulchritudinis specie."
Petrarch here quotes the second half of 'Stoici vero et sapientem amaturum esse dicunt ...'
Aside from the rhetorical and argumentative value which accrues to his manipulation of the
first half of Cicero's sentence, Petrarch's use of '... et amorem ipsum...' signals a return to
the text in Tusc. IV, xxxiv, 72 and clearly marks the termination of an important
interpolation. Additionally, its position following the clarification of amor entailed by
'Amabit enim Deus' permits Petrarch to embark on a concentrated form of the criticisms
only implied by the earlier discussion of poetry.
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Quis tam cecus, ut non videat quid sibi velit
hec pulchritudo? Recte ergo querit illic
Cicero: "Quis est enim," inquit, "iste amor
amicitie: cur non deformem adolescentem
quisquam amat neque formosam anum?"
[IV, xxxiii, 70] Quis est enim iste amor
amicitiae? Cur neque deformem
adolescentem quisquam amat neque
formosum seneml
From the perspective of Petrarch's conception of friendship, this is an important passage,
since it indicates the importance of the notion introduced in the previous sentence. In moving
from Tusc. IV, xxxiv, 72 back to Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 70, Petrarch accords amicitia far more
significance than in Cicero's original and concentrates the focus of the discussion more
precisely.
Nimirum etas et forma cum delinimentis
suis sunt huius "amicitie" fundamenta, que
honestius sic dicitur quam "libido"; quid sit
tamen, apertis sanisque oculis facile
cernitur.
This fulfils two functions. (1) Having accorded the concept of amicitia greater significance
than in Cicero's original, Petrarch obliged himself to comment further. Cicero's 'formosam
senem' at Tusc. IV, xxxiii, 70, however, is followed immediately by a rather rambling
discussion of Greek gymnasia and a commentary on this would detract from the focus of
Petrarch's discussion. This stark opposition of 'amicitia' and 'libido' neatly summarises the
previous two quotations from Cicero. (2) The contrast between amicitia and libido represents
the distillation of Ratio's argument so far and sets the stage for more general conclusions to
be drawn.
'Apertis sanisque oculis'' is an interesting expression. Although Cicero, De amicitia,
VIII, 27 does use an allusion to sight, it would seem unusual if this reference did not pick up
Petrarch's earlier use of II Cor 4:18, with its apparently Augustinian overtones. It is also
worth noting the references to sight and 'healthy eyes' in Augustine's Soliloquies and
corollary references in the Secretum.
Itaque tota res eo redeat ut, si sit amor
quisquam in rerum natura sine solicitudine
turpique desiderio sine suspirio et ardenti
cura, sit hie sane permissus sapienti; "vacat
enim omni libidine," ut Cicero idem ait,
omnique tumultu atque angore animi, que
maxime sunt vitanda sapientibus.
[IV, xxxiv. 72] Quis si quis est in rerum
natura sine sollicitudine, sine desiderio,
sine cura, sine suspirio, sit sane; vacat enim
omni libidine...
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This sentence is interesting for a variety of reasons. Of most immediate concern is the fact
that Petrarch gives 'sit [hie] sane [permissus sapienti]'. Whereas Cicero's original ('so be it!'
in J. E. King's translation) makes 'Quis si ... sine suspiro' ironical, Petrarch's amendment
transforms the meaning utterly and has the effect of making the statement affirmative. If
there is a form of love which exists 'sine solicitudine...' etc., then it has been surrendered to
wisdom sane (reasonably, in accordance with reason). Although this is in itself not out of
keeping with Stoic philosophy - and it is worth noting that Cicero's original irony is
somewhat odd, even granting its undertone of pragmatism - it nevertheless contributes to a
generally Christian tone in Petrarch's text, as Carraud briefly notes (vol. 2, p.323), which
corresponds to the earlier interpolation 'Amabit enim Deus...' and has a parallel in the
Secretum. This can be seen further reflected in the insertion of the adjectives 'turpique' and
'ardenti'. Although these adjectives are perfectly valid additions to Cicero's original, they
are terms which, when used with 'desiderio, and 'cura' are redolent of the early
Augustinianism of the Secretum, where foul desires and ardent cares play a prominent role.
A more striking illustration of the moral theology underpinning Petrarch's amendment can
be found in 'omnique tumultu atque angore animi, que maxime sunt vitanda sapientibus'.
Again, neither 'tumultu atque angora animi' nor 'vitanda sapientibus' conflicts with
Cicero's Stoicism, but given 'Amabit enim Deus...' it is plain that the love without libido of
which Petrarch is speaking is identifiable with the love of God. In this case, the linking of the
'tumult and anguish of the mind' with lust in opposition to the love of God, and 'vitanda
sapientibus' with the amor Dei, it seems more reasonable to observe a parallel in the
argument of the first book of the Secretum and to posit an early Augustinian adaptation of
Ciceronian Stoicism underpinning this passage. Indeed, Petrarch's decision to attribute only
'vacat enim omni libidine' to Cicero seems to indicate an awareness that he was bending the
meaning of Tusc. IV, xxxiv, 72 beyond the limits of its author's original intentions.
It is important to note that following from the previous sentence, this reconfiguration
of Cicero's original has the effect of making that amicitia which is based on a correct
understanding of amor essentially an amicitia Dei.
From a purely textual perspective, it is curious that Petrarch should have inverted
'sine desiderio' and 'sine cura'. Given the close attention that has clearly been given to
Cicero's original wording, it seems unjust to accuse him of reading inattentively. Although it
is perhaps incidental, it is tempting once again to question whether Petrarch was using a
corrupt redaction of the text.
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Ceterum non ut fando rerum facies velari,
sic mutari Veritas rerum potest; sermo
autem nobis nunc non nisi de libidinoso
amore susceptus est, qui his multisque aliis
magnis malis vacare nullo potest modo. Et
hec quidem de stoicis.
[IV, xxxiv, 72]... haec autem de libidine
oratio est.
This signals the end of Petrarch's gloss on Cicero's text, and 'Et hec quidem de stoicis' acts
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